1 C3J/OA 2/2023 (“OA 2”) was an application by the Law Society of Singapore (the “Law Society”) for the respondent, Mr Cheng Kim Kuan (“Mr Cheng”), to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”). The Law Society also seeks an order for the costs of and incidental to the action, including the costs of the proceedings before the disciplinary tribunal (“DT”) to be paid by Mr Cheng.

2 The misconduct in issue arose out of a solicitor’s written undertaking dated 12 May 2021 (the “Undertaking”) that Mr Cheng gave to the Council of the Law Society and the Supreme Court of Singapore in which Mr Cheng undertook to be the supervising solicitor for a fellow solicitor, Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy (“Mr Ravi”). The Law Society alleged that Mr Cheng breached the Undertaking by failing to supervise Mr Ravi and to ensure that Mr Ravi abided by the conditions (the “Conditions”) imposed on the Practicing Certificate issued to Mr Ravi for Practice Year 2021/2022 (the “Conditional Practicing Certificate”). The Law Society further alleged that Mr Cheng’s breach of the Undertaking constituted breaches of rr 8(3) and 13(4) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”) and that amounted to: (a) grossly improper conduct in the discharge of Mr Cheng’s professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the LPA and (b) misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

3 Before the DT, the Law Society preferred six principal charges and six alternative charges against Mr Cheng. The DT found cause of sufficient gravity existed in relation to two out of the six charges. These were the first and the third charges and their alternatives.

4 Before us, Mr Cheng indicated through his counsel that he was pleading guilty to the two charges in question and was not contesting the DT’s finding that cause of sufficient gravity existed. We agreed with the DT that cause for disciplinary action existed in respect of the first and the third charges. We imposed a six-month suspension on Mr Cheng. We now set out the reasons for our decision.

5 The first and the third charges against Mr Cheng, which were framed in the alternative under ss 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the LPA, read as follows:

6 As the remaining four charges and their alternatives were no longer in issue, it is not necessary to set out these charges in full. In summary, these four charges concerned other alleged breaches by Mr Cheng of the Undertaking. For instance, his alleged failure to seek the leave of the Court to amend the Conditions imposed on Mr Ravi to practise only under Mr Cheng’s personal supervision and out of the office of Mr Cheng’s legal practice, K K Cheng Law LLC (“KKCL”). Another alleged breach concerned Mr Cheng’s failure to vet all correspondence, affidavits and legal submissions emanating from Mr Ravi and to scrutinise Mr Ravi’s caseload to ensure that he had the capacity to take on legal matters.

7 The facts in support of the charges were undisputed. We summarise them below.

8 Mr Cheng was admitted as an advocate and solicitor on 26 July 1997. At all material times, Mr Cheng was the sole director of KKCL, located at 101 Upper Cross Street #05-21 People’s Park Centre Singapore 058537.

9 Mr Cheng and Mr Ravi became acquainted with each other sometime in 2019. At that time, Mr Mr Ravi’s law firm was also located in People’s Park Centre. Mr Cheng would encounter Mr Ravi from time to time and they would engage in occasional small talk. On one such occasion, Mr Ravi informed Mr Cheng that he was to be reinstated as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore but was unable to do so as no lawyer was willing to stand as his supervising solicitor or monitoring solicitor. Upon hearing this, Mr Cheng offered to be Mr Ravi’s monitoring solicitor. This entailed Mr Cheng’s supervision over Mr Ravi’s consumption of his medications.

10 Sometime in December 2020, Mr Ravi requested Mr Cheng to be his supervising solicitor. Mr Cheng considered this matter over several months before agreeing to do so around April 2021.

11 On 12 May 2021, Mr Cheng gave the Undertaking to the Supreme Court of Singapore and the Council of the Law Society to be Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor. The terms of the Undertaking were:

12 The Conditions were annexed to the Undertaking and read as follows:

13 It was not in dispute that Mr Cheng had read and understood the Conditions. Mr Cheng also confirmed that he had agreed to undertake the role of supervising solicitor and he had understood that Mr Ravi would only be practising as an advocate and solicitor in KKCL under Mr Cheng’s personal supervision.

