1 The claimant, Mr Eugene Loh (the “Claimant”), is a manager at a company engaged in the business of feng shui. ¹ The defendant, Mr Ng Soon Hin (the “Defendant”), is a businessman. ² The parties became acquainted sometime in 2021, when the Defendant engaged the Claimant for the latter’s geomancy services. ³ They subsequently became friends, but fell out sometime in 2022. ⁴ Their relationship has since broken down.

2 The parties were embroiled in two concurrent lawsuits. These were the present action (“OC 8236”) and MC/OC 10825/2024 (“OC 10825”). Following an application filed in OC 10825 for the consolidation of both OC 8236 and OC 10825, ⁵ the Deputy Registrar ordered that both matters be consolidated and tried one after the other before the same trial judge. The trials in both actions were subsequently fixed before me. I heard the trial in OC 10825 on 29 June 2026, and delivered judgment on 18 September 2026 (the “10825 Judgment”), allowing the claim brought by the Defendant (who was the claimant in that case) in part. ⁶ The trial in OC 8236 was heard on 31 August 2026, and the parties in this case filed their closing submissions on 12 October 2026.

3 An issue common to both actions concerns the identity of the person operating a Facebook account bearing the username “Seng Toh Toh” (the “STT Account”). ⁷ As in OC 10825, the Claimant alleges in the present action that the Defendant was the person operating the STT Account. ⁸ For the reasons set out at [80] to [91] of the 10825 Judgment, I found that the Claimant had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was the person operating the STT Account. Had the parties adduced the same evidence and advanced the same arguments concerning the identity of “Seng Toh Toh” in both trials, there would have been no reason for me to depart from my earlier finding on that issue. However, the evidence and the parties’ arguments on this issue differed in the trial of OC 8236. ⁹ Accordingly, as I informed the parties at the conclusion of the trial in OC 8236, I would assess the evidence and arguments concerning the identity of “Seng Toh Toh” separately in rendering my decision in OC 8236. ¹⁰

4 I turn to the salient facts and the parties’ pleaded cases in OC 8236. The Claimant pleads that the Defendant published statements defamatory of him on three platforms to three different groups of readers, as follows:

(a) First, between May 2022 and December 2023, the Defendant made 10 statements defamatory of the Claimant in a WhatsApp group chat comprising Ms Shirnar Lim Suat Hua (“Ms Lim”), Ms Nancy Yew Zhen Zhen (“Ms Yew”), and the Defendant (the “Groupchat”). ¹¹

(b) Second, between 2022 and 2024, the Defendant made 11 statements defamatory of the Claimant to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger. ¹²

(c) Third, from February 2024 to the date of the SOC (being 2 September 2025), the Defendant made 23 statements defamatory of the Claimant in public Facebook posts made using the STT Account. ¹³

5 In respect of these 44 defamatory statements (collectively, the “Statements”), the Claimant seeks the following relief:

(a) An injunction restraining the Defendant from publishing or causing to be published words of like or similar effect to the Statements which are defamatory of the Claimant; ¹⁴

(b)  An injunction compelling the Defendant to delete or remove, or cause to be deleted or removed, the messages and posts containing the Statements within seven days of the date of the order; ¹⁵

(c) An apology and a signed undertaking not to publish or make any further statements which are or may be defamatory of the Claimant; ¹⁶ and

(d) General and aggravated damages. ¹⁷

6 In an Agreed Statement of Facts dated 3 July 2026 (the “ASOF”), ¹⁸ the Defendant admitted that:

(a) He, Ms Lim, and Ms Yew, were members of the Groupchat; ¹⁹

(b) He made statements concerning the Claimant in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger; ²⁰

(c) The terms “Situ”, “Botak”, and “FY”, as used by him, referred to the Claimant, as did the statements referred to at [6(b)] above; ²¹ and

(d) The 23 statements posted on the Facebook page belonging to the STT Account (the “23 Facebook Statements”) were accessible by members of the public with Facebook accounts. ²²

7 In his Defence, the Defendant:

(a) Denies that any of the statements he made in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger ²³ were defamatory;

(b) Denies operating the STT Account, ²⁴ and accordingly denies publishing or being responsible for the 23 Facebook Statements; and

(c) Relies, as I understand his pleaded case, on the defence of qualified privilege only in relation to the statements he generally admits to having made in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger ²⁵ (rather than in relation to all the Statements, as certain paragraphs of his Defence might suggest ²⁶ ). This defines the scope of Issue 2 (see [9(b)] below).

9 Three key issues arise for determination:

(a) Issue 1: Has the Claimant established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of the Statements?

(b) Issue 2: Has the Defendant made out the defence of qualified privilege in respect of the statements found to be defamatory?

(c) Issue 3: If the Claimant succeeds on liability, what relief is he entitled to?

10 To establish the tort of defamation, the Claimant must prove that:

(a) The Defendant published the offending words;

(b) The words are defamatory; and

(c) The words referred to the Claimant as the person defamed (Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd and another and another suit [2009] 1 SLR(R) 177 (“Review Publishing (HC)”) at [23]).

11 The present action is a claim in libel founded on the 44 Statements. All 44 Statements are in written form, comprising WhatsApp messages, Facebook Messenger messages, and Facebook posts. To publish a libel is to “convey by some means to the mind of another the defamatory sense embodied in the vehicle” (Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 363, cited with approval at [54] of Golden Season Pte Ltd and others v Kairos Singapore Holdings Pte Ltd and another [2015] 2 SLR 751 (“Golden Season”)). It follows that the publication of a libel is a bilateral, rather than a unilateral, act: the publisher must make the statement available to a third party, who must in turn comprehend its defamatory sense (see Golden Season at [54]).

12 Accordingly, the Claimant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant made the 44 Statements available to one or more third parties, and that those third parties comprehended the Statements.

13 I begin by considering the 10 statements made in the Groupchat and the 11 statements made via Facebook Messenger (collectively, the “21 Statements”), before turning to the 23 Facebook Statements. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Claimant has proved that the Defendant published some of the 21 Statements, but not the 23 Facebook Statements.

