

**IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF
THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE**

[2023] SGHC 282

Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 258 of 2023

In the matter of Section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966

And

In the matter of Rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011

And

In the matter of Chester Lee Jun Ming

Chester Lee Jun Ming

... Applicant

AND

Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 363 of 2023

In the matter of Section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966

And

In the matter of Rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011

And

In the matter of Chong Weng Teng

Chong Weng Teng

... Applicant

Admission of Advocates and Solicitors No 370 of 2023

In the matter of Section 12 of the Legal Profession Act 1966

And

In the matter of Rule 25 of the Legal Profession (Admission) Rules 2011

And

In the matter of Lin Shuang Ju

Lin Shuang Ju

... Applicant

FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION

[Legal Profession — Admission]

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Re Lee Jun Ming Chester and other matters

[2023] SGHC 282

General Division of the High Court — Admission of Advocates and Solicitors
Nos 258, 363 and 370 of 2023

Sundaresh Menon CJ

22 September 2023

9 October 2023

Sundaresh Menon CJ:

Introduction

1 These were three applications for admission as Advocates and Solicitors of the Supreme Court (the “Applications”). The Attorney-General (the “AG”), the Law Society of Singapore and the Singapore Institute of Legal Education (collectively, the “Stakeholders”) did not object to the Applications. The Stakeholders, having considered the Applications, were satisfied that the three applicants were fit and proper persons for admission in terms of their character, and they each explained their reasons for coming to this view. On 22 September 2023, I heard and allowed the Applications and explained my reasons in brief terms. I now provide the detailed grounds for my decision.

General principles

2 The central inquiry in admission applications, where there is no question as to the applicant’s competence or qualifications, is whether the applicant in

question is suitable for admission in terms of his or her character. Where there have been incidents of misconduct suggesting the need to drill further into this issue, the court will examine all the circumstances, including the following (*Re Suria Shaik Aziz* [2023] SGHC 129 (“*Suria Shaik*”) at [20]; citing *Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and other matters* [2022] SGHC 237 at [3]):

- (a) the circumstances of the applicant’s misconduct;
- (b) his or her conduct during the initial investigations;
- (c) the nature and extent of subsequent disclosures made in his or her application for admission;
- (d) any evidence of remorse; and
- (e) any evidence of efforts planned or already initiated towards rehabilitation.

3 Where a significant period of time has passed since the misconduct, the latter two factors may take on particular importance in helping the court to determine whether any further deferment of the applicant’s admission is necessary (*Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter* [2023] SGHC 59 (“*Tay Jie Qi*”) at [4]). In such a circumstance, the question for the court and the Stakeholders is not whether the applicant has been sufficiently *punished* for his or her misconduct, but rather, whether the applicant has sufficiently reformed his or her character issues and demonstrated suitability to shoulder the weighty responsibilities that come with being an advocate and solicitor in Singapore (*Suria Shaik* at [23]).

4 As I have mentioned, the Stakeholders were satisfied that the applicants were fit and proper persons for admission in terms of their character. They had each also completed the prescribed requirements to establish their competence to be admitted. The sole issue in each of the Applications therefore was whether the court was similarly satisfied.

Mr Chester Lee Jun Ming

5 The applicant in HC/AAS 258/2023 was Mr Chester Lee Jun Ming (“Mr Lee”). In May 2017, Mr Lee recorded two upskirt videos of a woman while on public transport. In January 2018, he pleaded guilty to one charge of insulting the modesty of a woman under s 509 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) and consented to a further charge of the same offence being taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing. He was convicted of the charge and sentenced to a one-month imprisonment term.

Whether Mr Lee is a fit and proper person to be admitted

6 These circumstances made it necessary to inquire further as to whether Mr Lee had a deficit of character at the time of his admission application. It should be noted that the offence had taken place six years earlier. The severity of Mr Lee’s offence cannot be understated. As explained by the Court of Three Judges in *Law Society of Singapore v CNH* [2022] 4 SLR 482 at [50], sexual offences inevitably and invariably entail a severe violation of the dignity and bodily integrity of the victim, often causing deep-seated trauma. Someone capable of committing such an offence will almost invariably be found to be unfit for admission as an advocate and solicitor in terms of his character.

7 The fact is, however, that Mr Lee’s application came six years after his offence. For the following reasons, I was satisfied that Mr Lee had sufficiently reformed his character in the intervening period and to that extent he was no longer the same person that he was when he committed the offence.

