a. A Declaration that the Presumptions contained in Section 18(1) and 18(2) of the [MDA] which were imposed upon the Claimants should be read down and given effect as imposing an evidential burden only in Compliance with Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution and the Common law Presumption of innocence.

b. Alternatively, a Declaration that the Presumption upon Presumption contained in Section 18(2) read with Section 18(1) of the MDA which were imposed upon the Claimants are unconstitution [sic] for violating Articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution.

c. A Prohibitory order against the execution of the death sentences upon the Claimants.​

18.—(1) Any person who is proved to have had in his or her possession or custody or under his or her control —

    (a) anything containing a controlled drug;

    (b) the keys of anything containing a controlled drug;

    (c) the keys of any place or premises or any part thereof in  which a controlled drug is found; or

(d) a document of title relating to a controlled drug or any other document intended for the delivery of a controlled drug,

is presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have had that drug in his or her possession.

(2) Any person who is proved or presumed to have had a controlled drug in his or her possession is presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have known the nature of that drug.

44 I shall now address the points raised by the Attorney-General. I agree that s 21 [of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed)] contemplates an application by a QC and not the litigants in the case in question. It also assumes that there is an instructing solicitor on record but does not make that a necessary feature of every application. There is no requirement in our law that QC must appear only on instructions from a solicitor. Indeed, a QC is admitted under s 21(1) ‘to practise as an advocate and solicitor’. The Legal Profession Act does not prohibit a litigant from acting in person (see s 34(e)). Accordingly, if a litigant chooses to act in person, he or the QC in question may affirm the affidavit specified in s 21(3). The litigant acting in person may also address the court in the way an instructing advocate and solicitor may. If the litigant chooses to affirm the affidavit, he cannot claim to have no or insufficient knowledge of what is required of him in ad hoc admissions.

[emphasis added]

15.—(1) Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the court may, for the purpose of any one case, admit to practise as an advocate and solicitor any person who —

(a) holds —

(i) Her Majesty’s Patent as Queen’s Counsel; or

(ii) any appointment of equivalent distinction of any jurisdiction;

(b) does not ordinarily reside in Singapore or Malaysia, but has come or intends to come to Singapore for the purpose of appearing in the case; and

(c) has special qualifications or experience for the purpose of the case.

(2) The court must not admit a person under this section in any case involving any area of legal practice prescribed under section 10 for the purposes of this subsection, unless the court is satisfied that there is a special reason to do so.

(3) Any person who applies to be admitted under this section must do so by originating application supported by an affidavit of the applicant, or of the advocate and solicitor instructing the applicant, stating the names of the parties and brief particulars of the case in which the applicant intends to appear.

…

(6A) The Chief Justice may, after consulting the Supreme Court Judges, by notification in the Gazette, specify the matters that the court may consider when deciding whether to admit a person under this section.

…

(a) constitutional and administrative law;

(b) criminal law;

(c) family law.

3. For the purposes of section 15(6A) of the Act, the court may consider the following matters, in addition to the matters specified in section 15(1) and (2) of the Act, when deciding whether to admit a person under section 15 of the Act for the purpose of any one case:

(a) the nature of the factual and legal issues involved in the case;

(b) the necessity for the services of a foreign senior counsel;

(c) the availability of any Senior Counsel or other advocate and solicitor with appropriate experience; and

(d) whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to admit a foreign senior counsel for the purpose of the case.

56 … As Rajah JA explained in Re Andrews at [39], what this requirement entails is that the foreign senior counsel’s qualifications or experience must be relevant to the issues in the case for which he seeks to be admitted; if, for example, a case involves areas of law that call for specialised learning such as arbitration, insolvency or intellectual property, the foreign counsel must have demonstrable expertise in these areas of law. It follows that when a case involves an area of law in which the jurisprudence is uniquely local, such as where the case turns on the meaning of legislation that has no analogue elsewhere or at least where the counsel concerned has no direct experience with that body of law, it will ordinarily be difficult to satisfy the court that foreign counsel has ‘special qualifications or experience’ for the purpose of that case.

[emphasis added]

[7] Since commencing practice as a barrister, my principal practice area has been in the criminal law at the trial and appellate levels. I have appeared in over 230 criminal appeals and quasi-criminal appeals and in numerous criminal trials. Further, I have been appeared in cases involving statutory construction, and with the intersection of the criminal law and procedure and fundamental constitutional rights.