14 I explain.

15 The contents of the 21 Statements, as pleaded in Schedule A to the SOC, are reproduced in Column (A) of the table at [16] below (“Table 1”). Some of these Statements were written wholly or partly in Chinese. The Claimant was therefore required to adduce evidence of both the Statements themselves and the English translations of their non-English portions. However, the Claimant did not provide a consolidated table identifying and cross-referencing the original extracts of the Statements and, where applicable, to the English translations to assist the Court in locating the relevant evidence. More significantly, as Table 1 demonstrates, the Claimant failed to adduce objective establishing that certain Statements had been made.

16 I have therefore undertaken my own examination of the SOC and CAEIC to identify the relevant evidence and references, which I have set out in Column (B) of Table 1 below. Where the Claimant has adduced certified English translations of the Chinese portions of the 21 Statements, I have reproduced those translations in italics and within parentheses immediately after the original Chinese text.

17 As seen from Column (B) of Table 1, the Claimant has failed to prove that the Defendant made the statements appearing in the grey-shaded rows of Table 1. Neither the Defence nor the ASOF remedies this evidential deficiency. The Defence does not contain an unqualified admission of publication; the Defendant admits only to having made “certain statements” in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew, rather than all the statements pleaded in Schedule A or the specific statements in the grey-shaded rows of Table 1. ³² Similarly, the Defendant’s admission in the ASOF that he “made statements” in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger did not extend to all the statements in Schedule A nor the specific statements in the grey-shaded rows of Table 1. Moreover, counsel for the Claimant did not specifically put to the Defendant that he had made any of the statements appearing in the grey-shaded rows of Table 1, whether in the Groupchat or to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger.

18 In these circumstances, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish that the statements appearing in the grey-shaded rows of Table 1 had been made at all. Accordingly, the Claimant has proved only the existence of the following statements:

(a) In the Groupchat: the statements at s/n 2 to 3 and 5 to 10 of Table 1 (the “Proved Groupchat Messages”).

(b) To Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger: the statements at s/n 11(a), (b), (d), and (e); 12(a), (e), (f), (h), (j); 13(d); 14(a), (b), (d), and (e); 15 (a) and (b); and 16 to 21 of Table 1 (the “Proved FB Messages”).

19 So far as the Proved Groupchat Messages and Proved FB Messages are concerned, the Defendant did not expressly deny, whether in his Defence or his DAEIC, having made the statements contained therein. Indeed, he admitted to having made some of these Messages (see [17] above), although he did not specify the particular Messages he was admitting to having made. In the absence of an express denial that he had made the Proved Groupchat Messages or the Proved FB Messages, I find that the Defendant made the Proved Groupchat Messages in the Groupchat and the Proved FB Messages to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger.

20 The next question is whether Ms Lim and Ms Yew, as the recipients of the Proved Groupchat Messages and Proved FB Messages, read and comprehended the Messages they received.

21 I begin with Ms Lim’s evidence. In her AEIC, Ms Lim acknowledged that she was a member of the Groupchat and that its members “discussed the actions of the Claimant without restrictions”. ³³ She did not deny having read the Proved Groupchat Messages. Although counsel for the Claimant did not specifically put to Ms Lim in cross-examination that she had read any of the 10 statements made in the Groupchat, I consider Ms Lim’s failure to deny having read the Proved Groupchat Messages, taken together with her acknowledgment that the Groupchat members discussed the Claimant and her own participation in those conversations, is sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that she had read those Messages.

22 I turn now to Ms Yew. As Ms Yew was not called to testify at trial, there is no direct evidence that she read the Proved Groupchat Messages. Nevertheless, I find there to be sufficient evidence to infer that Ms Yew took the screenshots of the Proved Groupchat Messages and subsequently sent them to the Claimant. In the absence of any express explanation in the Claimant’s AEIC as to how he obtained the screenshots appended to his pleadings, this finding necessarily rests on a process of inference and elimination. I explain.

(a) First, neither party suggests that the Defendant took or forwarded these screenshots to the Claimant. None of the screenshots of the Proved Groupchat Messages were taken using the Defendant’s phone. I conclude this from the fact that the Proved Groupchat Messages appear in white bubbles on the left side of each screenshot. It is common knowledge that WhatsApp messages sent by the user of a mobile device appear on the right side of the chat when viewed on that device. Conversely, the appearance of the Proved Groupchat Messages on the left side of the screenshots indicates that the screenshots were taken using a device belonging to someone other than the Defendant. Given the absence of any suggestion that the Defendant was the one who sent these screenshots to the Claimant, it was most likely someone else – probably the person who took these screenshots – who forwarded them to the Claimant.

(b) Second, there is also no evidence or suggestion that Ms Lim took or forwarded the screenshots of the Proved Groupchat Messages to the Claimant.

(c) Third, there is likewise no evidence or suggestion that a non-member of the Groupchat gained access to it and subsequently forwarded screenshots of the Proved Groupchat Messages to the Claimant. By elimination, the only person who could have done so was Ms Yew, the only remaining member of the Groupchat. This inference is reinforced by the fact that one of the messages appearing on the right side of the chat in the screenshots was sent by Ms Yew. Its position indicates that the screenshot was taken using the sender’s device. The message in question was sent at 18:32, and is reproduced below ³⁴ (the “18:32 Message”):

The 18:32 Message is attributed to the user “Bao Bei” in the text file version of the Groupchat extracted and exhibited by the Defendant. ³⁵ Both the Claimant and Ms Lim testified that “Bao Bei” was Ms Yew, ³⁶ and this was not disputed by the Defendant. On the basis of this undisputed evidence and the process of elimination above, I find that Ms Yew was more likely than not the one who had taken the screenshots of the Proved Groupchat Messages and subsequently sent them to the Claimant. That explains how the Claimant, who was not a member of the Groupchat, came into possession of these screenshots.

23 Flowing from the above, I find it more likely than not that Ms Yew had read the Proved Groupchat Messages. The Proved Groupchat Messages appeared in the screenshots that Ms Yew had in all likelihood selected, rather than randomly chosen, to send to the Claimant. It is therefore reasonable to infer that she must have read these Messages before deciding which screenshots to forward to the Claimant.

24 In sum, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that both Ms Lim and Ms Yew read the Proved Groupchat Messages.

