1 The claimant brings this action against the defendant seeking to recover over $1m ¹ as damages for personal injuries that he suffered on 6 September 2019. The claimant was, at that time, employed by the defendant as a flight steward. In the course of his employment with the defendant, the claimant fell ² on what he says was a slippery area on the floor ³ of the defendant’s aircraft. It is the claimant’s case that his injuries and current disabilities were caused by the defendant’s breach of its duty of care to him as his employer to provide him a safe place of work and a safe system of work. ⁴

2 The defendant denies liability for the claimant’s injuries. ⁵ The defendant accepts that the claimant fell on board the defendant’s aircraft on 6 September 2019. ⁶ The defendant accepts also that he was acting in the course of his employment when he fell. ⁷ The defendant does not deny that it owed him a duty of care as his employer. ⁸ But the defendant denies: (a) that there was a slippery area on the aircraft floor; ⁹ (b) that the claimant suffered his injuries because the defendant breached its duty of care to him; ¹⁰ and (c) that the claimant’s fall caused the disabilities that he now complains of. ¹¹ The defendant also relies on the defences of contributory negligence and volenti non fit injuria. ¹²

3 Having considered the parties’ evidence and submissions, I dismiss the claimant’s claim. I do so for two principal reasons. First, I find that there was no slippery area on the floor of the defendant’s aircraft as the claimant alleges. Second, and in any event, I do not accept that the defendant breached the duty of care that it owed to the claimant.

4 I now set out my reasons.

5 The defendant is an airline incorporated and headquartered in Singapore.

6 The claimant is a Malaysian citizen. He was born in June 1988. He was therefore 31 at the time of his injuries in 2019 and 35 at the time of trial in 2024. ¹³

7 The defendant employed the claimant on 11 April 2016 as a flight steward on a five-year contract at a salary of $6,058 per month. ¹⁴

8 Unfortunately, the claimant’s experience working for the defendant was not a happy one. In addition to the workplace injury that is the subject of this action, he suffered six other workplace injuries between April 2017 and April 2019. ¹⁵

9 First, in April 2017, the claimant injured his back while helping a passenger close an overhead luggage compartment. The treatment for this injury included painkillers and physiotherapy. ¹⁶ The claimant filed a claim for compensation for this injury under the Work Injury Compensation Act 2019 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WICA”) and was awarded $26,200. ¹⁷

10 Second, in July 2017, the claimant suffered bruises on his left forearm when changing a meal rack. This was a minor injury that resolved without treatment ¹⁸ or claim. ¹⁹

11 Third, in September 2017, the claimant hit his left thumb on a meal cart when stowing the meal cart during descent. This too was a minor injury that resolved without treatment ²⁰ or claim. ²¹

12 Fourth, in January 2018, the claimant slipped and fell from a staircase while exiting the crew bunk. ²² The treatment for this injury included surgery in April 2018 to fuse the claimant’s C5/C6 vertebrae. The defendant paid for this surgery, which cost just over $41,000. ²³ The claimant filed a claim for compensation for this injury under the WICA and was awarded $91,700. ²⁴

13 The defendant grounded the claimant as a result of his medical condition arising from this injury. ²⁵ The claimant complained against his grounding to the Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices, alleging that the defendant’s employment practices were insufficiently progressive. ²⁶ Later that year, the defendant certified that the claimant was fit to fly and he resumed his duties as a flight steward. ²⁷

14 Fifth, in December 2018, the claimant broke his left fingernail while handling a meal cart. This was a minor injury that resolved without treatment ²⁸ or claim. ²⁹

15 Sixth, in April 2019, the claimant bruised the tip of a finger while opening a compartment door. This too was a minor injury that resolved without treatment ³⁰ or claim. ³¹

16 On 10 April 2021, the defendant allowed the claimant’s employment contract to expire without offering him a fresh contract. ³² The defendant had formed the view by then that the defendant could no longer contribute positively to its business. The defendant’s assessment was that the claimant’s productivity was low and that he had failed to demonstrate a desire to excel. As a result of his seven workplace injuries, including the one that is the subject of this action, the claimant had been on medical leave for 603 days from 1 January 2018 until 10 April 2021. ³³ This is over half of the 1,195 calendar days between those two dates. It is therefore well over half of the working days between those two dates. In addition, the claimant’s doctor had by then certified that the claimant’s disabilities arising from his injuries on 6 September 2019 had left him medically unfit ever to resume work as a flight steward. ³⁴

17 The claimant’s case is that he continues to be medically unfit to return to work as a flight steward even to this day. ³⁵ His case on the nature and effect of his injuries is as follows. As a result of his fall on 6 September 2019, he suffered a cervical disc prolapse at the C4/5 and C6/7 levels and weakness in his left arm. ³⁶ He has not, even by the time of trial in 2024, recovered from these injuries. ³⁷ He continues to experience pain and discomfort in his back and neck while sitting, standing, walking or running. ³⁸ The pain comes on anywhere from five to 15 minutes after commencing physical activity and worsens if he continues. To cope with the pain, he must take frequent breaks, supplemented with painkillers.

18 The claimant now works a customer care analyst at Ricoh (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd. He is engaged on a two-year contract from September 2023 to September 2025 at a monthly salary of RM4,200 (about $1,300) per month. ³⁹ Well over half of his total claim for damages is therefore his claim of almost $700,000 for loss of future earnings. ⁴⁰

19 The parties’ cases raise five issues:

(a) Was there a slippery area on the floor of the aircraft?

(b) Did the defendant breach its duty of care to the claimant?

(c) Did the claimant’s fall on the defendant’s aircraft on 6 September 2019 cause the disabilities that the claimant now complains of?

(d) Can the defendant rely on the defence of contributory negligence or the defence of volenti non fit injuria?

(e) What is the quantum of the claimant’s loss arising from his injuries?

20 As I have mentioned, I find against the claimant on the first and second issues. That suffices to dispose of the claimant’s entire case. I therefore need not and do not analyse the remaining three issues that go to causation, defences and quantum.

21 I now analyse the first issue, ie, whether there was a slippery area on the floor of the aircraft.

22 Analysing the first issue requires a closer examination of the events of 6 September 2019. The background facts are either common ground or not in dispute. I now summarise them.