14 On 17 November 2021, Mr Cheng received a letter (the “17 November 2021 Letter”) from the AGC setting out various incidents concerning Mr Ravi’s behaviour and alleged misconduct in several legal matters in which Mr Ravi was instructed as a solicitor. The 17 November 2021 Letter also stated that Mr Ravi had published several social media posts where he made certain remarks and disclosed submissions that he had made in relation to ongoing legal proceedings in HC/OS 1025/2021.

15 The AGC then requested that Mr Cheng respond to the AGC by 5pm on 1 December 2021 regarding the following:

16 On 19 November 2021, Mr Cheng met with Mr Ravi (the “19 November 2021 Meeting”) and handed him a copy of the 17 November 2021 Letter, seeking Mr Ravi’s explanation as to its contents. Mr Ravi, however, did not provide any explanation. Mr Cheng further informed Mr Ravi that he would need to review their arrangement and to impose several conditions including the following: (a) Mr Cheng’s written approval would be required before Mr Ravi took on any legal matters; and (b) Mr Ravi was to refrain from further social media posts relating to existing and future legal matters while he practised under the name of KKCL. Mr Ravi did not agree to Mr Cheng’s requests. Mr Cheng then informed Mr Ravi to seek immediate approval to practise as a sole proprietor or in any other law practice of his choice.

17 On 24 November 2021, the AGC sent another letter (the “24 November 2021 Letter”) to Mr Cheng detailing a further incident involving Mr Ravi’s appearance in a video conference before the General Division of the High Court on 22 November 2021 and his confrontations with the High Court judge presiding over an action brought by drivers of SBS Transit Ltd (the “SBS matter”). The 24 November 2021 Letter sought Mr Cheng’s explanation by 1 December 2021 as to whether he was aware of Mr Ravi’s conduct in relation to this incident and asked for information in relation to the supervisory steps taken by Mr Cheng.

18 Mr Cheng forwarded the 24 November Letter to Mr Ravi in an email copying the Law Society and AGC and asked Mr Ravi to provide an explanation as to the allegations contained in the letter. Mr Cheng also provided a summary of the 19 November 2021 Meeting, highlighting Mr Ravi’s rejection of the additional requirements that Mr Cheng sought to impose on him. Mr Cheng repeated his request that Mr Ravi seek approval to practise as a sole proprietor or in any other law practice. Finally, Mr Cheng drew Mr Ravi’s attention to paragraph 14(b) of the Conditions, which stated that Mr Ravi could be asked to stop practising immediately if so directed by the Law Society or the AGC.

19 On 29 November 2021, the AGC sent yet another letter (the “29 November 2021 Letter”) seeking further clarifications from Mr Cheng on the following matters:

20 On 1 December 2021, Mr Cheng sent three letters to the AGC in response to the 17 November 2021 Letter, 24 November 2021 Letter and 29 November 2021 Letter (collectively, the “1 December 2021 Reply Letters”):

(a) The first letter contained Mr Cheng’s response to the 17 November Letter and stated that:

(i) Mr Ravi had sole conduct of all legal matters and court proceedings subject to instructions from his clients and that Mr Cheng was not involved in any of Mr Ravi’s matters.

(ii) Mr Cheng did not approve nor oversee the legal matters taken on by Mr Ravi as the latter was then an advocate and solicitor with around 25 years of experience.

(iii) Mr Cheng did not review the documents prepared, filed or sent out by Mr Ravi (such as letters, legal submissions, affidavits, and correspondence).

(iv) Prior to receiving the letters from AGC, Mr Cheng was not aware of Mr Ravi’s conduct of or his behaviour in the cases stated in the 17 November 2021 Letter nor was Mr Cheng aware of Mr Ravi’s social media post regarding one of the ongoing proceedings.

(v) Mr Cheng had informed Mr Ravi on 19 November 2021 of the conditions that are to be imposed in respect of his supervised practice but Mr Ravi rejected those requirements.

(b) The second letter contained Mr Cheng’s response to the 24 November Letter and stated that:

(i) Mr Cheng did not take any action in relation to the existing matters that Mr Ravi was handling and that Mr Ravi was at liberty to conduct the legal matters as he deemed fit, subject to his client’s instructions.

(ii) Mr Cheng confirmed that Mr Ravi had sole conduct of the SBS matter before the General Division of the High Court and that Mr Cheng was not aware of and did not participate in those proceedings.