25 Turning to the Proved FB Messages, the inference that Ms Yew took the screenshots of these Messages appended to the SOC and subsequently sent them to the Claimant is even stronger. The evidence shows that the Facebook Messenger conversation involved only the Defendant and Ms Yew. Again, neither party suggests that the Defendant took screenshots or forwarded copies of their exchanges to the Claimant. Nor is there any evidence or suggestion that a third party gained access to the Facebook Messenger conversation and forwarded screenshots of those exchanges to the Claimant.

26 Based on [25] above, the logical conclusion is that it was Ms Yew who had taken the screenshots of the Proved FB Messages and subsequently sent them to the Claimant. It is therefore likely that she had read these Messages before doing so.

27 Finally, I consider whether the Claimant has established publication of the Proved Groupchat Messages and the Proved FB Messages in Singapore. The place where the recipients received and read these Messages determines the place where the tort was committed and, consequently, the applicable law (Low Tuck Kwong v Sukamto Sia [2013] 1 SLR 1016 at [15]). The Claimant’s pleadings do not specify whether publication took place in Singapore or overseas. No evidence of foreign law was adduced at trial. Accordingly, I confine my consideration of the Claimant’s case to publication in Singapore, to which Singapore law applies. The Claimant must therefore show that Ms Lim and Ms Yew received and read the Proved Groupchat Messages, and that Ms Yew read the Proved FB Messages, in Singapore, to satisfy the requirement of local publication.

28 As in OC 10825, there is no direct evidence of local publication in the present case. ³⁷ Nevertheless, I am prepared to infer that the Messages were published in Singapore, particularly given the absence of any challenge on this issue by the Defendant. There is no evidence or suggestion that either Ms Lim and Ms Yew were based overseas or they were travelling abroad when they received the Messages in question. There is therefore nothing to cast serious doubt on their presence in Singapore at the material time. Given these circumstances, I find it more likely than not that both women were in Singapore when they received and read the relevant Messages. The Claimant has accordingly established publication in Singapore. ³⁸

29 I turn next to the issue of whether the Defendant published the 23 Facebook Statements. This requires me to first determine whether the Defendant was the person who operated the STT Account at the material time. Only if this preliminary question is answered in the affirmative would it be necessary for me to consider whether the Claimant has satisfied the bilateral test for publication of a libel – namely, whether the Defendant conveyed the allegedly defamatory meanings embodied in the 23 Facebook Statements to another person (see [11] above).

30 I considered the same preliminary question in my 10825 Judgment, albeit in the context of the defence of justification raised by the Claimant (the defendant in OC 10825). In that case, the Claimant relied on four facts to support his contention that the Defendant (the claimant in OC 10825) was “Seng Toh Toh”. ³⁹ I rejected that argument, and found that the Claimant had failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was the person operating the STT Account. ⁴⁰

31 Having had the benefit of reading my 10825 Judgment prior to filing his closing submissions in OC 8236, the Claimant submits that the evidence he has adduced in OC 8236 is “materially fuller” than that adduced in OC 10825. He therefore contends that I should reach a different conclusion in the present action and find that the Defendant was the operator of the STT Account. ⁴¹

32 Before considering the Claimant’s arguments concerning the identity of the operator of the STT Account, I address a new argument raised by Claimant’s counsel at [48] of the CS. There, counsel submits that, even if the Claimant fails to prove that the Defendant operated the STT Account, the Defendant should nevertheless be found “liable in his own right for the matters he supplied or shared [to/with “Seng Toh Toh”]”. I reject this argument. The factual basis of this new argument was not pleaded, and the nature of the alternative cause of action being advanced is unclear. Moreover, the Claimant has cited no authority in support of this argument.

33 I now turn to consider the Claimant’s arguments and evidence in support of his allegation that the Defendant was the operator of the STT Account. The Claimant makes clear that, in seeking to persuade me to reach a different conclusion on the identity of “Seng Toh Toh”, he does not rely on the same facts and arguments that I rejected in my 10825 Judgment. ⁴² In particular, the Claimant confirms that he is no longer relying on the first three facts I rejected at [80] of the 10825 Judgment – namely, the Defendant’s alleged oral admission that he operated a “fake” account with the username “Seng Toh Toh”, the allegedly similar turns of phrase the Defendant and “Seng Toh Toh” used in certain messages and posts, and Ms Yew’s post suggesting that “Seng Toh Toh” had posted about matters which that only the Defendant supposedly knew about. As the Claimant has abandoned his reliance on these three facts, I will not consider them in determining this issue in OC 8236.

34 The Claimant instead advances five grounds in support of his allegation that the Defendant is “Seng Toh Toh”. These are:

(a) The Defendant’s allegedly inconsistent evidence concerning how “Seng Toh Toh” came into possession of a photograph of a UOB cheque (the “Cheque Photo”), which the STT Account posted on 6 December 2021 (the “First Point”); ⁴³

(b) The Defendant allegedly acting as “Seng Toh Toh’s” “representative” (the “Second Point”); ⁴⁴

(c) The Defendant’s sharing of and interactions with “Seng Toh Toh’s” Facebook posts (the “Third Point”); ⁴⁵

(d) Changes over time in the Defendant’s “account of [“Seng Toh Toh”]” (the “Fourth Point”); ⁴⁶ and

(e) The Defendant’s failure to call “Seng Toh Toh” as a witness at trial (the “Fifth Point”). ⁴⁷

35 I take each of the above five Points in turn.

36 I begin with the First Point. Here, the Claimant seeks to rely on an apparent inconsistency between the Defendant’s testimony at trial and a letter dated 5 December 2025 sent by Yuen Law LLC on behalf of its client, the Defendant (the “Letter”). ⁴⁸ In the Letter, the Defendant denied sending the Cheque Photo to “Seng Toh Toh”. ⁴⁹ However, in his AEIC and at trial, the Defendant admitted to sharing the Cheque Photo with “Seng Toh Toh”. ⁵⁰ There is therefore a material inconsistency in the Defendant’s accounts of whether he sent the Cheque Photo to “Seng Toh Toh”. The Claimant relies on this inconsistency, submitting that the Defendant’s position in the Letter has neither been withdrawn nor corrected, and remains unexplained. ⁵¹

37 The difficulty I have with this argument is that the Defendant was never given a chance to explain the inconsistency in cross-examination. The Claimant’s counsel ought to have confronted the Defendant with the discrepancy between the Letter and his testimony at trial, and afforded him an opportunity to explain it. This is required by the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), which is a rule of fairness requiring counsel to put to a witness “any matter upon which it is proposed to contradict the[ir] evidence-in-chief” to afford the witness an opportunity to explain the alleged contradiction (cited at [65] of Liza bte Ismail v Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 SLR(R) 555 (“Liza bte Ismail”)). The rule applies equally in both civil and criminal proceedings (see Liza bte Ismail at [65]). In the absence of such questioning, the Court has been deprived of any explanation the Defendant might have given for the inconsistency between the Letter and his AEIC and Court testimony. In these circumstances, the inconsistency cannot be relied upon to impugn the Defendant’s credibility.