8 First, there was Mr Lee’s conduct immediately after his offence and during investigations. Once he was apprehended, Mr Lee complied with the instructions of the MRT staff. When the police later arrived, Mr Lee admitted to what he had done. Once he was charged, Mr Lee pleaded guilty. He also promptly informed his employer of his charge and expressed remorse for his actions. While none of this in any way negated the severity of Mr Lee’s offence, it at least showed, even soon after he committed the offence, that Mr Lee already had some level of appreciation that what he had done was very wrong. The fact that he had such an appreciation even then made it more likely that six years later and after serving a term of imprisonment, he had “learnt the requisite lessons” (see *Tay Jie Qi* at [4]).

9 Second, there was the significant period of time that had passed since Mr Lee’s offence. Six years had passed since Mr Lee committed the offence and five years had passed following his release from prison. Mr Lee had maintained a clean criminal, and also academic, record throughout this period. As I explained in *Tay Jie Qi* at [30], a clean record during a significant period of time after misconduct can demonstrate that the applicant has “learnt from her mistake and has taken steps to reflect on her mistake and on what she must do to reform herself”.

10 Third, and on a related note, there was what Mr Lee had done in that significant period of time since his offence. Mr Lee served his one-month imprisonment term, maintained a full-time job, enrolled in and graduated from law school, passed the bar examinations and completed a practice training contract. An individual who has taken active steps to improve himself and his professional prospects is likely to also have taken steps to resolve his character issues.

11 Fourth, there was the fact that Mr Lee faced punishment for his offence in the form of a one-month imprisonment term. On this point, the AG made a robust submission that the fact that Mr Lee had faced criminal punishment was irrelevant when considering whether he was a fit and proper person to be admitted. I did not entirely accept this submission. The AG was correct that the aim of criminal punishment is entirely different from that of deferring or refusing an applicant's admission to the bar. The former tends to be primarily concerned with punishing offenders while the latter is solely concerned with ensuring that only fit and proper persons are admitted to the bar. As has been made clear (see [3] above), deferring an applicant's admission to the bar is not meant to be a form of punishment. Accordingly, the AG's submission was correct to the extent that when considering fitness for admission, the court should not engage in social accounting and take a lenient approach towards admission just because the applicant in question may have served a period of imprisonment and incurred other types of hardship. One simply does not follow from the other.

12 However, it is important to emphasise that virtually all forms of criminal punishment are ultimately intended to, and do, have some rehabilitative effect on the offender. Criminal punishment can provide the impetus for an offender to understand why what they have done was wrong and to reform themselves to

avoid doing the same again. Where an applicant has faced criminal punishment and maintained a clean record over a long period thereafter, it seems reasonable to conclude that the criminal punishment has been effective to some extent in contributing to the reformation of his or her character. In that regard, I did consider Mr Lee’s one-month imprisonment term to be relevant. Taken together with Mr Lee’s clean record since, it supported the conclusion that his character was indeed different from what it was at the time he committed the offence.

13 Fifth, there was the fact that others attested to Mr Lee’s character. Mr Lee was able to obtain character references from two people who were clearly aware of the details of his offence. One of these was Mr Lee’s immediate supervisor and a former lawyer practicing in Malaysia. She had worked with Mr Lee for a number of years, beginning a few months after the time of Mr Lee’s offence, and her view that Mr Lee had learnt from his mistakes and reformed his character carried weight, as it was formed from the perspective of someone who interacted with Mr Lee closely during the relevant period.

14 Sixth, there was Mr Lee’s attitude towards his offence in his application for admission. He made full disclosure of his offence in his affidavit. It is an explicit requirement that applicants disclose any prior criminal convictions in their affidavits, and too much credit should not be given for simply complying with this explicit requirement. That said, the level of disclosure in Mr Lee’s affidavit demonstrated that he was unlike other candidates who had not been “completely forthright” about their misconduct that happened far in the past (*Suria Shaik* at [42]). The Stakeholders were all able to form their views on Mr Lee’s suitability for admission on the basis of the details provided voluntarily in his affidavit. Furthermore, when describing his offence, Mr Lee did not seek to “downplay his culpability” in any way, unlike other applicants (*Suria Shaik* at [45]). Mr Lee recognised that what he had done was “wrong,

despicable, and disrespectful to women”. Mr Lee’s attitude as reflected in his application further persuaded me that there had been considerable reformation of his character.

15 For all these reasons, I was satisfied that Mr Lee had reformed his character since his offence and was a fit and proper person for admission to the bar.

