1 The plaintiff, Ms Poongothai Kuppusamy (“Ms Kuppusamy”), was involved in a road traffic accident on 23 September 2017. She was 48 years’ old at the time. I found the first defendant, Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd (“Huationg”), to be wholly liable for her injuries: Poongothai Kuppusamy v Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd and another (Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Singapore, intervener) [2021] SGHC 108. The assessment of damages subsequently took place before me. I set out my findings below.

2 Ms Kuppusamy and the second defendant, Mr Guru Murti a/l Maheshrou (“Mr Maheshrou”), are Malaysian citizens. Huationg is a company incorporated in Singapore.

3 Beginning on 1 August 2017, Ms Kuppusamy was employed as a Security Officer by Eve3r Knight Consultancy Services Pte Ltd (“Eve3r”). ¹ Eve3r is a company incorporated in Singapore. It is in the business of, amongst other things, supplying its customers with “Security Officers” (ie, security guards). ² “Security Officers” must fulfil a range of duties, including dynamic (eg, patrolling) and static (eg, standing sentry) duties. ³

4 On 23 September 2017, Ms Kuppusamy was riding pillion on a motorcycle ridden by Mr Maheshrou, ⁴ when they were involved in an accident with a lorry driven by an employee of Huationg (the “Accident”). ⁵

5 As a result of the Accident, Ms Kuppusamy has suffered: (a) a below-the-knee amputation of her left limb; (b) injury to her left popliteal region, requiring a skin graft; (c) pain over her knee; and (d) lower back pain. ⁶

6 After the Accident, Eve3r paid Ms Kuppusamy her wages for September 2017, inclusive of overtime pay earned up to the date of the Accident. ⁷ Eve3r subsequently terminated her employment and she returned to Malaysia, residing in Johor Bahru. Ms Kuppusamy has received treatment in Singapore, at Tan Tock Seng Hospital (“TTSH”) and National University Hospital (“NUH”), ⁸ and in Malaysia.

7 Ms Kuppusamy remained on hospitalisation leave until January 2018. Later that year, she obtained her first prosthetic limb in Malaysia. This prosthetic limb was unsuitable. Consequently, Ms Kuppusamy sought a second prosthetic limb. Ms Kuppusamy's prosthetic expert, Mr Santosh Kumar Prasad (“Mr Prasad”), recommended her the “Microprocessor-Controlled Prosthetic Limb” (“MPCP”). After three months of training beginning in October 2022, Mr Prasad fitted Ms Kuppusamy with the MPCP in February 2023. ⁹

8 Ms Kuppusamy commenced proceedings against Huationg and Mr Maheshrou seeking, amongst other things, damages to be assessed against both defendants. ¹⁰ This matter was bifurcated, with the issue of liability to be dealt with before the issue of damages. On 3 May 2021, I found Huationg wholly liable for Ms Kuppusamy’s claim.

9 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages against Huationg under the following heads:

Ms Kuppusamy and Huationg are referred to collectively as the “Parties”.

10 During the assessment of damages, Ms Kuppusamy and Huationg called Mr Prasad and Ms Kalaivani a/p Vedaiyan Gurusamy (“Ms Gurusamy”), respectively, as their expert witnesses on prosthetic limbs (collectively, the “Prosthetic Experts”). Ms Kuppusamy and Huationg called Dr Yegappan Muthukaruppan (“Dr Muthukaruppan”) and Dr Kamal Bose (“Dr Bose”), respectively, as their expert witnesses on the former’s claims for damages arising from PSL and FMEs. ¹¹ Dr Muthukaruppan and Dr Bose are both orthopaedic surgeons. ¹² In relation to the claim for FMEs, Ms Kuppusamy and Huationg called Dr Sankara Kumar (“Dr Kumar”) and Dr Vivek Singh (“Dr Singh”), respectively, as expert witnesses. ¹³ Ms Kuppusamy also called as a witness, one Mr Mohammad Riduan bin Osman (“Mr Riduan”), Eve3r’s Operations Manager. ¹⁴

11 The issues to be determined in this judgment arise pursuant to the particular heads of claim for damages sought by Ms Kuppusamy. I examine them below. The Parties’ submissions consistently apply an exchange rate of S$1 = RM3.3. I adopt this exchange rate for the purposes of my decision.

12 In her Reply Submissions, Ms Kuppusamy agreed with Huationg’s proposal for the relevant period in the determination of PTLE to be from November 2017 to May 2023 (ie, 67 months), and claims S$134,814.78. However, this sum mistakenly also includes a claim for overtime pay for September and October 2017. ¹⁵ Based on the relevant period, Ms Kuppusamy’s claim is correctly for damages in the sum of S$134,150 for PTLE. ¹⁶ This is calculated based on multipliers and multiplicands submitted by Ms Kuppusamy as set out below: ¹⁷

Notwithstanding the Parties’ agreement on the multiplier, Huationg submits that Ms Kuppusamy’s submission on the multiplicand is incorrect.

13 Accordingly, the key issue in this section relates to the applicable multiplicand. This raises further sub-issues in relation to:

14 Before considering this issue, it is useful to first summarise the position on PTLE as set out in Yap Boon Fong Yvonne v Wong Kok Mun Alvin and another and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 230 (“Yap Boon Fong”) at [40]–[42]: (a) the courts are generally antipathic towards the idea of awarding compensation for loss which did not actually materialise (at [40]); (b) the plaintiff must prove his pre-trial losses as a matter of special damages (at [41]); (c) all pre-trial losses must be losses that have actually been incurred by the plaintiff and that can and must be specially proved (at [41] and [42]); and (d) the established approach is to “[examine] whether any actual provable loss had been suffered by the plaintiff” (at [40]).

15 Ms Kuppusamy submits that the applicable multiplicand, as set out in the table at [12] above, should comprise of three components: her (a) basic salary; (b) allowances; and (c) overtime pay. ¹⁸ At the time of the Accident, Ms Kuppusamy’s basic salary amounted to S$700 per month, her allowances amounted to S$600 per month, and overtime pay was payable at a rate of S$5.51 per hour. ¹⁹ Based on her submissions, Ms Kuppusamy’s position is, in effect, that she would have worked overtime for an average of 90.7 hours per month, at least for the year of 2018, for an additional S$500 per month in overtime pay.

16 On the other hand, Huationg submits that the multiplicand should comprise only of Ms Kuppusamy’s basic salary, amounting to S$46,900 for 67 months. ²⁰ Huationg relies on Mr Riduan’s evidence that only the receipt of Ms Kuppusamy’s basic salary was certain. ²¹ The monthly allowances were subject to Ms Kuppusamy’s full attendance and good conduct, while the overtime pay was discretionary. ²²

17 If the court is inclined to factor in overtime pay, Huationg submits that the quantum of damages should be S$73,840.24. ²³ Huationg came to this figure by referencing Mr Riduan’s testimony that Eve3r’s Security Officers tend to work three overtime hours per day. ²⁴ As Ms Kuppusamy’s employment contract with Eve3r required her to work six days per week, she would have worked overtime for 18 hours per week, or 72 hours per month. At the contractual overtime pay rate of S$5.51 per hour, Ms Kuppusamy would have earned an overtime pay of S$396.72 per month. In addition to her basic salary of S$700, the monthly multiplicand should be S$1,096.72, for a total award of S$73,840.24. ²⁵ Before moving on, I observe that this figure was incorrectly calculated. Multiplying a multiplicand of S$1,096.72 by a multiplier of 67 months amounts to S$73,480.24. I take this figure to be Huationg’s submission here.

18 In response, Ms Kuppusamy submits that Huationg had misinterpreted Mr Riduan’s evidence. On re-examination, Mr Riduan had clarified that the basic salary and allowances components of Ms Kuppusamy’s monthly wages are a “package”, such that her monthly wage would be a “minimum” of S$1,300. ²⁶

19 I agree that on the evidence, Ms Kuppusamy’s monthly wage would have been at least S$1,300. In relation to the allowances, Mr Riduan testified that if not for the Accident, he expects that Ms Kuppusamy would have earned in subsequent months at least, if not more than, what she earned in August 2017 (ie, S$1,788.92). This suggests that Mr Riduan did not have any doubts as to whether she would be able to satisfy the requirements to obtain the allowances of S$600 per month. Further, Ms Kuppusamy was praised by clients during the short time that she was with Eve3r, indicating good conduct as required for receipt of allowances.

20 In relation to overtime pay, the fact that it would have been a variable component of Ms Kuppusamy’s monthly wage does not preclude its inclusion in the multiplicand. As held in Yap Boon Fong at [40], the assessment of PTLE must be based on the provable state of affairs at the time of the Accident. Accordingly, the question is whether the evidence proves that at the time of the Accident, Ms Kuppusamy would have worked overtime, and if so, how many hours she would have worked.

21 During the hearing, Ms Kuppusamy testified that as she was single and did not have a family, she would have consistently worked overtime if employed at Eve3r. ²⁷ Further, she expressed that as other Security Officers in Eve3r usually worked overtime, she would do the same. ²⁸ This testimony was corroborated by Mr Riduan, who stated that it was clear from the way Ms Kuppusamy spoke to him that she wanted to work overtime, as she was single and also needed the overtime pay. ²⁹ Further, Mr Riduan testified that Eve3r’s Security Officers did generally work overtime, contributing to increases in their monthly wages. ³⁰ On the evidence, I find that Ms Kuppusamy has proven that she would have worked overtime, had she continued working at Eve3r. As such, I will factor overtime pay into the multiplicand. I next assess the quantum of the multiplicand.

22 Mr Riduan testified that Ms Kuppusamy received a gross salary of S$1,788.92 in August 2017, and S$1,635.22 in September 2017. ³¹ From these figures, Mr Riduan calculated that Ms Kuppusamy worked overtime for between 78 to 82 hours in August 2017, and around 56 hours over 22 days in September 2017, as of the date of the Accident (ie, 23 September 2017). Extrapolating the latter figure for the period of 30 days, Ms Kuppusamy would have worked overtime for about 76 hours in September 2017, if not for the Accident. ³² Taking the median point of the range provided by Mr Riduan for August 2017 and averaging the number of overtime hours worked during her two months at Eve3r, Ms Kuppusamy would have worked overtime for an average of 78 hours per month in August and September 2017. I consider this to be a reasonable initial reference point for the number of hours that she would have worked overtime every month.

23 Nonetheless, I note that Mr Riduan highlighted that the law limits the maximum number of overtime hours worked to 72 hours per month, unless a company has an exemption to this rule. ³³ Mr Riduan testified that Eve3r had such an exemption around the time of the Accident for about two or three years. ³⁴ As an award for PTLE is a grant of special damages, I adopt a conservative approach towards this evidence and take the lower limit of this range to assume that Eve3r had this exemption for two years from 2017 to 2018. In light of this, I find that but for the Accident, Ms Kuppusamy would have worked overtime for 78 hours per month from November 2017 to December 2018 (ie, 14 months) and 72 hours per month from January 2019 to May 2023 (ie, 53 months).

24 Ms Kuppusamy’s submissions on the multiplicand also factors in a promotion to “Senior Security Officer” (“SSO”) from January 2022 onwards, such that the multiplicand is S$2,200 in 2022 and S$2,350 in 2023.

25 In his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”), Mr Riduan stated that he expects that if Ms Kuppusamy were still working for Eve3r, she would presently earn at least S$2,100 per month, including allowances and overtime pay. He testified that Eve3r would promote Security Officers who have remained with the company for three to five years to the rank of SSO, ³⁵ where they would earn around S$2,300 to S$2,400 per month. Mr Riduan claimed that this would have been Ms Kuppusamy’s salary if she was still in the company. ³⁶

26 On Mr Riduan’s evidence, Ms Kuppusamy would have been promoted if she remained with Eve3r. Two sub-issues then arise in relation to this section:

27 Huationg claims that there is no basis for the multiplicand to factor in an increase in basic salary following a promotion at Eve3r. ³⁷ In support of this submission, Huationg highlighted the high attrition rate of security guards in Eve3r, and that there are currently only three to four persons, out of 45, who earn between S$2,300 to S$2,400 per month at Eve3r. ³⁸

28 In Tan Siew Bin Ronnie v Chin Wee Keong [2008] 1 SLR(R) 178 (“Tan Siew Bin”), Chan Seng Onn J (as he then was) explained at [25] in relation to PTLE that:

This dicta was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yap Boon Fong at [40].

29 Although Eve3r suffers from a high attrition rate and there are few security guards who presently hold the position of SSO, these facts do not necessitate that Ms Kuppusamy would have left Eve3r or had her employment terminated, and consequently not enjoyed the promotion. Referencing the analysis in Tan Siew Bin, the high attrition rate connotes that there was a risk that Ms Kuppusamy would have resigned from her job at Eve3r at some point prior to being promoted to SSO. However, this risk had not materialised during the time Ms Kuppusamy was at Eve3r, and it would be unfair to impute the realisation of this risk onto her based on circumstances that are not specific to her. As such, I find that for the purposes of assessing damages for PTLE, the multiplicand should account for Ms Kuppusamy remaining with Eve3r, and consequently factor in an increase in her salary resulting from a promotion to SSO.

30 Notwithstanding, I recognise that the promotion did not materialise during Ms Kuppusamy’s employment at Eve3r prior to the Accident. Coupled with the claim for PTLE being a claim for special damages, I will adopt a conservative approach in determining the multiplicand. According to her employment contract, Ms Kuppusamy was on probation for a period of three months (ie, from August to October 2017). ³⁹ Mr Riduan’s evidence was that Security Officers are promoted to SSO after remaining with Eve3r for three to five years. I will take the upper limit of this range – ie, promotion after five years of employment – and exclude the period of probation from this calculation. In other words, I assume that Ms Kuppusamy would have been promoted in November 2022. At which point, I find that the applicable multiplicand is that of the lower limit of the range provided by Mr Riduan – S$2,300 per month, inclusive of allowance and overtime pay. Assuming no changes to her monthly allowance (ie, S$600 per month) and hourly rate of overtime pay (ie, S$5.51 per hour, totalling S$396.72 per month), Ms Kuppusamy’s monthly basic salary for the year following the promotion is about S$1,303.28 per month.