(c) The third letter contained Mr Cheng’s response to the 29 November Letter and stated that:

(i) KKCL did not rent the High Street Centre Office; neither is that office registered as a branch office of KKCL.

(ii) KKCL did not hire nor employ any of the staff/interns working for Mr Ravi and that he was at liberty to hire and dismiss any staff /intern working from the High Street Centre Office.

(iii) The monies paid to Mr Ravi by his clients are deposited into KKCL’s office account with Mr Ravi’s clients’ approval. Mr Ravi would have to furnish the relevant Warrant to Act or Letter of Engagement, the accompanying receipts or invoices issued to the client(s) and a list of the monies paid by his client(s) to Mr Ravi each month before Mr Cheng disburses the money to Mr Ravi.

21 Mr Cheng also informed AGC in the 1 December 2021 Reply Letters that he had brought to Mr Ravi’s attention the 21 November Letter, the 24 November Letter and the 29 November Letter but no response was forthcoming from Mr Ravi. Mr Cheng also indicated that he did not wish to continue as Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor after the expiry of Mr Ravi’s Conditional Practicing Certificate at the end of March 2022.

22 On 3 December 2021, in response to the points raised by Mr Cheng in the 1 December 2021 Reply Letters, the AGC sought further clarification on the following points (the “3 December 2021 Letter”):

(a) Whether there was any supervisory arrangement between Mr Cheng and Mr Ravi.

(b) Whether Mr Cheng was seeking to withdraw his consent to act as Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor and to be released from his obligations under the Undertaking.

(c) The nature of the High Street Centre Office and whether there was any relationship between that office and KKCL.

(d) The manner in which monies paid by Mr Ravi’s client into KKCL’s office accounts were paid out to Mr Ravi, as well as any relevant documentation on these practices.

23 On 16 December 2021, Mr Cheng responded to the 3 December Letter stating:

(a) The terms of the parties’ supervisory arrangements were not evidenced in writing.

(b) Mr Cheng did not intend to withdraw his consent to act as supervising solicitor but he would cease acting as Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor when Mr Ravi’s Conditional Practicing Certificate expired at the end of March 2022. In the meantime, he was unable to personally supervise Mr Ravi’s conduct of his legal matters or his general conduct.

(c) Mr Cheng had visited Mr Ravi on three occasions at the High Street Centre Office but it was not to observe or to assess Mr Ravi in the course of Mr Ravi’s legal practice.

(d) Mr Cheng clarified that Mr Ravi did not hold any position in KKCL and that Mr Ravi ran his legal practice as a “chamber” under KKCL. Further, Mr Ravi devised and issued the letterhead, invoice form and receipt for his legal practice at the High Street Centre Office and Mr Cheng was not involved.

(e) Mr Cheng clarified that although KKCL had a client account, Mr Ravi’s client monies were not deposited into that account. Mr Cheng also provided details of the manner in which monies from Mr Ravi’s clients were paid out to Mr Ravi from KKCL’s office accounts.

24 Following the exchange of correspondence detailed above, the Attorney-General brought a complaint against Mr Cheng for breach of the Undertaking to the Council of the Law Society of Singapore pursuant to s 85(3) of the LPA. On 20 July 2022, the DT was appointed to hear and investigate the complaint.

25 In the proceedings before the DT, Mr Cheng claimed trial to all six primary charges and their respective alternatives. The key issues for the DT were whether: (a) the elements of each charge were made out; (b) Mr Cheng’s conduct fell within ss 83(2)(b) or 83(2)(h) of the LPA; and (c) cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed under s 83 of the LPA.

26 As the focus of OA 2 was on the first and third charges, it is sufficient for us to state the positions taken by the Law Society and by Mr Cheng with respect to these charges before the DT.

27 The gravamen of the first charge was premised on paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking which states that Mr Cheng “shall personally supervise [Mr Ravi]’s practise as an advocate and solicitor in [KKCL]”. The Law Society submitted that Mr Cheng had breached paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking by allowing Mr Ravi to have sole conduct of his own legal matters without any supervision on Mr Cheng’s part.

