1 Between 1 August 2012 and 3 October 2013 (the “Relevant Period”), the two accused persons conspired to manipulate the markets for and prices of three counters which were, at the time, being traded on the Mainboard of the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”). These were Blumont, ¹ Asiasons, ² and LionGold ³ (collectively, “BAL”). The accused persons succeeded.

2 Not only was their scheme elaborate and thoroughly planned, but it was also complex, sophisticated, highly exploitative, long running, and well-guised. Before me, the accused persons also displayed no remorse for their conduct, or regret for the damaging consequences which followed therefrom. Instead, they denied every charge brought against them and pushed the blame to others. They also cast aspersions on the integrity of the Prosecution and investigating agencies.

3 For these, amongst other reasons I will discuss in these grounds, it is – on hindsight – perhaps somewhat unsurprising that the Prosecution had described this matter as the “most serious case of stock market manipulation in Singapore”, ⁴ an assertion which I will need to return at the very end of these grounds.

4 For his involvement in the entire scheme – from its conception, its execution, to the period following its eventual discovery – the First Accused, Mr Soh Chee Wen (also known as “John Soh”), faced a total of 189 charges. These fell within five distinct groups: ⁵

(a) First, ten charges for being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 197(1)(b) of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “SFA”), which proscribed “false trading and market rigging transactions”. The Second Accused, Ms Quah Su-Ling, was alleged to be his co-conspirator. It should also be noted that six of these ten charges concerned the markets for BAL shares (the “False Trading Charges”). The remaining four concerned the prices of BAL shares (the “Price Manipulation Charges”).

(b) Second, 162 charges for a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 201(b) of the SFA, which prohibited the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the subscription, purchase, or sale of securities. The Second Accused was, again, alleged to be his co-conspirator. After the close of the Prosecution’s case, only 161 of these charges remained in issue before me as I had acquitted the accused persons of a single charge ⁶ pursuant to the submissions that there had been no case to answer by the accused persons (see [1518]–[1519] below). Thus, in these grounds, I will refer only to the 161 charges as the “Deception Charges”.

(c) Third, six charges for being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, Rev Ed 2008) (the “Penal Code”), that was, cheating and dishonestly inducing property to be delivered (the “Cheating Charges”). In essence, these charges alleged that the accused persons had conspired to dishonestly induce two entities to deliver hundreds of millions in margin financing.

(d) Fourth, three charges for being concerned in the management of Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold while being an undischarged bankrupt, contrary to s 148(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (the “Companies Act”). I refer to these charges as the “Company Management Charges”. The First Accused had been adjudged bankrupt in Malaysia on 14 January 2002 and has remained undischarged ever since. ⁷

(e) Lastly, five charges for perverting the course of justice contrary to s 204A of the Penal Code and a further three charges for attempting to pervert the course of justice contrary to s 204A read with s 511 of the Penal Code (collectively, the “Witness Tampering Charges”). These eight charges essentially alleged that the First Accused had successfully tampered or attempted to tamper with the evidence of four key witnesses in these proceedings.

5 The Second Accused faced 178 charges for offences falling within the first three groups of charges brought against the First Accused. As she was alleged to be his co-conspirator, the charges against her were essentially identical to those brought against him. ⁸ When I refer to the False Trading, Price Manipulation, Deception, and Cheating Charges, I include those charges faced by the Second Accused. I will also refer to all these charges faced by both the accused persons collectively as the “Conspiracy Charges”.

6 The Prosecution’s case for these 367 charges commenced on 25 March 2019 and concluded on 21 April 2021, ⁹ after 169 hearing days. ¹⁰ There were 95 witnesses of fact for the Prosecution, though the attendance of 34 were dispensed with. Of these 95, 85 witnesses gave evidence by way of conditioned statements pursuant to s 264(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (the “CPC”). The Prosecution also called two experts – one on market surveillance, Professor Aitken; ¹¹ and the other on valuation, Mr Ellison. ¹² The defence was developed over 28 hearing days thereafter. ¹³ The First Accused took the stand for 25 hearing days, and called an expert witness, Mr White, ¹⁴ to respond to the evidence of Professor Aitken. Mr White took the stand for the remaining three days. The Second Accused elected not to give evidence in her defence and did not call any witnesses. At the trial, miscellaneous evidential and procedural disputes also arose, primarily during the Prosecution’s case, which necessitated intermediate resolution (for example, see my decisions in Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another [2020] 3 SLR 1435 (“PP v Soh Chee Wen (No 1)”) and Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen and another [2021] 3 SLR 641 (“PP v Soh Chee Wen (No 2)”). There were also other issues which did not give rise to published judgments.

7 On 5 May 2022, after careful consideration of the evidence, the parties’ written submissions ¹⁵ and their oral arguments, ¹⁶ I convicted the accused persons, respectively, of 180 and 169 of the total 189 and 178 charges which had been brought against them. The parties were given time to tender their submissions on sentence. On 28 December 2022, after considering the parties’ written submissions ¹⁷ and their oral arguments, ¹⁸ I imposed on the accused persons aggregate sentences of 36- and 20-years’ imprisonment, respectively. On both 5 May and 28 December 2022, I delivered fairly detailed reasons for my decisions, but, even so, I stated that full grounds would follow. These are the full grounds of my decision.

8 Given the unprecedented scale of this matter, it should come as no surprise that these grounds of decision must address a very substantial number of issues and, as such, they are commensurately extensive. To aid the reader in navigating them, I will begin by stating the structure of these grounds, and then setting out a table of contents.

9 These grounds will proceed as follows:

(a) First, following this section, I will provide some general background to this matter. As the events with which this case was concerned took place around a decade ago, it is useful to be reminded of the circumstances surrounding the discovery and investigation of the offences as well as the initiation of prosecution.

(b) Second, I will state the crucial components of the Prosecution’s case. As would have been gleaned from [1] above, the essence of the Prosecution’s case was that the accused persons had successfully executed a conspiracy to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares during the Relevant Period. ¹⁹ This general conspiracy (which I will call the “Scheme”), however, did not form the subject of any specific charge. The charges were instead concerned with narrower aspects of the Scheme; for example, with creating a false appearance with respect to the market for Blumont shares across different periods, or for dishonestly inducing Goldman Sachs ²⁰ to provide substantial margin financing. Nevertheless, the narrative put forth by the Prosecution in relation to the Scheme as a whole was the through line of all 367 charges which had been brought, and serves as a useful framework for organising the various strands of the case.

(c) Third, I will explain the broad categories of evidence relied on by the Prosecution to prove the components of its case and, thus, the individual charges. Although the probative value and limitations of most of these categories of evidence should be clear once I turn to my substantive analyses of them, it is still useful to state – in a single section of these grounds – how the Prosecution set out to prove the entirety of its case.

(d) Fourth, I will state the accused persons’ defence. As would have been gathered from [2] above, the accused persons’ principal response was to deny liability for all the charges brought against them. In this connection, efforts were made to undermine the credibility of the Prosecution’s case and the quality of the Prosecution’s evidence. Apart from this negative defence, however, the accused persons also put forth the positive case that several other actors who featured in this matter were the ones who had actually coordinated to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares during the Relevant Period. This section will therefore also generally explain that positive case.

(e) Fifth, I will set out my decision with respect to the accused persons’ liability for the charges brought against them. After setting out those detailed grounds, which begin from [156] below, I will summarise my decision briefly from [1289] below. My decision will address the five groups of charges in the order in which they appear at [4] above.

(f) Sixth, I will set out my detailed reasons for imposing on the First and Second Accused, respectively, imprisonment terms of 36 and 20 years. In this section, I will also deal with several issues which were generally disputed during the trial, but which were most relevant to the issue of sentencing.

(g) Seventh, as mentioned at [2] above, aspersions were cast on the integrity of the Prosecution. More specifically, these were allegations that there had been Prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Thus, in the final section of these grounds, prior to my conclusion, I will address those allegations.

10 There are four appendices. First, an Excel Workbook: “Index of Relevant Accounts and Charges”. Second, a table containing a glossary of the persons –both individuals and companies – referred to in these grounds. Third, a diagram which illustrates the relationships between the accused persons and certain persons relevant to this matter. Lastly, descriptions of important procedural and evidential issues which arose during the trial, and my decisions in respect of those issues.

11 A full table of the foregoing contents follows.

12 Given the elusive nature of the Scheme, it is apposite to begin near its end. On Saturday, 7 September 2013, the Straits Times published an article by Senior Correspondent Mr Goh Eng Yeow titled, “Blumont’s meteoric rise raises concerns: Mining counter’s huge gains don’t square with the firm’s Q2 results”. ²¹ For context, the price of Blumont shares at the beginning of the second quarter of 2013 was approximately S$0.625. By the first week of September 2013, when the foregoing article was published, this price had climbed to just under S$2.00, ²² a more-than threefold increase.

13 The publication of this article led Commercial Affairs Officer (“CAO”) Ms Eunice Yeo to lodge a police report raising the possibility that Blumont’s shares may have been the subject of manipulation. This triggered an inquiry by the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) into the matter. ²³

14 This inquiry, however, did not get far before others began expressing similar sentiments. On 1 October 2013, SGX’s then-Head of Market Surveillance, Mr Kelvin Koh, ²⁴ issued the following query to Blumont’s Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Mr Hong, ²⁵ using the central exchange’s online announcement platform: ²⁶

15 Similarly, on 2 October 2013, Today published an article titled, “SIAS and SGX query ‘steep increase’ in Blumont share price”. ²⁷ The article, by and large, expressed the same message as that in the SGX’s query. ²⁸

16 These statements shortly preceded the most significant event connected with this matter. On Friday, 4 October 2013, Blumont’s share price fell sharply from S$1.895 to S$0.88 within the first hour of the trading day. The share prices of Asiasons and LionGold followed suit, falling from S$2.65 to S$1.04 and S$1.42 to S$0.875, respectively. As a response, the SGX suspended the trading of all three counters that same day at around 10.00am. ²⁹

17 On Sunday, 6 October 2013 at around 6.00pm, the SGX announced that trading would resume the next day, ³⁰ but, that the three counters were to be declared “Designated Securities”. ³¹ This meant that BAL shares could only be purchased if the buyer had cash on hand; contra trading was not permitted. ³² Further, short selling was also prohibited. Shares could only be sold if the seller had the shares to be sold on hand.

18 After these announcements were made, on the evidence of the First Accused – Blumont’s lawyer at the time, Mrs Lee SF of Stamford Law Corporation ³³ – called and spoke to SGX’s then-Chief Risk and Regulatory Officer, Mdm Yeo. ³⁴ This conversation was held with a view to convincing the SGX to defer the resumption of trading by two days to allow traders to prepare the funds needed to trade in BAL, given its designated status. Without such buffer time, the First Accused suggested that “mayhem” was bound to ensue. ³⁵ This request was ultimately not acceded to for reasons which were not made known. At the trial, nothing more was revealed about any such communications (on this, see [1302] below). ³⁶ When trading resumed on 7 October 2013, BAL’s share prices continued to fall rapidly, dropping from S$0.88, S$1.04, and S$0.875 before the suspension, to S$0.13, S$0.15, and S$0.25 by the end of that trading day. ³⁷ Collectively, I will refer to the sharp price drops on both 4 and 7 October 2013 as “the Crash”.

19 Whether the foregoing articles, queries, and decisions had materially contributed to the crash that followed the crescendo which had been building since August 2012 was a matter of considerable dispute. The Prosecution’s case was, naturally, that the accused persons were responsible for the Crash because they had, by their Scheme, created appearances as to the markets and prices of BAL shares which were “so utterly false that, when the music eventually stopped and the bubble burst on 4 October 2013, the share prices of all three companies collapsed”. ³⁸ The accused persons’ submissions, of course, opposed this. Assuming they were even the ones to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL’s shares – which they denied – the accused persons cited several factors, including but not limited to the articles, queries, and decisions, ³⁹ and suggested that they could not be said to have caused the Crash. ⁴⁰

20 These are matters I will return to much later in these grounds (see [1299] below). For now, the salient point is that the Crash resulted in the CAD and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) launching a joint investigation into the matter. ⁴¹ The CAO who led the joint investigation was Ms Sheryl Tan ⁴² and her team’s investigations were extensive.