31 As seen from the table at [12] above, the quantum of damages claimed by Ms Kuppusamy for PTLE also accounts for annual increments of S$50 to her monthly wages from 2017 to 2021, an increment of S$200 for the year of 2022, and an increment of S$150 for the year of 2023. Huationg’s submissions indicate that they do not accept any such increments to be factored into the multiplicand. ⁴⁰

32 Ms Kuppusamy’s employment contract does not provide for specific annual increments but states that all salary adjustments are at Eve3r’s discretion. ⁴¹ Notwithstanding, Ms Kuppusamy’s submission for annual increments is supported by Mr Riduan’s oral evidence. He testified that the security guards in Eve3r receive annual increments to their monthly basic salary of around S$70 to S$100, depending on their individual performance. ⁴² Further, Mr Riduan agreed that the annual increments sought by Ms Kuppusamy as set out in the table above at [12] are fair and reasonable. ⁴³

33 In light of Mr Riduan’s evidence, I accept Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for annual increments of S$50 to her basic salary from November 2017 to December 2021 (see also Lee Teck Nam v Kang Hock Seng Paul [2005] 4 SLR(R) 14 (“Lee Teck Nam”) at [41]–[43]). However, there is no evidence to support her claim of a S$200 increment to S$2,200 per month for 2022, and a S$150 increment to S$2,350 per month for 2023. Further, this rate of increase surpasses the range of S$70 to S$100 which Mr Riduan gave evidence for. In so far as these increments are intended to be attributed to a job promotion to SSO, I have dealt with this above at [30]. As such, I will apply an annual increment of S$50 to the relevant monthly multiplicand for every period of 12 months.

34 Regardless, Huationg submits that Ms Kuppusamy had not satisfied her duty to mitigate her losses and hence, the applicable multiplicand should be reduced. ⁴⁴ This duty arose from February 2018 to May 2023, following the end of her hospitalisation leave. Huationg’s position is that Ms Kuppusamy has not been as aggressive in finding employment as she could have been, bearing in mind that she could have sought assistance from employment agents and disability associations to find employment. ⁴⁵

35 Huationg hence submits various alternative figures of monthly salaries which could be subtracted from the applicable multiplicand, depending on the extent of mitigation the court deems reasonable:

(a) RM1,797 (S$544.55) – based on the average salary of a person in Malaysia with the same level of education as Ms Kuppusamy, per the Department of Statistics Malaysia (“DOSM”);

(b)  RM1,500 (S$454.55) – based on the salary of a security guard in Malaysia, ie, a role which Ms Kuppusamy applied for; or

(c) RM1,200 (S$363.64) – based on the salary of a retail or sales assistant in Malaysia.

36 Huationg further submits that Ms Kuppusamy could have but failed to apply for interim payment earlier and was thus responsible for the delay in securing a prosthetic which would have restored her functions. ⁴⁶

37 In response, Ms Kuppusamy submits that she has been unable to find gainful employment in Singapore and Malaysia since the Accident. She was fitted with her first prosthetic limb in May 2018. ⁴⁷ However, this first prosthetic leg required further assistance from a walking stick to allow her to move around. ⁴⁸ Later, this first prosthetic limb caused her pain and by 2019, she was only wearing this prosthetic at home. ⁴⁹ Ms Kuppusamy was fitted with her second and current, prosthetic limb in October 2022. ⁵⁰ Following which, she underwent a period of training, with a final fitting of this prosthetic around February 2023. ⁵¹ She testified that she has tried looking for various jobs, including as a security officer, cashier, and sales assistant. She was not successful. ⁵² She also testified that she not aware of any associations that could help disabled get jobs nor aware of employment agents who could do so. ⁵³

38 Before analysing the evidence, I highlight that the burden of proof is on Huationg to show that Ms Kuppusamy had failed to mitigate her loss (see Teo Sing Keng and another v Sim Ban Kiat [1994] 1 SLR(R) 340 at [45]–[46]).

39 I see no reason to reject Ms Kuppusamy’s evidence. In my view, it is unreasonable to expect her to have immediately returned to work, or look for work, after the end of her hospitalisation leave in mid-January 2018, especially without the aid of any prosthetic limb. Also, although Ms Kuppusamy was fitted with her first prosthetic limb in May 2018, the issues caused by this prosthetic, especially the pain she experienced, would have made it difficult for her to return to work, even as a retail assistant.

40 Huationg submits that these issues could have been resolved by an earlier application for interim payment. ⁵⁴ This was raised for the first time in Huationg’s Reply Submissions. As such, this claim was not put to Ms Kuppusamy, nor was she cross-examined on this during the hearing. Furthermore, Ms Kuppusamy has not had the opportunity to respond to this unsubstantiated claim. Accordingly, I find that Huationg has not satisfied its burden to prove that Ms Kuppusamy failed to mitigate her PTLEs in this respect.

41 From her testimony in court, Ms Kuppusamy did not strike me as someone who was unwilling to look for a job. On the contrary, she appears willing to look for a job but had been unsuccessful in finding employment thus far due at least in part to her physical disability. While Huationg submits that there are associations and employment agents that can help disabled persons find employment, it has not adduced any evidence of such association or agents, or evidence that they can indeed help someone with a physical disability to find jobs.

42 In light of the evidence before me, I find that on the whole, Huationg has not satisfied its burden to prove that Ms Kuppusamy had not mitigated her loss. Hence, I will not reduce the multiplicand.

43 Following from the above, I award Ms Kuppusamy damages for PTLE for the period from November 2017 to May 2023 in the sum of S$124,366.04:

44 Ms Kuppusamy seeks damages for PSL that arise from:

45 Ms Kuppusamy seeks S$75,000 for PSL arising from the below-the-knee amputation of her lower left limb. Huationg submits that S$40,000 is sufficient. ⁵⁵

47 Ms Kuppusamy refers to three High Court cases and the awards of damages for PSL therein. ⁵⁶ First, Quek Yen Fei Kenneth v Yeo Chye Huat [2016] 3 SLR 1106 (“Kenneth Quek (HC)”), where the plaintiff was 20 years’ old at the time of the accident and was awarded S$80,000. There, the court considered the plaintiff’s youth at the time of the accident, the pain and suffering he endured from the surgical attempt to salvage his leg, and the fact that the plaintiff continued experiencing pain four years after the accident. Second, Hiak Chuak Kin v Teo Li Lian (Suit No 608 of 2007, High Court) (“Hiak Chuak Kin”), where the plaintiff was 40 years’ old at the time of the accident, underwent multiple surgeries, and was awarded S$80,000. Third, Tan Juay Mui (by his next friend Chew Chwee Kim) v Sher Kuan Hock and another (Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd, co-defendant; Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd and another, third parties) [2012] 3 SLR 496 (“Tan Juay Mui”), where the plaintiff was 48 years’ old at the time of the accident and was awarded S$60,000.

48 As Ms Kuppusamy was 48 years’ old at the time of the Accident, she submits that Tan Juay Mui bears the closest resemblance to the present case, but the applicable quantum should be adjusted upwards for, first, inflation. ⁵⁷ She relies on Lee Teck Nam for her submission that the quantum of damages payable should be adjusted for inflation. ⁵⁸ The S$60,000 award in Tan Juay Mui was granted in 2012. Using the Goods & Services Inflation Calculator on the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s website (the “MAS Inflation Calculator”), the value of the award in Tan Juay Mui is S$67,587.28, or around S$68,000, in 2022. ⁵⁹ Second, Ms Kuppusamy submits that a further uplift should be applied such that she be awarded S$75,000. ⁶⁰

49 Huationg submits that the damages should only be S$40,000. ⁶¹ Amongst other things, it claims that Ms Kuppusamy no longer experiences pain in the amputated region. ⁶² Huationg relies on Ms Kuppusamy’s oral testimony that “there is no pain [in the amputated region]; even if there was any pain it’s much lesser”. ⁶³ Huationg also relies on a report dated 7 August 2021 by Ms Kuppusamy’s prosthetic expert, Mr Prasad, where he noted in relation to her left stump, “[p]hantom pain absent”. ⁶⁴

50 Huationg further submits that this case may be distinguished from Tan Juay Mui. ⁶⁵ First, Ms Kuppusamy did not suffer a life-threatening injury which necessitated the below-the-knee amputation, unlike the plaintiff in Tan Juay Mui. ⁶⁶ Second, the plaintiff in Tan Juay Mui suffered from various complications as a result of the accident, such as low blood pressure, sepsis, significant retrograde amnesia, phantom limb pain and depression, which Ms Kuppusamy did not experience. ⁶⁷ Third, the award in Tan Juay Mui Ms Kuppusamy relies on was a separate award for diabetic-related conditions, as opposed to being an award for leg injury. ⁶⁸ Ms Kuppusamy is not known to be diabetic. ⁶⁹ Consequently, her claim of S$60,000 by analogy to Tan Juay Mui is overstated. ⁷⁰

51 Additionally, Huationg avers that the quantum of damages should not include adjustments for inflation or further uplifts. ⁷¹ It submits, first, that the range set out in the Guidelines already accounts for inflation. ⁷² In support of this, Huationg relies on Quek Yen Fei Kenneth (by his litigation representative Pang Choy Chun) v Yeo Chye Huat and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 229 (“Kenneth Quek (CA)”) at [41] and [110]. ⁷³ Second, Huationg submits that if the court were inclined to factor inflation into the quantum of damages, the applicable rate of inflation should be that in Malaysia (ie, approximately 3.3%) as Ms Kuppusamy has returned to Malaysia and will continue living there. ⁷⁴

52 Of the three precedents which Ms Kuppusamy referred me to, I agree with her that Tan Juay Mui bears the most factual similarity to the present case. This is because, in particular, Ms Kuppusamy was significantly older than the plaintiff in Kenneth Quek (HC) at the time of the accident and did not have multiple surgeries, like the plaintiff in Hiak Chuak Kin.

53 I am unable to agree with Huationg’s submissions which seek to distinguish Tan Juay Mui from the present case. First, while it was not a “life-threatening injury” which necessitated the loss of her lower left limb, the Accident was nevertheless the cause for the loss of Ms Kuppusamy’s limb. Second, the fact that she did not suffer from the same side effects as the plaintiff in Tan Juay Mui does not preclude the former’s reference to the award there for leg injury. The plaintiff in Tan Juay Mui suffered not just a leg injury, but also a severe brain injury with blood collecting between the layers of the brain (Tan Juay Mui at [3]). This brain injury was responsible for many of the complications that the plaintiff in Tan Juay Mui suffered from, which Huationg claimed Ms Kuppusamy did not share. Significantly, Judith Prakash J (as she then was), in upholding the separate award for damages of S$170,000 granted by the court below for the plaintiff’s brain injury, took into account the complications caused by the said brain injury (at [36]). Further, when granting the plaintiff an award of S$60,000 for the leg injury, Praksah J (as she then was) observed that there were side effects, such as weakness of the plaintiff’s left side and impaired vision, which could not be attributed to her leg injury (at [54]). In other words, the court in Tan Juay Mui had considered the causes of the complications and side effects experienced by the plaintiff there and granted distinct awards of damages for the relevant injuries and complications. Third, the court in Tan Juay Mui granted two distinct awards for the plaintiff’s diabetic condition and leg injury, respectively. As such, Ms Kuppusamy’s reference to the award of S$60,000 in Tan Juay Mui is not a reliance on the award for the diabetic condition suffered by the plaintiff there.

54 I accordingly reference the figure of S$60,000 awarded in Tan Juay Mui as the baseline of the quantum of damages to be awarded to Ms Kuppusamy.

55 In relation to whether this figure should be adjusted for inflation, I concur with Lee Teck Nam at [13] that inflation may be factored into the quantum of damages awarded. The Court of Appeal in Kenneth Quek (CA) had also recognised at [41] that the court may take into account changes in purchasing power since the time of the precedent in its award of damages. Contrary to Huationg’s submission, Kenneth Quek (CA) at [110] does not support its claim that the range set out in the Guidelines accounts for inflation. The Court of Appeal at [110] recognised that the Guidelines were promulgated 18 years after the award in Pang Teck Kong v Chew Eng Hwa [1992] SGHC 31 was granted. In light of this passage of time, the authors of the Guidelines recommended a 40% increase in the maximum value of the award. Hence, contrary to Huationg’s submission, the dicta in Kenneth Quek (CA) at [110] suggests that awards should account for inflation where the increase in the value of money, due to the passage of time, is significant.

56 Huationg submits that the rate of inflation should be that in Malaysia (ie, 3.3%) and the time period for which this rate of inflation should apply begins in 2010, the year that the Guidelines were published. ⁷⁵ However, this submission is of a higher inflation rate and longer time period than that claimed by Ms Kuppusamy. Ms Kuppusamy references the award in Tan Juay Mui, which was granted in 2012. Additionally, the MAS Inflation Calculator, which she used to calculate the value of the award in Tan Juay Mui, applied the rate of inflation in Singapore. Over the same period as that submitted by Huationg, this rate was only 1.2%. ⁷⁶ I find Ms Kuppusamy’s submission reasonable and thus, I will apply the parameters as submitted by her, notwithstanding Huationg’s submission.

57 Applying the MAS Inflation Calculator, the value of an award of S$60,000 in 2012 would be S$67,587.28 in 2022. I will hence adjust the reference figure of S$60,000 for inflation to S$67,500.