28 As for the third charge, the Law Society contended that Mr Cheng had breached paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking which states that Mr Cheng “shall provide to the [the Law Society] and [the AGC] a monthly report within the first working day of every calendar month … attesting to whether [Mr Ravi] has complied with all applicable professional conduct rules and that no complaint in relation to [Mr Ravi]’s professional conduct has been received”. The Law Society submitted that there was a clear breach of paragraph 2(b) on Mr Cheng’s part when he failed to submit the monthly report detailing his supervision of Mr Ravi for the month of November 2021 (the “November 2021 report”) by the stipulated deadline of 1 December 2021.

29 Mr Cheng contended that the elements for both charges were not made out. The gist of Mr Cheng’s defence for the first charge was that he understood his obligation under paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking as meaning that he had to exercise general oversight over Mr Ravi’s compliance with the PCR. Mr Cheng further argued that he had complied with this obligation through his handling of the monies paid by Mr Ravi’s clients as well as by arranging for the 19 November Meeting after he was aware of the 17 November 2021 Letter.

30 As for the third charge, Mr Cheng did not deny breaching paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking. Instead, his primary argument was that the circumstances had rendered it unnecessary for the November 2021 report to be submitted. According to Mr Cheng, the 17 November 2021 Letter had apprised all the relevant parties of the issues relating to Mr Ravi’s professional conduct. Mr Cheng therefore believed it was no longer necessary to file the November 2021 report since it would merely repeat the issues pertaining to Mr Ravi which were already known to everyone.

31 In its report dated 17 February 2023 (the “DT Report”), the DT determined under s 93(1)(c) of the LPA that the first and third charges were made out and that cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action to be taken against Mr Cheng:

(a) In respect of the first charge, the DT found that Mr Cheng made no attempts to supervise Mr Ravi. Mr Cheng knew nothing about Mr Ravi’s practice and had no idea what Mr Ravi was working on during the material period in question. Mr Ravi also did not operate out of the same premises as KKCL. Instead, Mr Ravi was given free reign over all aspects of his legal practice, including the freedom to hire his own employees. Mr Cheng’s complete failure to exercise supervision over Mr Ravi, contrary to his obligations under the Undertaking, would certainly constitute grossly improper conduct.

(b) In respect of the third charge, Mr Cheng’s failure to submit the November 2021 Report, despite the clear, unambiguous and unqualified obligation pursuant to the Undertaking, was a breach of the Undertaking. He “deliberately chose not to submit the November 2021 Report”.

(c) The DT was further satisfied that Mr Cheng’s conduct in relation to the alternative charges to the first and third charges would also constitute conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

32 The DT dismissed the remaining four charges and their alternatives as it was not satisfied that the Law Society had established sufficiently the requisite elements of the charges.

33 Pursuant to the DT Report, the Law Society filed OA 2 for an order that Mr Cheng be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA in respect of the first and third charges.

34 The Law Society did not dispute the DT’s dismissal of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth charges and their alternatives. Its position was that due cause in respect of the first and third charges was made out against Mr Cheng. The Law Society further submitted that suspension from practice for six to eight months was the appropriate sanction to impose on Mr Cheng for the following reasons:

(a) A fine was insufficient as: (i) public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession had been undermined as a result of Mr Cheng’s conduct; and (ii) aggravating factors were present in Mr Cheng’s conduct.

(b) A striking-off was not warranted as: (i) Mr Cheng’s misconduct did not render him unfit to be a member of the legal profession; (ii) Mr Cheng had not demonstrated any blatant disregard of the law or exhibited any predatory instincts; and (iii) Mr Cheng’s infractions were not so severe to have brought grave dishonour to the entire legal profession.

35 Mr Cheng, on the other hand, did not deny that the DT found correctly that the elements of the first and third charges were made out. Before us, his counsel indicated that Mr Cheng was pleading guilty to these charges. His counsel submitted that a fine was the appropriate sanction in respect of both charges as Mr Cheng’s breaches of the Undertaking were not deliberate but were ultimately a result of his “grave misjudgment”.

36 For the first charge, Mr Cheng argued that his breach of paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking arose from his erroneous understanding of the extent of supervision and was not a deliberate breach. As for the third charge, Mr Cheng argued that the breach of paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking similarly arose from his erroneous understanding regarding the need to file the November 2021 report. He had assumed that there was no need to file the said report as all the relevant parties were aware of the complaints made against Mr Ravi as set out in the 17 November 2021 Letter.

