1 Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy (“Mr Ravi”) is a solicitor of 20 years’ standing who represented one Gobi a/l Avedian (“Gobi”) in CA/CM 3/2020 (“CM 3”).

2 CM 3 was Gobi’s application to review the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 113 (“Gobi (Appeal)”). Those proceedings began when Gobi was charged under s 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) for importing controlled drugs under Class A of the First Schedule to the MDA (the “Drugs”) of an amount punishable by death. At trial, the High Court found that Gobi did not know that the Drugs were of the nature of a Class A controlled drug and held that he had rebutted the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA. Gobi was thus convicted of an amended lesser charge of attempting to import the Drugs believing it to be a controlled drug under Class C. Gobi was acquitted of the capital charge: see Public Prosecutor v Gobi a/l Avedian [2017] SGHC 145 (“Gobi (Trial)”). The Prosecution then appealed against this decision in CA/CCA 20/2017 (“CCA 20”). On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Gobi had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s 18(2) of the MDA. The CA set aside Gobi’s conviction on the amended lesser charge and convicted Gobi of the original capital charge.

3 CM 3 was premised on a separate decision of the Court of Appeal in Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 254 (“Adili”) that had been released after Gobi (Appeal). In Adili, the Prosecution relying on the presumption under s 18(1) of the MDA, ran the case that the accused had been wilfully blind to the existence of certain drugs found in his possession. The CA held that the Prosecution could not invoke the s 18(1) MDA presumption to prove that the accused person was wilfully blind to the nature of the drugs because the s 18(1) presumption was a presumption of fact while the doctrine of wilful blindness was a construct of law. The CA, however, left open the question of whether the same was true of s 18(2) of the MDA.

4 On 19 October 2020, the Court of Appeal heard CM 3 and allowed Gobi’s application. The Court of Appeal, in the context of considering the state of an accused person’s knowledge of the nature of a controlled drug in his possession, held in brief grounds of its judgment released the same day (the “Brief Grounds”) that a finding that the accused person had been wilfully blind to the fact in question, namely the nature of the controlled drug, was distinct from a finding that he had actual knowledge of that fact; and further, that when relying on the doctrine of wilful blindness to make out its case, the Prosecution could not invoke the presumption in s 18(2) of the MDA. Wilful blindness was a legal construct where the law imputed knowledge to the accused person in certain circumstances, whereas the presumption was a legal device by which a state of fact was presumed. The Court of Appeal also held that the Prosecution’s case at trial had been that Gobi was wilfully blind to the nature of the Drugs, whereas its case on appeal was that Gobi had actual knowledge of the same. The CA further held that this change of case was prejudicial to Gobi. Applying the principles it had laid down in the Adili case distinguishing between wilful blindness and actual knowledge because at trial, the CA found that the Prosecution had relied on the presumption of knowledge even though its case was one of wilful blindness; whereas on appeal, it ran its case on the footing that the accused person had actual knowledge of the nature of the controlled drug in his possession. Given the CA’s holding that the presumption of knowledge could not be relied on where the case was one of wilful blindness, and given that the Prosecution had not otherwise proved that Gobi was wilfully blind to the nature of the Drugs, it set aside his conviction. The Court further held that the Prosecution could not run a case based on actual knowledge in the appeal because the accused person had not been confronted with a case of actual knowledge at trial. Accordingly, the Court reinstated his conviction on the lesser charge that the trial court had substituted in place of the original charge in Gobi (Trial). The Court released the full grounds of its decision later that day: see Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi (Review)”).

5 Shortly after the delivery of the Brief Grounds, Mr Ravi was interviewed by The Online Citizen Asia, where he made the following statements (“the Interview Statements”):

… [O]ne of the things which is troubling in this decision today, is that the Court noted that the Attorney-General, or the Public Prosecutor ran a different case in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Then that begs the question and calls into the fairness of the administration of justice in Gobi’s case by the Prosecution, because the Prosecution has a duty as ministers of justice to be fair.