21 Following investigations, in the third quarter of 2016, the Prosecution preferred charges against the First and Second Accused. However, it should be noted that at the start of the trial, the accused persons were charged with abetting, by conspiracy, offences under s 197(1)(b) and s 201(b) of the SFA as well as s 420 of the Penal Code. They had not been charged for criminal conspiracy under s 120B of the Penal Code. It was only in July 2019, after the trial had commenced, that the Prosecution applied to amend the original charges for abetment to the Conspiracy Charges, an application which I allowed (see [1502]–[1506] below). The consequences of this amendment remained contentious in closing (see [126] below) and even at the sentencing stage of these proceedings (see [1319] below).

22 A third person, Mr Goh HC, ⁴³ whom the Prosecution assessed had played a smaller role in the Scheme – was also charged alongside the accused persons. Mr Goh HC faced a total of six charges for abetting, by intentionally aiding, the accused persons in their commission of offences under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. These six offences were punishable under s 204(1) of the SFA read with s 109 of the Penal Code. ⁴⁴

23 On 20 March 2019, before See Kee Oon J, Mr Goh HC pleaded guilty to two of the six charges he faced, with the four others being taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. The two charges to which Mr Goh HC pleaded guilty were essentially identical save that one pertained to the role he played in connection with the false trading of Blumont shares, and the other concerned Asiasons shares. As an illustration, I reproduce the charge which concerned Blumont shares: ⁴⁵

24 See J sentenced Mr Goh HC to 36 months’ imprisonment for each of the two proceeded charges, which were ordered to run concurrently (see Public Prosecutor v Goh Hin Calm HC/CC 13/2019). ⁴⁶ Thereafter, the trial against the accused persons commenced before me.

25 Broadly, it was the Prosecution’s case that during the Relevant Period, the accused persons had masterminded a scheme to artificially inflate the markets for and manipulate prices of BAL shares. They were said, essentially, to have carried out this scheme by controlling, coordinating their use of, obtaining financing for, and conducting illegitimate trading activity in an extensive web comprising 189 trading accounts (the “Relevant Accounts”) held with 20 financial institutions (“FIs”) in the names of 60 individuals and companies (the “Relevant Accountholders”). The 20 FIs comprised nine local brokerages, as well as 11 foreign brokerages and private banks.

26 In the next seven sub-sections, I will set out the aspects of this general case in greater detail as follows.

(a) First, how the accused persons were said to have obtained control of and used the Relevant Accounts. The broad relationships between the accused persons and the Relevant Accountholders will be described.

(b) Second, how the accused persons were said to have coordinated their use of the Relevant Accounts to perpetuate their Scheme, and how the accused persons allegedly kept atop the coordination of the substantial number of accounts they controlled.

(c) Third, how the accused persons purportedly financed the Relevant Accounts. This principally included obtaining margin financing from the FIs.

(d) Fourth, the two key techniques used by accused persons to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. The predominant practice that was said to have been used was “wash trading”. Connectedly, and although not illegitimate per se, the accused persons were also said to have abused contra trading.

(e) Fifth, by way of illustration, a trading technique allegedly used by accused persons to inflate the prices of BAL shares will be described. This was known as “aggressive trading”. In this connection, I will also set out an incident relied on by the Prosecution to establish one of the four Price Manipulation Charges.

(f) Sixth, the alleged broader purpose of the accused persons’ Scheme, and how they intended it to be utilised beyond the mere fact of price hikes and drops. On this matter, it is necessary to outline the evidence of two key witnesses, Mr Tai ⁴⁷ and Mr Leroy Lau. ⁴⁸

(g) Lastly, how the accused persons conducted themselves after the Crash. Such conduct included, for example, the First Accused’s involvement in meetings that appeared to serve the purpose of assisting various Relevant Accountholders settle losses suffered as a result of the Crash.

27 These seven components formed the building blocks on which the Prosecution’s overarching thesis – as stated at [25] above – was constructed. They served to support the general inference that there were, in fact, conspiracies between the accused persons to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares, and, further, that such conspiracies had been successfully carried out.

28 In this sub-section, I set out some details about the Relevant Accounts, state how the accused persons were said by the Prosecution to have obtained control of them and, further, how the accused persons actually used them.

29 The 189 Relevant Accounts were held in the names of the Second Accused, Mr Goh HC, as well as 36 other individuals and 22 corporations. ⁴⁹ Most of these individuals and companies had some link to or relationship with either the First Accused, the Second Accused, or both. In the Relationship Diagram appended to these grounds, I have illustrated these links. ⁵⁰ Here, I will briefly describe some of these connections falling within two pertinent groups.

(a) First, amongst the Relevant Accountholders were several members of both accused persons’ immediate and extended family. There were eight people in this group: the First Accused’s two sons, ⁵¹ his brother, ⁵² his two brothers-in-law, ⁵³ the wife of a brother-in-law, ⁵⁴ the Second Accused’s mother, ⁵⁵ and her brother-in-law. ⁵⁶ Collectively, they held 22 Relevant Accounts with eight FIs.

(b) Second, amongst the Relevant Accountholders were also many of the First Accused’s Malaysian friends, as well as business and political associates. This group was the most significant. Excluding entities under their control, it comprised 14 individuals under whose names 81 Relevant Accounts were held with 13 FIs. The entities under these associates’ control comprised a further 14 corporate accountholders with 25 Relevant Accounts in 11 FIs.

30 Persons in the latter group included, for example, one Mr Neo. ⁵⁷ Apart from the fact that he held the appointments of Chairman and Executive Director of Blumont, Mr Neo was also an individual in whose name nine Relevant Accounts were held with seven FIs. The First Accused had known Mr Neo since 1981 or 1982, ⁵⁸ and has kept close ties with him through a country club in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, called the “Lakeview Club”. Both maintained office spaces in this club. ⁵⁹ Another example was one Mr Chen, ⁶⁰ under whose name 14 Relevant Accounts were held with eight FIs. The First Accused had met Mr Chen sometime in 1993 or 1994 at a Malaysian Chinese Association (“MCA”) meeting. ⁶¹ Both Mr Neo and Mr Chen have, over the years, worked with the First Accused on various projects or business acquisitions. Other identifiable but less direct connections included one Ms Hairani. ⁶² She was a “good friend” ⁶³ of one Ms Ung, ⁶⁴ who was Mr Chen’s ex-fiancée. According to Mr Chen, Ms Ung was also the First Accused’s god-sister. ⁶⁵ Ms Ung was not a Relevant Accountholder though Ms Hairani was.

31 However, some connections were stronger than others and, indeed, not every Relevant Account was obviously linked to either the First or Second Accused. These included individuals such as Mr Chiew ⁶⁶ in whose name three Relevant Accounts were held with two FIs. On the First Accused’s account, he was a building contractor who worked for Mr Neo. ⁶⁷ However, no evidence was adduced to show links other than this. There were also some Relevant Accountholders who had no personal connections to the accused persons. These included Mr Lim HP, ⁶⁸ Mr Lim LA, ⁶⁹ and Mr Toh. ⁷⁰

32 Even so, as stated at [28] above, most of the Relevant Accountholders had a personal connection with either or both accused persons. The existence of such links formed an important part of the Prosecution’s case. The accused persons were said to have drawn on their personal and business relationships in order to obtain control of the existing Relevant Accounts, and, further, even to cause new trading accounts to be created for their use. ⁷¹ Mr Chen was an example. In respect of all 14 Relevant Accounts held in his name, he testified that, from 2000 to 2013, the First Accused had approached him on several occasions to open trading accounts with various FIs. Mr Chen stated that this was on the understanding that those trading accounts were to be controlled and used by the First Accused. ⁷²

33 That said, although the accused persons supposedly “drew on” their relationships with the Relevant Accountholders, these accountholders were not the characters that were most germane to the issue of control. Indeed, the fact that Mr Chen gave evidence as an accountholder was the exception. Of the 60 Relevant Accountholders, only six individuals were called by the Prosecution to give evidence at the trial, although some of them were able to speak for corporate accountholders.

34 Instead, the persons more pertinent to the Prosecution’s case were those who had performed functions which directly or indirectly allowed the accused persons to regularly place trades in the Relevant Accounts in furtherance of the Scheme, who had kept them apprised of the information they needed to know to stay atop the Scheme, and who had even managed certain Relevant Accounts on their behalf.

35 Broadly, the functions performed by these persons could be divided into two categories:

(a) First, functions which were operational in character. This would include tasks such as keying orders into the Relevant Accounts pursuant to trading instructions given by the accused persons; relaying instructions to persons who would then key in the orders; reporting the status of orders placed; and providing updates of the trades in cash accounts due to be settled.

(b) Second, functions which involved a degree of autonomy, decision-making and administration. This included deciding for themselves whether to place orders for Blumont, Asiasons or LionGold shares, and if so, the timing, volume, and price of that order. Further, if placing the order using a cash account, whether to pick up the shares or to trade on a contra basis.

36 Four types of persons allegedly carried out these functions. ⁷³ First, the dealers or remisiers employed by and/or acting as commissioned agents for the local FIs. I will refer to them as trading representatives or “TRs”. Second, the persons or entities formally authorised to give trading instructions on behalf of the Relevant Accountholders. Specifically, these were persons with limited powers of attorney (“LPOA”) to instruct or place trades on behalf of the Relevant Accountholders in their accounts. I will refer to these persons as the “intermediaries”. Third, some of the Relevant Accountholders themselves, in connection with certain accounts. Lastly, third parties who were not TRs, intermediaries, or Relevant Accountholders.

37 The most significant of these four groups were the TRs and intermediaries. A total of 23 TRs managed the 131 Relevant Accounts held with local FIs (the “Local Accounts”). ⁷⁴ Sixteen of these 23 TRs gave evidence at the trial and, in respect of one other TR, ⁷⁵ the Prosecution admitted two of his investigative statements ⁷⁶ with the Defence’s consent. ⁷⁷ As regards the 58 accounts held with foreign FIs (the “Foreign Accounts”), ⁷⁸ five distinct intermediaries had been appointed to manage 53 of them. Evidence was given by or on behalf of all five intermediaries.

38 The Prosecution’s case was that the TRs and intermediaries principally performed functions falling within the first category. That said, certain TRs and intermediaries were said to have been more involved than others, taking on functions within the second category.