23 On 6 September 2019 (Singapore time), the claimant was a member of the cabin crew on board the defendant’s flight SQ 31 from San Francisco to Singapore. ⁴¹ Flight time was about 16¾ hours. The flight was scheduled to take off from San Francisco at 11.25am on 5 September 2019 (San Francisco time) ⁴² or 2.25am on 6 September 2019 (Singapore time). It was scheduled to land in Singapore at 7.10pm on 6 September 2019 (Singapore time). ⁴³

24 The aircraft assigned to the flight was an Airbus A350. The typical number of cabin crew assigned to an aircraft of this class is 12 to 15. ⁴⁴ The cabin crew of this flight comprised 13 members. ⁴⁵

25 The following are the five members of the cabin crew of this flight who gave evidence at trial, listed in order of seniority together with a summary of their duties:

(a) Mr Nor Azam bin Mohamed Shariff (“Mr Azam”) was the Chief Steward. As Chief Steward, Mr Azam was the second-most senior member of the cabin crew, after the In-flight Manager. One of Mr Azam’s duties as Chief Steward was to assist the In-flight Manager in exercising overall supervision of the entire cabin crew. In addition, Mr Azam was the senior team leader assigned to the economy section. Mr Azam has been employed by the defendant since 1995. ⁴⁶

(b) Ms Chia Yen Ching Christina (“Ms Chia”) was the Leading Stewardess. She was assigned to the economy section. As the Leading Stewardess, Ms Chia was a junior team leader whose role included assisting Mr Azam in supervising the economy section. Ms Chia has been employed by the defendant since 2001, albeit with gaps for maternity leave and due to the Covid 19 pandemic. ⁴⁷

(c) The claimant was a flight steward. He was assigned the “C2” position. The C2 is also called the “galley steward”. The C2 is required to use both aisles of the aircraft as well as the galley to perform his duties. ⁴⁸ As the C2, it was the claimant’s duty to secure all items in the galley and to ensure that the galley was dry and clean. This included the galley floor. ⁴⁹ During a meal service, the claimant’s duties included being stationed in the galley to heat up meals and to load and replenish the meal trolleys used to serve food and drink to passengers in the economy section. ⁵⁰

(d) Ms Marshelly Viola Elizabeth (“Ms Marshelly”) was a flight stewardess. She was assigned the “C5” position. As the C5, her area of responsibilities included serving the passengers on the left aisle of the economy section and assisting the C2, ie, the claimant, in the galley during a meal service. ⁵¹ Ms Marshelly has been employed by the defendant since 2016. ⁵²

(e) Ms Chiang Tsai-Jung (“Ms Chiang”) was a flight stewardess. She was assigned the “C3” position. As the C3, her area of responsibility during the meal service was the left aisle in economy class. ⁵³ Ms Chiang has been employed by the defendant since 2018. ⁵⁴

26 As I shall show, four material aspects of the claimant’s account of how and why he fell are at variance with his evidence in cross-examination and his case as he left it with me for determination at the close of trial. These variances are one reason why I reject the claimant’s case as to why he fell.

27 For ease of exposition, however, I begin by summarising at [28] to [33] below the claimant’s account of how and why he fell as taken from his pleadings and his affidavit of evidence in chief ⁵⁵ before drawing out the variances between this account and his account in cross-examination.

28 After the doors of the aircraft closed in San Francisco but before the aircraft took off, the claimant noticed a patch of grease on the floor of the economy class galley. He “immediately” ⁵⁶ informed Ms Chia about the patch of grease. Ms Chia instructed him to remove the patch of grease with disinfectant cleaning spray and a hand towel. The claimant attempted to clean the patch of grease as Ms Chia had instructed. Despite his best efforts, the grease remained on the floor. Ms Chia then warned cabin crew about the patch of grease and instructed them to exercise the necessary caution while carrying out their duties. ⁵⁷

29 All of this occurred before take-off. After take-off, Ms Chia “instruct[ed] cabin crew” to clean the patch of grease again. This attempt also failed. ⁵⁸

30 The claimant’s pleaded account of how and why he fell is set out in para 5 of his Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) (the “Statement of Claim”):

In the last line of para 5 of his Statement of Claim, the claimant refers to the aircraft’s “Cabin Defect Log” (“CDL”). ⁵⁹ I explain what the CDL is at [77] below.

31 As is to be expected, the claimant’s account in his affidavit of evidence in chief of how and why he fell is largely (though not entirely: see [53] below) consistent with the account in his Statement of Claim: ⁶⁰

32 About 15 hours into the flight, and about 2½ hours before the flight was due to land in Singapore, the claimant was preparing for the final ⁶¹ meal service of the flight. As he was walking into the galley, he slipped on the patch of grease and fell hard on his back onto the floor. At the time of his fall, the galley light was switched on and the aircraft was stable. ⁶²

33 Members of the cabin crew helped the claimant to an empty crew seat in the economy section and applied some light first aid. ⁶³ They then helped him to an empty business class seat. ⁶⁴ He was relieved of his duties and rested in that seat for the remainder of the flight.

34 When the flight landed Singapore, the claimant left the aircraft in a wheelchair and went straight to see a doctor at the airport clinic. ⁶⁵

35 The evidence of the defendant’s witnesses of fact, in so far as is material, can be summarised as follows.

36 The claimant did not inform Ms Chia of any “patch of grease” on the aircraft floor before take-off. ⁶⁶ Instead, he informed Ms Chia of a “patch of grease” only after take-off. Ms Chia instructed him to clean it using soap from the lavatory and to wipe the area dry using paper hand towels. ⁶⁷

37 Of the defendant’s witnesses of fact, only Ms Marshelly saw the claimant fall. ⁶⁸ Her evidence is that she was standing in an area on the left of the galley (as one faces the cockpit) when the claimant entered the galley from the right and fell: ⁶⁹

Although Ms Marshelly saw the claimant slip and fall, she was unable to shed any light on how or why he slipped or fell.

38 None of the other witnesses of fact at trial saw the claimant fall. ⁷⁰ Ms Chiang did, however, hear a thud to her left when the claimant fell. ⁷¹ She therefore turned to her left and saw the claimant lying on the galley floor. ⁷² But Ms Chiang too was unable to shed any light on how or why he fell.

39 There is some discrepancy between the claimant’s evidence of the precise location of where in the galley he fell and Ms Marshelly’s and Ms Chiang’s evidence of the precise location where he fell. But this discrepancy does not need to be resolved. The defendant’s defence is that no part of the galley floor whatsoever was slippery for any reason at any time during the flight, whether by reason of a grease patch or otherwise. The precise location in the galley where the claimant fell is therefore immaterial to the defendant’s liability.

40 For the claimant to succeed, he must prove on the balance of probabilities that the galley floor was slippery at the time he fell, and that this slipperiness caused him to fall. ⁷³ Further, it is not the claimant’s case that the galley floor was slippery in its natural state and that his place of work was, for that reason alone, inherently unsafe. ⁷⁴ The claimant must therefore also prove on the balance of probabilities that the galley floor was slippery because the presence of a foreign substance on its surface rendered it slippery. Counsel for the claimant therefore accepts that, if I find that no foreign substance was present on the surface of the galley floor that rendered it slippery, the claimant’s entire claim must logically fail. ⁷⁵

41 I find that no foreign substance was present on the surface of the galley floor that rendered it slippery. I make that finding for three reasons: (a) the claimant is not a credible witness; (b) the defendant’s witnesses are credible witnesses; and (c) the defendant’s contemporaneous documents provide no support for the claimant’s case, do not contradict the defendant’s case and, on one view, undermine the claimant’s case.

42 The first reason for this finding is that the claimant is not a credible witness. I do not find him credible because there are several material, self-serving and unexplained variances between: (a) the claimant’s case as pleaded in his Statement of Claim (see [30] above) and as set out in his affidavit of evidence in chief (see [31] above) on the one hand; and (b) the evidence that the claimant gave under cross-examination on the other hand. These variances, combined with my other two reasons, lead me to reject as untrue the claimant’s oral evidence that a foreign substance was present on the surface of the galley floor that rendered it slippery.