58 As to whether there ought to be a further uplift to this quantum for Ms Kuppusamy’s pain, I note that while Mr Prasad reported that she did not feel phantom pains, the fact that Ms Kuppusamy did not feel pain around the time she met Mr Prasad does not preclude the possibility of her feeling pain on other occasions. Also, when Huationg asked Ms Kuppusamy if she felt pain now, her reply was no, but “even if there was… it’s much lesser”. ⁷⁷ Her reply is hence that she did not feel pain at the point of the question, but she did feel pain on other occasions, but of a lesser degree. Ms Kuppusamy also stated while giving her testimony in court that “[her] leg [was] painful because [she had been] sitting for very long”. ⁷⁸ I find no reason to doubt her testimony during the hearing that she was experiencing pain. Her evidence is consistent with the statement by her orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Kumar, that she “has persistent left knee pain due to the scarring over the back of knee”. ⁷⁹ Additionally, Huationg’s orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Singh, also recognised that the amputation was “traumatic”. ⁸⁰

59 However, I do not find Ms Kuppusamy’s pain to be so severe as to justify departing from the upper limit of the range set out in the Guidelines (see Kenneth Quek (HC) at [12]–[17]; affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kenneth Quek (CA) at [41]). In light of the evidence on the pain suffered, I grant a further S$2,000 uplift to award Ms Kuppusamy damages in the sum of S$69,500 for PSL caused by the below-the-knee amputation of her lower left limb.

60 Ms Kuppusamy seeks damages for the aggravation of osteoarthritis in her right knee. She relies on Pandian Marimuthu v Guan Leong Construction Pte Ltd [2002] SGDC 189, where the court awarded S$5,000 in 2002 for osteoarthritis in the knee. ⁸¹ Basing her claim on this figure, Ms Kuppusamy used the MAS Inflation Calculator to determine the value of this award in 2022 – ie, S$7,234.72. ⁸² Ms Kuppusamy rounds this figure up and claims S$7,500. ⁸³

61 Huationg submits that no award of damages should be granted under this sub-head. ⁸⁴ As a preliminary point, Huationg submits that this claim was not sufficiently pleaded and that it did not have adequate notice of this claim. ⁸⁵ Amongst other things, Huationg claims that any aggravation of osteoarthritis in Ms Kuppusamy’s right knee was caused by her use of ill-fitting prosthetics and her decision to stop using said prosthetics without first obtaining medical advice. ⁸⁶

62 Ms Kuppusamy and Huationg called Dr Muthukaruppan and Dr Bose (collectively, the “Experts”) as their expert witnesses for this head of claim, respectively. During the hearing, both Experts affirmed that they did not have radiological images of Ms Kuppusamy’s knees prior to the Accident. As such, they could not testify as to the changes to her knee due to the Accident. Notwithstanding, both Experts agreed that the post-Accident radiological images showed similarities in both knees. In light of this similarity, Dr Bose testified that his presumption is that the state of both knees is not related to the Accident. ⁸⁷ Dr Muthukaruppan testified that it is possible that the current osteoarthritic conditions of both knees are age-related. ⁸⁸ Huationg emphasises these views of the Experts. ⁸⁹

63 Ms Kuppusamy accepts the Experts’ evidence that her osteoarthritic condition in both knees is likely a pre-existing one. However, she relies on their evidence that there could have been an increase in loading on the right knee due to the amputation of her lower left limb in support of her claim.

64 Given the radiological similarities in both knees, I find Dr Bose’s view that Ms Kuppusamy’s osteoarthritic condition is likely age-related to be compelling and logical. Even Huationg’s expert, Dr Muthukaruppan, agrees that the radiological similarities lend support to Dr Bose’s view. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support that there actually was any aggravation of osteoarthritic symptoms due to the amputation of Ms Kuppusamy’s lower left limb. I consequently disallow her claim for damages for aggravation of osteoarthritis in her right knee. In view of this, it is unnecessary for me to deal with Huationg’s objection on the ground of lack of pleading.

65 Finally, Ms Kuppusamy seeks S$10,000 in damages for PSL caused by extensive non-surgical scarring. Huationg submits that this has not been pleaded ⁹⁰ and that it was consequently not able to give proper attention to the evidence relevant to this claim. ⁹¹ Its position is that no award of damages should be made. ⁹²

66 As a result of the Accident, Ms Kuppusamy received a split skin graft (“SSG”) at her left popliteal fossa (ie, back of her left knee), which left a scar measuring 9cm by 8cm. She also has two scars measuring 18cm by 6cm and 13cm by 6cm at the SSG donor site on her left thigh. Ms Kuppusamy references Kenneth Quek (HC) where the court awarded the plaintiff S$7,000 for two small scars measuring 3cm each and submits that S$10,000 was reasonable given that her scars were much larger than that in Kenneth Quek (HC).

67 Huationg submits that in Kenneth Quek (CA), the scars suffered by the plaintiff were caused by the accident itself, without any surgical interference, unlike the scars suffered by Ms Kuppusamy. ⁹³ Ms Kuppusamy’s scars are also capable of being easily hidden under common articles of clothing and hence do not have adverse aesthetic effect. ⁹⁴ In the event that the court is inclined to award damages for non-surgical scarring, Huationg highlights that Ms Kuppusamy’s mature age should decrease the quantum of such award. ⁹⁵

68 I will deal first with Huationg’s preliminary objection on the lack of pleading as Ms Kuppusamy only surfaced this particular claim in her Closing Submissions. ⁹⁶ Notwithstanding, I observe that Ms Kuppusamy had expressly stated in her Statement of Claim that her injuries include an "[i]njury to the left popliteal region requiring skin graft". The scars for which she claims damages arose as a direct result of this skin graft.

69 In How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] SGCA 21 (“How Weng Fan”), the Court of Appeal explained at [19] that “only material facts … supporting each element of a legal claim … must be pleaded” [emphasis in original omitted; emphasis added in italics] (ie, the “Material Facts Principle”). Notwithstanding, the court may permit a claim for which the material facts supporting its elements were not pleaded “where there is no irreparable prejudice caused to the other party in the trial that cannot be compensated by costs or where it would be clearly unjust for the court not to do so” (How Weng Fan at [20]).

70 Applying the Material Facts Principle, the Court of Appeal in How Weng Fan held at [30(a)] that where a plaintiff does plead the material facts underlying a claim in negligence but does not frame this specifically as a claim in negligence, the court can find the defendant liable for negligence unless there is clear evidence that the defendant will be unduly prejudiced. In this case, I find that the material facts for this claim have been pleaded. Further, in any event, I do not consider Huationg to be unduly prejudiced, as the Parties’ dispute is centred on legal submissions, and not evidential disagreements.

71 In Kenneth Quek (HC), the award was given at [27] in relation to scars arising directly from the accident. Surgical scars arising from the amputation stump were considered separately under the damages awarded for the amputation. The issue of non-surgical scars, as a distinct head of claim, did not arise there. The question thus arises here, as to whether an award should be given for the scars arising from the SSG. Pertinently, the SSG (and consequently the scars from it) would not have arisen but for the Accident. Huationg did not dispute this but submitted that if they had known of such a claim, they could have asked Ms Kuppusamy whether she did suffer from pain arising from having such scars. ⁹⁷ However, the consideration of damages for scarring in Kenneth Quek (HC) at [27] proceeded on an assessment of whether there was objectively an aesthetic defect. This is in contrast to the court’s earlier consideration there at [15] in relation to the plaintiff’s claim for continuing pain, which took into account both subjective (ie, the plaintiff’s views on pain) and objective evidence. In this case, I am satisfied that from the medical reports, there is sufficient evidence of the nature of the scar, such that Huationg is not unduly prejudiced from having this claim considered.

72 I will consequently award Ms Kuppusamy damages for the scars that she received as a result of the SSG. In respect of quantum, I note that the plaintiff in Kenneth Quek (CA) was 20 years’ old at the time of the accident while Ms Kuppusamy was 48 years’ old. I also acknowledge that the scars she suffered, on the back of her left knee and on her left thigh, are easily concealed under common articles of clothing. This is similar to that of the plaintiff in Kenneth Quek (CA), whose scars were on his right knee and right shoulder. Notwithstanding, Ms Kuppusamy’s scars are substantially larger compared to those of the plaintiff in Kenneth Quek (CA). As such, I award Ms Kuppusamy S$7,000 for her non-surgical scars.

73 In summary, I award Ms Kuppusamy a total of S$76,500 in damages for PSL.

74 Ms Kuppusamy also claims damages for LFE. As a preliminary matter, I note that Huationg’s position on LFE is inconsistent. It submits on the one hand that there should be an award of S$57,380 for LFE and no award for LEC as the latter is included in the LFE calculations. ⁹⁸ At the same time, Huationg also submits that there should be no award for LFE. ⁹⁹ As Huationg has not provided submissions as to why the LFE award should be $57,380 but has made submissions to justify why there should be no award of LFE, I will examine its case on the basis of the latter.

75 In Mykytowych, Pamela Jane v V I P Hotel [2016] 4 SLR 829 (“Mykytowych”), the Court of Appeal explained at [140] that an award of LFE is “a form of special damages awarded for real assessable loss proved by evidence (see Fairley v John Thompson (Design and Contracting Division) Ltd [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 40 at 42)” [emphasis in original]. In assessing damages for LFE, the Court of Appeal elaborated at [141] that:

76 In Singapore, the method for calculating LFE is the multiplier-multiplicand approach, as affirmed in Kenneth Quek (CA) at [42]. This approach involves determining the multiplier and the multiplicand, and multiplying the two figures to calculate the present value of losses in earnings that Ms Kuppusamy will suffer in the future.

77 I will first assess what the multiplicand should be. Ms Kuppusamy submits that the multiplicand should be calculated based on a monthly wage of S$2,350. ¹⁰⁰ This figure is the median point of the salary range provided by Mr Riduan of a SSO – ie, S$2,300 to S$2,400 per month (see [25] above). ¹⁰¹ Ms Kuppusamy expects that it will take her three to four months to find gainful employment, ¹⁰² from May to August 2023. Hence, the applicable multiplicand for this period should be the full sum of S$2,350. ¹⁰³ From September 2023 (inclusive) onwards, Ms Kuppusamy submits that she would earn about RM1,200 (S$363.64) per month. On this basis, the applicable multiplicand should be S$1,900 – ie, the difference between the monthly wage of S$2,350 she would have earned and the S$363.64 she expects to earn, rounded down. ¹⁰⁴

78 Huationg submits that, first, the basis of the multiplicand should not be S$2,350 as the range provided by Mr Riduan is not a reasonable estimate of Ms Kuppusamy’s future earnings. ¹⁰⁵ Second, the multiplicand from September 2023 onwards should be lower, on the basis that Ms Kuppusamy is likely to earn a higher monthly salary of RM1,757 (S$532.42). ¹⁰⁶

79 From the Parties’ submissions, two sub-issues arise:

(a) what quantum should form the basis of the assessment; and

(b) what amount should be deducted from the figure derived above to account for mitigation of Ms Kuppusamy’s losses.

80 Ms Kuppusamy submits that the multiplicand should be based on a monthly wage of S$2,350 (see [77] above). ¹⁰⁷ Huationg submits that the multiplicand should be based only on her basic salary of S$700, excluding allowances and overtime pay. ¹⁰⁸

81 Ms Kuppusamy testified that if not for the Accident, she would have continued working in Singapore and presently be a SSO. ¹⁰⁹ Her evidence on this was not challenged.

82 As canvassed above, the evidence before me suggests that Ms Kuppusamy is likely to have satisfied the requirements for the monthly allowances, which is given to employees as part of a “package”. Additionally, the evidence also shows that she would have worked overtime for about 72 hours per month and have been promoted to SSO. Consequently, and consistent with my finding above at [19]–[21] in relation to PTLE, I find it reasonable for the multiplicand to account for the basic salary, allowances, and overtime pay that Ms Kuppusamy would have earned if she remained at Eve3r. Notwithstanding, I refer to the analysis at [33] above and reiterate that Ms Kuppusamy’s claim that her monthly wage would have been S$2,350 per month is not justified. I also observe that she did not claim that the multiplicand used to assess damages for LFE should factor in annual increments in her basic salary. As such, I will apply S$2,300 per month as the base for determining the applicable multiplicand.

83 Ms Kuppusamy stated that she is likely to find employment as a sales assistant in three to four months (ie, she would be gainfully employed by September 2023). In her written submissions, she claims that she would earn RM1,200 per month as a sales assistant. ¹¹⁰ However, her oral evidence was that she expected to earn RM1,500 per month. ¹¹¹ In light of her testimony that this figure does not account for future increases in salary, ¹¹² which would decrease the loss she suffers and the amount of damages Huationg is liable for, I will take the higher figure of RM1,500 per month as the monthly wage of a sales assistant in Malaysia.