38 Moreover, if the Claimant’s position is that neither of the Defendant’s accounts is true, or that only one is true, that position ought to have been put to the Defendant so that he could fairly respond and clarify his evidence. As the Claimant’s counsel did not do so, it remains unclear precisely how the Claimant alleges that “Seng Toh Toh” obtained the Cheque Photo. Although a possible explanation may be inferred from the manner in which the Claimant has advanced his case, I decline to make that assumption in the absence of a clearly articulated position on his part.

39 Because the Defendant was not afforded a fair opportunity to explain the very inconsistency upon which the Claimant seeks to rely, I reject the Claimant’s reliance on the First Point.

40 I move on to the Second Point. The Claimant relies on eight messages sent by the Defendant into the Groupchat, which he contends demonstrate that the Defendant was either “Seng Toh Toh’s” mouthpiece or “Seng Toh Toh” himself. ⁵² I reject the Claimant’s reliance on these messages for two reasons.

(a) First, the Claimant gave no prior notice of his intention to rely on these eight messages as evidence that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh”. None of the eight messages were highlighted for this purpose in the CAEIC. In fact, only one of them – namely, the message referred to at (2) of [36] of the CS – was mentioned in the Claimant’s pleadings. Accordingly, the Defendant was not given adequate notice that the Claimant intended to rely on these eight messages to establish that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh”.

(b) Second, as with the First Point, the Claimant’s counsel did not put to the Defendant in cross-examination the allegation that he had written these eight messages in the manner he did because he was, in fact, “Seng Toh Toh”. This omission is particularly significant given the absence of any prior notice that the Claimant intended to rely on these messages for that purpose. The Defendant could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this argument and address the eight messages in his DAEIC or in closing submissions.

41 On this basis alone, I consider it unsafe to make findings of fact based on the eight messages identified at [36] of the CS. I therefore reject the Second Point.

42 In any event, even if I were to refer to the contents of these eight messages, I fail to see how they support a finding that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh” rather than his mouthpiece and therefore a separate individual from “Seng Toh Toh”. A mouthpiece, by definition, speaks on behalf of another person, and would be expected to have a close relationship with that person. It is therefore unsurprising for a person acting as “Seng Toh Toh’s” mouthpiece to make statements appearing to anticipate “Seng Toh Toh’s” actions or to concern matters ostensibly known only to “Seng Toh Toh”. Such statements would be consistent with that person acting as a mouthpiece. Thus, the very evidence relied upon by the Claimant does not favour either of the two competing possibilities he advances at [39] above.

43 I turn to the Third Point. The Claimant relies on the fact that the Defendant shared and interacted with the posts made by the STT Account. Even if proven, this fact does not necessarily support an inference that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh”. Indeed, sharing and interacting with social media posts are activities commonly undertaken by persons other than the original author of the posts.

44 Furthermore, the Claimant’s argument that the screenshots from the STT Account’s Facebook page “contradict [the Defendant’s] claim that he cannot recall sharing [posts made by the STT Account]” ⁵³ is a non-starter. The mere fact that the Defendant interacted with the posts made by the STT Account does not, without more, establish that he was able to recall having done so. A person may have genuinely forgotten past actions, or may choose not to acknowledge them. If the Claimant intended to allege that the Defendant was dishonest in claiming, in the Letter, that he could not recall interacting with “Seng Toh Toh’s” Facebook posts, and that this dishonesty was motivated by some improper purpose, that allegation ought to have put to the Defendant in cross-examination and properly developed in submissions. Neither was done.

45 I come now to the Fourth Point. The Claimant contends that the Defendant’s “account of [“Seng Toh Toh”]” has changed over time. On closer examination, part of the factual basis for this contention merely reiterates the First and Third Points, which I have already rejected. ⁵⁴ The remaining factual bases may be distilled into a single argument: that the Defendant failed to produce objective evidence capable of establishing that he and “Seng Toh Toh” were two different individuals. The evidence to which the Claimant refers comprises Facebook Messenger chats between the Defendant and “Seng Toh Toh” in 2021 (the “2021 messages”), which was apparently the first time the pair communicated with each other, ⁵⁵ and messages exchanged between them regarding “Seng Toh Toh’s” communications with the Defendant on the morning of trial (i.e., 31 August 2026) (the “2026 messages”). ⁵⁶

46 I accept that the Defendant’s excuse that he “may have deleted” the 2021 messages, together with his failure to explain why the 2026 messages were not adduced, are somewhat convenient. ⁵⁷ However, the starting point remains that the burden of proving publication rests on the Claimant (see Review Publishing (HC) at [23]). It is therefore for the Claimant to establish that the offending statements were made by the Defendant, rather than by some other person. If the Claimant fails to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh”, the evidential balance to disprove this allegation does not shift to the Defendant. The remaining arguments under the Fourth and Fifth Points focus on the evidence the Defendant has failed to produce, rather than the evidence adduced by the Claimant in support of his own case. The Claimant’s arguments under the Fourth Point would become relevant if and only if the evidential burden had shifted to the Defendant. For the reasons at [36] to [44] above, I find that the evidential burden has not shifted in this case.

47 Accordingly, the Defendant’s failure or inability to produce the 2021 and 2026 messages merely gives rise to suspicion, but does not constitute substantive proof, that he was “Seng Toh Toh”.

48 Finally, I address the Fifth Point. The Claimant urges me to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant for failing to call “Seng Toh Toh” to testify at trial. At the risk of repetition, the evidential burden would shift to the Defendant only if the Claimant had, by the close of his case, adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that the Defendant and “Seng Toh Toh” were the same person. Only then would the Defendant be required to adduce evidence, including by calling appropriate witnesses, to rebut that prima facie case. In the present case, the Claimant has failed to establish even a prima facie case that the Defendant was “Seng Toh Toh”. The Defendant is therefore under no obligation to disprove that allegation. Drawing an adverse inference against the Defendant in these circumstances would, in my view, effectively reverse the evidential burden of proof. I therefore decline to draw the adverse inference sought by the Claimant.