43 In the interest of brevity, I examine only four of these material variances.

44 First, the claimant pleaded in his Statement of Claim that he had told Ms Chia about a “grease patch” on the floor of the galley “immediately” upon finding it. ⁷⁶ Further, he pleaded that he had made an attempt to clean the “grease patch” only after Ms Chia instructed him to do so and that that in turn was only after he had escalated the issue to her. ⁷⁷ His affidavit of evidence in chief is consistent with his pleaded case. ⁷⁸

45 But in cross-examination, the claimant said for the first time ⁷⁹ that he had made a first attempt to clean the “grease patch” using paper hand towels and disinfectant on his own initiative, while the plane was still taxiing for take-off, ⁸⁰ and before he escalated the issue to Ms Chia. ⁸¹

46 Second, the claimant pleaded that, despite his best efforts at removing the “patch of grease” using disinfectant cleaning spray and a paper hand towel after Ms Chia instructed him to do so, the “grease still remained on the floor”. ⁸² His affidavit of evidence in chief is consistent with his pleaded case. He says in chief that his cleaning attempt “could not remove” the “grease patch”. ⁸³

47 But in cross-examination, the claimant said for the first time that the result of his first cleaning attempt – the one that he had made on his own initiative before escalating the issue to Ms Chia (see [45] above) – was that “the greasy patch had been removed” ⁸⁴ although the surface of the floor was still slippery: ⁸⁵

48 In cross-examination, the claimant also said for the first time that the result of removing the “grease patch” was that the slippery area of the floor was now invisible, although it appeared “a bit shiny” only to him: ⁸⁶

49 In a latter passage in his cross-examination, the claimant confirmed this new version of the events, ie, that this slippery area of the galley floor appeared “shiny” to him but was invisible to everyone else: ⁸⁷

50 Third, the claimant said nothing in his pleadings or in his affidavit of evidence in chief about any other member of the cabin crew testing the slippery area that remained after he removed the patch of grease and finding it to be slippery.

51 But in cross-examination, the claimant said for the first time that he and “some of the stewardesses” tested this area of the galley floor after he had removed the “grease patch and found it to be slippery”: ⁸⁸

52 Fourth, the claimant asserted in his affidavit of evidence in chief that Ms Chia “instruct[ed] cabin crew to clean the…grease patch again after take-off and before the first meal service commenced” [emphasis added] (see [31] above). ⁸⁹

53 Although this assertion appears in the claimant’s affidavit of evidence in chief, it appears nowhere in his pleaded case. To the extent that this aspect of his evidence in chief suggests that the “grease patch” was sufficiently stubborn to persist despite two attempts to remove it, instead of just one as pleaded, I consider this variance between his pleaded case and his evidence in chief to be self-serving, even before considering his evidence in cross-examination. I consider this variance to be symptomatic of the claimant’s propensity to embellish his case in a self-serving manner.

54 The claimant compounded his embellishment in cross-examination. The meaning conveyed by a plain reading of this assertion in chief is that Ms Chia instructed an unnamed or unidentified member of the cabin crew other than the claimant to make this attempt at cleaning the “grease patch”. ⁹⁰ This appears to be the claimant’s intended meaning. After all, in the second and third sentences of the same paragraph of his affidavit of evidence in chief, he uses the pronouns “I’ and “me” when he wants to refer to himself specifically (eg, “I informed [Ms Chia] about the patch of grease and she instructed me to clean up the grease patch.”). ⁹¹

55 But in cross-examination, the claimant said for the first time that what he meant by the phrase “instruct[ed] cabin crew” [emphasis added] was that Ms Chia instructed him, the claimant, to clean the galley floor again. ⁹²

56 The effect of these variances is that the claimant’s final version of the events, after cross-examination, is as follows. Before take-off, he found a “grease patch” on the floor of the aircraft galley. On his own initiative, he made a first attempt to clean the “grease patch”. This was before he escalated the issue to Ms Chia. His first attempt removed the “patch of grease”, leaving only a slippery area where the grease had been. This slippery area appeared “a bit shiny” to him but was invisible to everyone else. He and other members of the cabin crew tested this area and confirmed that it was slippery. He then escalated the issue to Ms Chia and told her that this area of the galley floor was “still slippery”. After take-off, Ms Chia instructed him to make a third attempt to clean this slippery area of the galley floor. Despite this attempt, that area of the galley floor remained slippery.

57 The material nature of these variances and their omission from his affidavit of evidence in chief is one reason I find the claimant not to be a credible witness. If the claimant had exercised his own initiative to make an attempt to clean the galley floor before he escalated the issue to Ms Chia, he would have said so in chief. If this first attempt by the claimant had actually removed the “patch of grease”, he would have said so in chief. If removing the “patch of grease” had nevertheless left a slippery area on the galley floor invisible to everyone but the claimant, he would have said so in chief. If he and “some of the stewardesses” had tested the area and found it to be slippery, he would have said so in chief. If the claimant had escalated to Ms Chia an issue about an invisible slippery area on the galley floor instead of a “patch of grease” on the galley floor, he would have said so in chief. And if the claimant had cleaned the galley floor a total of three times instead of just once, ie twice before take-off and once after take-off, he would have said so in chief.

58 The self-serving nature of these variances is another reason I find the claimant not to be a credible witness.

59 The first variance is self-serving because, as the claimant acknowledges, ⁹³ it shows that he complied with the defendant’s safety training (see [106] below) by attempting to resolve the issue himself before escalating it to Ms Chia.

60 The second variance is self-serving because it aligns the claimant’s evidence with the defendant’s witnesses’ evidence. Their evidence is that none of them had noticed any “grease patch” or other foreign substance on the galley floor at any time during the flight (see [68] below). The claimant’s final version of events asserts, for the first time, that there was an invisible “slippery area” on the galley floor that other members of the cabin crew could not see. This final version is now consistent with the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses that none of them noticed a “patch of grease” on the galley floor at any time during the flight.

61 The third variance is self-serving because it suggests that there are unnamed stewardesses who can corroborate the claimant’s account that a slippery area existed. It is equally self-serving that the claimant, in the same passage of his cross-examination, said for the first time that the issue he had escalated to Ms Chia before the flight took off was not the presence of a “patch of grease” on the galley floor – as he had pleaded and stated in his affidavit of evidence in chief – but the presence of an area on the galley floor that was “still slippery”, as he had testified in cross-examination.

62 The fourth variance is self-serving because it suggests that the claimant cleaned the galley floor three times and not just two: (a) first, before take-off, on his own initiative; ⁹⁴ (b) second after Ms Chia told him to clean the galley floor, after he had escalated the issue to Ms Chia and before take-off; ⁹⁵ and (c) third and finally, after take-off, again on Ms Chia’s instructions. ⁹⁶ This in turn supports the claimant’s case that the substance on the floor was stubborn, persisting despite three attempts at removal. It also enlarges the role that the claimant allegedly played in attempting to resolve the issue than the role he set out in his pleadings or affidavit of evidence in chief.