84 Huationg submits that there should be no award of damages for LFE as Ms Kuppusamy is capable of returning to her pre-Accident job as a security guard in Singapore. ¹¹³ In support of its submission, Huationg relies on: (a) Ms Kuppusamy’s testimony that she is capable of undertaking employment as a security guard, and had hence applied for a job as a security guard in Malaysia; ¹¹⁴ (b) the evidence of its prosthetic expert, Ms Gurusamy, that Ms Kuppusamy is able to work as a security guard with the use of the “Mechanically Controlled Prosthetic” (“MCP”) that Ms Gurusamy recommended; ¹¹⁵ (c) Mr Riduan’s testimony for the claim that Eve3r is willing to re-employ Ms Kuppusamy; ¹¹⁶ and (d) the lack of evidence proving that she is unable to find work as a security guard in Singapore. ¹¹⁷

85 In the event where the court is inclined to find that Ms Kuppusamy is indeed unable to return to work as a security guard in Singapore, Huationg submits that there is no evidence to support the proposition that she is limited only to working as a sales assistant. ¹¹⁸ Huationg highlights that other persons in Malaysia with the same level of education as Ms Kuppusamy earn about RM1,757 (S$532.42). ¹¹⁹ As there are other employment opportunities available, and given Ms Kuppusamy’s level of education, the multiplicand should factor in a deduction of RM1,757 (S$532.42). ¹²⁰

86 First, I observe that Huationg has overstated Eve3r’s willingness to re-employ Ms Kuppusamy. In his AEIC, Mr Riduan stated that he “would not hire [Ms Kuppusamy] on behalf of [Eve3r] because [their] customers will not accept someone with a physical disability and also because security work is physically demanding.” ¹²¹ During the hearing, Mr Riduan clarified that he would be willing to re-employ Ms Kuppusamy if there were medical documents stating that she was fit to fulfil the duties of a security guard and if Eve3r’s customers were comfortable with her, despite her disability. ¹²² Furthermore, Ms Kuppusamy would need to successfully pass the medical examinations conducted by the Singapore Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) in order to obtain a work permit that would allow her to work in Singapore. ¹²³ Accordingly, there were several conditions that had to be satisfied before Eve3r would consider re-employing Ms Kuppusamy, as opposed to an unqualified willingness to re-employ her.

87 Huationg’s position is that Eve3r should have taken steps to determine whether the requisite conditions for re-employing Ms Kuppusamy were satisfied. However, this position is unfounded. It fails to recognise that Eve3r owes no obligation to Ms Kuppusamy and is under no duty to check with their customers if they would indeed have accepted someone who is an amputee as a Security Officer. Hence, the fact that Eve3r did not make further checks does not diminish Eve3r’s position, as set out by Mr Riduan, that they would hire Ms Kuppusamy only if the requisite conditions are satisfied. ¹²⁴ Accordingly, the fact that Eve3r is conditionally willing to re-employ Ms Kuppusamy does not justify denying her an award of damages for LFE.

88 While Mr Riduan’s statement was made on behalf of Eve3r as Ms Kuppusamy’s former employer, I consider that the difficulties that Mr Riduan raised are likely to also reflect the difficulties faced by other companies in Singapore when considering whether to employ her as a security guard. Ms Kuppusamy will likely face similar obstacles when applying to other companies in Singapore to be a security guard. Huationg has not in its cross-examination of Mr Riduan or Ms Kuppusamy suggested that this may not be so. Hence, in view of Mr Riduan’s extensive evidence highlighting the difficulties of hiring a disabled person as a “Security Officer”, I find that Ms Kuppusamy has, on balance, sufficiently shown that it is not likely that she would be able to find work as a security guard in Singapore, given her disabled condition.

89 Additionally, I observe that Ms Gurusamy had not considered that a security guard has patrolling duties, sentry duties or guardhouse duties, and that a certain level of fitness is needed to handle emergency situations when she claimed that Ms Kuppusamy would be capable of returning to her job as a security guard with use of the MCP. ¹²⁵ Ms Gurusamy also recognised that there are several limitations with the MCP in relation to handling inclines, stairs and movement on flat ground. Therefore, even if Ms Kuppusamy had been fitted with the MCP, she would have been limited in her ability to perform the duties of a security guard.

90 Ms Kuppusamy testified that she is likely to obtain employment as a sales assistant in Malaysia, with a salary of RM1,500 (S$454.55). For the reasons above, I accept her evidence that this is her likely employment, and also accept her oral evidence on the likely salary. I note, in any event, that the 1st Defendant submits, albeit in relation to PTLE, that the salary of a security guard in Malaysia would also be RM1,500 (S$454.55). ¹²⁶ Hence, I will deduct S$454.55 from the base monthly wage of S$2,300 to obtain a multiplicand of S$1,845.45 per month, applicable from September 2023 onwards.

91 For completeness, I observe that although the average monthly wage of a person working in Malaysia with the same education level as Ms Kuppusamy is RM1,757 (S$532.42), as stated by the DOSM, there is no evidence that this figure applies equally to persons of the same education level and disability as her. As such, I find that it would be inappropriate to factor this figure into the multiplicand on the facts of the present case.

92 The multiplier is “the mathematical tool used to calculate the lump-sum present value of the stream of future periodic losses across … the remaining working life … of the claimant”: Kenneth Quek (CA) at [42]. In Poh Huat Heng Corp Pte Ltd and others v Hafizul Islam Kofil Uddin [2012] 3 SLR 1003 (“Hafizul”), the Court of Appeal noted at [48] that there are at least four approaches that may be adopted in determining the multiplier: (a) referencing the multiplier awarded in comparable cases (the “Precedent Approach”); (b) applying a pure arithmetical discount to the expected period of future loss on account of accelerated receipt and other vicissitudes of life (the “Arithmetic Approach”); (c) adopting the multiplier set out in actuarial table(s) (the “Actuarial Approach”); and (d) applying a formula fixed by legislation.

93 In relation to determining the multiplier, two issues arise:

94 Ms Kuppusamy submits that her remaining number of working years should be calculated based on a retirement age of 63 years’ old. ¹²⁷ She relies on Mr Riduan’s oral evidence that the oldest Malaysian citizen working at Eve3r as a “Security Officer” is 62 years old and that this Security Officer’s work permit from the MOM had been extended until the age of 63. ¹²⁸ As Ms Kuppusamy is presently 54 years’ old, she calculates that she has nine more working years and that the multiplier should be determined accordingly.

95 On the other hand, Huationg submits that the minimum retirement age in Malaysia is 60 years’ old. Therefore, Ms Kuppusamy has a remaining working life of five years and eight months as of the assessment of damages hearing. ¹²⁹ This submission, and the evidence supporting it, was raised for the first time, after the trial, in Huationg’s Reply Submissions. As such, Ms Kuppusamy has not had the opportunity to cross-examine Huationg or any expert on this, or adduce evidence in response. Accordingly, I do not allow Huationg’s application to adduce such evidence after the trial, nor accept its submission. For completeness, I observe that in any event, such evidence is not germane to the issue at hand. 60 years’ old is the minimum retirement age, prior to which a Malaysian employer may not retire an employee. Huationg has not shown that there is a legislative bar precluding Ms Kuppusamy from continuing to work beyond this minimum retirement age. Moreover, this minimum retirement age applies to persons working in Malaysia and not Singapore, where Ms Kuppusamy would have continued working but for the Accident.

96 I accept Ms Kuppusamy’s submission, based on Riduan’s evidence, ¹³⁰ that she could have worked as a security guard at Eve3r until the age of 63. As she was born in February 1969, ¹³¹ she would turn 63 years’ old in February 2032. Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for LFE for the period starting May 2023. ¹³² However, in light of the Parties’ submission for damages for PTLE to include the loss of earnings for May 2023, ¹³³ the relevant period for assessing LFE begins from June 2023. Ms Kuppusamy has not submitted as to whether the remaining number of working years should be calculated with reference to the end of the year she turns 63 years’ old (ie, 31 December 2032) or the date on which she turns 63 years’ old (ie, 4 February 2032). As damages for LFE constitute special damages, I will adopt a conservative approach and find that the relevant period for determining the multiplier ends on the date which Ms Kuppusamy turns 63 years’ old (ie, 4 February 2032). Consequently, eight years and eight months remain in Ms Kuppusamy’s working life, including the three months she expects to spend finding employment. The multiplier should hence be calculated on the basis of 8.67 years remaining.

97 Referencing Hauw Soo Hoon et al, Actuarial Tables with Explanatory Notes for use in Personal Injury and Death Claims (Academy Publishing, 2021) (“Actuarial Tables”), Ms Kuppusamy submits that if the Actuarial Approach is adopted, the multiplier should be 8.3. ¹³⁴ On the other hand, if the Arithmetic Approach is adopted, the multiplier should be 7.97. ¹³⁵ Huationg did not submit on which approach should be adopted, but did submit in relation to FMEs that the multiplier should not be determined with reference to the Actuarial Tables as this applies only to Singapore citizens.

98 In Pollmann, Christian Joachim v Ye Xianrong [2021] 5 SLR 1111 (“Pollmann”), the court held at [16]:

99 Based on the Parties’ submissions, and the court’s holding in Pollmann, two sub-issues arise in relation to the calculation of the multiplier:

(a) whether Ms Kuppusamy can rely on the Actuarial Tables; and

(b) if not, what the outcome of adopting the Arithmetic Approach is.

100 Ms Kuppusamy’s position is that the Actuarial Tables may be relied on if the multiplier is adjusted to account for differences in life expectancy. ¹³⁶ According to the Actuarial Tables, the applicable multiplier based on a working life ending at the age of 63 is 8.91. ¹³⁷ Ms Kuppusamy submits that this figure may be adjusted downwards by 6.87% to obtain a multiplier of 8.3, in order to account for the difference between life expectancy of women in Singapore (ie, 85.9 years) and that in Malaysia (ie, 80 years). ¹³⁸

101 Even if the court does not adopt the Actuarial Approach with reference to the Actuarial Tables, Ms Kuppusamy submits that the multiplier derived from the Actuarial Tables should not be totally excluded. The Personal Injury (Claims Assessment) Review Committee (“PIRC”), using data from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook on life expectancy, found that there was no significant impact after applying the mortality rate in Bangladesh and China compared to a Singaporean male aged 30 (multiplier of 24.1 and 23.7 versus 24.6 respectively). Ms Kuppusamy submits that on this basis, the multiplier derived based on the Actuarial Tables can act as a “check-post” for the Court in selecting the appropriate multiplier.

102 Huationg submits, albeit in relation to the multiplier for FME, that the multipliers set out in the Actuarial Tables should not apply. In Hafizul, the Court of Appeal at [53] rejected an adoption of the United Kingdom’s Ogden Table in Singapore “because [the Ogden Tables] are based on projected mortality rates in the UK”. Applying the same reasoning, Huationg’s position is that the Actuarial Tables should not apply to foreign plaintiffs.

103 It is undisputed that the Actuarial Tables are based on data of the life expectancy of Singapore residents and that Ms Kuppusamy is a Malaysian citizen. In the Explanatory Notes to the Actuarial Tables, there is an explicit caveat that the multipliers in the Actuarial Tables are based on the mortality rates of Singapore residents, and hence the use of the tables may not be suitable for non-Singapore residents such as migrant workers. In addition, three significant elements are built into the Actuarial Tables: (a) they are based on a yield curve that represents expected investment returns for investments of different periods of time in Singapore; (b) it caters for inflation by adopting the historical average price inflation in Singapore of 2%; (c) there is a built-in mortality improvement of 2.6% per annum for both genders in Singapore, derived using a simple average of the mortality improvement over the past ten years. Ms Kuppusamy has not submitted as to how the multiplier derived from the Actuarial Tables can be adjusted to account for the differences between these factors and that in Malaysia.

104 While the Preface to the Actuarial Tables mentions that the PIRC used data from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook on life expectancy in Bangladesh and China to arrive at equivalent multipliers for a Chinese and Bangladeshi male, it does not state the methodology used to derive these equivalent multipliers. Consequently, it is not clear if Ms Kuppusamy’s approach of applying a discount to the multiplier derived from the Actuarial Tables to reflect only differences in life expectancies is sufficiently robust. This approach is also not substantiated with any submissions or evidence. Moreover, as highlighted above, the Actuarial Tables contain three significant elements that are peculiar to Singapore and Ms Kuppusamy has not addressed how these elements are taken into account by her proposed discount. In view of the above, I do not consider the multiplier set out in the Actuarial Tables, with or without Ms Kuppusamy’s proposed adjustment for life expectancy, to be directly applicable here. It is, at most, a reference point, and even then, to be referred to with caution.

105 In the alternative, Ms Kuppusamy submits that if the Actuarial Tables do not apply because she is a migrant worker, the Arithmetic Approach using the formula set out in Kenneth Quek (CA) at [72] should be adopted.

106 At the outset, I note that Ms Kuppusamy’s submission for the formula in Kenneth Quek (CA) to apply, includes the discount rate applied therein. ¹³⁹ In Kenneth Quek (CA), the Court of Appeal observed at [78] that “the implicit rate of return for awards of damages in Singapore has been between 4% to 5% per annum”. Notwithstanding, the court there applied a discount rate of 5.44% because the relevant number of periods was 50 years. Despite this significantly longer time period compared to the present case, I note that Ms Kuppusamy did not submit for a lower discount rate. Huationg also did not make any submissions in this regard. Accordingly, my analysis proceeds on the basis of adopting a discount rate of 5.44%.

107 Applying a discount rate of 5.44% per annum on the basis of nine remaining working years, Ms Kuppusamy submits that the multiplier should be 7.97. However, I observe that this multiplier is calculated based on ten remaining working years, not nine years as she submits. Based on her submission of nine remaining working years, referencing the Annexure of Kenneth Quek (CA), the multiplier sought by Ms Kuppusamy should be 7.35, and not 7.97. As such, I will consider her submission with reference to a multiplier of 7.35.

108 Before giving my decision on this, I reiterate that the relevant time period to apply to the formula set out in Kenneth Quek (CA) would be 8.67 years (ie, the remaining number of working years that Ms Kuppusamy has), as opposed to nine years, as she submitted. I also make one additional clarification. As recognised in Kenneth Quek (CA) at [43(b)], the multiplier is undergirded by, amongst other things, “the receipt of compensation for the future losses by the claimant as an immediate lump sum, which can almost invariably be invested at a rate over and above that of inflation to make a profit”. This lump sum payment is the aggregate of periodic, usually annual, payments that may be paid out, hypothetically speaking, at the beginning or the end of each period (eg, 1 January or 31 December). Depending on the court’s decision as to whether each periodic payment should take place at the beginning or the end of the period, the relevant formula differs. The effect of the decision as to payment date is that, for example, the multiplier for payments on 1 January is higher than that for payments on 31 December.