Mr Chong Weng Teng

16 The applicant in HC/AAS 363/2023 (“AAS 363”) was Mr Chong Weng Teng (“Mr Chong”). Mr Chong was enrolled in Module LL4352, “China and International Economic Law” during the final semester of his candidature with the National University of Singapore’s (“NUS”) Faculty of Law. The assessment for this module required Mr Chong to submit an academic research paper. In the research paper that Mr Chong submitted (the “Research Paper”), he reused portions of another research paper that he had previously submitted for another module.

17 Mr Chong’s conduct was prohibited by NUS’ Plagiarism Policy (the “Plagiarism Policy”), which provided the following:

Self-Plagiarism

The concept of self-plagiarism is the act of reusing a piece of work already submitted for another class or publication without acknowledging or citing the earlier submission. It can involve reusing data, copying or paraphrasing text or ideas from an earlier piece of work completed by the author him/herself. Where possible, a student should always refrain from reusing the same piece of work more than once. If there remains a need to reuse material from the same piece of work, the student should always discuss with his/her supervisor or lecturer first. The responsibility is on the student to acknowledge, cite and specify what portions of the work have been previously submitted or published, and to clarify his/her relative

contribution to that piece of work, if it was a co-authored submission or publication.

18 NUS Law’s Ethical Conduct Guidelines (the “Ethical Conduct Guidelines”) also prohibited such conduct:

Plagiarism – Additional Guidelines for Law Students

Law students should observe the following guidelines specific to the norms of our discipline:

...

3. If students have written a paper for one course, they cannot submit any part of that paper as original work for another course. If students wish to use their own previous work, they must use the proper quotation and citation format to identify that previous source.

[emphasis in original]

19 After submitting the Research Paper, Mr Chong was asked to attend a plagiarism inquiry on 24 March 2022. He was informed by the Vice-Dean (Academic Affairs) of NUS Faculty of Law that what he had done constituted “self-plagiarism” and that it was prohibited under NUS’ policies. Mr Chong admitted to the offence, expressed his apologies to the inquiry panel and indicated that he would accept any penalty without question or appeal.

20 On 13 April 2022, the inquiry panel informed Mr Chong that as penalty for his academic offence, he would be awarded zero marks for the Research Paper. Because the Research Paper was responsible for 80% of Mr Chong’s grade in Module LL4352, Mr Chong failed the module.

21 Mr Chong enrolled in an additional module from May 2022 to June 2022 to achieve the necessary module credits for graduation. He completed the additional module and graduated on 31 August 2022.

Whether Mr Chong was a fit and proper person to be admitted

22 In my view, the key point in Mr Chong's case was that his academic offence was found not to have arisen from a lack of academic integrity. According to Mr Chong, the offence arose out of his failure to check the NUS plagiarism guidelines and his ignorant assumption that plagiarism only involved copying *someone else's* work. The Stakeholders all accepted Mr Chong's explanation that he was not dishonest when he self-plagiarised. They accepted that Mr Chong was genuinely unaware that it was contrary to NUS' rules to reuse portions of his original work that he had previously submitted for another assessment.

23 I too accepted that Mr Chong's explanation was genuine. Mr Chong's case was unlike that of the applicant in *Suria Shaik*, where I was unable to accept a similar contention that the applicant's plagiarism reflected a lack of academic diligence rather than a lack of academic integrity (at [31]). In *Suria Shaik*, the applicant lifted substantial portions of his research paper from internet sources without proper attribution (see [5]). In that context, I explained that when a student submits work to be graded, he does so on the basis that it is his own work – it would be meaningless to speak of work being graded otherwise. Therefore, when a significant proportion of work submitted by a student was actually the work of others, there was no room for viewing this as a lack of diligence. In other words, the requirement that one must only submit original work was so obvious that the severe failure to meet this requirement could not possibly be passed off as an innocent mistake. This reasoning did not apply to Mr Chong's case. Mr Chong's mistake was not that he had submitted another's work but that he had reused his own, previously submitted, work. While this greatly reduced the amount of effort required for Mr Chong to complete the Research Paper, it was not meaningless to speak of grading the Research Paper.

After all, the work submitted was still Mr Chong’s own work and was a product of his time, thought and effort. In this context, it was plausible that Mr Chong did not appreciate that what he had done was contrary to NUS’ policies. Unlike the applicant in *Suria Shaik*, Mr Chong’s mistake was not so fundamental and obviously contrary to the standards applicable to him. In these circumstances, I accepted that his “self-plagiarism” stemmed from a lack of academic diligence.