63 The claimant’s reaction when confronted with these variances is yet another reason I find him not to be a credible witness. Despite these material variances, the claimant refused to accept that he had changed his evidence. ⁹⁷

64 In any event, claimant’s counsel has adopted the claimant’s final version of his account of events (see [56] above) as the case that he leaves to the court for determination at the conclusion of trial. Therefore, the gist of the claimant’s case as it stands before me now is no longer that he slipped on a “patch of grease” on the galley floor but that he slipped on an invisible, slippery area on the galley floor that was left behind after he had “removed” a “patch of grease” there. ⁹⁸ I consider and reject (at [87]–[95] below) the defendant’s objection that this change in the claimant’s case is an impermissible departure from his pleadings.

65 For all of the foregoing reasons, I attach no weight to the oral evidence of the claimant. In particular, I reject his oral evidence that there was any area of the galley floor that was slippery. His oral evidence therefore falls short – indeed, far short – of discharging his burden of proof on this essential element of his case. The claimant’s case therefore fails on the inadequacies of his own oral evidence, even before I consider the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses.

66 It is of course entirely possible for a claimant to discharge his burden of proof by relying on the evidence of opposing witnesses. But, for the reasons that follow, the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses does not assist the claimant in discharging his burden of proof. Indeed, I find the defendant’s witnesses to be sufficiently credible that their evidence warrants positive findings in favour of the defendant on the disputed issues of fact.

67 The second reason for the finding at [41] above is that I find the defendant’s witnesses to be credible witnesses. In particular, I find their evidence to be credible on two critical issues of fact: (a) that no part of the galley floor was slippery whether due to grease or any other substance at any time during the flight; and (b) that the claimant’s only complaint on 6 September 2019 before and immediately after his fall was about the presence of grease on the galley floor, and not – as he now claims – about the presence of an invisible slippery area on the galley floor. Although no part of the burden of proof on these two issues rests on the defendant, the consistent, coherent and credible evidence of the defendant’s witnesses is in fact sufficient to warrant me making positive findings in the defendant’s favour on these two critical issues of fact.

68 On the first point, Ms Chia, ⁹⁹ Ms Chiang, ¹⁰⁰ Ms Marshelly ¹⁰¹ and Mr Azam ¹⁰² all gave evidence that they did not see any grease or other foreign substance on the galley floor at any time during the flight. Ms Chia says that she did not see any “greasy patch” on the floor of the galley during the flight. Ms Chiang says that she walked around the economy section including the galley many times during the flight but did not notice any grease patch or any other kind of spillage on the galley floor. Ms Marshelly says that she walked in and out of the economy class galley throughout the flight and noticed no spillage or any grease on the floor of the galley, both before the claimant fell and at the time he fell. Mr Azam says that there was also nothing spilled on the galley floor that could have caused the claimant to fall.

69 Further, in so far as the claimant’s case now is that he slipped, not on a “patch of grease”, but on an invisible, slippery area on the galley floor that remained after he removed a patch of grease, Ms Chiang, Ms Marshelly and Mr Azam also gave consistent, coherent and unequivocal evidence that nobody other than the claimant – whether a member of the cabin crew or a passenger – had, during the flight: (a) complained about any spillage on the floor; (b) complained about any slippery area on the floor; (c) slipped on any part of the floor for any reason; or (d) fallen for any reason. ¹⁰³

70 Curiously, Ms Chiang did give evidence that she saw the claimant fall twice during the flight, in addition to the fall which is the subject of this action. ¹⁰⁴ The claimant denies that he fell more than once during the flight. ¹⁰⁵ However curious it may be, it is not necessary to resolve this dispute. Whether the claimant fell once or thrice, Ms Chiang’s evidence remains consistent with the evidence of Ms Chia, Ms Marshelly and Mr Azam in the sense that nobody other than the claimant fell during the flight. This suggests that he fell as a result of an idiosyncratic risk factor (such as his footwear) ¹⁰⁶ rather than as a result of a universal risk factor, ie one that created a risk of falling for everyone (such as an invisible, slippery area on the galley floor).

71 Further, after the claimant had fallen, both Mr Azam and Ms Chia separately and independently checked the area of the galley floor where the claimant had fallen. Neither of them found anything unusual, whether it be the presence of grease, any spillage ¹⁰⁷ or any slipperiness for any other reason.

72 I do not accept the claimant’s submission that the defendant’s witnesses are biased in favour of the defendant, being employees of the defendant. Having assessed their demeanour in the witness box, and even after reminding myself of the limitations of such an assessment (see Sandz Solutions (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others v Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd and others [2014] 3 SLR 562 at [43]–[46]), I have formed the view that they gave their evidence in a forthright manner and in a manner that was coherent and consistent without being contrived or collusive. I detected no basis for a finding that the defendant’s witnesses came to court to toe a party line on these two critical issues of fact or that they gave their evidence as they did out of fear for their employment or career.

73 On the second point, Ms Chiang’s evidence is that she heard the claimant say immediately after his fall, albeit not to her, that he had fallen because of the presence of a grease patch on the galley floor. ¹⁰⁸

74 Ms Chia’s evidence is consistent with Ms Chiang’s evidence. Ms Chia was told that the claimant fell because he slipped on a “greasy patch” on the floor of the galley. ¹⁰⁹ Ms Chia’s oral evidence on this point is not rendered inadmissible by s 62(1) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”). The purpose of her oral evidence on this point is not to prove the truth of its contents, ie, that the claimant did, in fact, fall on a grease patch. The purpose of her oral evidence is simply to prove that a “greasy patch” is what the claimant attributed his fall to at that time. That evidence – coupled with the fact that the claimant now attributes his fall to something else, ie an invisible, slippery area on the galley floor – suffices to diminish further the claimant’s already diminished credibility.

75 The third reason for the finding at [41] above is that the defendant’s contemporaneous documentary evidence adduced at trial does not assist the claimant or contradict the defendant’s witnesses. Indeed, on one view (see [86] below), this documentary evidence undermines the case that the claimant now presents.

76 The contemporaneous documentary evidence produced by the defendant that the claimant relies on are: (a) the CDL; and (b) a document known as the eCCAR.

77 The CDL is a record in which the defendant’s crew log any defects found in the cabin of a particular aircraft. The purpose of the CDL is both to forewarn future cabin crews on the same aircraft about known defects in the cabin and also to flag known defects for the defendant’s maintenance crew to address and resolve. The entry in the CDL logging slippery flooring in the galley was made by a flight stewardess who was not called to give evidence at trial: one Ms Vanessa Wong Wan Kuen (“Ms Wong”). ¹¹⁰ The CDL, in so far as it is material, records the following: ¹¹¹

78 The eCCAR is an electronic accident report ¹¹² that is lodged as part of the defendant’s standard practice whenever there is an inflight injury. ¹¹³ The eCCAR recording the claimant’s fall was made by Ms Chia. ¹¹⁴ The eCCAR, in so far as it is material, says the following: ¹¹⁵

79 There was some dispute at trial as to whether Ms Wong made her entry in the CDL before the claimant fell or after he fell, together with and for the purposes of Ms Chia’s eCCAR. It is not necessary to resolve this dispute. The claimant’s purpose in asserting that Ms Wong made her entry in the CDL before the claimant fell is to attribute knowledge of the slippery flooring to the defendant before the claimant’s fall. But the defendant accepts that the claimant made Ms Chia aware of his allegation that there was slippery flooring in the galley well before he fell.