…

[T]he Public Prosecutor has been overzealous in his prosecution and that has led to the death sentence of Gobi …

…

Please apologise to Gobi, and for the suffering, his family, and he has gone through during this process, because the Prosecution, as the Court observed, ran a different case in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. So therefore, the Prosecution, essentially the fairness of the Prosecution, is called into question by the Court itself.

6 On 20 October 2020, the then-Deputy Attorney General Mr Hri Kumar Nair (“the DAG”) wrote to Mr Ravi to inform him that the Interview Statements contained serious allegations that the Public Prosecutor had acted in bad faith or maliciously in the prosecution of Gobi, and alleged that Mr Ravi was aware that such allegations were false and inflammatory (“the DAG’s Letter”). Shortly after, Mr Ravi uploaded the DAG’s Letter on his Facebook page (the “First Facebook Post”). The First Facebook Post contained the following statements:

a. The “First Facebook Statement”:

… [T]hese government lawyers who handled Gobi’s case are the wrongdoers. The public should demand the AG to retract this letter and apologise.

b. The “Second Facebook Statement”:

c. The “Third Facebook Statement”:

7 On 22 October 2020, Mr Ravi replied to the DAG’s Letter, acknowledging that he had made the Interview Statements (the “Reply Letter”). He reiterated that he was instructed by Gobi to commence legal action against the Attorney-General (the “AG”), the DAG and “members of the Prosecution who had carriage” of the Gobi proceedings (collectively, the “AG et al”). He uploaded the contents of the Reply Letter on Facebook the same day (the “Second Facebook Post”). Mr Ravi, on behalf of Gobi, then commenced HC/S 1068/2020 (“Suit 1068”) against the AG et al on 4 November 2020, alleging that the AG et al had committed the tort of misfeasance in public office.

8 Following a complaint by the DAG (the “DAG’s Complaint”), the Law Society brought four charges against Mr Ravi before a disciplinary tribunal (the “DT”). These are as follows:

a. The first charge was that Mr Ravi conduct himself in a manner unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor by giving the Interview Statements, which were false and/or misleading and intended to convey that the AG had acted in bad faith, maliciously and/or improperly (the “First Charge”).

b. The second charge was that Mr Ravi had failed to treat the AG et al with fairness and courtesy in making the First and Second Facebook Statements (the “Second Charge”).

c. The third charge was that Mr Ravi had acted in a manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession by making the Third Facebook Statement against the Law Society (the “Third Charge”).

d. The fourth charge was that Mr Ravi acted improperly in sending the Reply Letter and threatening to commence legal proceedings against the AG et al (the “Fourth Charge”).

9 The DT convicted Mr Ravi of the Second to Fourth Charges, but determined that the First Charge was not made out as it found that Mr Ravi had a reasonable basis to make the Interview Statements since the CA, in its Brief Grounds, noted that the change of the Prosecution’s case had prejudiced Gobi. The DT held that there was no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action and imposed a collective monetary penalty of $6,000 for Mr Ravi’s misconduct.

10 The Law Society then applied for Mr Ravi to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “LPA”). It argued that due cause for disciplinary action had been made out on the basis of the Second to Fourth Charges, and that the appropriate sanction was for Mr Ravi to be suspended. Mr Ravi accepted the DT’s decision in relation to his conviction on the Second to Fourth Charges but argued that his misconduct did not give rise to due cause.

11 The key issue was whether Mr Ravi’s misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of sanctions under s 83(1) of the LPA. A proper assessment of the seriousness of Mr Ravi’s misconduct required a granular examination of the context in which Mr Ravi’s various statements were made. In this regard, while the First Charge was not in issue, the Court considered it helpful to revisit the DT’s analysis because it not only shed light on why the DT saw fit to dismiss the First Charge, but also because a correct understanding of the Interview Statements was key to understanding the true gravity of Mr Ravi’s misconduct: at [50], [52] and [74].