24 I did note that Mr Chong completed an online declaration that he read and understood both the Plagiarism Policy and the Ethical Conduct Guidelines. However, I accepted that Mr Chong might have submitted the declaration without fully reading and understanding the policies.

25 On this basis, the fact that Mr Chong’s misconduct stemmed from a lack of academic diligence rather than a lack of academic integrity was highly relevant because the sole concern in AAS 363 was the question of Mr Chong’s character. Dishonesty is “almost invariably seen as suggestive of underlying character flaws that are incompatible with being admitted as an advocate and solicitor” (*Tay Jie Qi* at [59]). However, the same cannot be said for a lack of diligence or carelessness. While carelessness and a lack of diligence must not be seen to be acceptable qualities of an advocate and solicitor, they do not invariably suggest a flaw in *character*. Whether they do so suggest will depend on the degree of carelessness involved. Where an individual demonstrates a lack of care so severe that it is indicative of a complete disregard for the value of the standards applicable to him, it might be fair to say that the individual has a character flaw rendering him unfit to be an advocate and solicitor.

26 In this case, Mr Chong’s carelessness did not suggest a flaw in his character. It was important that Mr Chong immediately took ownership of his mistake by: (a) admitting to it; (b) apologising for it; and (c) accepting without

reservation a very serious punishment that could have delayed his graduation. It was also relevant that Mr Chong gave full disclosure of his academic offence in his affidavit for admission despite the absence of a public record. In addition to supporting the inference that Mr Chong was not dishonest, these points also established that Mr Chong had not failed “to apprehend the ethical implications of [his] actions” (see *Suria Shaik* at [31]). Mr Chong’s misconduct fell short of the standards expected of him due to a lack of diligence, and he was well-aware of this. However, his lack of diligence was not so serious that it was indicative of a complete disregard for the standards applicable to him. While Mr Chong’s carelessness and lack of familiarity with NUS’ policies was not excusable, and similar conduct while practising as an advocate and solicitor would not be excusable, it did not expose a defect in his character.

27 I was therefore satisfied that Mr Chong was a fit and proper person for admission to the bar.

Ms Lin Shuang Ju

28 The applicant in HC/AAS 370/2023 (“AAS 370”) was Ms Lin Shuang Ju (“Ms Lin”).

The plagiarism incident

29 On 7 January 2022, Ms Lin was approached by Senior Lecturer Ong Ee Ing (“Ms Ong”) to write a full-length article on pet trusts for Lexicon, a Singapore Management University (“SMU”) student legal publication club which edits and collates articles for the Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon). Ms Lin agreed and started work on the article (“the Article”).

30 Between February 2022 and February 2023, the Article went through multiple rounds of substantive editing. On 12 February 2023, Ms Lin chose the following title for the Article: “*Saving Argos: The Need to Adopt a Pet Trust Statute in Singapore*”. The Article was eventually published in the Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon) on 5 July 2023.

31 On 24 July 2023, Ms Lin was told by Ms Ong that an accusation of plagiarism had been made in relation to the Article. Ms Lin was informed that she was alleged to have plagiarised an article by Mr Andrew B. F. Carnabuci (“Mr Carnabuci”), titled “*Avoiding the Fate of Argos: The Duty of Pet Trust Protectors in Connecticut*” (2018) 31(3) Quinnipiac Prob. L. J. 281 (the “Carnabuci Article”). In the footnotes of the Article, the Carnabuci Article was cited twice. Ms Lin arranged to meet SMU on 26 July 2023 to discuss the allegation.

32 At the meeting on 26 July 2023 at 1pm, Ms Lin provided her account of events to SMU. After the meeting, at SMU’s request, she prepared a detailed document setting out the sources that she had referred to in the course of writing the Article.

33 SMU’s internal investigations were completed on 2 August 2023. SMU found that there was some evidence of plagiarism (in the sense that there was some use of the work of others without appropriate attribution), but that it could be remedied by increased attribution and appropriate editing. Ms Ong also strongly suggested that Ms Lin write a personal apology to Mr Carnabuci and disclose the incident in AAS 370.