80 The claimant submits that I ought to attach significant weight to the CDL and the eCCAR because both documents emanate from the defendant, both documents were recorded contemporaneously by the defendant’s employees, and both documents establish: (a) that the galley floor was slippery at the material time; and (b) why the galley floor was slippery.

81 The eCCAR is, of course, admissible as evidence of the truth of its contents because its maker, Ms Chia, gave evidence at trial. The CDL too is admissible as evidence of the truth of its contents, even though Ms Wong – as its maker – did not give evidence at trial. The CDL is admissible under s 32(1)(b)(i) of the EA. Ms Wong’s entry in the CDL is, within the meaning of that provision, a statement made by Ms Wong in the ordinary course of her occupation in one of the books kept by the defendant in the ordinary course of its business. If Ms Wong made her statement in the CDL from her own personal knowledge of the cause of the claimant’s fall, it is admissible under the primary provision in s 32(1)(b)(i) of the EA. If Ms Wong made her statement in the CDL, not from her personal knowledge, but based on information supplied by the claimant, or indeed any other member of the cabin crew, Ms Wong’s statement in the CDL is nevertheless admissible under the concluding words of s 32(1)(b) of the EA.

82 Even though the EA renders the CDL and the eCCAR admissible, s 32(5) of the EA expressly provides that it is entirely a matter for me what weight to assign to the statements in these two documents as evidence of these two issues of fact (see [80] above). For the reasons that follow, I attach no weight to these statements as evidence on these two issues of fact.

83 It is important for present purposes that only the claimant can give evidence from personal knowledge on these two issues of fact. The first issue is that the galley floor was slippery at the material time. But the defendant’s witnesses’ evidence, as I have accepted, positively contradicts the claimant’s evidence on this issue (see [68]–[71] above). On the second issue, why the galley floor was slippery, the defendant’s witnesses expressly disclaim personal knowledge of the cause. The claimant does not suggest that this disclaimer is in any way disingenuous.

84 Therefore, the contents of the statements in both the CDL and the eCCAR on these two issues of fact (see [80] above) could not have come from the personal knowledge of Ms Wong or Ms Chia respectively or indeed from the personal knowledge of any other member of the cabin crew. ¹¹⁶ Given that what is recorded in the CDL and the eCCAR is consistent with the claimant’s own contemporaneous attribution of the cause of his fall, ie, to slipping on a “grease patch”, the CDL and the eCCAR simply record what the claimant himself contemporaneously attributed his fall to, ¹¹⁷ either directly to Ms Wong and Ms Chia ¹¹⁸ or through other members of the cabin crew who reported his attribution to them. ¹¹⁹

85 Neither document is therefore even capable of being independent and contemporaneous corroboration of the claimant’s evidence. That is so whether one considers his contemporaneous attribution of his fall to a “grease patch” or his current attribution of his fall to an invisible slippery area which remained after he removed a grease patch. Both documents are therefore entitled to no more weight than the defendant’s own oral evidence in proving that the galley floor was slippery and why it was slippery. The CDL and the eCCAR therefore neither advance the claimant’s case nor contradict the defendants’ witnesses’ evidence.

86 Indeed, in so far as both the CDL and the eCCAR record that “grease” was still present on the galley floor when the claimant fell and record that that “grease” was why the galley floor was slippery, both documents are positively inconsistent with the claimant’s case as it now stands. On that case, as I have already pointed out, the claimant “removed” the “grease patch” in the galley before the aircraft took off, leaving only an invisible, slippery area on the galley floor. To that extent, the contents of the CDL and the eCCAR further undermine the claimant’s credibility and the credibility of the case that he now advances.

87 I now consider the defendant’s objection that the claimant’s allegation that he slipped on an invisible, slippery area on the floor that remained after he removed a “grease patch” is inconsistent with his pleaded case. ¹²⁰ Even though the claimant’s account of the events leading to his fall changed materially at trial (see [42]–[65] above), I do not accept that the claimant has impermissibly departed from his pleadings so as to preclude him from leaving his case as it now stands (see [64] above) with me for determination at the conclusion of the trial.

88 Pleadings serve at least two general purposes. First, they define the parameters of a claimant’s claim and a defendant’s defence. Second, they clearly and precisely identify the factual and legal issues that the court must determine (see How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] 2 SLR 234 (“How Weng Fan”) at [17]). The first purpose is necessary to ensure that each party has reasonable notice of the case that his opponent is advancing and therefore of the case that that party must meet at trial. Pleadings thereby prevent trial by ambush (see V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithalingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 (“V Nithia”) at [37]). The second purpose is necessary to define and constrain the adjudicative task of a court. It ensures that a party cannot turn a trial into a roving and open-ended commission of inquiry.

89 These two general purposes of pleadings lead to two general rules. First, a party is bound by its pleadings. Second, a court should not dispose of litigation before it by determining an issue that the parties have not put in play by their pleadings (see How Weng Fan at [18], V Nithia at [38]). But these are only general rules. Thus, as a narrow exception to these rules, a court may permit a party to advance as part of its case – and therefore a court may also dispose of the litigation before it by determining – an issue that has not been pleaded if doing so would not cause any prejudice to the opponent that cannot be compensated by costs or if it would be clearly unjust for the court not to allow the party to raise the unpleaded issue (see How Weng Fan at [20], V Nithia at [40]).

90 In my view, the defendant’s objection draws a semantic distinction without a substantive difference. The claimant’s pleaded case is that: (a) that upon Ms Chia’s instructions, he attempted to clean the grease patch; and (b) that despite his best efforts, he was unable to remove the grease patch which therefore remained on the galley floor. ¹²¹ The claimant’s case as it stands now is that: (a) he attempted to clean the grease patch on his own initiative before he escalated the issue to Ms Chia; and (b) his attempt removed the grease patch but left an invisible slippery area on the galley floor. ¹²²

91 These are, of course, material variances. But the core of the claimant’s case as it stands now remains consistent with his pleadings: (a) a foreign substance on the galley floor rendered it slippery; and (b) that slipperiness caused him to fall. I do not consider that the claimant’s case as it stands now amounts to a departure from his pleadings in any substantive way.

92 Even if the claimant’s case as it stands now is a substantive departure from his case as pleaded, I find that any such departure has caused the defendant no prejudice for which it cannot be compensated by costs. Defendant’s counsel had a reasonable and fair opportunity to deal with the core of the claimant’s case – both as pleaded and as it now stands – in the cross-examination of the claimant. Indeed, it is the cross-examination of the claimant on the variances between his pleaded case and his case as it now stands that has led me to find that the claimant is not a credible witness and to reject his evidence. Further, counsel for the claimant quite fairly put the claimant’s case as it now stands to the defendant’s witnesses during his cross-examination, giving the defendant’s witnesses a fair opportunity to respond to it.