12 The Court disagreed with the DT’s analysis on the First Charge. While the DT took into account the CA’s observation in the Brief Grounds that Gobi had been “prejudiced” by the Prosecution’s change of case, it had not considered the CA’s qualification in the Brief Grounds that the Prosecution could not have anticipated that it had changed its case due to the existing law at the time. This qualification was made in light of the fact that Adili was only released after the conclusion of the proceedings in Gobi (Appeal). Therefore, the clarification in Adili regarding the distinction between the legal concept of wilful blindness to a fact and actual knowledge of that fact and consequently the availability of the presumption of fact in s 18(1) of the MDA in the former context was not available to the Prosecution during the proceedings in Gobi (Appeal): at [57] and [59] to [60].

13 The CA’s finding in Gobi (Review) that Gobi had been “prejudiced” also had to be understood in light of the requirements for the exercise of the CA’s power to review earlier decisions of an appellate court. The review power, which Gobi sought to invoke in CM 3, could only be exercised where it was shown not only that there was, for instance, a change of the law, but also that this change could have a material bearing on the outcome of the case. Therefore, the CA’s finding in Gobi (Review) that Gobi had been “prejudiced” was directed at whether the Prosecution’s change of case could be material to the outcome of the case, and did not suggest the Prosecution had conducted the proceedings against Gobi unfairly or improperly: at [62].

14 Mr Ravi’s Interview Statements contained the allegation that the Prosecution had been excessively enthusiastic in the conduct of the criminal proceedings against Gobi in an unfair manner that caused the sentence of death to be wrongly imposed on him. The Interview Statements also alleged that the Prosecution’s conduct of the proceedings against Gobi called into question the fairness of the administration of justice, and that the CA itself had called into question the fairness of the Prosecution. It was clear from the Interview Statements themselves, Mr Ravi’s subsequent conduct in making the Facebook Statements, and his claim in Suit 1068 that the AG et al had committed the tort of misfeasance of public office that Mr Ravi intended to convey impropriety on the part of the Prosecution. When Mr Ravi’s Interview Statements were juxtaposed against the actual nature of the Prosecution’s conduct of the Gobi proceedings and a correct understanding of the CA’s findings in Gobi (Review), there was no doubt that Mr Ravi had no reasonable basis to make the Interview Statements: at [63] to [71].

15 The Court held that there was due cause for disciplinary action against Mr Ravi. To begin with the Second Charge, Mr Ravi’s First Facebook Statement referred to the AG et al as “wrongdoers”. The term “wrongdoers”, had to be seen in light of the Interview Statements (made one day prior) and the statement of claim filed in Suit 1068. In particular, the statement of claim (which Mr Ravi had also posted on Facebook around two weeks after making the First Facebook Post) alleged that the AG et al was “dishonest”, had engaged in “deplorable conduct”, and “had taken unfair advantage” of Gobi leading to the death sentence wrongfully imposed on him. Further, it was relevant to consider that the AG, who has the power to commence and conduct of criminal prosecutions, is an essential pillar of the Singapore legal system. The First Facebook Statement was a direct attack toward the AG’s execution of this core function, and therefore amounted to a serious accusation against the AG et al.: at [78] to [85].

16 Further, this allegation of “wrongdo[ing]” was made without a reasonable basis. In its Brief Grounds, the CA clarified that the parties did not have the benefit of the clarification in Adili at the time of trial, and that the Prosecution’s case might have been formulated on the premise that the doctrine of wilful blindness was essentially the same as actual knowledge and therefore that the s 18(2) presumption could not be invoked. This was why the issue of the Prosecution’s change of case was not raised in Gobi (Appeal) or in the initial submissions in Gobi (Review), but instead raised by the Court of Appeal of its own motion. As such, while the CA held that the change of case had caused prejudice to Gobi, it did not conclude that the Prosecution had done this deliberately (unlike what Mr Ravi’s statements suggested). The prejudice was a result of a confluence of unique circumstances, as well as the evolution and clarification of the legal position following Adili. Given his involvement in the review proceedings, Mr Ravi ought to have known that his allegations against the AG et al lacked basis: at [88] and [89].