34 On 5 August 2023, Ms Lin wrote a letter of apology to Mr Carnabuci, acknowledging that she had used his article without proper attribution. Ms Lin apologised for her failure to adequately cite his work. She clarified that she had no intention to pass off Mr Carnabuci’s work as her own, and had mistakenly believed that sufficient attribution was provided in the Article. She mentioned that this was her first time publishing an academic article. She informed Mr Carnabuci that she would be working carefully with the Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon) to revise the Article.

35 On 7 August 2023, Ms Lin was informed by the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) that it had received an e-mail from Mr Carnabuci on 21 July 2023 alleging that she had plagiarised his article. AGC also informed Ms Lin of the AG’s intention to apply for a one-month adjournment of AAS 370. At a case management conference on 14 August 2023, a one-month adjournment of AAS 370 was granted.

36 On 8 August 2023, Mr Carnabuci replied to Ms Lin, stating that he accepted the apology in full and that once the Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon) issued a correction with appropriate citation, he would consider the matter closed.

37 On 10 August 2023, Ms Ong wrote to AGC explaining SMU’s findings. Ms Ong stated that SMU’s belief was that Ms Lin did not intend to plagiarise. Rather, she had fundamentally misunderstood how to attribute sources appropriately, especially in the context of a published academic article.

38 Ms Lin, Ms Ong and Lexicon’s editors then tried to revise the Article and provide proper attribution such that it could be published. Ms Ong explained to Ms Lin, in detail, the principles of academic integrity and proper attribution

in an e-mail on 9 August 2023. She also asked Ms Lin to review the Article in its *entirety* and supply her sources for every sentence and every idea. Ms Lin complied and responded with a draft that contained significant changes from the published version of the Article. On 16 August 2023, Ms Ong pointed out that there was “still too much of the ‘simply reporting of what other people said’ aspect of [Ms Lin’s] paper”. On 19 August 2023, Ms Ong informed Ms Lin that SMU had decided to retract the article. She explained that incorporating the proposed changes would substantially change the Article, going beyond the original remit of editing the article for appropriate attribution. She told Ms Lin that the Article was still not of publishable quality even with the appropriate attribution because it was largely a repeat of what other people had said about the topic.

The filing of the First Affidavit

39 Ms Lin filed her first affidavit for admission on 26 July 2023 (the “First Affidavit”). At para 7(j) of Ms Lin’s First Affidavit, she confirmed that she had no knowledge of any fact that affected her suitability to practice as an advocate and solicitor. The First Affidavit was filed *after* Ms Lin had been informed by SMU about the allegation of plagiarism. After SMU concluded its investigations, Ms Lin filed a second affidavit on 14 August 2023 (the “Second Affidavit”) to explain the plagiarism incident. On 23 August 2023, the AG requested information about the circumstances surrounding the filing of Ms Lin’s First Affidavit. Ms Lin filed a further affidavit on 29 August 2023 (the “Third Affidavit”) to respond to this request.

40 In the Third Affidavit, Ms Lin explained that the First Affidavit was affirmed on 24 July 2023 at 1.01pm. This was one hour *before* SMU informed her of the plagiarism allegation. On 25 July 2023 at 11.42pm, Ms Lin sent her

First Affidavit to BR Law Corporation for filing. On 26 July 2023 at 9.37am, Ms Lin's First Affidavit was filed. This all took place before Ms Lin's meeting with SMU on 26 July 2023. She explained that, at that time, she believed that there was no plagiarism in the Article and that there must have been a misunderstanding.

Whether Ms Lin was a fit and proper person to be admitted

41 As with Mr Chong, the Stakeholders all accepted that Ms Lin had not demonstrated any dishonesty. They accepted that her plagiarism arose not out of a lack of academic integrity but out of a fundamental misunderstanding of the rules of attribution in academic publications. They also accepted that Ms Lin did not act dishonestly when she filed her First Affidavit without disclosing the plagiarism allegations of which she was aware.

42 I agreed with the Stakeholders that Ms Lin's plagiarism did not appear to have involved dishonesty. Ms Lin could hardly have intended to claim Mr Carnabuci's ideas as her own. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that she had referred to the Carnabuci Article, and the Article's footnotes allowed readers to understand that the source for some of the ideas in the Article was Mr Carnabuci. The similarity between the titles of the Article and the Carnabuci Article would have made this apparent.

43 I also took into account the fact that Ms Lin promptly wrote a letter of apology to Mr Carnabuci. Ms Lin's explanation in the apology letter came across as genuine. It was certainly genuine enough for Mr Carnabuci to accept the apology in full and consider the matter closed. This supported the conclusion that Ms Lin's plagiarism was not dishonest.