[3] On 21 November 1978, I was called to the Bar of England and Wales and become [sic] a member of Counsel practicing almost exclusively in criminal law. In addition, in September 1986 I passed the New York Bar, in the United States.

…

[5] Since commencing practice as a barrister, I have appeared as counsel in appeals in the European Court of Human Rights, the House of Lords and its successor court the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal for England and Wales, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, and before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in appeals – including appeals involving the imposition of the death penalty – from appellate courts in the Caribbean.

47 Conversely, not all cases of a macro nature may be enough to qualify as a ‘special reason’. This applies a fortiori in constitutional matters. It is possible to argue, in criminal cases, that the only person affected is the accused, because it is the accused’s life and liberty at stake, and it is the exact circumstances of his act which will determine the appropriate conviction and sentence. In almost all constitutional matters, however, the challenge mounted will be a challenge to the law at large as the law will have been drafted in a general manner and targeted either at the population at large or at a section of the population. If a ‘special reason’ could be made out simply because it held significant repercussions beyond the individual concerned, then almost invariably every constitutional case would necessarily engage a ‘special reason’. This would wholly defeat Parliament’s aim in adding the area of constitutional and administrative law to the list of restricted areas. As I have already observed, the statutory framework necessitates that a more restrictive approach should be taken towards any of the three areas named in s 32(1) of the Admission Rules. A ‘special reason’ must thus be a reason that is unique to the circumstances of that case rather than one which is inherent in the nature of all constitutional cases. Otherwise, the ‘special reason’ requirement would not restrict the ad hoc admission of foreign senior counsel in constitutional and administrative cases, but would expand the scope for such admission.

[emphasis in original]

54 In my view, the phrase ‘special reason’ in s 15(2) of the current LPA envisages an exceptional case. What is exceptional should be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Ms Kam’s position was that a case must invariably raise significant matters of a macro nature before it can be considered exceptional. While Ms Kam’s suggested approach is likely to be the norm in practice, I would go further. There could well be cases where the interests of an individual or issues pertaining solely to that individual are so out of the ordinary that they require special consideration and, hence, qualify as a ‘special reason’. For example, an individual may be able to establish that his case is exceptional if he can prove that despite all reasonable efforts conscientiously made, he cannot find any competent local counsel to represent him. …

[emphasis added]

23 Having clarified who should file affidavits in support of ad hoc admission applications, I turn now to another important procedural practice point pertaining to the details of the contents of such affidavits. It is important for the court to have the fullest possible picture of all the relevant facts. In particular, the full details of the party’s efforts in securing local counsel should be presented to the court for the purposes of facilitating the court’s consideration of: (a) the necessity for the services of a foreign senior counsel; and (b) the availability of local Senior Counsel or other local advocate and solicitor with appropriate experience (see [66]–[68] below). The details to be provided should include the nature of the contact between the party and the local counsel who was approached (whether personally or through a third party), the mode of contact (whether in writing, orally over the telephone or in person), the date(s) and duration(s) of the call(s) and/or meeting(s), the venue(s) of the meeting(s), as well as a summary of the discussion(s) held. In addition, the date of the local counsel’s refusal to take on the party’s case and the reasons given should also be set out in detail. This list is by no means exhaustive, and solicitors should endeavour to ensure that all relevant details are presented to the court and are supported by relevant documentary evidence.

We are firmly of the view that, while there is a good arguable case that the use of double presumptions to secure a conviction under the Misuse of Drugs Act impermissibly infringes upon the presumption of innocence, on the facts of the 4 cases, the double presumption was either not used or did not need to be used by the Court to secure the convictions.

… to make it absolutely clear - it is not our position that we will only be prepared to act if the merits are ‘strong’. In our view, the facts of the 4 cases are such that the pending challenge has no merit. We do not think it is even fairly arguable that the convictions in the 4 pending cases were based upon the use of double presumptions. Even if one could argue that the High Court did use the double presumption, the admissions/ totality of the evidence in the cases also persuades us that the Court did not in fact need to use the double presumption and that a conviction could safely have been made on the evidence without the use of the double presumptions.

As we advised during the recent call, we see no prospect of the Court granting any meaningful relief unless the applicants can show that their convictions cannot be upheld without the use of the double presumption.

…

If the legal validity of double presumptions is to be effectively challenged, one has to find a case where the Court had to necessarily rely upon the double presumptions to secure the conviction.

[emphasis in original]