37 Mr Cheng also submitted that there were relevant mitigating factors to take into account. In particular, he did not receive any benefit from undertaking to act as Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor and his current predicament arose simply because of “his genuine desire to help Mr Ravi”.

38 Mr Cheng submitted, in the alternative, that a one-month suspension would be appropriate. He argued that the suspension suggested by the Law Society would be manifestly excessive in the light of the mitigating factors.

39 As Mr Cheng did not dispute that the two charges were made out, the sole issue for our consideration was the appropriate sanction to impose under s 83(1) of the LPA.

40 For completeness, we set out our reasons why we agreed with the DT that due cause was established on the facts.

41 Both the first and third charges and their alternatives concerned Mr Cheng’s breach of the Undertaking. The principles relating to a solicitor’s breach of his undertaking are well-established. The starting point is to appreciate the nature of an undertaking given by a solicitor. In Law Society of Singapore v Naidu Priyalatha [2022] SGHC 224 (“Naidu Priyalatha”), the Court (at [1]) described an undertaking given by a solicitor as:

42 In Re Lim Kiap Khee; Law Society of Singapore v Lim Kiap Khee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 398 (“Lim Kiap Khee”), the Court emphasised (at [21]):

43 The sacrosanct status of a solicitor’s undertaking is such that “the average person and even the court may rely on it without question” and a “solicitor should only give an undertaking with which she is able to comply. Once given, there is no turning back”. Accordingly, a breach of a solicitor’s undertaking will have to be “met with the strongest disapprobation from the profession” and not doing so would erode the trust and confidence placed on a solicitor’s undertaking: see Naidu Priyalatha at [32]. It will also give rise to a prima facie cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action: see Naidu Priyalatha at [40].

44 The first charge and its alternative alleged that Mr Cheng breached paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking by failing to supervise Mr Ravi’s legal practice as an advocate and solicitor in KKCL. It was not disputed that Mr Cheng allowed Mr Ravi to have sole discretion in the conduct of his legal cases, without any supervision by Mr Cheng. This included: (a) permitting Mr Ravi to take sole charge of his legal cases without observing or assessing Mr Ravi in the course of his legal practice and (b) permitting Mr Ravi to practise in a separate location at the High Street Office without any system of checking on him. Indeed, Mr Cheng conceded in the 1 December 2021 Reply Letters and before the DT that he did not exercise any supervision over Mr Ravi’s practice as a lawyer prior to the 17 November 2021 Letter. As the DT Report summarised at [98(a)], Mr Cheng “was happy to leave [Mr Ravi] to his own devices” and “knew nothing about what Mr Ravi was doing in his capacity as an advocate and solicitor”.

45 The evidence before us disclosed only three instances in which Mr Cheng was involved in Mr Ravi’s legal practice. The first concerned Mr Cheng’s management of the payment of monies by Mr Ravi’s clients into KKCL’s office account. This was the only positive and proactive step taken by Mr Cheng to supervise Mr Ravi’s legal practice. The other two instances occurred during the 19 November 2021 Meeting where Mr Cheng sought an explanation on Mr Ravi’s conduct stated in the 17 November 2021 Letter and then sought to impose several terms on Mr Ravi’s continued legal practice. These were steps taken by Mr Cheng in an attempt to address the complaints made against Mr Ravi. However, they were reactive in nature when his obligations in the Undertaking were meant to be proactive and preventive. In any event, these steps taken only after the alleged misconduct had occurred did not ameliorate the situation in any way as Mr Ravi gave Mr Cheng no explanation and rejected the conditions sought to be imposed. Mr Cheng made no further attempts to involve himself in a supervisory capacity in the legal matters that Mr Ravi undertook.

46 We therefore agreed with the DT that Mr Cheng’s conduct fell woefully short of what was expected of him under paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking. Besides the payment of Mr Ravi’s clients’ monies into the KKCL office account, there was simply no attempt by Mr Cheng to supervise Mr Ravi’s legal practice in any way. It was clear therefore that Mr Cheng had breached paragraph 2(a) of the Undertaking and, as the quoted authorities show, a breach of a solicitor’s undertaking would amount invariably to grossly improper conduct within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. We also accepted that Mr Cheng’s conduct would constitute misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the LPA. Accordingly, due cause was established with respect to the first charge and its alternative and Mr Cheng was wise in his decision to “plead guilty” to the two charges before us.