49 Even if I were to consider the five Points collectively, they do not, in my judgment, overcome the evidential and conceptual deficiencies identified in respect of each of them. ⁵⁸ Having regard to the evidence adduced and the arguments advanced by the Claimant in OC 8236, I find that he has, once again, failed to prove that the Defendant and “Seng Toh Toh” were the same person, or that the Defendant operated the STT Account at the material time. It follows that the Claimant has also failed to establish that the Defendant published the 23 Facebook Statements.

50 In conclusion, the Claimant has established, in respect of the first limb of the tort, only that the Defendant published the Proved Groupchat Messages and the Proved FB Messages. I will refer to these two sets of Messages collectively as the “Proved Messages”.

51 I turn next to the requirement that the offending words refer to the Claimant. The Claimant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that an ordinary reasonable person who, at the material time, was aware of the relevant circumstances or special facts (if any) would reasonably understand the offending words as referring to the Claimant (Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing (CA)”) at [49]). The test is an objective one, and must be applied in the context in which the words were used (see Review Publishing (CA) at [50]). The Claimant need not be expressly referred to by name in the offending words, and it is also immaterial whether or not the Defendant intended to refer to the Claimant (see Review Publishing (CA) at [49]).

52 For ease of reference, I reproduce the Proved Messages in the table below:

53 The Defendant does not dispute that the Proved Messages referred to the Claimant. In any event, I am satisfied that this element of the tort has been established for the following reasons:

(a) The Defendant admitted in the ASOF that he had “made statements… concerning the Claimant” both in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger. ⁶⁴ Consistent with this admission, the Defendant did not dispute, and made little reference to, this element of the tort in his closing submissions.

(b) An ordinary reasonable person who knew the Claimant, was familiar with his appearance, and was aware that the Defendant, Ms Lim and Ms Yew were acquainted with him, would reasonably understand references to “Botak” – a colloquial term for a bald person – as referring to the Claimant. Indeed, the Claimant sported a clean-shaven head at the trial, as well as in screenshots of videos depicting him from April 2024 onwards. ⁶⁵ In addition, Ms Lim acknowledged that the word “Botak” in the Proved Groupchat Messages referred to the Claimant. ⁶⁶ Her evidence forms part of the relevant factual background against which the ordinary reasonable person would understand those Messages. This analysis applies to the statements made at s/n 14 to 20 of the table at [52] above, insofar as they contain references to “Botak”.

(c) An ordinary reasonable person familiar with the circumstances in which the Groupchat was created would also understand most, if not all, negative references to a male – particularly one engaged in the geomancy business – as references to the Claimant. Ms Lim testified that the Groupchat was created after the Claimant had “attacked both [Ms Yew] and [her] on his Facebook page”. ⁶⁷ Both the Defendant and Ms Lim also acknowledged that most of the messages in the Groupchat related to the Claimant. ⁶⁸ In my judgment, an ordinary reasonable person would infer from these undisputed facts that the Groupchat was created primarily for the purpose of discussing the Claimant.

54 For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Proved Messages referred to the Claimant.

55 The third and final limb of the tort concerns whether the Proved Messages were defamatory of the Claimant. This requires a two-stage analysis. First, I must determine the meanings conveyed by the Proved Messages. Second, I must consider whether those meanings were defamatory of the Claimant.

56 The Claimant pleads that the Proved Messages were defamatory solely by virtue of their natural and ordinary meanings. ⁶⁹ The natural and ordinary meaning of words is the meaning that the words in question would convey to an ordinary reasonable person, who is neither unduly suspicious nor avid for scandal, and who applies his general knowledge and common sense (see Review Publishing (CA) at [27]). This inquiry extends beyond the literal meaning of the offending words; the ordinary reasonable person may draw inferences or implications from those words in the light of his general knowledge, common sense and experience (see Review Publishing (CA) at [28]). However, extrinsic evidence cannot be relied upon in ascertaining that meaning, which must be derived from the words themselves, read in the context of the entire passage in which they appear (see Review Publishing (CA) at [27]).

57 As the test set out at [56] above is an objective one, neither the meaning intended by the publisher nor the meaning actually understood by the Claimant is relevant to the inquiry (see Review Publishing (CA) at [27]). It follows that any purported admission by the Defendant at trial that the meanings of the Proved Messages were defamatory is irrelevant; ⁷⁰ such an admission would reflect the Defendant’s subjective understanding of what the Proved Messages conveyed, which has no place in the objective inquiry prescribed by Review Publishing (CA).

58 The Claimant has set out what he says are the natural and ordinary meanings of the Proved Messages in Schedule A to his pleadings. ⁷¹ The Defendant did not advance any alternative meanings for any of the Proved Messages. Accordingly, the only meanings before me for consideration are those pleaded by the Claimant.

59 Given the number of Proved Messages, I set out in the table below (“Table 2”) both the natural and ordinary meanings alleged by the Claimant and, applying the objective test, my findings as to the meanings conveyed by each Message.

60 For the purposes of the ensuing analysis, I shall refer to the statements in the white rows of Table 2, whose pleaded natural and ordinary meanings I have accepted wholly or in part, collectively as the “Proved Messages (Subset)”.

61 I turn to the second stage of the inquiry into defamatory meaning (see [55] above). A publication is defamatory when it tends to lower the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society in general, or where it would expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned or avoided (see Review Publishing (HC) at [47]).

62 I consider that the meanings conveyed by the Proved Messages (Subset) fall within 10 categories:

(a) That the Claimant was mentally unstable or mentally disordered (s/n 2, 9, 14(b), and 14(e) of Table 2);

(b) That the Claimant was a gossiper (s/n 5 of Table 2);

(c) That the Claimant had been castrated (s/n 6 of Table 2);

(d) That the Claimant was unintelligent and ignorant (s/n 8, 14(a), 14(b), and 14(d) of Table 2);

(e) That the Claimant was greedy and lustful (s/n 9 of Table 2);

(f) That the Claimant was dishonest, unethical, deceitful, untrustworthy, and/or a cheat (s/n 11(a), 12(a), 12(e), 12(f), 12(h), 12(j), 13(d), 16, 20, and 21 of Table 2);

(g) That the Claimant was not a genuine or a good geomancy master (s/n 11(b), and 11(d) of Table 2);

(h) That the Claimant was malicious, controlling, and dangerous (s/n 11(e), and 15(a) of Table 2);

(i) That the Claimant was worthless (s/n 15(b) of Table 2); and

(j) That the Claimant was a criminal involved in illegal gambling (s/n 18 of Table 2).