44 Finally, I considered that SMU’s conclusion contained in Ms Ong’s 19 August 2023 e-mail (see [38] above) was telling of the deeper issue with the Article. While the only complaint received was from Mr Carnabuci, the problem with the Article was more fundamental. The Article largely consisted of Ms Lin reporting what others had said about the topic and did not contain enough originality of thought or contribution. The problem was not so much that Ms Lin dishonestly used ideas of others and passed them off as her own. Rather, she paraphrased various ideas that she seen in other articles, cited those articles, and synthesised those ideas into an essay about the topic. While this may have been acceptable for a university assignment, it was not acceptable for an academic article. In that regard, Ms Lin completely misunderstood what was required in an academic publication. This was clearly expressed in SMU’s responses to AGC’s queries on 20 August 2023:

However, with the appropriate attribution finally in place, Lexicon was of the view that the article, as-is, was not of publishable quality due to lack of originality. Despite her efforts in the Singapore law section (second half) of the article, the article was largely a repeat of what other people had already said about the topic.

- o However, this also reinforced our views that Ms Lin had misunderstood the requirements for a published article, i.e. originality of thought (*versus being just a research report*), as well as appropriate attribution.

[emphasis in original]

45 The Article began as a 1,500-word assignment that Ms Lin submitted for a university module which Ms Ong suggested could be worked into a long-form piece. This was also Ms Lin’s first academic article. Ms Lin was unfamiliar with the degree of originality needed in a published academic article and assumed that paraphrasing other articles and citing them was acceptable. This was a mistake, but it was not dishonest.

46 I also agreed with the Stakeholders that Ms Lin's filing of the First Affidavit was not a dishonest act aimed to conceal the plagiarism incident. I accepted Ms Lin's explanation that she was waiting for the full facts before making the necessary disclosure. At the time the First Affidavit was filed, Ms Lin had no details of the plagiarism allegation beyond what she was told in SMU's first e-mail to her on 24 July 2023 (see [31] above). Based on her understanding of the rules of attribution, she may not have understood how there could have been an allegation of plagiarism arising in respect of the Carnabuci Article which she had paraphrased and cited twice. Without any clear details of what the alleged plagiarism entailed, and without SMU's view on the allegations, it was not clear what Ms Lin could have disclosed at para 7(j) of the First Affidavit at the time it was filed. The crucial point was that Ms Lin did disclose the full details of the plagiarism incident in the Second Affidavit, once SMU's investigations had been completed, and this ensured that all the material facts were made clear to the court and the Stakeholders before her scheduled admission hearing.

47 Given that Ms Lin's plagiarism and subsequent filing of the First Affidavit did not contain any element of dishonesty, my analysis at [25] above applied equally. I was also satisfied that neither incident indicated any other defect of character rendering Ms Lin unfit for admission as an advocate and solicitor. I therefore concluded that she was a fit and proper person for admission in terms of her character.

Conclusion

48 In conclusion, I was satisfied that the applicants were all fit and proper persons for admission as Advocates and Solicitors of the Supreme Court in terms of their character. While Mr Lee had, six years prior, committed a serious criminal offence, he was able to demonstrate that he had reformed his character in the intervening period. While Mr Chong and Ms Lin had committed academic offences, the circumstances in which their offences were committed did not suggest dishonesty or any other defect of their character. For these reasons, I allowed the Applications.

Sundaresh Menon
Chief Justice

Isaac Tito Shane, Sindhu Nair d/o Muralidharan Nair and Lim Chu Yech (Tito Isaac & Co LLP) and Mathavan Devadas (Tito Isaac & Co LLP) (moving the call) for the applicant in HC/AAS 258/2023;
Toh Wei Yi (Harry Elias Partnership LLP) for the applicant in HC/AAS 363/2023;
Daniel Loh Weijie (BR Law Corporation) for the applicant in HC/AAS 370/2023;
Jeyendran Jeyapal and Pesdy Tay (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the Attorney-General;
Avery Chong (Singapore Institute of Legal Education) for the Singapore Institute of Legal Education;
Sanjiv Kumar Rajan and Mehaerun Simaa d/o Ravichandran @ Raqiib Chandra (Allen & Gledhill LLP) for the Law Society of Singapore in HC/AAS 258/2023; and
Brinden Anandakumar and Cui Shenzhi (Fullerton Law Chambers LLC) for the Law Society of Singapore in HC/AAS 363/2023 and HC/AAS 370/2023.