93 The defendant nevertheless submits that it has indeed suffered prejudice for which it cannot be compensated by costs. It submits that, if the claimant’s case as it stands now had been properly pleaded, the defendant would have adduced expert evidence on the nature of the galley floor and the likelihood of the floor remaining slippery after a patch of grease had been removed. ¹²³

94 I do not accept this submission. As I have pointed out, the core of the claimant’s case is that a foreign substance was present on the galley floor that rendered it slippery and caused him to fall. Even if the claimant had pleaded that there was a slippery area on the galley floor that remained after the claimant had removed a grease patch, it is my view that the defendant would not have had to lead any additional evidence over and above the evidence that it actually did lead. This is because no issue in this action turns on: (a) the nature or identity of the foreign substance allegedly present on the galley floor; (b) whether the claimant slipped on the substance itself or on the residue left after the substance had been removed; or (c) whether the residue was or was not visible, either to the claimant or to others. Allowing the claimant to recharacterise the cause of his fall from a “grease patch” on the galley floor to an invisible slippery area that remained on the galley floor after he removed a grease patch did not and has not caused the defendant any prejudice for which it cannot be compensated by costs. The defendant has not been a victim of trial by ambush.

95 I therefore hold that the claimant is not precluded from leaving for my determination at the conclusion of trial his case as it now stands.

96 In conclusion, and for all of the foregoing reasons, I find on the balance of probabilities that there was no slippery area on the galley floor. This suffices to dispose of the claimant’s claim. If there was no slippery area, there is no basis for the claimant’s assertion that the defendant breached its duty of care to him.

97 Nonetheless, in case I am wrong in this finding of fact in the defendant’s favour, I now analyse the claimant’s allegation that the defendant breached its duty of care to him. In this analysis, I shall assume in the claimant’s favour, contrary to my finding, that there was indeed a “slippery area” on the galley floor.

98 To succeed in a claim in negligence, a claimant must show that: (a) the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care; (b) the defendant breached the duty of care; (c) the defendant’s breach caused the claimant to suffer losses that are not in law too remote to be recovered; and (d) the losses can be adequately proved and quantified (see Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”) at [21]).

99 The defendant does not deny that it owed the claimant a duty of care. ¹²⁴ In my view, the defendant is correct not to deny a duty of care. ¹²⁵ As between the defendant and the claimant, in their capacity as employer and employee, I have no doubt that the two-stage test at common law for a duty of care to arise with respect to personal injuries premised on proximity and policy considerations preceded by a threshold requirement of factual foreseeability is satisfied (see Spandeck at [73]).

100 The issue I now consider, therefore, is whether, subject to my assumption at [97] above, the defendant breached its duty of care to the claimant.

101 The first step in determining whether the defendant breached its duty of care to the claimant is to determine the standard of care that the defendant had to meet. The standard of care in any given duty of care situation is premised on the concept of reasonableness, ie, the standard of a reasonable person using ordinary care and skill (see Gary Chan Kok Yew & Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 06.002, and BNJ (suing by her lawful father and litigation representative, B) v SMRT Trains Ltd and another [2014] 2 SLR 7 (“BNJ”) at [91]–[92]).

102 In Chandran a/l Subbiah v Dockers Marine Pte Ltd (“Chandran”) [2010] 1 SLR 786 at [14], the Court of Appeal held that an employer must take the same care for its employees’ personal safety as would be taken by a reasonable and prudent employer applying its mind positively to the safety of its employees in the light of its superior knowledge of the risks of the employment. In so doing, the Court of Appeal approved the following passage in Swanwick J’s decision at first instance in Stokes v Guest, Keen and Nettlefold (Bolts and Nuts) Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1776 (at 1783):

103 The claimant invokes in this action two specific dimensions of the duty of care that an employer owes to its employee: a duty to provide its employees a proper system of work (see Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR(R) 377 at [46]) and the duty to provide employees a safe place of work (see Chandran at [15]).

104 The claimant pleads the following eleven particulars of the defendant’s failure to provide the claimant a safe place of work and a safe system of work: ¹²⁶

105 The defendant adduced evidence of the measures it takes to minimise the risk of anyone slipping and falling on board its aircraft, whether a member of its cabin crew or a passenger. I find that these measures suffice to discharge the defendant’s duty of care to provide the claimant a safe place of work and a safe system of work with respect to slips and falls on board its aircraft.

106 The defendant’s measures begin with its Cabin Crew Readiness Programme (“the CCRP”), an intensive training programme for all new cabin crew. ¹²⁷ The CCRP includes training on how to identify the potential risks of inflight work accidents and how to minimise the incidence of these accidents. ¹²⁸ More specifically, the CCRP trains cabin crew – if they find any spillage in any part of the aircraft – to remove the spillage on their own initiative immediately and to clean the affected area. ¹²⁹ If they are unable to remove the spillage, they are trained to escalate the issue to a supervisor. ¹³⁰

107 The claimant himself underwent the CCRP ¹³¹ and concedes that he was trained to deal with spillage in this way. ¹³² Indeed, as I have found, he has tailored his evidence to demonstrate that the complied with his training (see [47] above).

108 The CCRP instils into cabin crew a strong, career-long understanding of the importance of safety in general and the importance of not leaving spillage on the aircraft floor in particular. The evidence of Mr Azam, Ms Chiang and Ms Chia confirms this. Thus, Mr Azam says: ¹³³

109 Ms Chiang says: ¹³⁴

110 Ms Chia says: ¹³⁵

111 I accept the evidence Mr Azam, Ms Chiang and Ms Chia as true, not only as to the content of their training but also on the impact it has in instilling a strong, career-long culture of safety into the defendant’s cabin crew. ¹³⁶

112 The defendant’s measures to prevent slips and falls do not end when the CCRP ends. The defendant’s Safety, Security, Quality and Health Department (“SSQH”) reinforces cabin crew’s training on the CCRP ¹³⁷ by issuing periodic reminders to cabin crew. ¹³⁸ The purpose of these reminders is to raise awareness about the importance of preventing accidents and about the safe working practices that cabin crew should follow to prevent workplace injury.

113 A specific example is a reminder that SSQH issued to the defendant’s cabin crew in June 2018 to alert them about, amongst other things, the risk of sustaining injuries by slipping and falling on board the defendant’s aircraft. In this reminder, the defendant advised supervisors to guide cabin crew to maintain a high degree of situational awareness in order to avoid slippery areas and, if that was not possible, to work with care on slippery surfaces. ¹³⁹

114 Another example is a reminder issued in July 2018 that reminded cabin crew of safe work practices to prevent slips and falls: ¹⁴⁰

115 The evidence satisfies me that the defendant’s training and follow up measures have been effective virtually to eliminate the risk of slips and falls on board the defendant’s aircraft. The defendant adduced evidence of flights where a foreign substance had spilled onto the floor of an aircraft and cabin crew were able to avoid any injury, whether to cabin crew or to passengers, by dealing with the spillage in accordance with their training. On one flight, cabin crew found the forward galley to be “very oily and slippery”. In accordance with their training, cabin crew washed the galley floor thoroughly to ensure that it was no longer oily and slippery. ¹⁴¹ On another flight, cabin crew saw pink liquid leaking from a trash compactor. In accordance with their training, cabin crew used rags to prevent the liquid from spreading across the floor to other areas of the aircraft. ¹⁴² In both cases, injury was prevented.