39 Take for example, Mr Gan. ⁷⁹ He was a TR with DMG & Partners, ⁸⁰ and managed two accounts held in the names of two Relevant Accountholders, Mr Lim KY ⁸¹ and Mr Fernandez. ⁸² In addition to functions within the first category, Mr Gan was also said to have exercised decision-making functions in respect of the two accounts under his management, 27 accounts held with Phillip Securities ⁸³ under the management of another TR, Mr Tjoa, ⁸⁴ and a further 32 accounts held with IB ⁸⁵ and Saxo ⁸⁶ managed by Mr Tai, the intermediary for these 32 accounts. ⁸⁷ Mr Gan was also purported to have shared this responsibility with two other individuals, ⁸⁸ Mr Tai and Mr Gwee. ⁸⁹

40 Nevertheless, the functions performed by the majority of TRs and intermediaries who gave evidence were distinguishable from those allegedly performed by Mr Gan, Mr Tai, and Mr Gwee. Mr Jack Ng ⁹⁰ was an example of a TR which only performed functions within the first category as described at [35(a)] above. He was a TR associated with OCBC Securities ⁹¹ and managed eight Relevant Accounts held in the names of six accountholders. These were ESA Electronics, ⁹² Mr Goh HC, Mr Kuan AM, ⁹³ Ms Lim SH, ⁹⁴ Ms Ng SL, ⁹⁵ and the Second Accused. The Prosecution’s case was that the accused persons had directly called and given trading instructions to Mr Jack Ng, ⁹⁶ who would, in turn, place orders for BAL shares in these eight accounts pursuant to their instructions. ⁹⁷ Other functions performed by Mr Jack Ng included providing trade reports to the accused persons ⁹⁸ and reminders in respect of cash trades due for settlement. ⁹⁹ It was not said that Mr Jack Ng exercised any discretion in relation to these accounts. ¹⁰⁰

41 I give another example. This example illustrates the Prosecution’s case not only in respect of what functions specific TRs had performed, but also how those TRs came to perform those functions in the first place. This “how” question complemented the Prosecution’s claim that the accused persons “drew on” their personal relationship to obtain control of the Relevant Accounts. Mr Chen held one Relevant Account ¹⁰¹ with Maybank Kim Eng under the management of a TR, Mr Ong KC. ¹⁰² As stated at [30] above, the First Accused had known Mr Chen since around 1993 or 1994. They were also both acquainted with Mr Ong KC, having met him sometime in the 1990s. Mr Ong KC knew that the two were acquainted. ¹⁰³

42 It was Mr Ong KC’s evidence that, by August 2012 the First Accused had frequently been giving trading instructions in respect of Mr Chen’s account with Maybank Kim Eng. This arrangement was initially limited. On Mr Ong KC’s evidence, Mr Chen would occasionally permit the First Accused to give trading instructions on his behalf, whenever he was busy. On such occasions, Mr Chen would inform him ahead of time that the First Accused would be calling Mr Ong KC to give trading instructions. Subsequently, however, instructions from the First Accused were not prefaced by such calls from Mr Chen to Mr Ong KC. Nevertheless, the latter continued to accept those instructions because he “trusted” that Mr Chen “would not act as a proxy for other persons [given that] he was a lawyer in Malaysia”. ¹⁰⁴

43 As regards how the First Accused actually conveyed his instructions for Mr Chen’s account, Mr Ong KC testified that the First Accused would call using his mobile phone, specify whether he wished to enter a buy or sell order, the counter, the quantity, and the price at which to place the order. Mr Ong KC would then enter the instructed order. ¹⁰⁵ On occasions when Mr Ong KC was out of the office, he redirected calls from his primary mobile phone to another mobile phone that he would have left in the office with his covering TR, Mr Lim TL. ¹⁰⁶ Mr Lim TL testified to this. ¹⁰⁷

44 However, not all TRs accepted the accused persons’ trading instructions because they trusted their legitimacy on the basis of some prior relationship. There were varying reasons they each did so, including a fear of losing the commissions they earned from the accused persons’ very active trading. Mr Jack Ng (see [40] above) was an example. His evidence was that after he had been verbally authorised by the Relevant Accountholders to accept instructions from the Second Accused, he had mailed third-party authorisation forms to each of them so as to allow them to properly authorise the Second Accused to give instructions on their behalf. The Second Accused, he testified, took issue with this and threatened to move her business to another FI. Not wanting to lose her or the other accountholders as clients, Mr Jack Ng dropped the issue and continued accepting her instructions without her being formally authorised. ¹⁰⁸ A similar example was Mr Wong XY, ¹⁰⁹ a TR associated with AmFraser. ¹¹⁰ Under his management were 29 Relevant Accounts of 19 accountholders. He gave evidence that, despite believing that the accused persons’ trades had likely been improper, he nevertheless carried them out because he was “greedy for the commissions”. He likely made around S$1 million in commissions between January 2012 and October 2013 “just by trading for [the accused persons]” alone. ¹¹¹

45 These examples highlight a salient point about the Prosecution’s case. For the accused persons to have obtained direct control of the Relevant Accounts, they required both the Relevant Accountholder, and the TR or intermediary managing the account, to be amenable. Even if a particular accountholder was agreeable to their account being used, it still would not have been possible for the accused persons to exercise direct control if the TR or intermediary had refused to act on their instructions. Although the use of internet trading accounts qualified this, most of the Relevant Accountholders as well as the accused persons did not have a penchant for using internet trading platforms. This was the reason the TRs and intermediaries – as stated at [37] above – played a significant role in this matter.

46 An example of a TR who was probably not amenable to receiving instructions from persons who were not formally authorised was Mr See ¹¹² associated with Lim & Tan. ¹¹³ Mr See managed five Relevant Accounts held in the names of four accountholders; they were the Second Accused, Mr Neo, Friendship Bridge, ¹¹⁴ and Annica Holdings. ¹¹⁵ Friendship Bridge was a subsidiary of IPCO; ¹¹⁶ the Second Accused was the CEO of IPCO during the Relevant Period. Annica Holdings was a company under the control of Mr Sugiarto, ¹¹⁷ an associate of the First Accused with whom the First Accused kept ties through his membership at the Lakeview Club. ¹¹⁸ Mr Sugiarto was himself the holder of six Relevant Accounts.

47 From Mr See’s evidence, he operated by the book, and did not accept instructions from anyone who was not formally authorised. ¹¹⁹ Therefore, it was the Prosecution’s case that in respect of Annica Holdings’ account, the First Accused exercised indirect control by relaying instructions through Mr Sugiarto. ¹²⁰ This would have cloaked his involvement from Mr See. Indeed, Mr See’s evidence was that he had never spoken to the First Accused, ¹²¹ and that Mr Sugiarto was the only person who gave instructions in respect of Annica Holdings’ account. ¹²² As regards the other four Relevant Accounts, the Second Accused was the one who gave Mr See instructions. She was, of course, authorised in respect of her own accounts and she was also an authorised signatory for Friendship Bridge’s account. ¹²³ The Second Accused was also formally authorised to give instructions in respect of Mr Neo’s account as she had been granted an LPOA. ¹²⁴ Accordingly, there was no reason for Mr See not to accept her instructions.

48 From this, it can be seen that even if the accused persons had not been able – or had not attempted to – persuade a particular TR or intermediary to permit their direct use of the Relevant Accounts, they could still exercise indirect control by relaying instructions through the Relevant Accountholder or authorised signatories. On the other hand, if the TR or intermediary was amenable to acting on the accused persons’ instructions despite want of formal authority – eg, Mr Ong KC, Mr Jack Ng, and Mr Wong XY discussed above – the accused persons then allegedly had a range of means by which they could exercise control. They could, as suggested at [35] above, give direct instructions, relay instructions through various individuals, or even delegate the task of giving instructions to others.

49 Given the number of Relevant Accounts, accountholders, TRs, and intermediaries, it should not be surprising that there were a fair number of permutations as regards how the accused persons were said to have obtained control of the Relevant Accounts, and exercised control – whether it was through the giving of direct instructions to TRs or intermediaries, relaying instructions through others, or delegating their decision-making functions.

50 I return to these variations and nuances on the issue of control at [194] below when I turn to explain my findings in respect of whether the accused persons had in fact controlled each account. Having set out this broad explanation, I turn next to describe how the accused persons allegedly coordinated such control in pursuance of the Scheme.

51 On the footing that the Relevant Accounts had been controlled by the accused persons, the Prosecution suggested that such control had been exercised in concert to give effect to their Scheme. This took many forms, and, in this sub-section, I set out some examples from various strands of the Prosecution’s case.

52 The most straightforward manner in which the accused persons were said to have acted in concert, was by coordinating the BAL trading activity of the Relevant Accounts so as to carry out wash trading between them (“wash trading” is explained at [78] below). Various modes of proof were relied on by the Prosecution to establish the blatant coordination. The first and most direct means of proof was the evidence of key witnesses. Mr Leroy Lau, for example, testified that he took trading instructions from the accused persons to coordinate ‘roll-over’ trades with them so as to enable them to “refresh” the positions in the other Relevant Accounts. His description of such coordination is usefully considered in full: ¹²⁵

53 The Prosecution also carried out their own verification work to demonstrate that the communications records between Mr Leroy Lau and the accused persons cohered with the account given by Mr Leroy Lau. The following table illustrates proximate calls interspersed between LionGold orders entered by Mr Leroy Lau in his own account on 23 July 2013: ¹²⁸

54 Read with Mr Leroy Lau’s evidence as to the purpose of his communications with the Second Accused, this table suggested that the accused persons had in fact been coordinating their Scheme.

55 Apart from unabashedly coordinating trading activity in an illegitimate manner, there were also less direct means by which the Prosecution suggested that the accused persons had acted in concert, or, at least, had enabled themselves to do so more effectively. These included certain practices they had allegedly adopted and documents that they had supposedly maintained.

56 One such practice was trade reporting. This was a practice that was most pertinent to the Relevant Accounts held with local FIs, in respect of which the accused persons were said to have given direct instructions to the TRs. For example, this included the accounts managed by Mr Jack Ng mentioned at [40] above.

57 The giving of such direct instructions typically followed this sequence. First, the accused persons would contact the TR over the phone or via text message to give them trading instructions. Some TRs, on certain occasions, were the ones to initiate contact. Second, the TR would then place an order in the Relevant Account according to those instructions. Third, if the order was fulfilled immediately, the TRs would report that accordingly. If it was not, they would first report that the order was in the queue, and thereafter, that the order was fulfilled, partially fulfilled, or not fulfilled. Last, the TRs would also, after T+5 days, report to the accused persons that those shares were due to be sold or picked up. The accused persons would then give their fresh instructions, and the cycle would repeat. By this system of reporting, the accused persons were kept apprised of the due positions in the Relevant Accounts and, thus, able to take timely trading decisions in furtherance of their Scheme.

58 Mr Jack Ng may, again, be used as an example. The messages set out below were extracted from Mr Jack Ng’s mobile device and the recipients of these messages were the phone numbers +60 12304 0678 (the “678 number”) and 9650 6523. The former number, on the Prosecution’s case, was one used by the First Accused, though there was some dispute about this. ¹³⁹ I will return to this dispute at [197] below. There was no dispute that the latter number had belonged to the Second Accused. ¹⁴⁰ Some of the messages sent by Mr Jack Ng to these two numbers, were as follows: ¹⁴¹

59 That Mr Jack Ng had been sending such messages at all, was said to be telling that the accused persons were not only in control of the accounts. The verification work performed by the investigation officers showed that Mr Jack Ng had, in these messages, aggregated the total shares purchased in the eight Relevant Accounts under his management. In fact, he had also averaged the purchase price of multiple orders without either specifying the account in which the trades had been executed, or the specific prices at which the individual purchases had been made. ¹⁴² This, on the Prosecution’s case, stood in support of the conclusion that the accused persons were coordinating their control of the Relevant Accounts because, if they had not been, one would expect lines between the individual accounts – particularly for those accounts held by different accountholders – to matter.

60 I turn to the documents mentioned at [55] above. These included spreadsheets extracted from the accused persons’ electronic devices which recorded the shareholdings of various securities trading accounts, including several Relevant Accounts. I will refer to this generally, as the “Shareholding Schedule”, though I should note that there were various iterations of these spreadsheets uncovered during the investigations. ¹⁴³ These spreadsheets were not a perfect reflection of the complete list of Relevant Accounts and Relevant Accountholders. There were entries for trading accounts which did not form the subject matter of, nor were they relevant to, any of the charges. Conversely, there were Relevant Accounts which did not feature in them. Nevertheless, the Prosecution’s case was that, when viewed alongside the totality of the other strands of evidence, the Shareholding Schedule supported the inference that the accused persons had been coordinating their use of the Relevant Accounts.

61 The Shareholding Schedule captured the following information. The headings of the first three columns were: (a) “Name”; (b) “Broker”; and (c) “Statement Date”. In the rows under “Name”, there are entries such as “QSL” (ie, the Second Accused) and “GHC” (ie, Mr Goh HC). The rows under “Broker” recorded particular FIs with which the shares had been held. Some entries under this column also specified whether the shares held with a particular FI were “collateral”, “lock[ed] up”, or “trading”. The rows under “Statement Date” simply indicated the dates of the trading account statements from which the information was derived. The headings of the subsequent columns contained the names of the particular shares which the accused persons were allegedly tracking. This included Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold. The rows under each of these columns recorded a volume. For example, assuming the spreadsheet was correct, as at 19 March 2013, there were 18,422,000 Blumont shares in the Second Accused’s account with Julius Baer. ¹⁴⁴ The heading of the final column was liabilities. Although it was unclear the exact liabilities to which this was referring, the Prosecution suggested it could be inferred. Using the Second Accused’s Julius Baer account as a continuing example, the Shareholding Schedule indicated that as at 19 March 2013, the account had S$30,400,000 in liabilities. ¹⁴⁵ Referring to the relevant statements for this account showed that the account did indeed owe S$30,407,654.63 as at 21 March 2023, chiefly for “Advance Refunds”. ¹⁴⁶

62 The inclusion of these details in the spreadsheets – especially in light of the number of accountholders and accounts which featured – begged the question of why the accused persons were even interested in this information. This, on the Prosecution’s case, was most sensibly answered by the inference that the accused persons had been monitoring the BAL shareholdings they held through the various Relevant Accounts they had controlled. Such monitoring was essential for the accused persons to stay atop their highly complex scheme with so many moving parts and persons.