63 It will be noted that s/n 10 of Table 2 is not listed within these 10 categories. I find that the ordinary meaning of the statement listed at s/n 2 of Table 2 does not satisfy the test for defamatory meaning set out in [47] of Review Publishing (HC). The statement expresses what the Defendant wished would happen to the Claimant, namely, for the latter to die, rather than conveying any imputation about the Claimant himself. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to prove that the statement at s/n 10 of Table 2 is defamatory.

64 As for the meanings set out in the 10 categories at [62] above, I find that these meanings are defamatory of the Claimant. Viewed objectively, the statements imputing negative attributes to the Claimant’s character, intellectual ability, and competence as a geomancy master, as well as those alleging his involvement in criminal activities, ⁸⁰ would tend to lower the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. Honesty and moral integrity are generally regarded as fundamental virtues, particularly in personal and professional relationships. Society also places considerable value on intellectual ability and competence in one’s occupation as positive and desirable traits in a person, particularly in a society as educationally and technically advanced as Singapore. The statements therefore impugn qualities which society holds in high regard, and would tend to diminish the respect that right-thinking members of society would otherwise repose in the Claimant.

65 The statement concerning the Claimant having been castrated ⁸¹ would also expose him to ridicule. Whilst the mere fact that a man has undergone castration is not inherently shameful, the manner and context in which the statement was made – in particular, its derisory tone and choice of words (“got removed liao”, “no longer a man”, and “become Eunuch Fu”) – make a mockery of the Claimant’s genitalia or perceived masculinity (or lack thereof). The statement was plainly not intended as a neutral description of a particular physical condition. Rather, the ordinary reader would understand it as making the Claimant an object of mockery and humiliation. It is this portrayal of the Claimant which renders the statement defamatory.

66 I therefore find that the statements set out in the 10 categories at [62] above are defamatory of the Claimant. I shall refer to these statements collectively as the “Defamatory Statements”. Accordingly, in respect of Issue 1, the Claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation against the Defendant based on the Defamatory Statements.

67 The Defamatory Statements include statements published by the Defendant in the Groupchat and to Ms Yew via Facebook Messenger. The Defendant’s sole pleaded defence is that these Statements were published on occasions of qualified privilege. ⁸² It goes without saying that the burden of establishing this defence rests on the Defendant (see Review Publishing (HC) at [159]).

68 The defence of qualified privilege attaches to the occasion on which the words are published, rather than to the words themselves (Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another and another appeal [2010] 4 SLR 331 at [34]). The privilege arises where (Chan Cheng Wah Bernard and others v Koh Sin Chong Freddie and another appeal [2012] 1 SLR 506 (“Chan Bernard”) at [87], citing Seaga v Harper [2009] 1 AC 1 at [5]):

69 This is commonly known as the “duty-interest test” (see Review Publishing (CA) at [176]). Whether this test is satisfied requires a fact-sensitive assessment directed at the particular sender and recipient of the communication, the content of the communication, and the circumstances surrounding its publication (Goh Lay Khim and others v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 546 at [80]).

70 I turn, therefore, to whether the duty-interest test is satisfied in the present case. The Defendant’s closing submissions (“DS”) provide little assistance on this issue. Although the Defendant argued that there was a “commonality of interest” between the Defendant, Ms Lim, and Ms Yew, ⁸³ no authority was cited in support of that formulation. The Defendant appears to be referring to [164(a)] of Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1004, where the High Court held that, inter alia, statements made between parties who share a common or mutual interest in the subject matter of the communication are protected by qualified privilege. A shared interest of this nature is one of the circumstances in which the duty-interest test articulated in Chan Bernard is satisfied. What the Defendant must nevertheless establish is that:

(a) The Defendant had a legitimate and sufficient interest in communicating the Defamatory Statements;

(b) Ms Lim and Ms Yew each had a reciprocal interest in receiving the Defamatory Statements; and

(c) The Defamatory Statements were fairly warranted by those interests (see Chan Bernard at [87]).

71 The Defendant bases the asserted common interest between himself, Ms Lim, and Ms Yew (the “Trio”) on their status as former clients of the Claimant who believed that he “had behaved badly, and continued to behave badly”. ⁸⁴ The Defendant advances this argument in respect of all the Defamatory Statements, be they published in the Groupchat or over Facebook Messenger to Ms Yew. ⁸⁵ It is common ground that the Trio were the Claimant’s clients at some point. Indeed, the Claimant acknowledges that the Defendant had previously engaged him for feng shui services. ⁸⁶ Accordingly, the question is whether their status as former clients of the Claimant, without more, establishes a legitimate and sufficient common interest in communicating and receiving the Defamatory Statements.

72 In my judgment, the answer is no. The Defendant has failed to furnish sufficient evidence or make any argument as to how and why the Trio’s status as the Claimant’s former clients gave rise to a common interest in communicating and receiving defamatory statements about the Claimant. I arrive at this conclusion for the following reasons.

73 First, the statements concerning the Claimant’s alleged tendency to gossip (see [62(b)] above), the Claimant’s manhood and masculinity (see [62(c)] above), his alleged worthlessness (see [62(i)] above), and his alleged participation in illegal gambling activities (see [62(j)] above) bear no connection to the Claimant’s occupation as a geomancer. Nor has the Defendant explained how these statements related to the relationships between the Claimant, as a geomancer, and the members of the Trio, as his former clients. These statements therefore fall outside the scope of any qualified privilege that might have arisen by virtue of the Trio’s status as the Claimant’s former clients.

