1 It is well established that offences involving road rage violence warrant a deterrent sentencing approach. This is because minor disputes and frustrations are commonplace on public roads, and the courts must steadfastly discourage road users from responding to such incidents with violence. Road users are expected to exercise restraint.

2 However, it goes without saying that the mere fact that an offence of voluntarily causing hurt occurs on or in the vicinity of a road does not invariably render it an episode of road rage violence. As the High Court emphasised in Public Prosecutor v Lim Yee Hua and another appeal [2018] 3 SLR 1106 (“Lim Yee Hua”) at [21] and [25], there must be a nexus between the violence and the parties’ shared use of the roads. More specifically, road rage violence arises where the violence is perpetrated by a road user as a result of a real or perceived slight by another road user stemming from differences arising in the course of their shared use of the roads. Where that nexus is absent, the particular deterrent sentencing policy applicable to road rage violence would not apply.

3 As such, before applying the deterrent sentencing policy that accompanies road rage violence, it is necessary to examine the true genesis and context of the violence and, in particular, whether the requisite nexus with the parties’ shared use of the roads exists. This is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry.

4 In the present matter, the offender, Mr Lau Kah Wai, J (“Mr Lau”), pleaded guilty to a charge of voluntarily causing hurt under s 323 of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) to Mr Lee Chun Peng (“Mr Lee”) by grabbing Mr Lee on the right shoulder and the back of his neck, which caused scratches and superficial abrasions on Mr Lee’s right hand, neck and upper back area. This offence had occurred after both parties had alighted from their vehicles following a slight collision.

5 The central dispute was whether Mr Lau’s offence was one of road rage violence, which would have attracted the deterrent sentencing policy. The Prosecution, in submitting that it was, had sought a custodial sentence of six weeks’ imprisonment. On the other hand, the Defence contended otherwise and sought a sentence of a fine. I concluded that the present offence was not one of road rage violence and accordingly imposed a fine of $4,000 on Mr Lau. Being dissatisfied with my decision on sentence, the Prosecution has filed an appeal against the same.

6 The undisputed facts, as narrated in the statement of facts, were as follows. On 20 August 2024, at about 6.06pm, Mr Lau and Mr Lee were driving their respective vehicles along the road at 10 Bayfront Avenue, near Marina Bay Sands. Mr Lau was travelling in lane one, while Mr Lee was travelling in lane two.

7 At some point, Mr Lee signalled his intention to change into lane one ahead of Mr Lau. After signalling for a few seconds, Mr Lee began to move slowly into lane one. Upon seeing Mr Lee attempting to merge into his lane, Mr Lau accelerated to prevent him from doing so. A slight collision occurred between their vehicles, following which both men stopped their vehicles. A video footage was tendered depicting the collision.

8 Mr Lau and Mr Lee subsequently agreed to move their vehicles to lane three, the leftmost lane, to minimise obstruction to traffic. After doing so, they alighted from their vehicles and continued their conversation. Mr Lee was prepared to exchange particulars, but Mr Lau wanted to settle the matter privately. Mr Lee declined to do so.

9 Mr Lee then noticed that Mr Lau’s breath smelled of alcohol. He took out his mobile phone and attempted to call the police. Mr Lau sought to dissuade Mr Lee from doing so and reached for Mr Lee’s mobile phone, which Mr Lee was holding to his right ear.

10 At about 6.13pm, a scuffle ensued as Mr Lau attempted to prevent Mr Lee from calling the police. In the course of the scuffle, Mr Lau used his left hand to grab Mr Lee’s right shoulder and the back of his neck in an attempt to reach for Mr Lee’s mobile phone. Mr Lau knew that his actions were likely to cause Mr Lee pain. Another video footage showing the scuffle was exhibited.

11 As a result of Mr Lau’s actions, Mr Lee sustained the following injuries, which were subsequently assessed:

(a) scratches and superficial abrasions over the second metacarpophalangeal joint and second metacarpal bone on the dorsum of his right hand;

(b) two superficial abrasions over the right upper anterior trapezius area; and

(c) several scratches and abrasions over the back of his neck and right upper back trapezius area.

12 Mr Lee eventually managed to get through to the police and pushed Mr Lau away. Mr Lee reported over the telephone: “I can’t hold him any longer… This guy drunk car accident hit me faster come”.

13 Upon hearing this, Mr Lau disengaged and left the scene, leaving his vehicle behind. He did so to avoid being investigated by the police at that time, as he had consumed alcohol before driving. Mr Lee remained at the scene with both vehicles until the arrival of the police.