63 On the Prosecution’s full case, the accused persons’ coordinated use of the Relevant Accounts could be inferred from many more facts and pieces of evidence than set out above. I will return to them in greater detail when I turn to set out my findings on this issue at [728] below. For now, the three facets of coordination set out above adequately illustrate the manner in which the Prosecution set out to prove this aspect of its case.

64 I turn next to how the accused persons had allegedly financed the trading activity conducted in the Relevant Accounts. Such financing also allowed the Scheme to be scaled-up. Chiefly, the method the accused persons were said to have used was margin financing. Of the 131 Local Accounts, 40 were margin accounts. ¹⁴⁷ As regards the remaining 58 Foreign Accounts, 57 had been granted some kind of credit facilities. ¹⁴⁸ Margin financing was available for most of the Foreign Accounts, while short-term loans were granted in relation to some others. ¹⁴⁹

65 The quantum of financing provided to the accounts held with the foreign FIs, in particular, was extensive. Six such accounts formed the subject of the Cheating Charges – two held with Goldman Sachs and four with IB. Through these six accounts, cheated Goldman Sachs and IB were said to have been cheated of more than S$820 million (see [68] below).

66 To explain briefly, margin accounts are used to purchase shares using credit facilities granted on the value of shares provided to the FI as collateral. The acceptability of the shares proposed as collateral varied amongst FIs. For example, the representative who gave evidence on behalf of Maybank Kim Eng, ¹⁵⁰ Mr Kwek, ¹⁵¹ testified that prior to 2013, the Head of the FI’s Margin Department had the sole discretion to determine the shares which were marginable, taking into account considerations such as the market capitalisation of the shares, its liquidity, and volatility. Thereafter, the decision-making powers in respect of this function was conferred on a committee within Maybank Kim Eng. ¹⁵²

67 Further, not all marginable shares commanded the same loan-to-value ratio. Even in respect of the same share, this ratio also varied amongst FIs. That said, the actual ratios commanded by the shares pledged in the financed accounts were not essential to the case. What was more pertinent was whether the FIs had in fact financed those accounts. To prove this, the Prosecution relied on the FIs’ representatives’ evidence. I take, for example, the margin accounts held with AmFraser. Its representative, one Mr Tan SK, ¹⁵³ testified that as of 9 October 2013, 11 Relevant (margin) Accounts, each held in the name of a different accountholder, owed almost S$14 million. ¹⁵⁴

68 Representatives from the other FIs (with which financed Relevant Accounts had been held), gave evidence similar to that of Mr Tan SK. Most saliently, in respect of the two Relevant Accounts held with Goldman Sachs that formed the subject of two Cheating Charges (these being accounts held in the names of the Second Accused ¹⁵⁵ and Mr Hong), ¹⁵⁶ a representative of Goldman Sach – one Mr Moo ¹⁵⁷ – testified that, respectively, S$69.36 million and S$73.23 million in financing had been extended to those two accounts. In fact, these sums represented all the funds used to acquire shares as Mr Moo also gave evidence that the cash balances in these accounts had always been zero or negative. ¹⁵⁸ As regards the four IB accounts which formed the subject of the remaining Cheating Charges (these being accounts held in the names of the Second Accused, ¹⁵⁹ Mr Neo, ¹⁶⁰ Mr Tan BK, ¹⁶¹ and Mr Chen), ¹⁶² the representative for IB – one Ms Mary Ng ¹⁶³ – testified that a total amount of about S$815 million in financing had been furnished by IB during the Relevant Period. ¹⁶⁴ Respectively, S$200.73 million, S$232.16 million, S$117.68 million, and S$130.61 million in financing had been extended to those four accounts during the period of these four Cheating Charges which spanned 2 January 2013 to 3 October 2013. ¹⁶⁵

69 On the Prosecution’s case, the crucial issue which arose from the fact of such financing was whether the accused persons had been involved in the provision of collateral and, thus, the procuring of margin financing from these FIs. In their opening statement, it was said that the accused persons wanted to increase the attractiveness of BAL shares so that they could be pledged as collateral to obtain financing. This financing then allowed them to engage in further manipulative activities, which would, in turn, further increase the attractiveness of those shares as collateral, allowing them to obtain even more financing, and so on. This was characterised by the Prosecution as a “vicious cycle of deception, cheating, and market manipulation”. ¹⁶⁶ If, indeed, the accused persons had been involved in the procurement of such financing, the greater the extent of their involvement, the stronger the base of facts from which an inference can be drawn as regards the existence of the Scheme alleged.

70 Despite the fact that such financing was crucial to the operation of the Scheme on the Prosecution’s general case, it should be noted that they did not endeavour to address this issue comprehensively. By this, I mean that the Prosecution did not set out to prove that the accused persons had been involved in the obtaining of financing for each and every Relevant Account. In so far as the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were concerned, the extent of the accused persons’ involvement in the context of financing was but one part of the Prosecution’s case from which they invited the court to infer the accused persons’ Scheme.

71 In respect of the Cheating Charges, however, it was axiomatic that the Prosecution needed to prove its specific case that the accused persons had conspired to obtain financing from Goldman Sachs and IB in violation of s 420 of the Penal Code. In this regard, it was the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons had conspired to induce the provision of such financing by dishonestly concealing from Goldman Sachs and IB, the fact that they had been “engaging in a course of conduct, a purpose of which was to create a false appearance in the market” for BAL shares.

72 On this issue of inducement, however, it is pertinent to reiterate that the marginability and the loan-to-value ratio of a share were matters determined by the FI (see [66] above). Clients and third parties did not have input on these decisions, and, in that sense, they are unable (barring an allegation of there being some influence over the relevant decision-makers) to positively induce an FI to provide financing. The Prosecution therefore took the position that, rather than positively misrepresenting to Goldman Sachs and IB that BAL shares were not the subject of false trading or price manipulation, the accused persons had misrepresented this state of affairs by omission. ¹⁶⁷

73 I will return to this issue at [1117] below. For now, it suffices to state that the Prosecution’s factual case in respect of the six Cheating Charges turned on the fundamental question of whether the accused persons had controlled the six Relevant Accounts. The Prosecution said that in the context of their case, “the entire deception required that [the First Accused] conceal his involvement from the FIs completely, and that [the Second Accused] conceal her involvement in the accounts for which she was not an accountholder”. Thus, the accused persons would not have made personal representations to Goldman Sachs and IB that would have revealed their involvement. ¹⁶⁸ On the footing that the Relevant Accounts had been controlled by the accused persons, it was the Prosecution’s case that they had been actively involved in orchestrating and facilitating the deception of Goldman Sachs and IB. This evidenced their conspiracies to induce these FIs to deliver financing, ¹⁶⁹ which they were ultimately successful in doing.

74 Earlier in the Relevant Period, BAL shares were not widely marginable. Thus, to keep their capital needs to a minimum, it was the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons initially engaged in active contra trading using the cash accounts held with local FIs. ¹⁷⁰ It should be noted that of the total 131 Local Accounts, 91 were cash accounts. ¹⁷¹

75 When shares are purchased using a cash account, the accountholder is given a few days from the date of the trade (“T”) for settlement. During the Relevant Period, the SGX (and thus, the FIs) allowed settlement to be effected no later than five days after the day of the trade, ie, T+5. Settlement may be effected either by paying for or selling the shares. If the accountholder chooses to sell the shares by the end of the settlement period, this is known as a “contra trade”. Depending on whether the shares are sold at a price higher or lower than that at which they were bought, and after the deduction of commissions and transaction costs, the accountholder would either obtain or incur the difference as a contra profit or loss. Contra trading allegedly allowed the accused persons – in executing the Scheme – to trade in large volumes of BAL shares without needing to undertake the capital expense which would otherwise be necessary to purchase the shares. They needed only to incur commissions, transaction fees and contra losses (if any).

76 On the Prosecution’s case, by carrying out consistent “roll-over” contra trades, the accused persons were able to abuse the contra trading mechanism to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. Such artificial liquidity, in turn, had the effect of making BAL shares more attractive to genuine market participants. The involvement of real market participants would also help keep the shares on an upward trend which would also allow the accused persons to avoid contra losses that would have otherwise crippled a long-term market manipulation scheme premised heavily on contra trading. By way of an illustration, Mr Jack Ng gave evidence that the Second Accused was a “contra player”, and that she generally “rolled over her trades”: ¹⁷²

77 Contra trading was not, by itself, an illegitimate trading technique. That said, the accused persons were said to have abused it whilst also deploying other illegitimate trading techniques to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. ¹⁷³ This included, predominantly, “wash trading”.

78 A wash trade occurs when the two parties to the trade, the buyer and seller, are not acting as independent commercial parties but, rather, in concert by trading with each other. In such trades, apart from the commissions and transaction costs paid to the brokerage, no money genuinely exchanges hands. They thus do not reflect the actual demand for and supply of the security, and the trading volume generated as a result is artificial, representing false interest and activity. ¹⁷⁴ The Prosecution also suggested that wash trading enabled the accused persons to retain control of large amounts of BAL shares. ¹⁷⁵ This, in turn, also allowed them to use those shares as collateral in margin accounts to increase their overall trading capacity. ¹⁷⁶

79 To illustrate how the Relevant Accounts typically traded in BAL shares, I set out a simple sequence of trades. This sequence concerned the trading of Asiasons shares on 6 September 2013.

(a) Of interest were two buy orders (or “bids”) for 50,000 and 120,000 shares entered during pre-opening in the account of Mr Lim KY held with DMG & Partners. ¹⁷⁷ Both orders sat at the best bid of S$0.975. For context, this was one of two Relevant Accounts under the management of Mr Gan (see [39] above).

(b) By 11.09.00am, 11,000 of the bid for 50,000 had traded out against sell orders (or “asks”) of non-Relevant Accounts, ¹⁷⁸ but 17,000 had traded against a Relevant Account in the name of one Mr Lee CH, leaving a balance of 22,000 to be fulfilled. ¹⁷⁹ Mr Lee CH was an associate of the First Accused, whom he had known since the 1980s, ¹⁸⁰ and this particular account was one of 27 Relevant Accounts held with Phillip Securities under the management of Mr Tjoa.