74 Second, although the Defendant has not advanced this argument, I accept that former customers of a geomancer may have a legitimate common interest in exchanging information concerning the geomancer’s character in general, his honesty and trustworthiness, knowledge, mental stability, and competence in his craft (see [62(a)], [62(d)] to [62(h)] above). This is particularly so where these issues affected the quality of the service or advice they received from the Claimant, or their dealings with him in his professional capacity as a geomancer. However, whether such an interest existed must still be established on a balance of probabilities, having regard to the particular circumstances surrounding the offending publications.

75 In the present case, the Defendant has failed to establish that the Defamatory Statements were communicated in furtherance of any such legitimate common interest. The Trio may genuinely have believed that the Claimant had behaved badly and was of poor character. However, that belief alone does not establish an interest arising from their status as his former clients. The evidence does not show that the aspects of the Claimant’s character under discussion in the Defamatory Statements – such as his purported lack of knowledge, greed, or dishonesty and untrustworthiness – adversely affected either the quality of the geomancy or feng shui services they had received from the Claimant or their respective relationships with him as their service provider. Nor does the evidence show that the Trio were discussing genuine grievances arising from the Claimant’s provision of services to them. Indeed, as the Defendant and Ms Lim acknowledged in their oral testimony, ⁸⁷ the overall tenor and content of the Defamatory Statements indicate that they were made during informal conversations between friends, the purpose of which was to gossip about the Claimant, ⁸⁸ rather than to raise any legitimate concerns about the nature or quality of the geomancy services he had provided to them.

76 Absent any proven commonality of interest, the Defamatory Statements cannot be said to have been fairly warranted by the circumstances of their publication.

77 For these reasons, I find that the Defendant has failed to establish the requisite commonality of interest necessary for the occasions on which he published the Defamatory Statements to attract qualified privilege. The defence of qualified privilege therefore fails at the threshold, and there is no need for me to consider whether any such privilege would have been defeated by malice on the Defendant’s part (see Chan Bernard at [85]). ⁸⁹ I observe, however, that the Claimant neither filed a reply setting out the facts and matters from which malice was to be inferred, nor applied for the Court’s permission to file such a reply, as required by Order 43 rule 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2021. ⁹⁰ Thus, if I had found that the defence of qualified privilege was established, I would have been disinclined to determine the issue of malice.

78 Having established liability, the Claimant must now show that he is entitled to the reliefs he seeks. Although the Claimant’s pleadings included prayers for injunctions, an apology, and a signed undertaking, his CS addressed only the awards of general and aggravated damages. ⁹¹ I therefore take the Claimant to have abandoned all claims for non-monetary relief, and confine my analysis to whether general and aggravated damages should be awarded and, if so, in what amounts.

79 The Claimant seeks general damages of $10,000 if the Defendant is found responsible for publishing the 23 Facebook Statements on the STT Account, and $4,000 if he is not. ⁹² The Defendant takes no position on the quantum of general damages that should be awarded should he be found to have defamed the Claimant.

80 An award of general damages in defamation serves three purposes: first, to repair the damage caused to the claimant’s reputation; second, to vindicate his injured reputation; and third, to console him for the wrong done to him (Lee Hsien Loong v Xu Yuan Chen and another suit [2022] 3 SLR 924 (“Xu Yuan Chen”) at [76]).

81 The first of these purposes is not engaged on the facts of the present case. The Claimant has failed to establish that his reputation was damaged as a result of the publication of the Defamatory Statements. It is undisputed that the recipients of the Defamatory Statements – namely, Ms Lim and Ms Yew – already held a poor opinion of the Claimant’s character at the material time. ⁹³ In other words, the Claimant already enjoyed little, if any, favourable reputation in their eyes at the time of publication. More importantly, he did not seek to establish that the Defamatory Statements diminished their opinion of him any further.

82 Accordingly, only the purposes of vindicating the Claimant’s reputation and consoling him for the wrong suffered are relevant in the present case.

83 The factors governing the assessment of general damages in a defamation action are also set out at [67] of Xu Yuan Chen. They are:

(a) the nature and gravity of the defamation;

(b) the conduct, position and standing of the plaintiff and the defendant;

(c) the mode and extent of publication;

(d) the natural indignation of the court at the injury caused to the plaintiff;

(e) the conduct of the defendant from the time the defamatory statement is published to the very moment of the verdict;

(f) the failure to apologise and retract the defamatory statement;

(g) the presence of malice; and

(h) the intended deterrent effect of the damages.

84 I turn to assess the Defamatory Statements in the light of these factors. In doing so, I draw guidance from the 10825 Judgment and the only relevant authority cited by the Claimant, Tan Li-Ching Olivia v Lek Wee Tong [2021] SGDC 165 (“Tan Olivia”), in determining the appropriate quantum of damages.

85 In my judgment, the Claimant’s proposed award of $4,000 in general damages is appropriate, having regard to the comparatively more aggravated circumstances in Tan Olivia and OC 10825.

86 In Tan Olivia, the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages in respect of two Facebook posts found to be defamatory of her. These posts, made on the same day, asserted that the plaintiff (a) was untrustworthy and had made false representations to her friends about investments before disappearing to avoid accountability, and (b) was guilty of criminal conduct (at [6] to [8] and [23]). In assessing the quantum of general damages, the Court in Tan Olivia found that the parties were ordinary members of society (at [25] to [28]), and the evidence established that two persons had read the posts and five had interacted with them (at [33] and [35]).

87 In the 10825 Judgment, I found that the four defamatory posts – which were published on Facebook and accessible to the public – had been read by a limited audience of three of the Defendant’s friends, who did not believe their contents (at [112]). I also found that those posts remained accessible online for approximately 7.5 months (at [116]).

88 Similar to the parties in Tan Olivia, and consistent with my decision in [111] of the 10825 Judgment, I consider the parties in the present case to be ordinary members of society (see factor (b) at [82] above).

89 As regards the nature and gravity of the defamation (see factor (a) at [82] above), I recognise that many of the Defamatory Statements conveyed serious imputations of dishonesty, mental instability, and lack of intelligence. Nevertheless, the present case is less serious than Tan Olivia and OC 10825, principally because the Defamatory Statements were communicated privately to an extremely limited audience, and the period over which they were made has not been established (see factor (c) at [82] above). The Defamatory Statements were published to no more than two people through private channels of communication – namely, the Groupchat and the private Facebook Messenger conversation between the Defendant and Ms Yew. Most of the screenshots containing these conversations do not disclose the dates and times at which the Defamatory Statements were sent. Unlike the statements in Tan Olivia and OC 10825, the Defamatory Statements were not published publicly on a social media platform to a potentially wider audience. Nor was it established that they remained accessible for an extended period, as was the case with the four posts considered in the 10825 Judgment.