14 Mr Lau was not arrested for the present offence. He also subsequently agreed to have the following offences arising from the incidents described above to be compounded:

(a) one charge of driving without due care and reasonable attention under s 65(1)(b) punishable under s 65(5)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“RTA”);

(b) one charge for failing to provide his particulars following an accident under s 84(1)(a) of the RTA; and

(c) one charge for leaving his vehicle in a position likely to cause danger, obstruction or undue inconvenience under s 122 of the RTA.

15 The Prosecution sought six weeks’ imprisonment. It accepted that the harm caused was low and that, applying the sentencing framework for an offence of voluntarily causing hurt as set out in Niranjan s/o Muthupalani v Public Prosecutor [2024] 3 SLR 834 (“Niranjan”), the offence fell within Band 1. The injuries sustained by Mr Lee were minor, and the assault was not prolonged. On the harm caused alone, the starting point would therefore have been a fine. Nevertheless, the Prosecution submitted that Mr Lau’s culpability was high and that the circumstances of the offence warranted a custodial sentence.

16 In particular, the Prosecution relied on four aggravating factors. First, it submitted that the offence involved road rage violence as the use of force bore a strong nexus to the parties’ shared use of the roads, thereby warranting an especially deterrent sentence. Second, Mr Lau had used force to prevent Mr Lee from alerting the authorities to a possible offence of drink driving. Third, Mr Lau was the aggressor while Mr Lee had acted defensively. Fourth, although Mr Lau’s antecedents were dated, they involved very similar offences.

17 The Prosecution also sought a disqualification from holding or obtaining all classes of driving licences (“DQAC”) for nine months pursuant to s 42 of the RTA in light of Mr Lau’s high culpability.

18 On the other hand, the Defence sought a fine of $5,000. Similar to the Prosecution, the Defence submitted the offence fell within Band 1 of the sentencing framework in Niranjan given the minor injuries sustained by Mr Lee. As for Mr Lau’s culpability, the Defence submitted that there was no premeditation; the altercation was neither prolonged nor one-sided; Mr Lee was not a vulnerable victim; and no weapon was used. While Mr Lau had a related antecedent for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, the Defence submitted that little weight should be placed on it as the conviction was almost 20 years old. It also relied on Mr Lau’s remorse, cooperation with the authorities and early plea of guilt.

19 The Defence further submitted that the custodial threshold had not been crossed as the present matter was not one involving road rage violence. Notably, Mr Lau had neither punched nor slapped Mr Lee, and the injuries arose when Mr Lau attempted to wrest Mr Lee’s mobile phone from him. In the alternative, the Defence sought an imprisonment term of one to two weeks. Mr Lau did not object to the Prosecution’s proposed DQAC period of nine months.

20 As mentioned, I rejected the Prosecution’s contention that the present offence involved road rage violence on the part of Mr Lau.

21 The applicable definition of road rage violence was set out by the High Court in Lim Yee Hua at [21] and [25]. Chan Seng Onn J (as he then was) explained that an incident of violence should be characterised as road rage violence only where the facts disclosed “violence perpetrated by road users as a result of real or perceived slights by other road users stemming from differences that arise in the course of the shared use of our roads” (Lim Yee Hua at [21]). Put simply, it was not sufficient that the violence happened on or near a road, or that the persons involved happened to be road users. There must be a nexus between the violence and a difference arising from their shared use of the roads.

22 The application of this definition in Lim Yee Hua itself was instructive. The first charge concerned Lim punching the victim after the latter, who had been aggrieved by Lim’s failure to give way at a zebra crossing, struck the roof of Lim’s car. Chan J held that the assault did not constitute road rage violence. Although the victim’s act of striking Lim’s car was itself prompted by a perceived slight arising from their shared use of the road, Lim’s subsequent violence was not. Rather, the immediate cause of Lim’s assault was the victim’s act of striking his car. The “rage” which triggered the assault therefore had nothing to do with the earlier traffic incident or any dispute arising from it. Indeed, Chan J regarded the victim, rather than Lim, as the road rage aggressor. The victim’s conduct amounted instead to provocation for Lim’s assault, although it did not excuse Lim’s disproportionate response in punching him. Accordingly, the deterrent sentencing policy applicable to road rage violence did not apply to Lim’s first charge: Lim Yee Hua at [50]–[54].

23 Much can be said about the meaning of the word, “nexus”. In my view, however, the nexus contemplated in Lim Yee Hua cannot be understood so loosely as to encompass any connection, however remote, between the violence and an antecedent incident involving the parties’ use of the roads. The definition at [21] of Lim Yee Hua was expressed in causal terms: the violence must have been perpetrated “as a result of” a real or perceived slight stemming from differences arising in the course of the parties’ shared use of the roads. Indeed, Chan J described the “litmus test” as whether the violence “originates from differences arising through common road use” (Lim Yee Hua at [21]). The inquiry therefore concerned the genesis of the violence, and not merely whether the violence could be traced in some broader factual or temporal sense to an earlier road-related incident.