109 The table in the Annexure of Kenneth Quek (CA) sets out payments that begin at Year 0 (ie, at the beginning of the period, when the award is granted by the court; eg, 1 January). The present value of this first payment, as a fraction of its nominal value, is 1.00 – ie, the first payment is not discounted. This suggests that the formula applied there to calculate the applicable multiplier connotes that the periodic payment takes place on 1 January:

Here, “n” refers to the number of periods (in years) while “r” refers to the applicable discount rate.

110 In contrast, the High Court in Pollmann at [78] and Muhammad Adam bin Muhammad Lee (suing by his litigation representatives Noraini bte Tabiin and Nurul Ashikin bte Muhammad Lee) v Tay Jia Rong Sean [2022] 4 SLR 1045 at [197] applied the following formula to the calculation of the multiplier:

Similarly, “n” refers to the number of periods (in years) while “r” refers to the applicable discount rate. The effect of this formula is that the “payments” are not treated as beginning at Year 0 (ie, when the award is granted by the court). Instead, the first payment is treated as occurring at the end of Year 0 (eg, on 31 December). As such, this first payment must also be discounted according to the relevant discount rate, as reflected in the differences between the applicable formula in Kenneth Quek (CA) and Pollmann.

111 On the facts of the present case, and Ms Kuppusamy’s submission for the formula in Kenneth Quek (CA) to be used (see [105] above), I will assess the damages for LFE on the basis of periodic “payments” at the beginning of the relevant period. Applying the discount rate submitted by Ms Kuppusamy of 5.44% and 8.67 years as the number of periods, the applicable multiplier is 7.14 (to two decimal places):

112 For completeness, I observe that the applicability of the Precedent Approach is limited to that of a “check” to ensure consistency with cases involving similarly situated claimants (Kenneth Quek (CA) at [54]). The lack of information about the real interest rates in Malaysia also affects the reliability of using the Precedent Approach here. In Hafizul, the plaintiff returned to Bangladesh (and was to invest his lump sum award in Bangladesh) but no real interest rate information on Bangladesh was available. Having observed this, the Court of Appeal in Kenneth Quek (CA) stated at [53] that simply applying the multipliers used in past cases which involve local claimants would be unsatisfactory where the claimant in the instant case is a foreigner. In this case, Ms Kuppusamy is a Malaysian citizen who will be living in Malaysia (and likely investing her lump sum award there), but no information on real interest rates in Malaysia has been adduced by either party.

113 Further, neither party surfaced any precedent which has used a multiplier that could apply in respect of Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for LFE. I note that Huationg highlights, in relation to the multiplier for FMEs, Toh Wai Sie and another v Ranjendran s/o G Selamuthu [2012] SGHC 33 (“Toh Wai Sie”). Huationg’s submission is that this case is not applicable and Ms Kuppusamy has not relied on Toh Wai Sie in her submissions. Nevertheless, Toh Wai Sie provides a reference point of an applicable multiplier, in the absence of other precedents. There, the plaintiff had a remaining life expectancy of nine years, similar to the number of years remaining of Ms Kuppusamy’s working life. No discount was applied, and the multiplier used by the court was nine.

114 I next compare the multiplier derived from the Actuarial Tables (ie, 8.30), with that derived from the Arithmetic Approach (ie, 7.14), and the multiplier used in Toh Wai Sie (ie, 9) per the Precedent Approach, for the purposes of cross-checking. The common limitation with each of the approaches is that the Parties have not adduced evidence of the real interest rates or the yield curves in Malaysia for a proper comparison with that in Singapore. Notwithstanding, the multiplier derived from the Arithmetic Approach, applying the discount rate Ms Kuppusamy submits, does not deviate too excessively as to be unduly inconsistent with past cases or the Actuarial Tables. Additionally, comparing the multiplier to that which she submits (ie, after correcting for the number of periods, see [107] above), the multiplier of 7.14 is not unfair to Ms Kuppusamy on the facts of this case. I will hence adopt the multiplier of 7.14 derived from the Arithmetic Approach.

115 Before calculating the quantum of damages for LFE by multiplying the multiplier by the multiplicand, I first address an oversight in Ms Kuppusamy’s submissions on quantum. Applying the Arithmetic Approach as set out in Kenneth Quek (CA), she claims that the quantum of damages for LFE should be S$191,116, ¹⁴⁰ based on the following:

116 It is evident from the table above that Ms Kuppusamy did not apply the multiplier to the period from May to August 2023, during which she submits she would be looking for employment. A multiplier incorporates an appropriate discount rate to account for the present value of the total award. In other words, no discount rate was applied to the damages claimed for the period from May to August 2023. Furthermore, the effect of Ms Kuppusamy’s method of calculation is that she would receive an award of damages comprising of “payments” for a period of nine year and four months, and not nine years.

117 In light of my observations, I do not adopt Ms Kuppusamy’s method of calculation. Instead, given that the assessment of damages took place in May 2023, and taking the period from June 2023 to February 2032 (months inclusive – ie, 105 months), I derive the annual multiplicand as follows.

118 Multiplying the annual multiplicand of S$22,301.28 by the multiplier of 7.14, I award Ms Kuppusamy damages for LFE in the sum of S$159.231.14.

119 Ms Kuppusamy seeks damages for LEC ¹⁴¹ while Huationg submits that there should not be any such award. ¹⁴²

120  Three issues arise in relation to the Parties’ submissions on Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for damages for LEC:

121 Ms Kuppusamy submits that it is settled law that damages for both LEC and LFE can be awarded as they are both distinct and different heads of claims. She relies on Mykytowych at [140].

122 Huationg submits that there should not be such an award. Instead, any damages for LEC would be included in the damages for LFE. ¹⁴³ The damages claimed for LEC and LFE arise out of the loss of earnings which Ms Kuppusamy would have earned as a security guard in Singapore. ¹⁴⁴ To award both LEC and LFE would amount to double recovery. ¹⁴⁵ Huationg relies on Chang Ah Lek and others v Lim Ah Koon [1998] 3 SLR(R) 551 (“Chang Ah Lek”) at [31].

123 I note that Chang Ah Lek did not specifically address the issue of whether a claim for LEC can be made even if an award for LFE has been made. Indeed, the Court of Appeal’s decision at [32] to award damages for LFE in place of LEC, was based on its finding that the evidence before the court supported damages for LFE, as opposed to LEC. Regardless, this specific issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in Chai Kang Wei Samuel v Shaw Linda Gillian [2010] 3 SLR 587 (“Samuel Chai”), Mykytowych and Lua Bee Kiang. These decisions support Ms Kuppusamy’s position that LEC and LFE are distinct heads of claim and that an award of damages for one head does not preclude an award of the other.

124 In Mykytowych, the Court of Appeal explained the distinction between LEC and LFE at [140]. There, the Court of Appeal explained that LEC and LFE are distinct types of awards and that it is open to grant both types of awards:

125 The Court of Appeal elaborated at [141] on the approaches to assess the quantum of damages for LFE and LEC. When determining the quantum of damages for LEC, the court:

126 Further, the Court of Appeal in Samuel Chai at [23] rejected the argument that where a substantial award was made for LFE, only a nominal award for LEC should be given:

127 It is clear from the Court of Appeal’s explanations in these cases, and in Lua Bee Kiang, that a plaintiff can claim damages for both LFE and LEC, and that a substantial award of damages for LFE does not bar an award for LEC.

128 In Lua Bee Kiang, the Court of Appeal held at [50] that the question was not whether the plaintiff was at risk of losing his post-accident job, but whether he has been prevented from competing for his pre-accident job. ¹⁴⁶ On the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff had been so prevented as he could no longer work as a carpenter following the accident. Instead, he had to work as a cleaner, for which he was paid less than as a carpenter.

129 In this case, Ms Kuppusamy worked as a security guard prior to the Accident. She submits that, now as an amputee, she is unable to do security work. ¹⁴⁷ Further, she claims that she will not be able to find a job as a security guard even with a prosthetic leg. ¹⁴⁸ As such, the injury caused by the Accident has prevented her from competing in the market for her pre-Accident job. Instead, she will have to undertake jobs that would pay her less than she would have otherwise earned, such as being a sales assistant. ¹⁴⁹

130 In terms of the quantum of damages, Ms Kuppusamy seeks S$15,000 and distinguishes her case from Lua Bee Kiang in terms of the respective plaintiffs’ remaining number of working years. ¹⁵⁰ In Lua Bee Kiang, the court found that the plaintiff would work for another six years, and the plaintiff was awarded S$5,000. In comparison, Ms Kuppusamy submits that she would have been able to work in Singapore for another nine years (ie, until the age of 63) and in Malaysia thereafter for another 12 years (ie, until the age of 75). ¹⁵¹ .

131 Huationg cites Chang Ah Lek and submits that Ms Kuppusamy should not be entitled to damages for LEC. In Chang Ah Lek, the Court of Appeal held at [31] that:

132 Here, Eve3r did not continue to employ Ms Kuppusamy after the Accident. Huationg submits that Ms Kuppusamy is thus not entitled to damages for LEC.

133 Huationg also submits that the evidence barely supports Ms Kuppusamy’s claim that she had lost her competitive position in the labour market as a security guard. ¹⁵² Huationg repeats substantial portions of its submissions against an award of LFE in support of this. ¹⁵³ In particular, that: (a) Ms Kuppusamy testified that she was capable of undertaking employment as a security guard; ¹⁵⁴ (b) she is able to return to work as a security guard with the use of the prosthetic; ¹⁵⁵ (c) Eve3r may be willing to re-employ her; ¹⁵⁶ and (d) she has not proven that she is unable to find work as a security guard (see above at [84]). ¹⁵⁷

134 Further, Huationg’s position is that Ms Kuppusamy had overstated her remaining number of working years. ¹⁵⁸ As alluded to above, Huationg sought leave after the trial to adduce evidence referencing Malaysian legislation and information published by the International Labour Organisation. Huationg relies on this evidence to submit that the minimum retirement age in Malaysia is 60 years’ old. ¹⁵⁹ Hence, based on Ms Kuppusamy’s age as at the date of the hearing for the assessment of damages (ie, 48 years’ old), her remaining working life is only five years and eight months’ long. ¹⁶⁰

135 In my view, Huationg misreads Chang Ah Lek. The plaintiff there was a self-employed ironmonger who was subcontracted by larger organisations, such as Hock Seng Engineering Works. The Court of Appeal found at [30] that there was no direct evidence that the plaintiff could not obtain work as an ironmonger on sub-contract from other engineering organisations, as a result of his disability. The court then contrasted this at [31] with a hypothetical situation where the plaintiff was a full-time employee of Hock Seng Engineering Works. The court observed that if the plaintiff was an employee who lost his employment with Hock Seng Engineering Works and was thrown into the labour market, his competitive edge to find employment as an ironmonger would be severely handicapped by his disability. In such a case, he would be entitled to damages for LEC. Accordingly, a key consideration in Chang Ah Lek for entitlement to LEC is the claimant’s competitiveness on the labour market for the same work that he did prior to the accident.

136 This is consistent with the more recent Court of Appeal decisions in Mykytowych and Lua Bee Kiang. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Lua Bee Kiang stated specifically at [50] that the question is not whether a plaintiff is at risk of losing his current, post-accident employment, but whether he has been prevented from competing in the market for his pre-accident job. At the final hearing for this matter, Huationg accepted this reading of Chang Ah Lek, but further submitted that as a matter of evidence, the case for LEC has not been met. ¹⁶¹

137 I find that in this case, there is evidence that Ms Kuppusamy has been prevented from competing in the market for her pre-accident job as a security guard in Singapore. While she is willing to, and considers herself able to, take on such a job, this is not a view unconditionally shared by her former employer. Mr Riduan testified on behalf of Eve3r that “Security Officers” need to attend to and assist in emergency cases and incidents. ¹⁶² Consequently, Mr Riduan expressed the view that it would be quite risky for Eve3r’s customers to accept a Security Officer with Ms Kuppusamy’s disability. ¹⁶³

138 While Mr Riduan accepted that there was a possibility that Eve3r could rehire Ms Kuppusamy if various conditions were met, he also explained that the satisfaction of these conditions posed difficulties. First, Eve3r would need to inquire into whether its customers are comfortable with being supplied with a security guard suffering from a disability. Second, there are also concerns over Ms Kuppusamy’s ability to successfully complete MOM’s medical examinations to obtain a work permit for her to work in Singapore. The consistency of Mr Riduan’s evidence is further supported by his testimony that he does not have any experience applying to MOM for a work permit to employ a potential “Security Officer” suffering from any handicap. ¹⁶⁴ In addition, Ms Kuppusamy had also applied unsuccessfully for a job a security guard job in Malaysia. While this was only one application, the rejection does fortify the testimony of Mr Riduan about the difficulties with rehiring Ms Kuppusamy as a security guard.

139 Consequently, applying the test as framed in Lua Bee Kiang, I find that it is clear that Ms Kuppusamy has been prevented from competing for her pre-accident job as a security guard. As such, I find that she is entitled to an award of damages for LEC.

140 In terms of the quantum, I observe that Ms Kuppusamy has not proven that she would be able to work in Malaysia until the age of 75. As for Huationg’s submission on the minimum retirement age of 60 years old in Malaysia, I reiterate my observations above (at [95]) that there is nothing precluding Ms Kuppusamy from working beyond the age of 60 and that this retirement age applies to persons working in Malaysia, not Singapore. As Ms Kuppusamy had been working in Singapore as a security guard at the time of the Accident, in my view, the assessment of damages should account for her disadvantage on the open employment market in both Malaysia and Singapore, where she was likely to have continued working as a security guard if not for the Accident. Given that Eve3r has an employee who has been renewed for employment until the age of 63 and Singapore’s minimum retirement age, I award Ms Kuppusamy damages for LEC up to the age of 63. In this case, the award for LEC takes into account a working period of eight years and eight months (ie, from June 2023 to February 2032), as compared to the six working years in Lua Bee Kiang. In light of these factors, I award her damages of S$7,500 for LEC.