90 For completeness, the Claimant did not plead malice as a factor warranting an increase in the award of general damages (see factor (g) at [82] above).

91 I turn to the appropriate quantum of damages. Many of the Defamatory Statements conveyed identical imputations (see, for example, [62(a)] and [62(f)] above) made to the same recipients. Further, some of these Defamatory Statements fall within more than one of the categories identified at [62] above (see, for example, the Statements at s/n 9 and 14b of Table 2). Having regard to the overlaps in recipients and defamatory meanings, as well as the fact that certain Defamatory Statements fall within multiple categories, I consider it appropriate to assess damages by reference to the categories identified at [62] above, rather than by treating each Statement as warranting a separate award. Although each Defamatory Statement is independently actionable as a separate tort, the Court must (Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and another and other appeals [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 at [137]):

92 Bearing the considerations at [89] above in mind, I consider it appropriate to award a lower sum per category in the present case than the individual awards of $1,000 which I made in respect of two of the defamatory posts in the 10825 Judgment (at [128]). Although one of the Defamatory Statements alleges criminal conduct on the Claimant’s part, that imputation is considerably less serious than those conveyed by the Third and Sixth Posts in the 10825 Judgment. Those Posts accused the Defendant of being involved in disseminating sexual content online. By contrast, the statement at s/n 18 of Table 2 alleges only the comparatively less serious wrongdoing of participating in illegal gambling. Hence, I consider the statement at s/n 18 of Table 2 to be of similar severity as the rest of the Defamatory Statements, notwithstanding the imputation of criminality.

93 I would have been prepared to award $500 for each of the 10 categories set out at [62] above. That would have resulted in an aggregate award of $5,000 in general damages. However, given that the Claimant seeks only $4,000 in general damages if the Defendant is not found to have operated the STT Account, I limit the award of general damages to $4,000.

94 Aggravated damages are awarded where the defendant’s conduct before and during trial aggravates the injury to the plaintiff’s feelings (see Xu Yuan Chen at [68]). The factual basis for such damages must be pleaded with sufficient specificity and particularity, as both the existence and extent of any aggravation depend on the particular circumstances of each case and cannot be presumed (Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2025] 4 SLR 95 (“Foo Diana”) at [21] to [22]).

95 Here, the Claimant relies on three grounds for an award of aggravated damages. ⁹⁴ However, given the Claimant’s failure to establish that the Defendant operated the STT Account at the material time and was responsible for publishing the 23 Facebook Statements, only two of these grounds remain relevant to the assessment of aggravated damages. These are:

(a) That the Defendant had “taken active steps and calculated his actions to be executed by targeting the Claimant’s professional integrity and character”; ⁹⁵ and

(b) That the Defendant had “made damaging comments regarding the Claimant’s business and that the goods sold by the Claimant was fake”. ⁹⁶

96 The Claimant submits that these two pleaded grounds engage the recognised bases for an award of aggravated damages – namely, malice on the Defendant’s part and persecution of the Claimant by other means. ⁹⁷ As aggravated damages are awarded for the aggravation of injury by the manner in which the defendant committed the wrong or by his motive in doing so, this enhanced hurt must be proved by the Claimant on the balance of probabilities (Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd [2022] 1 SLR 689 at [261]).

97 I begin with the ground of malice. As a preliminary point, the Claimant did not expressly plead malice as a ground for aggravated damages. This is apparent from the pleaded grounds reproduced at [95] above. Nevertheless, even if the Claimant had unequivocally relied on malice as the basis for either or both of the remaining pleaded grounds for aggravated damages, he has failed to establish malice on the evidence. Malice, in the context of defamation, encompasses ill-will, spite, or an improper motive (see Foo Diana at [125]). It may be proved in two ways:

(a) By establishing that the defendant knew the defamatory statement to be false, was reckless as to its truth or falsity, or did not believe it to be true; and

(b) Where the defendant genuinely or honestly believed the statement to be true, by establishing that his dominant motive was to injure the plaintiff or to pursue some other improper purpose (see Foo Diana at [125], citing Chan Bernard at [90] and Xu Yuan Chen at [88]).

98 The Claimant has not sought to establish malice by either of these means. Indeed, the section of the CS addressing malice at page 23 ⁹⁸ merely cites the relevant legal principles, without identifying the evidence said to establish malice or explaining how that evidence satisfies the applicable legal test. In the absence of substantive argument on this issue, I decline to make a finding of malice against the Defendant.

99 I move on to the allegation of persecution of the Claimant by other means. Again, I do not consider that the Claimant has adequately pleaded this ground. As the phrase itself suggests, persecution by other means refers to conduct by the defendant directed against the claimant through means distinct from the defamatory statements themselves. Such conduct may take the form of additional harassment or intimidation. For example, in M Badiuzzaman and others v Salma Islam and others [2023] SGHC 311 at [22], the High Court considered and rejected an allegation that the defendants had engaged in persecutory conduct against the claimants, including by exerting pressure on them to discourage them from pursuing the proceedings. It follows that the mere publication or repetition of defamatory statements does not, without more, amount to persecution by other means. The Claimant must show something more in order to establish this ground for aggravated damages.

100 The Claimant has failed to do so. Both pleaded grounds at [95] relate to the contents of the Defamatory Statements themselves. The Claimant has adduced no evidence of any additional acts by the Defendant amounting to harassment, intimidation, or other forms of persecution directed against him. Accordingly, I find that the Claimant has similarly failed to establish this second ground.

101 For the above reasons, the Claimant has failed to establish the aggravated injury necessary to justify an award of aggravated damages. I therefore decline to make such an award.

102 In conclusion, judgment is granted in favour of the Claimant, in the sum of $4,000 in general damages.

103 As pre-judgment interest cannot be awarded on general damages in defamation actions (Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 at [88] to [91]), I award only post-judgment interest at 5.33% per annum on the sum of $4,000, to run from the date of this judgment to the date of payment.

104 If the parties are unable to agree on the issues of costs and disbursements, they are to file written submissions thereon, limited to five pages, within two weeks of the date of this judgment.