116 It is because of this strong culture of safety that slips and falls on board the defendant’s aircraft are exceedingly rare. Mr Azam gave evidence that, in his 29 years of service with the defendant, he had never come across a single case of anyone slipping and falling on the galley floor in one of the defendant’s aircraft. ¹⁴³ Ms Marshelly too gave evidence that she had never seen anyone fall on board an aircraft in her eight years of service with the defendant. ¹⁴⁴ Ms Chiang testified that she had not seen a single incident of anyone slipping and falling on board an aircraft in which she was working in her six years of service with the defendant. ¹⁴⁵

117 The claimant submits that the defendant could and should have taken three further measures: (a) the defendant should have implemented a system requiring supervisors to follow up on any spillage escalated to them by more junior cabin crew; (b) the defendant should have stationed better cleaning equipment on board the defendant’s aircraft; or (c) the defendant should have placed a cart, barricade, lights or stickers over the slippery area. ¹⁴⁶

118 I do not accept the claimant’s submission.

119 It is not reasonable to require the defendant’s supervisors to follow up personally on reports of spillage escalated to them by more junior members of cabin crew. This amounts to imposing a duty on an employer to ensure that a junior employee acts in accordance with his training. But the law does not require an employer to supervise employees to this degree. Accepting the claimant’s submission would impose on overly onerous duty on an employer (see Lu Bang Song v Teambuild Construction Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2009] SGHC 49 at [36]).

120 In my view, the system of work put in place by the defendant was reasonable in the context of this particular risk in so far as the system left it to the personal responsibility of the junior member to comply with his training by carrying out the supervisor’s instructions dutifully and re-escalating the issue to the supervisor if it remained unresolved. Indeed, that is precisely what the claimant did in this case.

121 On a related point, I do not accept the claimant’s suggestion ¹⁴⁷ that the defendant was in breach of its duty of care because it did not establish a standard operating procedure or issue a manual for dealing with spillage on board its aircraft. In my view, it suffices that the defendant had in place a training programme, the CCRP, that instilled in cabin crew the importance of dealing immediately with common safety hazards like slippery floors onboard aircraft and that the defendant, through SSQH, followed up on the training programme by issuing periodic general and specific safety reminders. It is not reasonable to expect the defendant to devise and supply to cabin crew a step-by-step standard operating procedure or to issue to cabin crew a step-by-step manual for dealing with spillage on board its aircraft. This particular risk, after all, is not unique to the defendant or even to the aviation industry. It is a common household risk that any person of average intelligence and resourcefulness knows how to eliminate, mitigate or work around.

122 I do not accept the claimant’s suggestion that the defendant was in breach of its duty of care because it did not provide more effective cleaning equipment and materials to cabin crew. In so far as it is the claimant’s case that the slippery area on the galley floor was caused by a foreign substance, the claimant has failed to identify precisely what cleaning equipment or material the defendant should have provided to its cabin crew on board its aircraft to remove that substance without leaving a slippery area. Even the claimant concedes that it would be impractical to have a specialised cleaning crew onboard each of the defendant’s aircraft for every flight. ¹⁴⁸

123 I do not accept the claimant’s suggestion that the defendant should have taken measures such as placing a cart, a barricade or lights over the slippery area. Any such physical obstruction would not be tethered to the aircraft and would have, in itself, posed a real risk of serious injury to passengers and cabin crew alike in the event of turbulence. Further, even without turbulence, these measures would have posed a tripping hazard. Instead of mitigating or eliminating the risk of injury from an existing safety hazard, any of these measures would have introduced an additional safety hazard and increased the overall risk of injury. All of these measures are therefore, in my view, measures that a reasonable and prudent employer would positively not have taken.

124 I do not accept the claimant’s submission that the defendant should have placed stickers on the galley floor to warn cabin crew and passengers of the slippery area. The claimant suggests that another airline uses stickers to identify hazards on board its aircraft ¹⁴⁹ and that the defendant should have done the same. But, other than a bare assertion about this practice in cross-examination, the claimant adduced no evidence of this practice let alone of its efficacy.

125 Moreover, I do not accept the submission that defendant needed to adopt the additional measure of using stickers in this way in order to discharge its duty of care. The first step in the defendant’s system of work is for the member of the defendant’s cabin crew who comes across spillage to attempt to clean the spillage on his own initiative. The second step in the defendant’s system of work, if the attempt is unsuccessful, is to escalate the issue to his supervisor. His supervisor is then to provide further instructions on cleaning the spillage and to warn cabin crew. This system of work, in my view, is sufficient for the defendant to meet its duty of care to its employees, including the claimant. And, as I have already pointed out, this is exactly what happened in this case.

126 Finally, the claimant cites five cases to argue by analogy that the defendant breached its duty of care to the claimant:

(a) The decision of the Court of Appeal in Awang bin Dollah v Shun Shing Construction & Engineering Co Ltd and other appeals [1997] 2 SLR(R) 746 (“Awang bin Dollah”);

(b) The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Chandler v Cape plc [2012] 1 WLR 3111 (“Chandler”);

(c) The decision of Tan Lee Meng J in Hao Wei (S) Pte Ltd v Rasan Selvan [2009] 1 SLR(R) 142 (“Hao Wei”);

(d) The decision of the House of Lords in General Cleaning Contractors Ld v Christmas [1953] AC 180 (“General Cleaning Contractors”); and

(e) The decision of Lai Siu Chiu J in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2668 v Rott George Hugo [2013] 3 SLR 787 (“Rott George Hugo”).

127 None of these five cases assist the claimant. I take these cases in turn.

128 In Awang bin Dollah, an employee was injured when a site office at a construction site collapsed while he was inside it. The court held the employer liable in negligence for the employee’s injuries. The court accepted that a site office does not collapse in the ordinary course of events. That raised the strong inference that there was negligence in either or both the design or the construction of the site office. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur therefore operated to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the employer (at [33]). That shifted the burden to the employer to show that the collapse was not due to any negligence on its part. The court held that the employer had failed to discharge this burden and was therefore liable to the employee both at common law in negligence (at [34]) and under the Factories Act (Cap 104, 1985 Rev Ed) (at [48], [50]).

129 By analogy with Awang bin Dollah, the claimant submits that, in the ordinary course of events, a “grease patch” does not appear on a workplace floor if an employer provides a safe place of work to its employee. ¹⁵⁰

130 There is no analogy to be drawn with Awang bin Dollah for two reasons. First, the claimant confuses a but-for cause of injury with the proximate cause of injury. In Awang bin Dollah, the collapse of the site office was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In the present case, the presence of a “grease patch” was only one of many but-for causes of the claimant’s injury. Its presence merely created a risk of injury and was not, in itself, the proximate cause of any injury to the claimant.