141 In relation to her MEs, Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for:

142 The Parties agree that the quantum of damages for MEs incurred in Singapore is the revised amount of S$29,842.69. ¹⁶⁵ The remaining issues to be determined in relation to the damages for the claims above are:

(i) this includes the sub-issue of whether the claim for Ms Kuppusamy’s first prosthetic leg should be allowed; and

143 Ms Kuppusamy initially sought RM29,568.70 (S$8,960.21) in damages for MEs incurred in Malaysia. However, after Huationg highlighted a double counting of the same transaction amounting to RM1,557, ¹⁶⁶ Ms Kuppusamy adjusted her claim of damages for the MEs she incurred in Malaysia (excluding the expense for the MPCP) to RM28,011.70 (S$8,488.39). ¹⁶⁷

144 Ms Kuppusamy’s above claim for MEs incurred in Malaysia includes the cost of her first prosthetic limb, amounting to RM26,477.90 (S$8,023.61). ¹⁶⁸ Huationg claims that Ms Kuppusamy did not use this first prosthetic limb and obtained this prosthetic independent of a doctor’s recommendation. ¹⁶⁹ Hence, she should only be entitled to damages for MEs incurred in Malaysia amounting to RM1,533. ¹⁷⁰

145 Ms Kuppusamy disagrees with Huationg’s claim that she did not use the first prosthetic. She submits that she used it for more than a year, albeit with the aid of a walking stick. This was also her oral testimony. Notably, counsel for Huationg did not question her on whether she used the first prosthetic limb. Instead, she was asked whether the first prosthetic limb “help[ed]” her. ¹⁷¹ Counsel for Huationg put to Ms Kuppusamy that since it did not help her, Huationg should not pay for the first prosthetic limb. ¹⁷² As Huationg has provided no substantiation for its claim that Ms Kuppusamy did not use the prosthetic, and in light of the latter’s evidence, I find that she did use the first prosthetic.

146 Huationg also submits that Ms Kuppusamy obtained the first prosthetic limb from Teh Lin Prosthetic & Orthopaedic Co Sdn Bhd (“Teh Lin Prosthetic”) independently, without a doctor’s recommendation. Relying on a quotation dated 12 March 2018 (the “Quotation”), Huationg claims that Ms Kuppusamy obtained this prosthetic on this date, ¹⁷³ as opposed to in or around May 2018, as stated in her AEIC. ¹⁷⁴ If so, Ms Kuppusamy would have obtained her first prosthetic limb before she consulted Dr Amitabha Lahiri Amitabha (“Dr Lahiri”), a doctor at NUH who had treated Ms Kuppusamy soon after the Accident. Dr Lahiri assessed Ms Kuppusamy on 19 April 2018, ¹⁷⁵ and provided a “Specialist Medical Report” dated 3 May 2018 detailing the findings of the assessment she performed on the former date. ¹⁷⁶ As such, Huationg should not be liable for the cost of the first prosthetic limb.

147 Huationg’s claim that Ms Kuppusamy had obtained the first prosthetic limb without a doctor’s recommendation is premised on the date of the Quotation (ie, 12 March 2018). However, being a quotation, it is not clear from this document alone whether Ms Kuppusamy obtained her first prosthetic leg on this date, as suggested by Huationg, or at a later date, per the former’s AEIC. This issue was not put to Ms Kuppusamy during the hearing. Additionally, her testimony that she had obtained the first prosthetic limb in May 2018 was consistent throughout the trial. ¹⁷⁷ In other words, there is no other evidence that clearly contradicts the evidence in Ms Kuppusamy AEIC that she obtained the first prosthetic limb in May 2018.

148 I will hence allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of damages for MEs incurred in Malaysia amounting to RM28,011.70 (S$8,488.39), which includes the cost of her first prosthetic leg at RM26,477.90 (S$8,023.61).

149 The next issue relates to whether it was reasonable for Ms Kuppusamy to be fitted with the MPCP such that Huationg should be liable for damages incurred from the cost of this prosthetic. As stated above (at [7]), Ms Kuppusamy’s prosthetic expert, Mr Prasad, recommended and fitted her with the MPCP. In contrast, Huationg’s prosthetic expert, Ms Gurusamy, recommended the MCP.

150 Generally, different types of prosthetics exist to support different intensities of activity, which range from levels K0 to K4. K4 prosthetics support the highest intensity of activity. Both experts agreed that Ms Kuppusamy needed a prosthetic that supports activity at K2 to K3 levels, to walk and climb stairs, but not run with them.

151 Mr Prasad testified that the MPCP would generally allow patients to recover 80–85% of their former functionality. In making his recommendation, Mr Prasad took into account factors such as Ms Kuppusamy’s age, the need to avoid falls as she gets older, the need for her to go back to work in places such as shopping malls, and that she is not married and thus may have to live alone. Mr Prasad’s view was that the MCP would not be as effective as the MPCP. Amongst other things, recipients of the MCP would have to walk on their toes to go down slopes and lift their thighs higher to go up stairs. ¹⁷⁸

152 Ms Gurusamy considered it reasonable for Mr Prasad to recommend the MPCP. When drafting her report, Ms Gurusamy had sight of Mr Prasad’s report and recommendation. During the hearing, she agreed with Mr Prasad that the MCP would be more effective for someone with K3 to K4 level of activity, and less effective to support K2 to K3 levels of activity – ie, Ms Kuppusamy’s categorised levels of activity. ¹⁷⁹ She also agreed that the MPCP was more effective for handling inclines and stairs, and even for movement on flat ground. ¹⁸⁰ Ms Gurusamy also testified that with the MCP, there would be a need to go to a doctor for adjustment in various situations, such as when the height of the recipient’s shoe changes. ¹⁸¹

153 As Ms Kuppusamy had already committed to and made payment for the MPCP by the time Ms Gurusamy’s report came out, Ms Gurusamy said that in these circumstances, Ms Kuppusamy should continue using MPCP. ¹⁸² Further, she stated that once Ms Kuppusamy was comfortable with the MPCP, it was reasonable not to expect the latter to change from the MPCP to the MCP. ¹⁸³

154 Although Ms Gurusamy recommended the MCP in her report, it is notable that when asked by counsel for Huationg if she considered the MCP to be a fair and reasonable recommendation, her response was that if cost was not a consideration, the MPCP is actually reasonable for Ms Kuppusamy, as it mimics natural walking and was more effective. ¹⁸⁴

155 Despite its prosthetic expert’s testimony, Huationg maintains that the use of the MPCP and the cost incurred for it was not reasonable. ¹⁸⁵ In particular, it relies on Mr Prasad’s testimony that he did not undertake an assessment of Ms Kuppusamy’s financial means when recommending the MPCP. ¹⁸⁶ Huationg also submits, albeit in relation to FMEs, that Mr Prasad had failed to consider alternative prosthetics, including prosthetics that were more commonly used and/or those subsidised by the Malaysian government. ¹⁸⁷ Additionally, Huationg highlights that the MPCP is deficient to the MCP in that the latter allows for running and would better facilitate Ms Kuppusamy’s ability to return to her role as a security guard. ¹⁸⁸ In relation to Ms Gurusamy’s evidence in court, Huationg submits that this should be understood as evidence given in the context that cost is not an issue, when in fact, the cost of the prosthetic limb cannot be disregarded completely ¹⁸⁹

156 In response, Ms Kuppusamy submits that whether the recommendation and use of the MPCP is reasonable is not dependent on a financial assessment of her means. ¹⁹⁰ She asserts that Huationg’s position runs counter to the principle of compensation to reinstate the victim to a state of affairs as if the tort had not occurred, or as close to such state as possible. ¹⁹¹ In addition, there is no basis for Huationg’s submission that Mr Prasad did not consider other alternatives or government subsidies in selecting the MPCP, since even Ms Gurusamy agreed that the MPCP is suitable for her. Finally, Ms Kuppusamy highlights, albeit in relation to her claim for FMEs, that Huationg has not led evidence that she was eligible for subsidised medical care in Malaysia. ¹⁹²

157 A claimant’s impecuniosity and financial means, or lack thereof, should not be a consideration as to whether the cost incurred by the claimant as a result of the accident caused by the tortfeasor, is reasonable. The effect of Huationg’s submission is that a claimant who is impecunious would only be entitled to cheaper compensatory remedies, simply because of their relative financial means. This cannot be right. It cannot lie in the mouth of the tortfeasor to deny the claimant of the costs of a remedy which was made necessary only by the tortfeasor’s actions. This is consistent with the compensation principle as set out by the Court of Appeal in ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily (trading as Access International Services) [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [14] (affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 689 at [58]), citing Lord Blackburn’s dicta in Livingstone v The Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 that compensation should “put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong”.

158 It is thus clear that it is not a claimant’s financial means that determines the remedy which the claimant should receive. Instead, the remedy, and the award for the cost of that remedy, should be one which puts the claimant in a position as close to if the tort did not occur. Huationg submits that even this principle is subject to the test of reasonableness, citing Pollmann at [150]. However, what Vinodh Coomaraswamy J observed there was that the defendant in that case made a submission that the principle of compensation (set out above) is subject to a test of reasonableness. Coomaraswamy J then explained at [151] that the requirement of reasonableness is not a qualification of the general principle of restitutio in integrum and that the “requirement of reasonableness is simply an aspect of the plaintiff’s so-called “duty” to mitigate his loss: a plaintiff will not be able to recover any loss which he has incurred by acting unreasonably after suffering the tort”. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, there is no suggestion that Ms Kuppusamy was acting unreasonably in approaching Mr Prasad and relying on his recommendation. Indeed, Huationg’s submission is that Mr Prasad in making his recommendation should have taken into account Ms Kuppusamy’s impecuniosity, but as seen from above, there is no legal foundation for such a submission.

159 It is useful to see how this compensatory principle was applied by Tay Yong Kwang J (as he then was) in Kenneth Quek (HC). There, the plaintiff’s activity level was assessed to be at a K3 level. Hence, Tay J (as he then was) held that the plaintiff was only entitled to a K3 prosthesis, as opposed to a K4 level prosthesis that the plaintiff claimed for. There is no suggestion here that the MPCP is for an activity level beyond what Ms Kuppusamy needs. In Pollmann, Coomaraswamy J found that an award for employing a caregiver, as opposed to a private nurse, would have been reasonable as the former is less expensive while still capable of satisfying the plaintiff’s needs with more or less the same effectiveness. In this case, Huationg has not adduced evidence of an alternative prosthesis that satisfies Ms Kuppusamy’s needs with more or less the same effectiveness. Even Huationg’s own prosthetic expert, Ms Gurusamy, testified to the limitation of the MCP that she recommended.

160 As such, I find that Ms Kuppusamy’s financial means relative to the cost of the MPCP is not a relevant factor as to whether the use of the MPCP is reasonable. Instead, the focus of the inquiry is whether the MPCP would put her in a position as close to that if the Accident did not occur.

161 For the same reason, Ms Gurusamy’s recommendation for Ms Kuppusamy to have been fitted with the MCP does not undermine her testimony that if cost was not a consideration, the MPCP is actually a reasonable option for Ms Kuppusamy. In any event, Ms Gurusamy’s evidence as to the relative limitations of the MCP and that it is less effective than the MPCP for Ms Kuppusamy’s categorised activity level of K2 to K3, were not made in the context of cost considerations. These limitations also undermine Huationg’s submission that the MCP would better facilitate Ms Kuppusamy’s return to work as a security guard.

162 In relation to FMEs, Huationg submits that Mr Prasad should have considered other alternative prosthetics, including those subsidised by government and those commonly used. As this submission is relevant to the present issue, I will deal with this submission here. I find that this submission is not supported by any evidence of such alternatives, other than the MCP.

163 Considering and comparing the experts’ assessment of the MPCP and the MCP, I find Ms Kuppusamy’s use of the MPCP is reasonable, as were the MEs incurred for the MPCP. This is in view of Mr Prasad’s cogent explanations as to why he recommended and fitted Ms Kuppusamy with the MPCP, and the views of Huationg’s own prosthetic expert that the use of the MPCP is reasonable and more suitable for Ms Kuppusamy’s level of activity compared to the MCP. I will hence allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for MEs for the MPCP (ie, her second prosthetic limb) in the amount claimed of RM250,650 (S$75,954.55).

164 In totality, I grant Ms Kuppusamy damages for MEs totalling S$114,285.63, according to the following breakdown:

165 I next assess Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of damages for FMEs. Specifically, she claims FMEs for the cost of:

166 In relation to Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for damages arising from future replacement of her prosthetic limb, two issues arise:

167 As stated above (at [149]), Mr Prasad recommended and fitted Ms Kuppusamy with the MPCP while Ms Gurusamy recommended the MCP. However, Ms Gurusamy acknowledged that the MPCP was a reasonable recommendation for Ms Kuppusamy.