17 The sense of unfairness and discourtesy shown by Mr Ravi toward the AG et al in his First and Second Facebook Statements was enhanced due to the potential public reach of those statements. The misconduct under the Second Charge was a serious breach of the solicitor’s duty to treat other legal practitioners with fairness and courtesy: at [91] to [92].

18 In relation to the Third Charge, Mr Ravi’s Third Facebook Statement contained a baseless accusation that the Law Society, in “entertain[ing]” the DAG’s Complaint, was participating in “harassment by [the] AG” against Mr Ravi in “doing [his] job” and thereby was failing to “protect lawyers and the independence of the profession”. This lacked basis as, upon the AG’s request, the Law Society must apply for a disciplinary tribunal to be appointed (see s 85(3)(b) of the LPA). The fact that Mr Ravi knew of this when he made the Third Facebook Statement, yet persisted in making the allegations he did suggested that he had made the allegations with reckless disregard for the truth. The Third Facebook Statement amounted to an insinuation that the Law Society, by acting on the AG’s request, would be abdicating its core purpose in the protection of lawyers and the independence of the profession. This was a serious breach of the solicitor’s duty not to act in a manner contrary to his position as a member of an honourable profession: at [102] to [107].

19 In relation to the Fourth Charge, the contents of Mr Ravi’s Reply Letter strengthened the Court’s interpretation of Mr Ravi’s conduct as one that persistently insinuated or alleged impropriety on the part of the AG et al and buttressed the finding that due cause was made out: at [109].

20 Mr Ravi’s misconduct was seriously harmful to public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. The imposition of censure or a monetary penalty would be insufficient; instead, the relevant question was whether Mr Ravi’s misconduct warrants a period of suspension or striking Mr Ravi off the roll of advocates and solicitors: at [116].

21 Mr Ravi’s misconduct exhibited a fundamental lack of respect and a blatant disregard for the integrity of Singapore’s key legal institutions. Mr Ravi’s views were not only not rooted in fact but also seem to be stubbornly held and acted upon, revealing a defect of character. Mr Ravi’s history of related past disciplinary cases and his unsatisfactory conduct at the hearing before the Court of Three Judges pointed to this ingrained attitude: at [122] to [126].

22 Mr Ravi utter disregard for the AG and the Law Society, both of which are key institutions of the Singapore legal system, had brought dishonour to the standing of the legal profession: at [127].

23 The relevant aggravating factors include: Mr Ravi’s status as a senior lawyer of close to 20 years’ standing at the material time; his disciplinary cases of a similar nature over the past 15 years; and his lack of remorse. While Mr Ravi claimed to be remorseful about his misconduct, he had not only failed to apologise for his misconduct but had doubled down on his allegations against the AG et al and the Law Society during the hearing, going as far to suggest that the court had abdicated its duties: at [130] to [135].

24 Mr Ravi’s involvement in the Gobi proceedings might in theory be considered mitigating. However, the mitigating effect of Mr Ravi’s involvement was limited by the fact that it was the CA that first raised the matter of the Prosecution’s change of case. Indeed, after the CA raised the issue and invited submissions from the parties on this point, Mr Ravi’s own position was that it was not thought to be prejudicial to his client. Further, the nature of Mr Ravi’s accusations against the AG et al and the Law Society, coupled with his disciplinary history and lack of remorse, made it untenable to accord any significant mitigating weight to his conduct: at [138].

25 The Court imposed a five years’ suspension against Mr Ravi. In particular, the Court noted in Mr Ravi’s favour that he had not posted the statement of claim in Suit 1068 at the same time that he made the Facebook Statements, and thus that some of those who read the Facebook Statements at the time they were published may not have appreciated the full extent of his attack on the legal system. Further, the Interview Statements were not considered in determining the appropriate sentence: at [74], [120], and [136].

26 The Court emphasised that no solicitor can be permitted to recklessly and baselessly undermine the very pillars of the legal system in which he operates and noted that to do would cause grave injury to public confidence in the legal profession: at [143].