(c) At 11.13.58am, this account of Mr Lee CH entered a new ask for 52,000 at the best bid of S$0.975. ¹⁸¹ This immediately traded out against the balance 22,000 bid of Mr Lim KY, ¹⁸² and the other 30,000 fulfilled part of Mr Lim KY’s bid for 120,000, leaving 90,000 to be fulfilled. ¹⁸³ Between 11.14.00am and 11.32.26am, a further 23,000 shares were sold from non-Relevant Accounts to Mr Lim KY’s account, leaving 67,000 to be fulfilled. ¹⁸⁴ At 11.34.03am, the account of Mr Lee CH entered yet another ask for 30,000 shares at the best bid. ¹⁸⁵ Again, this immediately traded against the 67,000 balance of Mr Lim KY’s bid, leaving 37,000 to be fulfilled. ¹⁸⁶ A further 6,000 shares were sold by other non-Relevant Accounts to Mr Lim KY’s account, leaving a balance of 31,000 which ultimately did not get fulfilled. ¹⁸⁷

80 Although this sequence of trades did not represent a perfect “wash”, as not every Asiasons share purchased by Mr Lim KY’s account had been sold by another Relevant Account, of the total 139,000 shares that did exchange hands (50,000 + 120,000 – 31,000), 99,000 had passed between Relevant Accounts. This represented 71.2% of the shares traded in this simple sequence. Indeed, on the basis that both accounts had been controlled by the accused persons, ¹⁸⁸ Professor Aitken, identified the two trades at 11.13.58am of 22,000 and 30,000 shares as wash trades. ¹⁸⁹

81 Apart from proving generally that the accused persons had controlled the Relevant Accounts, and, thus, that the BAL trades executed between them had been washed, the Prosecution also specifically matched communications records and various BAL orders and trades to demonstrate that the accused persons had acted in concert to wash trades between the Relevant Accounts. ¹⁹⁰ One sequence of trades identified by the Prosecution concerned Mr Leroy Lau. ¹⁹¹ On 7 December 2012, at 4.35.37pm, he entered a bid for 450,000 LionGold shares at S$1.07, at the time, one tick above the best bid of S$1.065. ¹⁹² Mr Leroy Lau’s bid for 450,000 shares was immediately executed against three asks already on the order book.

(a) The first of these three asks was for 300,000 LionGold shares at S$1.07, and had been entered at 4.20.55pm in the Relevant Account of Mr Lim FC ¹⁹³ held with Saxo. ¹⁹⁴ Before Mr Leroy Lau’s bid for 450,000 had been entered at 4.35.37pm, this ask had sold 202,000 shares to two other accounts: (i) 30,000 to the Relevant Account of Ms Yap SK ¹⁹⁵ held with Phillip Securities; ¹⁹⁶ and (ii) 172,000 to a non-Relevant Account. ¹⁹⁷ The balance of 98,000 of Mr Lim FC’s ask was then traded against Mr Leroy Lau’s bid. ¹⁹⁸

(b) The second ask, which was executed against Mr Leroy Lau’s bid, had also been entered in a Relevant Account – that of Mr Tan BK held with Saxo. This ask was for 200,000 shares at S$1.07, and it had been entered at 4.21.23pm. ¹⁹⁹ It remained unfulfilled until Mr Leroy Lau’s bid for 450,000 shares was entered around 14 minutes later, whereupon, it was instantly and fully executed against that bid. ²⁰⁰

(c) The third ask, which was executed against Mr Leroy Lau’s bid, had also been entered in a Relevant Account held with UOB Kay Hian in the name of Ms Lim SH. It was for 100,000 at S$1.07 and it had been entered at 4.29.55pm. ²⁰¹ As with the trade above, it had not been fulfilled until Mr Leroy Lau’s bid was entered at 4.35.37pm. It then traded out instantly against that bid. ²⁰²

82 For the next 20 minutes, the balance 52,000 of Mr Leroy Lau’s 450,000 bid sat untouched on the order book. Then, at 4.53pm, Mr Hong received a call from the 678 number which, on the Prosecution’s case, belonged to the First Accused (see [58] above and [197]–[198] below). ²⁰³ Shortly thereafter, at 4.56.11pm, an ask for 500,000 LionGold shares at S$1.07, one tick below the best ask of S$1.075, was then entered in one of Mr Hong’s Relevant Accounts held with Credit Suisse. ²⁰⁴ Immediately, 52,000 was executed against the remainder of Mr Leroy Lau’s bid. ²⁰⁵

83 All but 1,000 of Mr Hong’s balance ask of 448,000 was then traded against three bids entered by Relevant Accounts within the next minute and a half of his ask. These bids were preceded shortly by communications between the two accused persons and the relevant TRs.

(a) First, at 4.56.00pm, Mr Jordan Chew called the Second Accused for a minute or less. ²⁰⁶ At 4.57.15pm, a bid for 260,000 LionGold shares was then placed in a Relevant Account held with DMG & Partners in the name of one Mr Menon, ²⁰⁷ the Second Accused’s brother-in-law. ²⁰⁸ It instantly traded against Mr Hong’s ask. ²⁰⁹

(b) Second, at 4.57.28pm, a bid for 40,000 LionGold shares was entered in an account belonging to Mr Chen, also held with DMG & Partners under the management of Mr Jordan Chew. ²¹⁰ Once again, this bid instantly traded against Mr Hong’s ask. ²¹¹

(c) Lastly, at 4.57.03pm, a call was made from +60 123123611 (the “3611 number”) to Mr Kam, ²¹² a TR with AmFraser. ²¹³ This call lasted 17 seconds and, shortly thereafter, at 4.57.33pm, a bid for 150,000 LionGold shares was entered in one of Mr Goh HC’s Relevant Accounts held with AmFraser under Mr Kam’s management. ²¹⁴ Instantly, a trade for 147,000 shares was executed against Mr Hong’s ask. ²¹⁵

84 Several points about the foregoing sequence of calls and trades need to be highlighted. First, the three bids in Mr Menon, Mr Chen, and Mr Goh HC’s accounts were – somewhat unusually – entered at S$1.07, one tick above the best bid of S$1.065, at the best ask, thereby accounting, at least in part, for the instantaneity of these trades. Second, the 3611 number had been registered in Mr Chen’s name. ²¹⁶ However, on the Prosecution’s case, the First Accused was the individual who was actually using that number (on this, see [197]–[198] below). Third, the balance 1,000 of Mr Hong’s 500,000 ask was not executed against a bid entered by a Relevant Account. ²¹⁷ Lastly, the balance 3,000 of Mr Goh HC’s 150,000 bid was executed against an ask entered by Mr Leroy Lau for 250,000 at 4.57.29pm. ²¹⁸ This ask entered by Mr Leroy Lau, however, only traded 3,000 against Mr Goh HC’s bid, ²¹⁹ and a further 7,000 against a non-Relevant Account. ²²⁰ The remaining 240,000 of Mr Leroy Lau’s ask was not ultimately fulfilled.

85 Again, on the basis that these orders in the Relevant Accounts had been entered under the control of the accused persons, these trades would have been a wash. Indeed, beyond that general proposition, it was the Prosecution’s case that the proximity of calls, orders and trades, could not have been explained by pure coincidence. It was, instead, an instance of the accused persons using the Relevant Accounts in concert as discussed at [51]–[54] above.

86 I stated at [77] above that wash trading was the “predominant” practice the accused persons were said to have used to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares. There were others identified by Professor Aitken which included, for example, pre-arranged trading. ²²¹ At this point, however, there is no need to delve into how each of those practices operated. It can simply be stated that it was the Prosecution’s case that those other practices had, in fact, been used; and, alongside wash trading, those practices were said to have significantly inflated the liquidity of BAL shares. On the footing that the Relevant Accounts had been controlled by the accused persons and used to carry out BAL trades, the Prosecution suggested that they had been responsible for trading 1.15 billion Blumont shares for a part of the Relevant Period – 2 January to 3 October 2013. In relation to Asiasons and LionGold, the volumes attributed were 3.41 and 4.33 billion shares, respectively, for the entire Relevant Period. These volumes were said to have represented, respectively, 60%, 88%, and 90% of the total traded volume of each share during those periods. ²²² To be clear, these percentages do not only reflect the trading volume between the Relevant Accounts (ie, wash trades). They represent the extent of BAL trades executed in the Relevant Accounts, irrespective of whether the trades were washes.

87 Not all these trades made use of an illegitimate trading practice such as wash trading. That said, the wash trades were said to have constituted a high proportion of all the BAL trading activity carried out in the Relevant Accounts. Professor Aitken’s evidence was that, in respect of Blumont, wash trading had taken place on 170 of 190 trading days, accounting for an average of around 17% of the total volume of Blumont shares traded per day. ²²³ For Asiasons, wash trades were identified on every trading day during the Relevant Period, and accounted for a daily average of 45% of the total trading volume of Asiasons shares. ²²⁴ Finally, in respect of LionGold, wash trades were identified on all but one trading day of the Relevant Period, and accounted for an average of 48% of the total trading volume per day. ²²⁵ It was suggested by the Prosecution that these volumes of wash trading, when viewed alongside their case in respect of control and coordination, pointed clearly to the conclusion that the accused persons’ control and use of the Relevant Accounts had been applied to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares.

88 As with the practices they allegedly used to inflate the liquidity of BAL shares, the Prosecution suggested that the accused persons had also adopted a variety of practices to inflate the price of BAL shares. An illustrative example, as explained by Professor Aitken, was “aggressive trading”. ²²⁶

89 Professor Aitken sought to identify instances where a trader or traders caused the price of a share to move up by at least three ticks within a ten-minute period without testing the market. To elaborate, a price “tick” (also called a “step” or “pip”) is the minimum price by which a particular share could move. At that time, for shares trading at a price below S$2.00, the tick was half a cent, and for those trading above S$2.00, the tick was one cent. As regards the “without testing the market” requirement, Professor Aitken explained that, if a trader was interested in purchasing shares, he would normally “test the market’s interest by leaving a buy order at the best bid price [or lower] for a period of time”. The test trade allowed the trader to determine if there were any sellers willing to fulfil his bid at that “best bid” price or lower. Placing bids at price levels above the best bid would, of course, allow the bid to be fulfilled more quickly. However, Professor Aitken’s evidence was that, absent some information on which the trader was acting, professional traders usually “tr[ied] to avoid” moving share prices in this way as it would ultimately cost them or their clients more money.

90 A relevant example took place on 30 September 2013. Professor Aitken’s analysis showed that bids entered in the Relevant Accounts between 4.47.14pm and 4.48.03pm caused the price of Asiasons shares to move from S$2.76 to S$2.81, ie, five ticks. He cited this as an instance of aggressive trading, noting that there was no price-sensitive information on the day which could otherwise explain the movement. ²²⁷

91 In essence, at 4.47.14pm, the best ask was S$2.76, and in the queue to sell were 315,000 in asks entered by the Relevant Accounts. This volume of 315,000 comprised around 95% of the volume of asks at S$2.76. At this moment, a bid for 500,000 shares was placed at the best ask (rather than the best bid of S$2.75) in the account of Mr Tan BK held with IB. ²²⁸ This bid immediately initiated 23 trades which cleared out all sell orders at the best ask, ²²⁹ thus moving the best ask up by one tick to S$2.77. ²³⁰

92 At 4.47.27pm, this same account entered another bid for 100,000 shares at S$2.77. ²³¹ This bid initiated four trades and cleared all the sell orders sitting at this price level, thereby moving the best ask up again. ²³² One of these four trades, for 5,000 shares, was executed against an ask entered in the account of Mr Lim KY held with DMG & Partners. ²³³ This was one of two accounts under the management of Mr Gan. At 4.47.37pm, yet another bid was entered in Mr Tan BK’s account for 100,000 shares at S$2.78. ²³⁴ This bid initiated three trades and also cleared out all the asks sitting at S$2.78. ²³⁵ One of these three trades, for 10,000 shares, was executed against an ask entered in the same account of Mr Lim KY. ²³⁶ This trading pattern was carried out thrice more at 4.47.48pm to clear out the sell orders at S$2.79, ²³⁷ at 4.47.54pm for sell orders at S$2.80, ²³⁸ and finally, at 4.48.02pm, which caused Asiasons to hit the best ask of S$2.81. ²³⁹ These three bids were also placed in the IB account of Mr Tan BK and were all for 100,000 shares, though not all were wholly fulfilled.

93 Mr Tai did not specifically give evidence in respect of these trades executed in the IB account of Mr Tan BK under his management. While it was not inconceivable that real market participants might have traded in the manner described above, that was unlikely. Even examined superficially, the trades, identified by Professor Aitken to be an instance of aggressive trading, appeared systematically targeted at driving the price of Asiasons shares upwards. ²⁴⁰

94 Moreover, the Prosecution also relied on the direct evidence given by Mr Leroy Lau as to aggressive trading he had carried out for the accused persons in order to cause price hikes. In respect of LionGold, it is again useful to state Mr Leroy Lau’s evidence in full: ²⁴¹

95 The emphasised text concerns Mr Leroy Lau’s use of aggressive trading to drive the prices of BAL shares up. This lent context to similar trading activity seen at [91]–[92] above. Furthermore, on the Prosecution’s case, the context in which Mr Leroy Lau had explained why he sought to manipulate the prices of LionGold shares made sense as part of a broader scheme. Price hikes by themselves, devoid of any potential reason or explanation, tend to invite suspicion and regulatory inquiry. However, when applied in connection with corporate activity, such hikes are harder to identify as false. This segues to the next component of the Prosecution’s case.