168 Mr Prasad was of the view that Ms Kuppusamy would be able to continue using the MPCP without difficulties even as she ages and her activity levels decrease. ¹⁹³ Mr Prasad also considered but ultimately did not recommend using a prosthesis that could support a lower level of activity, at K1 to K2 levels, after she retires. He was of the view that ageing would not mean that Ms Kuppusamy would be rendered wheelchair-bound. Instead, she would need to be active. ¹⁹⁴ Also, there would be adaptation problems from adjusting to a lower model, especially when she is older. ¹⁹⁵

169 As Ms Kuppusamy had already committed to and made payment for the MPCP by the time Ms Gurusamy’s report came out, Ms Gurusamy said that in the circumstances, Ms Kuppusamy should continue using MPCP. ¹⁹⁶ She stated that once Ms Kuppusamy was comfortable with the MPCP, it was reasonable not to expect her to change from the MPCP to the MCP. ¹⁹⁷ Ms Gurusamy further testified that if financial considerations were not accounted for, Ms Kuppusamy could continue using the MPCP. ¹⁹⁸

170 Huationg submits that Ms Kuppusamy’s future replacement prosthetics should be the MCP, and not the MPCP. Huationg’s submissions on this mirror its submissions on the reasonableness of the MPCP as set out above at [155]. Primarily, Huationg submits that the MPCP is more costly than other alternatives; is unable to restore Ms Kuppusamy to her full function or allow her to completely resume her duties as a security officer; ¹⁹⁹ and Mr Prasad failed to consider the applicability of any government subsidies to Ms Kuppusamy, ²⁰⁰ or other prosthetic alternatives. ²⁰¹

171 As highlighted above at [157], Ms Kuppusamy’s financial means and ability to afford the MPCP is not a relevant factor that affects the reasonableness of its use. In the same vein, it does not affect the reasonableness of the MPCP for future replacement prosthetics. As such, the relatively higher price of the MPCP compared to the MCP and Mr Prasad omitting to consider the applicability of government subsidiaries to Ms Kuppusamy are not relevant considerations. In any event, Huationg has not provided any evidence that Ms Kuppusamy is eligible for government subsidies. ²⁰²

172 In addition, Huationg’s own prosthetic expert, Ms Gurusamy, testified that the MPCP is “more efficient” for walking long distances and climbing stairs, in comparison to the MCP which she recommended. ²⁰³ She also agreed that the MPCP is “more effective” on flat ground. ²⁰⁴ In other words, the MPCP would allow Ms Kuppusamy to recover a higher degree of functionality than the MCP. Her evidence is consistent with Mr Prasad’s testimony. ²⁰⁵ Ms Gurusamy’s evidence also undermines Huationg’s submission that the MCP is more effective than the MPCP in allowing Ms Kuppusamy to recover the functionality that she might need for jobs, such as that of a security guard.

173 Finally, while Huationg submits that Mr Prasad failed to consider other alternative prosthetics, it has not provided any evidence of what such alternatives might be, other than the MCP, which I have dealt with above at [162]. In any event, Huationg’s submission that Mr Prasad failed to consider other alternative prosthetics is overstated. Mr Prasad testified that he did not consider other brands of prosthetics. ²⁰⁶ However, Mr Prasad agreed with Huationg’s counsel that Ottobock, the company which produces the MPCP, has a wide range of prosthetics. He testified that he did consider Ottobock’s alternative offerings but recommended the MPCP for its greater stability as Ms Kuppusamy had been having difficulties walking with her old protheses. ²⁰⁷ He also testified that the MPCP was a better alternative compared to the more commonly used prosthetic leg in Malaysia, in terms of functionality ²⁰⁸ and in terms of durability. ²⁰⁹

174 In Kenneth Quek (CA), the court found at [84] that even if the activity level of the plaintiff there decreased as he aged, it would be “unduly onerous” for him to have to downgrade to a K2 prosthesis from a K3 prosthesis, and adapt to the restricted range of activities permitted by the former. In view of this and the evidence before me, I find that it is reasonable for Ms Kuppusamy’s future replacement prostheses to be the MPCP.

175 Both Prosthetic Experts factored in six replacements of Ms Kuppusamy’s prosthetic limb into their calculations of the costs of future replacements. Mr Prasad estimated that the FME incurred in replacing the MPCP would amount to RM1,745,470 (S$528,930.30). ²¹⁰ He then applied a rate of inflation of 10% per annum to estimate that the replacements of the MPCP would amount to a total sum of RM2,127,309.41 (S$644,639.22). ²¹¹ Ms Gurusamy estimates that the cost of six replacements of the MCP is RM1,145,500 (S$347,121.21), ²¹² including a 10% increase in the price of prosthetic components. ²¹³

176 In their Closing Submissions, the Parties highlight that the estimates of both Prosthetic Experts are wrong. ²¹⁴ This is because the Prosthetic Experts’ calculations were based on a period beginning when Ms Kuppusamy was 48 years’ old despite her only obtaining her existing MPCP at the age of 53. ²¹⁵ Given this delay, and the fact that the expenses incurred by her existing MPCP has been claimed under the “Medical Expenses” head of claim, two sets of prosthetic legs, inclusive of any ancillary costs, should be removed from the computations. ²¹⁶ In other words, Ms Kuppusamy would only require four replacement prosthetics (inclusive of serviceable parts) in the future. ²¹⁷

177 Ms Kuppusamy hence submits for damages in the sum of S$352,620.20 [(RM1,745,470 / 6) x 4] / 3.3) for four future replacements of the MPCP. ²¹⁸ This figure is based on Mr Prasad’s estimated total cost of future MPCP replacements excluding the 10% per annum inflation on the price of prosthetic components. ²¹⁹ On the other hand, Huationg submits in its Closing Submissions that the cost of four replacement MPCPs should be RM1,145,464.70 (S$347,110.52). ²²⁰ This figure was derived by: (a) multiplying the unit price of each item set out in Mr Prasad’s quotation by the number of changes needed for each item over the course of 26 years; and, (b) including the 10% increase in the price of prosthetic components alleged by the Prosthetic Experts.

178 Notwithstanding its submission as set out above, in its Closing and Reply Submissions, Huationg also submits that the alleged 10% inflation in the price of prosthetics is unsupported by any evidence beyond Mr Prasad’s testimony. ²²¹ Hence, Huationg submits in its Reply Submissions that the cost of four replacements of the MPCP amounts to RM1,163,646.66 (S$352,620.20), ²²² as submitted by Ms Kuppusamy. Regardless, Huationg’s position is that Ms Kuppusamy has not shown that it was reasonable to incur the cost of the MPCP. Consequently, Huationg submits that the quantum of damages should be based on the cost of the MCP. Further, it submits that the award of damages should only contemplate the costs of four replacements of the MCP prosthetic, simpliciter (ie, excluding, amongst other things, serviceable items), ²²³ at a total sum of RM494,360 (S$149,806.06). ²²⁴

179 In light of these submissions, two further sub-issues arise:

180 As stated above, Mr Prasad’s estimate of the total cost of future replacements was adjusted to account for a 10% per annum increase in the price of prosthetic components. In providing her estimation of the cost of future replacements of the MCP, Ms Gurusamy had initially applied a 5% rate of inflation to account for increases in the price of prosthetic components. ²²⁵ However, she later stated that her initial projection was outdated and agreed that based on the latest trends, the price of prosthetic components was increasing at a rate of 10% per year. Consequently, she adjusted her estimation of the cost of six future replacements to RM1,145,500 (S$347,121.21). ²²⁶

181 Huationg submits that there is no documentary evidence to support the Prosthetic Experts’ claim of such price inflation. ²²⁷ In particular, the alleged rate of inflation of 10% is significantly higher than the core rate of inflation of 3.3%, and the rate of inflation of 0.7% in the health sector, as reported by the DOSM. ²²⁸ Huationg submits that the claims of its own expert, Ms Gurusamy, are bare assertions. ²²⁹

182 I agree with Huationg that neither Ms Gurusamy nor Mr Prasad provided any documentary evidence to support the 10% per annum increase in the price of prosthetic components. This is despite the fact that this was something that could have been done. Mr Prasad said in court that he had an email that said that from 1 January 2023, the cost of every prosthetic component had increased by 10%. However, this email was not adduced. Moreover, even on Mr Prasad’s oral testimony, the vendor for the MPCP had only said that there would be a 10% price increase from 1 January 2023, and not that there would be an increase of 10% per annum. Ms Gurusamy stated that her preparedness to accept the 10% increase in price as reported by the prosthetic manufacturer was based on having done more research into the latest trends on increases in the price of prosthetic components. ²³⁰ However, she did not adduce any documentary evidence of such research or from the manufacturer to substantiate her claim of a 10% per annum increase in prosthetic component prices. Assessing the evidence in the round, I find that the claim for inflation of 10% per annum to the price of prosthetic components has not been made out.

183 Huationg submits that the award should be RM494,360 (S$149,806.06) for four replacement MCP prosthetics, simpliciter, only.

184 Ms Kuppusamy highlights that Huationg’s submission deviated substantially from the recommendation and estimation of its own prosthetic expert, Ms Gurusamy. ²³¹ Regardless, Huationg attempts to justify its submission by claiming that Mr Prasad would have been amenable to recommending Ms Kuppusamy the more commonly used, and cheaper, prosthetic limb if Ms Kuppusamy had expressed concerns over the cost of the MPCP’s. ²³²

185 However, critically, neither of the Prosthetic Experts testified that in so far as future replacements are concerned, only the MPCP prosthetic, simpliciter, would suffice. On the contrary, the estimates provided by the Prosthetic Experts suggest that the prosthetic limbs, simpliciter, and other ancillary services and/or components, such as serviceable items, will be required by Ms Kuppusamy in the future. In any event, Huationg’s submission misconstrues Mr Prasad’s evidence. Mr Prasad testified that if he was asked for a recommendation within a given budget, he would have looked into the price of alternatives and recommended something within the given budget. ²³³ But Mr Prasad also testified to the limitations of the alternative prosthetics, whether from Ottobock or those more commonly used. His recommendation for Ms Kuppusamy, albeit without considering the question of her financial means, was the MPCP. Thus, Mr Prasad’s willingness to recommend a cheaper alternative prosthetic, when budgetary concerns are raised, cannot be taken to mean that his position is that cheaper alternative prosthetics are suitable replacements for Ms Kuppusamy.

186 Following from the above, I will allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of S$352,620.20, being the cost of four replacement MPCPs, excluding the 10% inflation per annum in the price of the prosthetic components.

187 Ms Kuppusamy also claims S$42,500 for a total replacement of her right knee. ²³⁴ She relies on the evidence of Dr Muthukaruppan and Dr Bose that her right knee would be subject to increased loading, ²³⁵ and submits that she would require a total knee replacement at least once in her lifetime. As Ms Kuppusamy is not a Singapore citizen, she does not qualify for subsidised medical care and hence the applicable cost of a total replacement of her right knee would be that of a private patient. ²³⁶ Dr Muthukaruppan’s report sets out the cost of a total knee replacement for a patient who is not entitled to subsidised healthcare, as between S$40,000 to S$45,000. ²³⁷ Ms Kuppusamy submits for damages in a sum at the median point of this range. ²³⁸

188 Huationg submits that the claim for total knee replacement of the right knee should be disallowed. ²³⁹ Although there was degeneration in Ms Kuppusamy’s right knee, there was symmetrical degeneration in her left knee as well. Dr Muthukaruppan conceded that he could think of no reason to explain the symmetry in degenerative changes in the knees except for Ms Kuppusamy’s age. ²⁴⁰ He agreed that there is an inverse correlation between a properly fitted prosthetic and the increased loading in her right knee, ²⁴¹ and admitted that he could not quantify the probability that Ms Kuppusamy will need a total replacement of her right knee based on this correlation. ²⁴² Dr Bose opined that the probability of osteoarthritis arising from an amputation is 16% for amputees compared to 11.7% for non-amputees, ie, an increase of only 4.3%. ²⁴³

189 I find that Ms Kuppusamy has not shown on a balance of probabilities that there is a need for the knee replacement as a result of the Accident. First, both experts agreed that the arthritic changes observed in both knees are likely age-related. Second, on Dr Bose’s unchallenged evidence, the probability of osteoarthritis arising in an amputee is only 4.3% higher in comparison with non-amputees. Third, Ms Kuppusamy’s own expert, Dr Muthukaruppan, accepted that, at best, there was a 50% chance that a knee replacement would be needed due to load bearing. Notwithstanding, Dr Muthukaruppan also accepted that overloading on the right knee can be corrected by proper use of a good prosthetic leg that is fitted well. With this, aggravation of the osteoarthritic condition of Ms Kuppusamy’s knees could be delayed. ²⁴⁴

190 For completeness, I also observe that Ms Kuppusamy has also not shown why the total knee replacement would have to take place in Singapore, such that the cost of such replacement would amount to S$42,500. She is a Malaysian citizen and, consequently, she would be charged much higher rates for a replacement of her right knee. Further, she has not provided submissions or evidence on the cost of such replacement in Malaysia.

191 I therefore reject Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for right knee replacement.

192 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages in the sum of RM2,400 (S$727.27) for FMEs on analgesics at RM100 per month for two years. ²⁴⁵ Dr Kumar had made provisions for analgesics on a permanent basis at RM200 per month for as long as her symptoms remains but commented in his clarification report that the RM100 and two-year period quoted by Dr Singh is reasonable. ²⁴⁶

193 Huationg submits that there is no evidence that Ms Kuppusamy is consuming analgesics at present and hence damages should not be awarded for this FME. ²⁴⁷ However, the analgesics for which Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for are FMEs, rather than current medical expenses. Furthermore, the experts of both parties have made provisions for such an expense. I will therefore allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for analgesics at S$727.27.

194 Finally, Ms Kuppusamy claims damages of S$727.27 for FMEs on 30 sessions of physiotherapy at RM80 per session. Dr Singh has provided for these sessions. Huationg agrees that this award is reasonable. I will allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for physiotherapy at S$727.27.