24 This understanding was consistent with the original formulation of the deterrent sentencing policy in Ong Hwee Leong v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR(R) 458 (“Ong Hwee Leong”). There, the offender and the victim had irritated each other by switching their headlights to high beam. When both vehicles subsequently stopped at a traffic light, the offender alighted, confronted the victim and punched him. In explaining why a deterrent sentence was warranted, Yong Pung How CJ observed that drivers had to refrain from assaulting others “simply because those others have annoyed them by their driving or in some other way” (Ong Hwee Leong at [7]). The violence in Ong Hwee Leong thus arose directly from the irritation occasioned by the parties’ use of the road.

25 In my view, nothing in Lim Yee Hua suggested that Chan J intended to expand this conception of road rage violence by treating any nexus with an earlier road-related incident as sufficient. Quite the contrary, the definition in Lim Yee Hua was formulated in the context of clarifying the proper limits of the label “road rage violence”, given the sentencing consequences which followed from its application (Lim Yee Hua at [1] and [3]). The requirement of a nexus must be understood accordingly. Otherwise, violence which merely occurred against the factual backdrop of a road-related incident could readily be characterised as road rage violence even though the violence was precipitated by a distinct event. That would certainly blur the very distinction which the High Court in Lim Yee Hua had sought to draw.

26 In the present case, it was evident (and the Prosecution accepted) that following the slight collision between the parties’ vehicles, both Mr Lau and Mr Lee promptly moved their vehicles to the third lane of the road to address the situation without obstructing traffic. When queried as to the requisite nexus between the present offence and the parties’ shared use of the roads, the Prosecution submitted that the offence arose from a “difference” between Mr Lau and Mr Lee as to how the earlier collision should be resolved. It further sought to distinguish Lim Yee Hua on the basis that there had been a “full disengagement” from the road-related dispute in that case, whereas there was no such disengagement here. I was not persuaded by either submission.

27 In my assessment, they cast the requisite nexus too widely. In particular, the former submission placed undue emphasis on the existence of a “difference” between the parties without sufficient regard to the remainder of the definition in Lim Yee Hua. The relevant difference had to arise in the course of the parties’ shared use of the roads, and the violence had in turn to be perpetrated as a result of a real or perceived slight stemming from that difference. It was therefore insufficient that the subject matter of the parties’ disagreement concerned the resolution of an earlier road traffic collision. The inquiry remained what had precipitated the violence.

28 Nor did the Prosecution’s reliance on the absence of a “full disengagement” take matters further. Whether the parties had “fully disengaged” from their earlier interaction was not the inquiry prescribed by the High Court in Lim Yee Hua. Indeed, the application of the definition to the first charge in Lim Yee Hua demonstrated that the inquiry was directed at the particular cause of the violence, rather than whether the parties’ interaction could be regarded as one continuous sequence of events. I was therefore of the opinion that the fact that the parties had remained engaged in dealing with the aftermath of the collision was not determinative.

29 The collision and the parties’ subsequent discussion as to how it should be resolved provided the factual setting for the offence, but neither was the true cause of the violence. The Statement of Facts made clear that Mr Lee was prepared to exchange particulars, but Mr Lau wished to settle the matter privately. It was only after Mr Lee noticed that Mr Lau’s breath smelled of alcohol and attempted to call the police that Mr Lau sought to dissuade him from doing so and reached for his mobile phone. The scuffle then ensued because Mr Lau attempted to prevent Mr Lee from making that call. The immediate cause of the violence was therefore Mr Lee’s attempt to call the police, not any real or perceived slight arising from the parties’ shared use of the roads. The requisite nexus was accordingly absent.

30 For the foregoing reasons, I was unable to accept the Prosecution’s characterisation of the present offence as one involving road rage violence.

31 With that, I turned to the appropriate sentence. At the first step of the framework in Niranjan, as the Prosecution had accepted, the minor scratches and superficial abrasions sustained by Mr Lee meant that the present offence fell squarely within Band 1 with a starting sentence of a fine. In view of the very minor injuries, I calibrated the starting fine at $2,500.

32 Turning then to the second stage of the framework, the court is required to make the necessary adjustments to the indicative starting sentence based on its assessment of the offender’s culpability as well as all other relevant factors: Niranjan at [56(b)] and [65]–[67]. The aggravating and mitigating factors identified in the Court of Appeal’s decision of Public Prosecutor v BDB [2018] 1 SLR 127 at [62]–[70] and [71]–[75], respectively, are relevant at this stage.