96 As a starting point, it bears restating that the First Accused faced three charges for being concerned in the management of BAL whilst being an undischarged bankrupt (see [4(d)] above). Such involvement, the Prosecution said, enabled the First Accused to put the inflated liquidity and value of BAL shares – and, thus, the Scheme more generally – to a useful end. That was, to use those shares as “currency” for corporate deals carried out by BAL.

97 To establish this allegation, the Prosecution relied on, amongst other things, ²⁴³ the evidence of Mr Tai. Mr Tai gave evidence on the manipulation of Asiasons’ share prices in connection with Asiasons’ possible acquisition of an oil and gas exploration and production company called Black Elk. ²⁴⁴ It is meaningful for Mr Tai’s evidence to be set out: ²⁴⁵

98 The Black Elk deal did not ultimately go through. This was because of the Crash which took place less than a month after the incident described above. However, the fact of the brokered deal had been announced. On Mr Tai’s evidence, after the efforts to bring down the price of Asiasons shares, a trading halt was called from 13 to 16 September 2013. Upon the resumption of trading on 17 September 2013, Asiasons announced the Black Elk deal. The total consideration provided by Asiasons for the deal was approximately US$171.7 million, payable in the form of 94,642,712 new, ordinary Asiasons shares to be issued. ²⁴⁸ Thereafter, true to what Mr Tai testified he had been told by the First Accused, the share price of Asiasons went up. Mr Tai further said: ²⁴⁹

99 Mr Tai was partially correct in his assumption. It was not Mr Gan who had been “deliberately pushing up” prices but, rather Mr Leroy Lau. The evidence given by Mr Leroy Lau corroborated the observations made by Mr Tai with respect to the price hike. Mr Leroy Lau’s evidence was as follows: ²⁵⁰

100 The Prosecution also relied on other pieces of evidence to prove the accused persons’ broader plan. They do not need to be discussed at this juncture. The testimonies of Mr Tai and Mr Leroy Lau are sufficient to illustrate the Prosecution’s case in this regard.

101 I turn to the last component of the Prosecution’s case. That was the actions of the accused persons after the Crash in their efforts to deal with the fall out. Two sets of actions were salient.

102 First, as stated at [18] above, following the Crash, BAL’s share prices fell, respectively, to S$0.13, S$0.15, and S$0.25 on 7 October 2013. Their respective prices right before the Crash were S$1.895, S$2.65, and S$1.42. This resulted in substantial losses being incurred in the Relevant Accounts. The FIs, unsurprisingly, began turning to the Relevant Accountholders and TRs to recover these losses. As alluded to at [65]–[68] above, the losses suffered in financed margin accounts were particularly substantial. On the Prosecution’s case, the way the accused persons – particularly the First Accused – dealt with such losses, was highly revealing of the existence of their Scheme.

103 On the Prosecution’s case, the accused persons had made payment arrangements for the losses suffered in the Relevant Accounts. There was no reason for them to have undertaken such an immense responsibility unless they had been in control of the accounts and, thus, accountable to the Relevant Accountholders for their use. Once again, by way of example, Mr Jack Ng’s evidence was illustrative: ²⁵¹

104 Apart from the fact of the accused persons’ coverage of the losses suffered in the Relevant Accounts, the Prosecution also relied heavily on the manner in which they went about settling such losses. ²⁵² Mr Tai gave evidence that the First Accused had impersonated Mr Neo in a conversation with IB’s staff regarding the need for additional collateral to be topped up to Mr Neo’s IB account shortly after the Crash. ²⁵³ A recording ²⁵⁴ and a transcript thereof ²⁵⁵ served as clear evidence of the First Accused’s impersonation of Mr Neo in at least one engagement with IB. ²⁵⁶

105 The second set of actions was slightly further removed from the Crash. It was the Prosecution’s case that, after investigations had commenced, the First Accused had also taken systematic steps to tamper with the evidence of several key witnesses. ²⁵⁷ For example, Mr Tai gave evidence that the First Accused wished to avoid repaying the losses to IB. He thus asked Mr Tai to prepare a statement to assist the Relevant Accountholders in denying liability for the losses incurred in their accounts. That statement was to allege that one Mr Swanson, ²⁵⁸ an officer of IB who worked in its institutional sales department, with whom Mr Tai had fairly extensive dealings, had asked Mr Tai to “churn” the accounts in order to generate volume and, thus, commissions. ²⁵⁹ Mr Tai agreed to do so and even filed a false statutory declaration making statements to this effect. ²⁶⁰

106 As would have been gathered from the fact that the First Accused faced eight Witness Tampering Charges (see [4(e)] above), this was not the only instance of witness tampering in which the First Accused was said to have been involved. I will address the others from [1197] below. For now, it suffices to state that it was an important part of the Prosecution’s case that the First Accused had tampered with witnesses. Considered alongside the six other components of their case, the Prosecution urged me to conclude that their general thesis, as well as the specific charges which had been brought – on the totality of the evidence adduced – was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

107 On that note, and before I turn to set out the Defence’s case, it is useful to set out the broad categories of evidence relied on by the Prosecution in support of their case as a whole. Some of these have already been alluded to above in describing the various components of the Prosecution’s case. There were seven: (a) the direct oral evidence of witnesses, including Relevant Accountholders, TRs, intermediaries; (b) the communication records, which included recorded calls, messages, and emails exchanged between relevant persons in this case; (c) the spreadsheets and other documentary records which indicated the accused persons’ control and coordination of the Relevant Accounts; (d) the investigative work carried out by the CAD in relation to some of the spreadsheets, documentary records and other information; (e) the raw trading data of BAL shares obtained from the SGX; (f) certain analytical work carried out by Ms Gao ²⁶¹ of the Government Technology Agency (“GovTech”); and (g) the evidence of the two Prosecution expert witnesses, Professor Aitken and Mr Ellison (see [6] above). I explain each category in turn.

108 First, the direct oral evidence of Relevant Accountholders, TRs, and intermediaries, amongst others. This category is self-explanatory. It simply bears repeating that out of 95 witnesses of fact, 85 witnesses gave evidence by way of conditioned statements. It should also be highlighted in this connection that, in her written closing submissions, ²⁶² the Second Accused alleged that the Prosecution had misconducted themselves by using “prepared” witness statements for several witnesses: Mr Andy Lee, ²⁶³ Mr Jack Ng, Mr Gan, and Mr Thurnham. ²⁶⁴ I address her allegations substantively from [1469] below. But at this point, it is enough to state that I rejected her assertions. Thus, the oral evidence of the witnesses, which included their conditioned statements (s 264(1) of the CPC), was assessed in the ordinary manner.

109 Second, communication records, which included recorded calls, messages, and emails exchanged between relevant persons in this case. Of particular relevance were those between the accused persons and the TRs and intermediaries. Not long after the Crash – in April 2014 – the CAD seized more than 20 electronic devices from various persons important in this matter, including the two accused persons. ²⁶⁵ Work was then carried out by officers in the TCFB to extract documents and communication records. ²⁶⁶ Steps were also taken to obtain the mobile phone numbers belonging to ²⁶⁷ and call records ²⁶⁸ of various persons important in this matter. ²⁶⁹ Given the length of the Relevant Period, however, such communication records were by no means “complete” in that they did not reflect every electronic exchange between and amongst the accused persons as well as every other relevant character. That said, the records that were obtained – particularly written messages – were critical and formed an objective, even if not perfect, foundation on which the investigation appeared to be built.

110 As an illustration, the investigators seized a BlackBerry mobile phone from the First Accused. ²⁷⁰ From this device, TCFB managed to extract a fairly large number of messages and emails. ²⁷¹ This included 109 messages exchanged between the First Accused and one Mr Alex Chew, ²⁷² a TR with DMG & Partners. In the thick of the Relevant Period, on 4 April 2013, the First Accused and Mr Alex Chew had the following exchange: ²⁷³

Other salient communications will be set out throughout these grounds as and when it is relevant and necessary to do so.

111 Third, spreadsheets and other documentary records which indicated the accused persons’ control and coordination of the Relevant Accounts. For example, a crucial document I introduced at [60] above was the Shareholding Schedule. Another vital spreadsheet was one maintained by Mr Goh HC which appeared to monitor the payment of contra losses (“Mr Goh HC’s Spreadsheet”). Other salient documents that bore on my decision will be referred to throughout these grounds as necessary.

112 Fourth, the investigative work carried out by the CAD in relation to some of the spreadsheets, documentary records and other information. The investigators had, to a degree, verified key spreadsheets and documents that were uncovered during the investigation. For example, in respect of Mr Goh HC’s Spreadsheet, work was done – to the extent possible – to ascertain the specific contra losses being recorded, as well as the bank accounts from and to which payments of such losses were being made. ²⁷⁴ Another example of such verification work was that done to confirm the trades being amalgamated in the trade reports provided by certain TRs. ²⁷⁵ I have alluded to the existence of such evidence at [58]–[59] above.

113 In general, such work lent greater context to the underlying spreadsheets, documents, or communications being examined and verified. Consequently, the work performed also increased the confidence I had in the accuracy of those underlying spreadsheets, documents, or communications.

114 Fifth, the raw trading data of BAL shares obtained from the SGX. Such trading data does not require substantial explanation. In short, they were densely populated spreadsheets which reflected the entire universe of orders, amendments and deletions which were placed, as well as trades executed, during the Relevant Period. There were separate spreadsheets for each of the three counters, ie, Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold.

115 The sixth category of evidence – the utility of which was fiercely contested – was certain analytical work carried out by Ms Gao of GovTech in respect of the BAL trading data as well as telecommunications records of the accused persons, Relevant Accountholders, TRs, intermediaries, amongst other relevant persons (the “GovTech Evidence”). ²⁷⁶ Broadly, the GovTech Evidence comprised four components.

(a) First, there were compilations of the telecommunications records of the accused persons, Relevant Accountholders, and TRs. These compilations captured both: (i) individual instances of phone communications which took place between the accused persons, Relevant Accountholders, and TRs; ²⁷⁷ and (ii) the aggregate number of phone communications the accused persons had with the TRs and intermediaries. ²⁷⁸ To be clear, phone communications included both calls and SMS messages, but an inherent limitation was that “communications via WhatsApp, Blackberry Messenger, and any other similar application sent and received over 4G, WiFi or any data network, [could not] be specifically identified in [the telecommunications companies’] records, and [were] therefore not captured by the [analysis]”. ²⁷⁹

(b) Second, there was an analysis of the telecommunications records between the accused persons on one end, and the TRs and intermediaries on the other. Such telecommunications records were analysed alongside the BAL trading data to determine whether (and to what extent) there had been communications between the accused persons and TRs or intermediaries shortly preceding the placement of BAL orders in the Relevant Accounts (ie, “proximate communications”). ²⁸⁰ I refer to these data sets collectively as the “Accused Persons’ Analysis”.