47 The third charge and its alternative alleged that Mr Cheng had breached paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking by failing to provide a monthly written report to the Law Society and the AGC for the month of November 2021 by the stipulated deadline of 1 December 2021. This was not denied by Mr Cheng who only argued that the November 2021 report was not necessary in the light of the 17 November 2021 Letter as all the relevant parties had been made aware of the issues relating to Mr Ravi’s alleged misconduct.

48 We agreed with the DT’s reasoning that Mr Cheng’s obligation under paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking was a strict one. The absence of any qualifier meant that Mr Cheng was required to file a monthly report by the stipulated deadline, regardless of the circumstances. If Mr Cheng had opined that the said report was not necessary in the circumstances that had taken place, he ought at least to have sought such confirmation from the relevant parties instead of making the determination unilaterally that there was no need for the report.

49 Mr Cheng’s failure to provide the monthly report to the Law Society and the AGC by the stipulated deadline therefore amounted to a breach of paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking. We were therefore satisfied that due cause was established in relation to the third charge as Mr Cheng’s breach of paragraph 2(b) of the Undertaking amounted to grossly improper conduct under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA or, alternatively, misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

50 Section 83(1) of the LPA sets out the sanctions that the Court may impose when due cause is shown. It provides:

51 When considering the appropriate sanction to impose in cases not involving dishonesty or deceit, the starting point should ordinarily be a monetary penalty: Law Society of Singapore v Tay Choon Leng John [2012] 3 SLR 150 at [59]. The existence of aggravating circumstances may then justify a departure from the aforesaid starting point and more serious sanctions such as suspension from practice or, in extreme cases, striking the advocate and solicitor off the roll may be justified: Law Society of Singapore v Chiong Chin May Selena [2013] SGHC 5 at [45]. A fine would also not be appropriate where the legal practitioner’s misconduct was not mere inadvertence: see Law Society of Singapore v Tan See Leh Jonathan [2020] 5 SLR 418 at [13].

52 With these principles in mind, we decided that a global suspension from practice for six months was warranted for the first and third charges. Equally, we did not think that a fine would be commensurate with the breach of the Undertaking on the facts of this case.

53 It is important to note why the Undertaking was necessary in this case. Mr Ravi had a psychiatric condition. As can be seen from the Conditions imposed on Mr Ravi, he was required to obtain and comply with medical treatment prescribed by a psychiatrist, to attend regular consultations with the psychiatrist for mental state reviews, to undergo prescribed medical tests, treatments and assessments in order to determine whether he continued to be medically fit to practise as an advocate and solicitor. Mr Ravi also had to consume medication prescribed to him by the psychiatrist. His condition was serious enough that a supervising solicitor and a monitoring solicitor were required to ensure his compliance with the Conditions. As counsel for Mr Cheng, Mr Ong Ying Ping (“Mr Ong”) acknowledged, the preventive and protective measures in the Conditions were essentially to ensure that Mr Ravi would be practising in a controlled environment.

54 We accepted that Mr Cheng’s obligation of personal supervision did not entail that he vet every court document or legal correspondence in Mr Ravi’s practice. We also accepted that Mr Cheng could not be reasonably expected to monitor every telephone call made by Mr Ravi. We also did not think the Undertaking required Mr Cheng to accompany Mr Ravi to every court hearing and every meeting with his clients outside the office. Such obligations would be unduly onerous on the supervising solicitor as they would effectively make him a full-time guardian to Mr Ravi in his legal practice.

55 However, Mr Cheng should apprise himself at least as to what legal work Mr Ravi had taken on and whether he was coping well generally. Personal supervision would be completely meaningless if the supervisor did not bother to know what legal work the supervisee was undertaking and how he was coping generally. In particular here, Mr Cheng had no awareness whatsoever of the legal cases that Mr Ravi had taken on or what documents he was dealing with. He was also unaware whether Mr Ravi had been appearing in court and whether there were any events of concern. As an example, paragraph 8 of the Conditions requires the supervising solicitor to notify the Law Society and the AGC if he becomes aware of any circumstances that may impair the fitness of Mr Ravi to practise as an advocate and solicitor or which may impair his professional judgment, including the refusal by the supervisee to consume prescribed medication. This cannot mean that the supervising solicitor can leave the supervisee to do as he pleases and only needs to intervene when he hears of trouble. Personal supervision must surely entail proactive steps on the part of the supervisor so that he is able to ensure that the supervisee is practising in a controlled environment.