33 I concluded that Mr Lau’s culpability was moderate. His actions were spontaneous and arose when Mr Lee attempted to call the police, which Mr Lau sought to prevent as he did not wish to be investigated after having consumed alcohol before driving. As the video footage revealed, the manner in which the hurt was caused was also very mild. Mr Lau did not punch or otherwise strike Mr Lee. Rather, the hurt was caused in the course of Mr Lau grabbing Mr Lee’s right shoulder and the back of his neck while attempting to reach for his mobile phone. The attack was neither prolonged nor premeditated, and no weapon was deployed.

34 This left me with the Prosecution’s submission that Mr Lau had used force to prevent Mr Lee from alerting the authorities to a possible offence of drink driving. I accepted that this was a significant aggravating factor. As Chan J explained in Lim Yee Hua at [64], the obstruction of and attacks on persons intending to make police reports impede the functioning of the police by obstructing the commencement of investigations and therefore engage the sentencing objective of general deterrence. The Prosecution accordingly submitted that, even if the present offence was not one involving road rage violence, this aggravating factor would have warranted a term of imprisonment.

35 I did not agree that a custodial sentence necessarily followed. The relevance and significance of an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice must still be assessed in its proper context.

36 In the context of an offence under s 204A of the Penal Code for obstructing the course of justice, the Court of Appeal in Parthiban a/l Kanapathy v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 847 at [27] has identified the seriousness of the predicate offence, the effect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice, and the degree of persistence, premeditation and sophistication as relevant considerations. I was of the view that these considerations were useful, by analogy, in assessing the weight to be accorded to the present aggravating factor.

37 In the present matter, Mr Lau’s attempt to prevent Mr Lee from calling the police was spontaneous, unsophisticated and short-lived. Notably, Mr Lee eventually succeeded in calling the police. I accepted, however, that this did not mean that Mr Lau’s conduct caused no prejudice to the ensuing investigation. As stated in the Statement of Facts, Mr Lau left the scene upon hearing Mr Lee’s call to the police because he wished to avoid being investigated at that time, having consumed alcohol before driving. By doing so, Mr Lau might have deprived the police of the opportunity to investigate his alcohol consumption contemporaneously.

38 That said, it bears emphasis that Mr Lau was never charged with such an offence. More importantly, the Statement of Facts went no further than to state that Mr Lau had consumed alcohol before driving and that Mr Lee had noticed that his breath smelled of alcohol. There was no evidence as to the amount of alcohol Mr Lau had consumed, much less that the concentration of alcohol in his breath or blood exceeded the prescribed limit. It would therefore have been speculative to proceed on the basis that Mr Lau had in fact committed an offence of drink driving.

39 The aggravating factor was therefore properly confined to the fact that Mr Lau had used force to prevent Mr Lee from calling the police because he wished to avoid being investigated for having consumed alcohol before driving, and that his subsequent departure from the scene might have deprived the police of the opportunity to investigate that matter contemporaneously. That was undoubtedly serious. At the same time, Mr Lau did not avoid accountability for the RTA offences which could be established against him. He was subsequently handed three charges arising from the incident, all of which he agreed to compound (see [14] above). The offence of drink driving, on the other hand, remained no more than a possibility.

40 None of this detracted from the seriousness of interfering with a person seeking police assistance. But general deterrence does not invariably require imprisonment. As Chan J observed in Lim Yee Hua at [47], where a fine of sufficient magnitude can achieve the requisite deterrent effect, proportionality may militate against the imposition of the more severe punishment of imprisonment. Having regard to the spontaneous and limited nature of Mr Lau’s conduct, the very minor hurt caused, and the absence of any sustained or sophisticated attempt to obstruct the course of investigations, this aggravating factor warranted a substantial enhancement of the fine, but did not, in my judgment, justify a custodial sentence.

41 As for Mr Lau’s antecedents, these were very dated, having occurred almost 20 years ago. I therefore did not consider them as revealing a pattern of repeat offending so as to constitute an aggravating factor: see Public Prosecutor v Marzuki bin Ahmad [2014] 4 SLR 623 at [40]. Separately, credit was given to Mr Lau for extending his cooperation to the authorities and indicating his intention to plead guilty.

42 Consequently, I enhanced the indicative starting sentence of a fine of $2,500 to a fine of $4,000 at the second stage of the Niranjan sentencing framework.

43 By all of the above, I concluded that the present offence of voluntarily causing hurt was not one involving road rage violence and therefore did not attract the attendant deterrent sentencing policy. While Mr Lau’s motivation in committing the offence, namely, to prevent Mr Lee from calling the police, was an aggravating factor, I did not consider it sufficiently serious as to require a custodial sentence. I therefore imposed a fine of $4,000 on Mr Lau.

44 No compensation order was sought by the Prosecution in light of the very minor injuries sustained and I accordingly did not make such an order. Nor did I impose a DQAC order against Mr Lau in view of my conclusion that he did not commit road rage violence.