(c) Third, a similar exercise was carried out in order to determine whether (and to what extent) there were proximate communications between the Relevant Accountholders and the TRs or intermediaries. ²⁸¹ I refer to this as the “Authorised Persons’ Analysis”. This served both to contrast and complement the Accused Persons’ Analysis. For example, with respect to Mr Chen’s AmFraser account managed by the TR, Mr Kam, the Authorised Persons’ Analysis showed that there were no proximate calls which preceded BAL orders for the entire Relevant Period. ²⁸² By contrast, the Accused Persons’ Analysis showed that, for the whole Relevant Period, there were 423 proximate calls which preceded BAL orders placed in Mr Chen’s AmFraser account. ²⁸³

(d) Fourth, there was also a spreadsheet which consolidated the instances of trading activity in the Relevant Accounts which were preceded by proximate communications between the accused persons and the relevant TR. In essence, this spreadsheet contained rows of trading data, similar to that seen in the SGX exhibits mentioned at [114] above; however, the rows of trading data here only included those which had been preceded by a proximate communication between the accused persons and the relevant TR. ²⁸⁴

116 Although this category of evidence was generally useful, I should state that there were situations which produced some difficulty in terms of whether such evidence should be regarded as corroborative of the Prosecution’s case, neutral, or exculpatory of the accused persons. Simply put, there were instances in which the GovTech Evidence contradicted the primary evidence given by the TRs or Relevant Accountholders, or, even the Prosecution’s own case. In these instances, it needed to be determined whether the contradiction was of such extent and character that it called into question the veracity of the primary evidence given by the witnesses (as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom); or, whether the primary evidence could accommodate a reasonable explanation of the contradiction. Connectedly, if the witnesses’ primary evidence could not accommodate a reasonable explanation for the contradiction with the GovTech Evidence but, yet, was otherwise credible, the question that then arose was whether that called into question the reliability of the GovTech Evidence itself.

117 The Defence submitted that, even if the GovTech Evidence was consistent with the principal evidence given by a particular witness, it did not possess any corroborative value because it rested on fundamentally flawed premises. ²⁸⁵ Chief amongst these was the fact that the mere proximity of a communication to a BAL trade order – without any additional information about the contents of that communication – could not establish a causal connection between the communication and the trade order entered. ²⁸⁶ Alternatively, if it was accepted that proximate communications indicated the giving of trading instructions, then, in the absence of proximate communications on particular days, it followed that no trading instructions had been given (the Defence referred to these as “Clear Days”, and I will refer to this as the “Clear Days Argument”). ²⁸⁷

118 Other criticisms of the GovTech Evidence included the following.

(a) First, notwithstanding the strong assumption the GovTech Evidence was essentially making that proximate communications amounted to the giving of trade instructions, it made no allowances for error, coincidence, or innocent explanations. ²⁸⁸

(b) Second, the GovTech Evidence chose to adopt a fairly long five-minute window for the identification of proximate communications between the accused persons and TRs, and an even longer ten-minute window between the accused persons and intermediaries. ²⁸⁹ This window was adopted despite there being clear evidence that most, if not all TRs, would only take around one minute to enter an order. ²⁹⁰ This unduly long window expanded the net of proximate communication “hits”. ²⁹¹

(c) Third, the GovTech Evidence was also occasionally contradictory to the primary evidence. For example, the Accused Persons’ Analysis conducted in relation to Mr Leroy Lau reflected a substantial number of proximate communications. However, Mr Leroy Lau’s own evidence was that the First Accused generally had not given him specific trading instructions, but, instead, a general objective to meet. This showed that proximate communication “hits”, contrary to the implicit suggestion made by the GovTech Evidence, did not necessarily reflect trading instructions. ²⁹²

(d) Fourth, the telecommunications data used in the preparation of the GovTech Evidence did not include alternative mobile phones of crucial actors. For example, these included the disposable phones used by individuals such as Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa. ²⁹³ Such omissions were problematic as some of these individuals gave evidence that they specifically used disposable phones to make it “more difficult for [the authorities] to trace any calls or messages” from them. ²⁹⁴

(e) Fifth, the Accused Persons’ Analysis included instances of proximate communications which were initiated by TRs with the accused persons. If the accused persons had in fact been controlling the Relevant Accounts and giving the TRs trading instructions, they should have initiated contact with the TRs. Yet, the GovTech Evidence failed to take this into consideration. ²⁹⁵

(f) Sixth, the GovTech Evidence also counted a substantial number of text messages as proximate communications between the accused persons and TRs or intermediaries. However, if the accused persons had, in fact, been coordinating their control of the Relevant Accounts to manipulate the market for BAL shares, such coordination would naturally have been time-sensitive and, accordingly, the use of calls would have been necessary. The use of text messages thus did not cohere with the Prosecution’s picture of coordination. ²⁹⁶

119 While none of the Defence’s criticisms was unfounded, the conclusion I was urged to reach – that the GovTech Evidence was therefore of no probative value at all – was somewhat overstated. In my judgment, though the GovTech Evidence did not possess any clear primary evidential value, it had corroborative value. This was particularly so where the data was meaningfully contextualised by primary descriptions of the relationships between the accused persons, the TRs, and the Relevant Accountholders.

120 Further, I also did not think that the extent of the Defence’s critique of the GovTech Evidence was ultimately necessary. The Prosecution did not take the position that the GovTech Evidence was a perfect data set, or that its premises could account for each and every situation. Indeed, Ms Sheryl Tan specifically highlighted various limitations which she assessed “may [have] work[ed] in favour of the accused persons”. ²⁹⁷ Put simply, the Prosecution did not – in my view – seek to elevate the GovTech Evidence beyond what it was. The Prosecution did not rely on the GovTech Evidence as a first port-of-call. The starting point was always the primary evidence given by the witnesses, supported by the objective documentary records. The GovTech Evidence typically came in only after that point (though, there were exceptions to this; the most notable of which concerned the single Relevant Account managed by TR Mr Yong: see [479]–[493] below). In that sense, there was almost always something against which the GovTech Evidence could be “tested”. On the occasions that contradictions arose between the primary evidence and the GovTech Evidence (eg, on the Defence’s Clear Days Argument), such contradictions simply engaged a need for careful scrutiny of the latter. It did not, as the Defence suggested, ²⁹⁸ necessitate disregarding the GovTech Evidence entirely.

121 Finally, the last category of the evidence relied on by the Prosecution was that of their two experts. As mentioned at [6] above, Professor Aitken is the market surveillance expert, and he gave evidence, inter alia, on the effects produced by the BAL trading activity carried out in the Relevant Accounts. The valuation expert, Mr Ellison, gave evidence on the “actual” value of BAL. In summary, Professor Aitken’s analysis suggested that, if the Relevant Accounts were indeed under the control of a single actor or group of actors working in concert, those accounts had, in fact, been used to perpetuate false trading and price manipulation. ²⁹⁹ As regards Mr Ellison, his evidence was that, on 3 October 2013 (right before the Crash), Blumont, Asiasons and LionGold’s shares were, respectively, 30.1, 15.1 and 4.6 times overvalued. ³⁰⁰ I will set out their evidence in greater detail, respectively, at [778] and [826] below.

122 The main through line which ran through the Defence’s case was the accused persons’ denial that they had been in control of any of the 189 Relevant Accounts. This denial manifested in both positive and negative positions they took against the Prosecution’s case and evidence.

(a) For example, a positive position taken by the Defence was that, if the markets for and prices of BAL shares had in fact been manipulated, the true wrongdoers were Mr Gwee, Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, Mr Wong XY, and “possibly others”. ³⁰¹ Excluding the possible but unnamed wrongdoers, it was said that these individuals had, between them, control and use of around 90 Relevant Accounts which they used to carry out illegal activities without the knowledge or involvement of the accused persons. Indeed, on the analysis of the Defence’s expert, Mr White, these accounts were responsible for most of the BAL trading activity which the Prosecution sought to impugn. ³⁰²

(b) Another example of a positive explanation given by the Defence in respect of the issue of “control”, was that the First Accused had been promoting LionGold shares to the TRs. This accounted for the volume of communications between himself and many TRs, on which the Prosecution placed “heavy reliance” to establish control. ³⁰³ Connectedly, the First Accused had also helped to facilitate the trading activities of certain Relevant Accounts – namely, those of his family members as well as close associates – by relaying trading instructions and arranging for the payment of losses suffered in their accounts. This was not an exercise of control over their accounts. ³⁰⁴

(c) An example of a negative position taken by the Defence was the fact that most of the Relevant Accountholders were high net-worth individuals and “people of substance”. In fact, many of them were said to have been “far more established and successful” than the First Accused. Accordingly, these persons “could not possibly” have agreed to be the accused persons’ nominees. ³⁰⁵

(d) Another example of a negative position taken by the Defence against the Prosecution’s case was as follows. Beyond their averment that the persons such as Mr Tai, Mr Gan, etc, were the actual wrongdoers (see [122(a)] above), the accused persons also challenged the allegations made by other TRs that they had given trading instructions in respect of the remaining Relevant Accounts (ie, those which were not under the management of Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, or Mr Wong XY). For example, this included TRs such as Mr Ong KC whose evidence was stated at [41]–[43] above. As regards these TRs, the Defence’s case was that the Prosecution had failed to discharge their burden of proof on account of the witnesses’ lack of credibility, the problems with the GovTech Evidence, amongst other issues. ³⁰⁶

123 Examples such as these, however, do not capture the full breadth of the Defence’s case. Much like the Prosecution’s case, which was characterised by a substantial degree of diversity and granularity – especially in relation to how each of the Relevant Accounts had allegedly been controlled – the case for the Defence was also fairly granular. Here, I endeavour to capture the vital strands of the Defence’s case without setting out too much inundating detail. Those details will be considered when I set out my substantive analysis from [156] below.

124 The Defence’s case generally targeted each of the five groups of charges separately (see [4] above). Accordingly, I set out their case as such. Before doing so, however, I ought to reiterate that the Second Accused elected not to give evidence or call any witness to her defence. A fuller discussion about the impact of her course of action is set out at [285]–[287] below. As stated at [6], only two witnesses gave evidence for the Defence – the First Accused and Mr White. As I will explain, the First Accused’s evidence chiefly revolved around giving context to the associations he had with the many individuals and companies which featured in this matter, and explanations of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution against himself and the Second Accused. In providing those explanations, the First Accused generally took positions which were consistent with the Second Accused’s interests. Simply put, this was not a case which involved a cut-throat defence. Accordingly, when I use the phrase “Defence’s case” (or any variation thereof), it generally refers to the submissions made by both accused persons, even though it only encompasses the evidence adduced by the First Accused and Mr White.

125 The Defence’s case in respect of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges comprised five key strands.

(a) First, these ten charges did not contain sufficient particulars and, as a consequence, the Defence was unable to adequately understand and meet the Prosecution’s case. ³⁰⁷

(b) Second, the accused persons did not control the accounts under the management of Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, and Mr Wong XY, and they were the true wrongdoers. ³⁰⁸

(c) Third, the accused persons did not control the other accounts, and the evidence adduced by the Prosecution failed to establish otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. ³⁰⁹

(d) Fourth, the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons had masterminded the Scheme, and entered into the precise conspiracies which formed the subject of these ten charges. ³¹⁰

(e) Finally, the accused persons were not the cause of the Crash. Instead, it had been brought about by other actors in the market including Goldman Sachs and the SGX itself. ³¹¹

126 In essence, the Defence submitted that the Prosecution took a “blunderbuss” ³¹² approach in framing the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges as they did. By way of example, Charge 1 – which pertained to an alleged conspiracy to manipulate the market for Blumont shares – read:

127 The most pertinent objections to the form of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were threefold.

(a) First, by framing the charges so broadly, the Prosecution failed to identify the specific dates, accounts, and market activity which went towards making out each charge. ³¹³ By this submission, I understood the Defence to mean that the Prosecution did not give details such as those I set out in the following segment to a hypothetical charge: “… which acts involved controlling [name specific accounts involved in the market activity being impugned] on [state date range] for carrying out [state market activity being impugned, for example, wash trading carried out on particular dates] of Blumont securities”. Without details such as these, the Defence argued, the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges could not be met.

(b) Second, the Defence had asked the Prosecution on multiple occasions to particularise the charges but was met with the response that it was not necessary for them to do so. Instead, the Prosecution “insisted that every charge include[d] all the [Relevant] Accounts”, which was not and could not be true as the evidence adduced eventually showed. Moreover, the Prosecution could not be allowed to “reverse-engineer” the charges from the evidence ultimately adduced at trial because the accused persons needed, in the first place, to have clear notice of how such evidence related to the specific False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges that had been brought. ³¹⁴

(c) Third, the imprecise approach taken by the Prosecution prevented the court from adopting a “mathematical approach” for determining whether the impugned transactions in the Relevant Accounts, apparently controlled by the accused persons, constituted false trading or market rigging contrary to s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. ³¹⁵

128 Resting on these objections, the Defence essentially submitted that the Prosecution could not have its cake and eat it too. As the Prosecution preferred to take a “global view”, it followed that they could only secure a conviction on the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges if they could make out their entire case. That was, that the accused persons had controlled each and every Relevant Account, and that each and every Relevant Account had been put towards the alleged Scheme. However, if the Prosecution failed in part of the case, then they failed in the whole of the case. ³¹⁶ I set out and deal with the Defence’s arguments in greater detail from [180]–[190] below.