131 Second, in Awang bin Dollah, the court held that, in the ordinary course of events, a site office does not collapse without negligence. In that sense, the collapse of the site office was a thing that spoke for itself (see also BNJ at [138]) and pointed to negligence as the prima facie cause. On the other hand, a “grease patch” can be found on a galley floor for any number of reasons, only some of which point to negligence as any cause, let alone a prima facie cause. I therefore do not accept that the presence of a “grease patch” on a galley floor is a thing that is even capable of speaking for itself.

132 There is therefore no reason to hold the defendant in breach of its duty of care by analogy with the employer in Awang bin Dollah.

133 The claimant cites Chandler, Hao Wei and General Cleaning Contractors to argue that the defendant knew that the galley floor could remain slippery after removing spillage, and yet had no system in place to prevent injury resulting from slipping and falling on a slippery area remaining after such removal.

134 I analyse this trio of cases together.

135 In Chandler, the plaintiff contracted asbestosis in the course of his employment by a subsidiary of the defendant. The plaintiff brought a claim in negligence against the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed a duty of care directly to him, as an employee of the subsidiary, either to advise the subsidiary on the steps it had to take in order to provide a safe system of work for its employees or to ensure that the subsidiary took those steps and actually provided a safe system of work to its employees. The defendant accepted that the subsidiary had breached the duty of care that it owed to the plaintiff as its employee but denied that it owed the plaintiff any duty of care.

136 The court held that there was sufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant to give rise to the duty of care on the defendant that the plaintiff claimed. The court held, further, that the defendant had breached that duty of care (at [78]).

137 Turning to Hao Wei, the plaintiff there was severely injured while operating the defendant’s bar-bending machine because the machine had not been secured by a stopper. Tan Lee Meng J held the defendant liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries because it did not have a safe system of work and did not properly supervise its employees (at [17]–[18]). This was because an employer who deploys his employee to perform various tasks at different places should be especially cautious where the employee has not previously undertaken the task at hand. The defendant knew about the specific risk that eventuated but failed to warn plaintiff about this risk.

138 Finally, in General Cleaning Contractors, a window cleaner stepped out onto a windowsill that was a mere 6¼ inches wide. He lost his balance and fell. He brought a claim in negligence against his employer. The House of Lords held the employer liable for the window cleaner’s injuries. This was because the employer breached its obligation to make its system of work reasonably safe by failing to give general safety instructions to its employees (at 189–190, 193–194 and 198–199).

139 These three cases are readily distinguishable from the present case for two reasons. First, all three cases involved unusual risks, ¹⁵¹ in circumstances where the employer had far greater knowledge of the nature of the risks than the employee. In Chandler, the plaintiff was exposed to asbestosis, a hidden risk. In Hao Wei, the plaintiff was injured by a bar-bending machine, an unusual risk. And in General Cleaning Contractors, the plaintiff fell while working at height on a narrow windowsill, an inherently risky endeavour.

140 In contrast, the present case involves, on the current assumption, a grease patch or a slippery area on a floor. This undoubtedly poses a risk of injury to cabin crew and passengers alike. But it not remotely in the same class of risk as the risks in Chandler, Hao Wei and General Cleaning Contractors. It was not a hidden risk, at least to the claimant. After all, it was the claimant who discovered and addressed the grease patch in accordance with his training. And the claimant could continue to see the slippery area even after he removed the grease patch (see [48] above). ¹⁵² Nor is walking on the galley floor an inherently risky endeavour, whether by the nature of the activity or by the nature of the location. By the same token, the risk of slipping and falling on a grease patch or a slippery area is not a risk about which, and about the consequences of which, the defendant has far greater knowledge than the claimant. Indeed, slipping on a greasy or slippery surface is an ordinary risk that is ever present: in the home, on the street, when taking public transport and in any workplace. There is no analogy that can properly be drawn to this trio of cases.

141 Second, a common theme running through this trio of cases is that the employers failed to provide general safety instructions to the plaintiffs. But, as I have found, the defendant established the CCRP as part of the mandatory training of cabin crew and reinforced the safety training in the CCRP with periodic reminders from SSQH about workplace risks. These risks included the specific risk of slipping and falling on board an aircraft.

142 There is therefore no reason to hold the defendant in breach of its duty of care by analogy with the employers in this trio of cases.

143 The final case that the claimant cites is Rott George Hugo. ¹⁵³

144 In Rott George Hugo, the plaintiff was walking in the car park of his condominium. He stepped onto what appeared to be a puddle of water. Underneath the water, however, was a patch of oil. The plaintiff slipped on the oil and fell. He sued the defendant seeking damages for his injuries. At first instance, the district judge found in favour of the plaintiff and held that the defendant had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff.

145 Lai Siu Chiu J upheld the district judge’s finding on appeal to the High Court. She held that the maintenance system that the defendant had put in place was inadequate to deal with oil patches and water puddles in the car park (at [36]). This was because the defendant was aware that the presence of oil patches and water puddles in the car park was a regular occurrence but did not specifically engage the services necessary to remove oil patches and water puddles (at [29]).

146 Rott George Hugo is distinguishable from the present case. I have found that the defendant has virtually eliminated the risk of slips and falls by its training and follow up measures (see [115] above). It would be unreasonable to expect the defendant to go beyond that and actually eliminate this risk. The nature of operating an airline business makes it impractical for the defendant to eliminate this risk, for example by stationing a permanent specialised cleaning crew or specialised cleaning equipment on board every one of its aircraft. Even the claimant concedes that this is impractical. ¹⁵⁴

147 I have found that the defendant took highly effective measures – through the CCRP and SSQH’s periodic reminders – to mitigate the risk of slips and falls caused by foreign substance present on the floor of its aircraft. Given the inevitable constraints of its business, I accept that it would be unreasonable to expect the defendant to go beyond this and take steps to eliminate that risk.

148 There is therefore no reason to hold the defendant in breach of its duty of care by analogy with the defendant in Rott George Hugo.

149 I am therefore satisfied that the defendant exercised the same care for the personal safety of the claimant on 6 September 2019 as would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent employer applying its mind positively to the safety of its employees in the light of its superior knowledge of the risks of the employment.

150 The defendant wholly discharged its duty of care to the claimant. It provided for the claimant both a safe system of work and a safe place of work. Although the claimant’s injuries are unfortunate, they have not arisen from any breach of the duty of care that the defendant owes to him.

151 Given my finding that the defendant did not breach its duty of care, it is not necessary for me to deal with the issues of causation, defences and quantum.

152 In summary, I dismiss the claimant’s claim because:

(a) I find that the defendant has, despite not bearing the burden of proof in this action, proven on the balance of probabilities that there was no slippery area on the galley floor.

(b) Even if, contrary to my finding, there was a slippery area on the galley floor, the defendant did not breach its duty of care to the claimant.

153 I will now hear the parties on costs.