56 Mr Cheng argued that Mr Ravi was a very senior lawyer and therefore should be able to handle his legal practice on his own. This implied that Mr Ravi needed no supervision at all in his legal practice. This begged the question why the Conditions had to be imposed on Mr Ravi and why Mr Cheng had to undertake the obligations of being his supervising solicitor. This complete failure to appreciate the seriousness of the Undertaking would also explain why Mr Cheng thought it fit, despite having undertaken to “personally supervise” Mr Ravi, “to leave him to his own devices” as stated in the DT Report at [98(a)].

57 On the issue whether Mr Ravi should be allowed to practise in a different location from Mr Cheng, our view is that, ideally, the supervisor and the supervisee should be located in the same office so as to facilitate communication and physical supervision. We accepted, however, that such an arrangement may not always be possible, bearing in mind practical constraints such as the available office space and particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic at the material time in 2021 when safe distancing might be advisable. These points did not appear to have been raised by Mr Cheng before the DT anyway. However, in a situation where the supervisor and his supervisee are not in the same location, it becomes all the more important that an arrangement be put in place so that the supervisor is able to check in on the supervisee at regular intervals. As was apparent on the facts here, Mr Cheng did not seem to have even thought about such measures although the supervisee was not even within his sight in the office.

58 On the evidence, despite Mr Cheng’s awareness of the Conditions and of his Undertaking as a supervising solicitor, Mr Cheng seemed to be concerned only with paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the Conditions regarding the handling of Mr Ravi’s clients’ monies and with paragraph 3 on his duty to provide monthly reports to the Law Society and the AGC. As Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor, Mr Cheng appeared oblivious to or indifferent to his obligation under paragraph 2(d) of the Undertaking to “take all necessary steps to ensure that [Mr Ravi] complies with all the conditions imposed on the Practising Certificate”.

62 When asked about this, Mr Ong responded that Mr Cheng had already informed the Law Society and the AGC and they could direct Mr Ravi to stop his legal practice. The point was that Mr Cheng could have warned Mr Ravi that he would not continue as the supervising solicitor if Mr Ravi remained intransigent in refusing the proposed conditions despite the complaints of alleged misconduct. This issue was raised in the 3 December 2021 Letter by the AGC which asked Mr Cheng to please “confirm our understanding that you are seeking to withdraw your consent forthwith to act as Mr Ravi’s supervising solicitor and consequently a release from your obligations” under the Undertaking (see [22] above). Mr Cheng’s reply on 16 December 2021 was that his intention was to cease acting as the supervising solicitor when the current practice year ended in 2022 “so as to avoid disruption to [Mr Ravi’s] practice”. This did not seem to us to be what a responsible senior advocate and solicitor ought to have done in the circumstances that prevailed then.

63  We also did not accept Mr Ong’s submission that Mr Cheng had adopted a “[sincere] and earnest attitude” in discharging his obligations under the Undertaking. It was apparent that Mr Cheng did not think it necessary to take any steps to supervise Mr Ravi because no incident or complaint was brought to his attention from April 2021 to September 2021. Mr Cheng was expected to take proactive steps to ensure that Mr Ravi could practise in a controlled environment so as to prevent untoward incidents from happening. He was there to help prevent fires but, unfortunately, saw his role as merely reporting fires when they occur.

65 Having considered the precedents relating to breach of undertakings by advocates and solicitors, we determined that a suspension of six months was the appropriate sanction to impose on Mr Cheng for both the first and third charges. In our opinion, a fine would not underscore the seriousness of breaching such an undertaking given to the Supreme Court and to the Law Society. At Mr Cheng’s request, we ordered the suspension to take effect from 1 January 2024 so that he could complete his outstanding legal matters. We also ordered Mr Cheng to pay costs of $12,000 inclusive of disbursements to the Law Society for the proceedings before the DT and before this Court.