195 In totality, I will hence award damages for FMEs in the sum of S$354,074.74 according to the following breakdown:

196 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages totalling S$2,013.93 for TEs incurred to attend medical appointments in Singapore and Malaysia: ²⁴⁸

197 Huationg submits that the total damages to be awarded for TEs should be limited to RM2,600 (S$787.88).

198 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages in the sum of S$120 for the TEs incurred in Singapore. ²⁴⁹ Huationg submits that no award of damages should be granted as there is no evidence that Ms Kuppusamy has actually incurred any TEs to seek medical treatment in Singapore.

199 Ms Kuppusamy’s claim thus raises three sub-issues:

200 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for TEs incurred from six trips to Singapore from Johor Bahru for medical treatment. ²⁵⁰ Huationg submits that there were only five trips as Ms Kuppusamy had attended one appointment at TTSH and four appointments at NUH. ²⁵¹

201 The evidence adduced by Ms Kuppusamy included invoices for one visit to TTSH and five visits to NUH. ²⁵² Accordingly, she would have attended six medical treatment sessions in Singapore, not five. Transport would have to be undertaken to attend these six sessions.

202 Huationg submits that there is no evidence that Ms Kuppusamy had actually incurred any TEs to seek medical treatment in Singapore. ²⁵³ Relying on her oral evidence, Huationg claims that Ms Kuppusamy had been ferried to Singapore for medical treatment by her neighbours. ²⁵⁴ Huationg cites Siew Pick Chiang v Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co Ltd and another [2016] SGHC 266 (“Siew Pick Chiang”) and submits that the High Court held that no damages, conservative or otherwise, should be granted in the absence of evidence of transport expenses on the possibility that the plaintiff there may have been fetched by her mother in a car to the destinations. ²⁵⁵

203 I note that Huationg did not accurately portray Ms Kuppusamy’s oral evidence. Her evidence was that “my neighbours are the ones who brought me, they did not keep any receipts. … we had paid the money to come to Singapore.” ²⁵⁶ Thus, her evidence was not that her neighbours ferried her to Singapore for free. Instead, her evidence was that she paid her neighbours for transport to Singapore, but she did not have receipts to prove that she so paid. Despite the lack of receipts, I find no reason to reject her evidence or claim that she paid her neighbours for transport to Singapore. That Ms Kuppusamy incurred TEs distinguishes this case from Siew Pick Chiang, where the court found that there was a possibility that the plaintiff there had been ferried by her mother or siblings to the destinations. In any event, despite such possibility, the court in Siew Pick Chiang nevertheless awarded the plaintiff there some amount for TE, at S$300 per month, totalling S$6,600. Accordingly, contrary to Huationg’s submission, Siew Pick Chiang does not stand for the proposition that where there is a possibility that TEs were not actually incurred by a claimant, no damages for TEs should be awarded at all.

204 In light of the above, I find that Ms Kuppusamy did incur TEs for transport to Singapore for medical treatments on six occasions.

205 Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of S$120 is based on six trips to Singapore at a rate of S$20 per round trip. ²⁵⁷ She relies on Tan Hun Boon v Rui Feng Travel Pte Ltd and another [2018] 3 SLR 244 (“Tan Hun Boon”). Pang Khang Chau JC (as he then was) held in Tan Hun Boon at [146] that he was prepared to make a reasonable estimate in order to arrive at an award for pre-trial transport expenses despite the lack of receipts and lack of evidence concerning the mode of transport adopted by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding, Pang JC cautioned that any such estimate should be a conservative one. The rationale of this approach is “to avoid putting plaintiffs who fail to produce receipts in a better position than plaintiffs who conscientiously retain receipts and adduce them in evidence” (at [146]). Referencing the award he had granted for FTEs of approximately S$30 per trip, Pang JC (as he then was) adopted a conservative approach and found that S$20 per trip was a reasonable figure for pre-trial TEs (at [147]). ²⁵⁸ Relying on this finding, Ms Kuppusamy claims S$20 per trip for TEs incurred for traveling to Singapore. Ms Kuppusamy also highlights that while receiving treatment at NUH, she was residing in Johor Bahru and needed to cross the border into Singapore to receive medical treatment. ²⁵⁹ Consequently, she submits that S$20 per round trip is a reasonable rate. ²⁶⁰

206 Huationg similarly submits that if the court were inclined to grant an award of damages under this sub-head, the cost of each trip should be S$20 per trip. ²⁶¹

207 Applying the approach in Tan Hun Boon, I am prepared to make a reasonable estimate of the cost of Ms Kuppusamy’s trips to Singapore, despite her lack of receipts. Considering that the court had granted S$20 per trip in Tan Hun Boon for trips within Singapore, the fact that Ms Kuppusamy claims the same amount despite the round trips being to and from Johor Bahru to Singapore, and Huationg’s position on the cost of each trip, I will allow her claim for TEs incurred for six medical appointments in Singapore at S$20 per round trip, for a total of S$120.

208 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages of RM1,100 (S$333.33) for TEs incurred by 37 trips for medical treatment in Malaysia. ²⁶² She submits that she paid her cousin, who was also her neighbour, RM30 per trip. ²⁶³ Huationg submits that no damages should be awarded.

209 There is evidence, in the form of invoices, that Ms Kuppusamy did attend 37 medical sessions in Malaysia. ²⁶⁴ Transport would have been needed for these sessions. While Ms Kuppusamy could not produce receipts, I find no reason to reject her evidence that she paid her cousin for these trips. Notwithstanding, following Tan Hun Boon, I will take a conservative approach, bearing in mind that Ms Kuppusamy has not produced any receipt to support the quantum claimed. I will hence allow her claims for 37 trips for medical treatment in Malaysia, at RM15 per trip, for a total of RM555 (S$168.18).

210 Finally, Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for TEs incurred by attending other medical appointments in Malaysia during the following dates/time periods: ²⁶⁵ (a) 3 September 2021; (b) 23 February 2022; (c) 11 June 2022; (d) 12–14 October 2022; and (e) 21–22 February 2023. Ms Kuppusamy’s initial submissions for the last two periods listed included claims for hotel room charges. However, Ms Kuppusamy informed the court at the last hearing that she will not be proceeding with these claims. ²⁶⁶ I will hence present Ms Kuppusamy’s submissions below, excluding the relevant sums for hotel room charges.

211 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages of RM750 (S$227.27) for TEs incurred in relation to her consultation with Mr Prasad on 3 September 2021. ²⁶⁷ Huationg accepts that there is evidence that Ms Kuppusamy had consulted Mr Prasad on 3 September 2021, but submits that an award of damages should be of a conservative estimation given her lack of evidence as to the TEs she had actually incurred. ²⁶⁸

212 It is undisputed that Ms Kuppusamy was traveling from Johor Bahru to Kuala Lumpur for her sessions with Mr Prasad and would necessarily incur TEs for these sessions. ²⁶⁹ The figure of RM750 she claims is the same as that claimed for TEs incurred for another medical appointment in Kuala Lumpur on 23 February 2022, for which she has adduced a receipt. However, Ms Kuppusamy also claims TEs amounting to S$100 (RM330) for another medical appointment in Kuala Lumpur on 11 June 2022, ²⁷⁰ which Huationg agreed was reasonable. ²⁷¹ In the absence of receipts to support her claim, and hence adopting a conservative approach, I grant an award of damages of S$100 for TEs incurred for the medical appointment on 3 September 2021.

213 Ms Kuppusamy also claims damages of RM750 (S$227.27) for TEs incurred in relation to her medical appointment on 23 February 2022. ²⁷² In support of her claim, Ms Kuppusamy references an email from her solicitors to Huationg’s solicitors, and the invoice attached therein, claiming damages for a “wasted trip to KL for med-re”. ²⁷³ Huationg submits that the 23 February 2022 appointment was with Ms Gurusamy, but there is no evidence that Ms Kuppusamy had seen Ms Gurusamy on that date. ²⁷⁴ In support of this submission, Huationg relies on Ms Kuppusamy’s AEIC which states that she had taken a trip to see Ms Gurusamy. ²⁷⁵

214 Although there is indeed no evidence that Ms Kuppusamy had seen Ms Gurusamy on 23 February 2022, this is an insufficient basis for disallowing her claim. Huationg’s submission ignores the part of Ms Kuppusamy’s AEIC where she states, in the same paragraph, that she had taken a trip to see Dr Singh on 23 February 2022 and that this was a “wasted trip”. ²⁷⁶ Moreover, the invoice is evidence of TEs amounting to RM750 being incurred for a medical appointment in KL on 23 February 2022.

215 Moreover, I note that Huationg had earlier submitted in its Closing Submissions that this claim for TEs should be allowed. ²⁷⁷ There, Huationg took the position that Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of RM750 for TEs incurred for her appointment with Dr Singh on 23 February 2023 was supported by documentary evidence, ²⁷⁸ referencing the same documents relied upon by her. ²⁷⁹ Further, Huationg’s position that no damages should be awarded was only raised in its Reply Submissions. As such, its claim that the trip on 23 February 2022 was to see Ms Gurusamy was not clarified with Ms Kuppusamy, who did not have the opportunity to respond during the hearing or in her written submissions. Nor did Huationg put to her during cross-examination that she did not actually incur TEs on this day.

216 In view of the above, I allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim of RM750 (S$227.27) for TEs incurred to attend her medical appointment(s) in Kuala Lumpur on 23 February 2023.

217 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages of S$100 for TEs incurred to attend the medical re-examination with Dr Singh on 11 June 2022. ²⁸⁰ Ms Kuppusamy agreed that this claim is reasonable. ²⁸¹ As such, I will allow this claim for S$100.

218 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for TEs amounting to RM1,500 for her trip to and from Kuala Lumpur to attend her appointment with Mr Prasad. ²⁸² Huationg agrees that Ms Kuppusamy is entitled to these damages. I will allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for TEs in the amount of RM1,500 (S$454.55).

219 Finally, Ms Kuppusamy claims damages of RM1,400 for TEs incurred in relation to her medical appointments on 21 and 22 February 2023. ²⁸³ Huationg agrees with this submission. ²⁸⁴ I will hence allow Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for RM1,400 (S$424.24).

220 In light of the above, I will allow damages amounting to S$1,306.06 for TEs incurred for travel within Malaysia for other appointments:

221 In summary, for Ms Kuppusamy’s claim for TEs, I grant an award of S$1,594.24 according to the following breakdown:

222 Ms Kuppusamy claims damages for FTEs of S$1,181.82. ²⁸⁵ This is comprised of two components:

(a) four round trips from Johor Bahru to Kuala Lumpur for future replacements of the MPCP at RM750 per round trip, totalling RM3,000 (S$909.09). ²⁸⁶ This quantum is based on the cost of trips that Ms Kuppusamyhas made, as evidenced by invoices; ²⁸⁷ and

(b) the cost of 30 round trips for her 30 physiotherapy sessions at RM30 per round trip, totalling RM900 (S$272.73). ²⁸⁸

223 Huationg cites Tan Hun Boon at [146] and [147] for the proposition that a reasonable amount for transport expenses is S$20 per round trip. ²⁸⁹ As Ms Kuppusamy has to attend a total of 35 sessions, comprising of five prosthetic replacement sessions and 30 physiotherapy sessions, the damages for FTEs to be award should be S$700. ²⁹⁰ Before assessing the Parties’ submissions, I pause to note that the Parties have agreed that Ms Kuppusamy will have to attend four prosthetic replacement sessions, ²⁹¹ as opposed to five as submitted by Huationg, totalling 34 trips. Accordingly, on Huationg’s submission, at S$20 per round trip, the award for FTEs should be S$680.

224 I note that it is undisputed that Ms Kuppusamy will require four replacements of her prosthetic (see [176] above), and that her prosthetist, Mr Prasad, is based on Kuala Lumpur while she resides in Johor Bahru. The evidence adduced by Ms Kuppusamy shows the cost of a round trip to Kuala Lumpur to range between RM700 ²⁹² (S$212.12) to RM750 (S$227.27). ²⁹³ The rate submitted by Huationg of S$20 per round trip is clearly insufficient, on the evidence, to cover the cost of Ms Kuppusamy’s round trips. As explained at [212] above, Ms Kuppusamy has also adduced evidence of incurring S$100 for each round trip from Johor Bahru to Kuala Lumpur. I will hence award S$100 for each of these round trips. Accordingly, I award Ms Kuppusamy damages totalling S$400 for FTEs incurred from four prosthetic replacement sessions.

225 In light of my grant of an award for the cost of Ms Kuppusamy’s 30 physiotherapy sessions, she will incur FTEs for transport within Johor Bahru to attend these sessions. ²⁹⁴ Huationg submits that the award of FTEs should be based on S$20 per round trip. On the other hand, Ms Kuppusamy’s submission is only for RM30 (S$9.09) per round trip.

226 The court in Kenneth Quek (HC) granted an award of S$1,000 for FTEs incurred from at least two visits to the hospital per year for a period of 18 years (at [75]). This works out to, on average, S$27.78 per round trip. In Tan Hun Boon, the court at [147] also found that S$20 was reasonable per round trip to the hospital. Notwithstanding, these awards were made in the context of plaintiffs who were traveling within Singapore for their medical appointments. As Ms Kuppusamy’s TEs would be incurred in Malaysia, as opposed to Singapore, and in light of her submissions, I will adopt the figure she claimed and hence award RM900 (S$272.73) for FTEs incurred from 30 physiotherapy sessions.

227 In summary, I grant Ms Kuppusamy damages for FTEs of a total of S$1,151.52 pursuant to the following breakdown:

228 In summary, I find that Huationg is liable to Ms Kuppusamy for an award of damages amounting to S$838,224.52, pursuant to the following:

229 The Parties informed me that they have come to an agreement on the issue of interest payable on the damages awarded to Ms Kuppusamy. If the Parties are unable to come to an agreement on the issue of costs, they are to file and exchange written submissions on costs, within ten days from the date of this judgment.