129 By this strand of the Defence’s case, it was contended that the Prosecution erred in concluding that the accused persons had been the ones who controlled the Relevant Accounts in order to perpetuate their alleged Scheme. Instead, the reality was that the bulk of the trading activity carried out in all 189 accounts could be traced to accounts under the management of a few individuals – namely, Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, and Mr Wong XY. ³¹⁷ Indeed, Mr White gave evidence that, on his analysis, the accounts managed by these individuals were responsible for approximately 75% of the BAL trading volume amongst the Relevant Accounts, and, around 47% of the BAL trading volume across the entire market, for the whole Relevant Period. ³¹⁸

130 These individuals fell within three groups:

(a) The first group comprised Mr Gwee, Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa. At the trial, they were called the “Manhattan House Group” because, sometime in 2013, they began working out of an office in Manhattan House, a building along Chin Swee Road, Singapore. ³¹⁹ Collectively, Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa managed around 90 Relevant Accounts as TRs (in the case of Mr Gan and Mr Tjoa) and as an intermediary (in the case of Mr Tai). The BAL trades executed in the accounts under their management represented 30.02% of the total trades carried out in the market for the entire Relevant Period. ³²⁰ Mr Gwee, the de facto leader of the group, was not himself the holder of any Relevant Account which formed the subject of the False Trading, Price Manipulation, or Deception Charges. However, his personal accounts had been used to trade with those under Mr Tai, Mr Gan and Mr Tjoa’s management. The Defence’s case in respect of the Manhattan House Group was, generally, that they had coordinated and executed wash trades amongst themselves. This was done without the knowledge or involvement of the accused persons and with the goal of “churning” trades in order to earn commissions. ³²¹ The suggestion was also made that the group had acted for Mr Gwee’s benefit, allowing him to trade with the Relevant Accounts under Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa’s management in a manner which allowed him to earn around S$50 million in profit from BAL trades alone. ³²² That such quantum of profits had been earned by Mr Gwee is a point confirmed by the lead CAD investigator, Ms Sheryl Tan. ³²³

(b) The second group comprised just one individual, Mr Leroy Lau. Mr Leroy Lau was a remisier with DMG & Partners. However, unlike the other TRs featured in this case, he was a day trader who operated his own trading account with substantial trading limits. On his own evidence, he traded in “very large quantities”, and there were days on which the total value of his executed trades fell within the range of S$200 million to S$300 million”. ³²⁴ This was supported by the evidence of Mr White, who testified that Mr Leroy Lau’s single Relevant Account had been responsible for 17% of the BAL trades carried out in the entire market across the whole Relevant Period. ³²⁵ The Defence’s general case in respect of Mr Leroy Lau was that he had acted independently of the accused persons, and that they should not be held liable for his conduct. He was “not someone who could be controlled”. ³²⁶ Moreover, the manner in which he traded was “so fast-paced and so complex that it would have been impossible for anyone to instruct or control him” within the framework of the Scheme alleged by the Prosecution. ³²⁷

(c) The third group also comprised just one individual, who was Mr Wong XY. It was mentioned at [44] above that he was a TR with AmFraser who had, under his management, a total of 29 Relevant Accounts belonging to 19 accountholders. Although the scale of his BAL trading activity was not as substantial as that of the Manhattan House Group or Mr Leroy Lau, the trades he had executed in the accounts under his management still represented 1.42% of the total volume of BAL trades executed in the entire market, for the duration of the Relevant Period. ³²⁸ This was not insubstantial. Indeed, on Mr Wong XY’s own evidence, he earned around S$1 million in commissions in 2012 and 2013. ³²⁹ It was on this footing that the Defence advanced the broad case that Mr Wong XY was a TR who had wrongfully traded in the accounts he managed in order to generate commissions for his own benefit. And, when the chance arose, he opportunistically and “conveniently pinned the blame on the accused persons”. ³³⁰

131 To persuade the court that these other individuals were the true wrongdoers in terms of having manipulated the markets for and prices of BAL shares, the Defence’s general approach was to challenge the cogency and credibility of the accounts they gave incriminating the accused persons. Indeed, in respect of Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa, the Defence took out impeachment applications. Such challenges were mounted on various grounds. For example, by: (a) highlighting inconsistencies between the accounts given by those actors and the objective evidence; (b) highlighting inconsistencies between the accounts given by those actors; (c) questioning the intentions of those actors in incriminating the accused persons; and (d) pointing out gaps in the objective evidence adduced by the Prosecution to support the accounts of these witnesses of allegedly dubious credibility.

132 The case against Mr Tai is illustrative of these grounds of challenge.

(a) There were inconsistencies between Mr Tai’s account and the objective evidence. Mr Tai testified that, apart from the periods during which the accused persons had delegated their BAL “market operations” ³³¹ to him (see [35(b)] and [39] above), they would have given him specific instructions as to what BAL orders he was to enter in the IB and Saxo accounts under his management. ³³² However, such evidence was not consistent with the objective evidence in this regard. For example, it was Mr Tai’s evidence that the accused persons had delegated the task of coordinating Asiasons trades in July and August 2013. ³³³ Outside this period, on 19 February 2013, numerous IB and Saxo accounts under Mr Tai’s management had entered orders to purchase more than 3,300,000 Asiasons shares. ³³⁴ On the other side of the order book, the IB and Saxo accounts had also sold around 5,000,000 Asiasons shares. ³³⁵ On Mr Tai’s own evidence, the accused persons should have instructed him in respect of these orders – specifically, where Asiasons was concerned, Mr Tai stated it would have been the First Accused. ³³⁶ However, when confronted with the fact that he had not received any calls from the First Accused, ³³⁷ Mr Tai accepted that the First Accused had not instructed him to place these orders, whether by phone or through Blackberry messages, and it was “unlikely” that the Second Accused had done so either. ³³⁸ Instead, he dialled back his position and stated that – between October 2012 to around February or March 2013 – the orders placed for Asiasons shares could also have been instructed by either Mr Gwee or Mr Leroy Lau when the First Accused was “not free”. ³³⁹ The Defence relied on this, ³⁴⁰ amongst other suggested inconsistencies ³⁴¹ to make the general point that Mr Tai was not a witness of credit.

(b) There were inconsistencies between Mr Tai’s account and those of other actors. Mr Tai testified that the accused persons had delegated their “market operations” to Mr Tai and Mr Gan for specific periods. In respect of Blumont, that period was said to have been from late-August until September 2013. ³⁴² As regards Asiasons, the period was said to have been July and August 2013. ³⁴³ And for LionGold, the period was said to have been from mid-March until early April 2013. ³⁴⁴ Mr Tai gave evidence that, outside these periods, he had not given trading instructions to others to coordinate “market operations”, and he would have acted on the First or Second Accused’s trading instructions. However, contrary to this, Mr Tjoa’s assistant, Mr Yip, ³⁴⁵ gave evidence that Mr Tai had called him to give trading instructions from as early as July 2012, before the Relevant Period. Mr Yip stated that Mr Tai initially probably gave such instructions around once a week. However, this rate “increased significantly” around January 2013. ³⁴⁶ This fell outside the alleged periods of delegation and, on the Defence’s case, this supported the inference that Mr Tai had concocted the delegation of “market operations” to explain periods during which the IB and Saxo accounts traded high volumes of BAL shares without communications with the accused persons to whom instructions could be attributed. ³⁴⁷

(c) Mr Tai’s motive for giving evidence against the accused persons was corrupt. It was said that Mr Tai had carried out BAL trades in the Saxo and IB accounts under his management in order to generate commissions and, effectively, cheat the Relevant Accountholders for his own benefit. In support of this, the Defence relied on Mr Tai’s admission that he had conducted “ping-pong” trades with the accounts under Mr Tjoa’s management. That was, essentially, rolling back-and-forth contra trades between the two sets of accounts which did nothing for the accountholders other than cause them to incur transaction costs. Those costs, in turn, benefitted Mr Tai and Mr Tjoa. Mr Tai also admitted that he had been responsible for other forms of illicit trading activity to generate commissions. ³⁴⁸ In light of Mr Tai’s own wrongdoing, the Defence submitted that it could be surmised that his motive in incriminating the accused persons was to shift blame away from himself and other members of the Manhattan House Group. Thus, his evidence should not be given weight or, at most, little weight. ³⁴⁹

(d) There were gaps in the Prosecution’s evidence. As stated at [132(a)] above, Mr Tai testified that, outside the periods during which the accused persons had allegedly delegated “market operations” to him, he would receive specific instructions from them as to the BAL trades he was to execute in the IB and Saxo accounts under his management. Yet, despite Mr Tai’s evidence that most of these instructions would have been conveyed through calls or Blackberry messages, ³⁵⁰ the Prosecution did not adduce any such messages. This was notwithstanding the fact that the CAD had managed to “recover thousands of [Blackberry messages] between the accused persons and other parties”. Given this gap, the Defence submitted that the “only logical conclusion” was that there were, in truth, no such messages, and certainly none which would have been able to support the claims made by Mr Tai. ³⁵¹

133 Submissions of a similar nature were made vis-à-vis Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, and Mr Wong XY. As Mr Gwee did not have any Relevant Accounts under his management (unlike the other three members of the Manhattan House Group), the arguments advanced against him were distinct but, nevertheless, connected. I have set out and dealt with the Defence’s submissions in respect of these three groups in greater detail below (in respect of the Manhattan House Group, see [648]–[726]; in respect of Mr Leroy Lau, see [308]–[322]; and in respect of Mr Wong XY, see [444]–[478]).

134 At this juncture, it suffices to state that on the footing that the Relevant Accounts which had been managed by Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, and Mr Wong XY had not been controlled by the accused persons, the Defence argued that there was not enough to establish the conspiracies alleged by the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. Take for example, Charge 1 reproduced at [126] above; it was highlighted by the Defence that the most significant party who traded in Blumont shares between 2 January and 15 March 2013 was Mr Leroy Lau. Of the total 1,474,984,000 Blumont shares that had been traded during this period, he was responsible for 307,222,000 (or 20.8%). ³⁵² Thus, if there was reasonable doubt that Mr Leroy Lau had been acting on the accused persons’ instructions, but, rather, in pursuance of his own day-trading strategies, the accused persons ought to be acquitted of this particular charge. ³⁵³ Similar arguments were advanced with respect to the other nine False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. ³⁵⁴

135 Turning to the remaining Relevant Accounts (other than those managed by Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa, Mr Leroy Lau, and Mr Wong XY), it was also the Defence’s case that the Prosecution had failed to prove control of them. The Defence sought to demonstrate the weaknesses in the Prosecution’s case through various means. Two examples were stated at [122(c)] and [122(d)] above. As the arguments raised in this connection were highly dependent on each particular Relevant Account, I will return to them when I turn to the issue of control at [194] below.

136 The fourth strand of the Defence’s arguments against the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges was that the Prosecution did not satisfactorily establish that the accused persons “masterminded” the Scheme alleged. That the accused persons had not masterminded the Scheme and, therefore, had not entered into the conspiracies forming the subject of the charges was particularly evident from two matters.

(a) First, the fact that the accused persons had themselves suffered millions in losses as a consequence of the Crash. ³⁵⁵ I understood this argument to be that it was not logical to suggest that the accused persons had entered into conspiracies which ultimately caused harm to themselves. To accept such a conclusion would be to illogically conclude that they had conspired against their own interests.

(b) Second, Blumont, Asiasons, and LionGold had been, during the Relevant Period, companies of genuine value. Their shares do not “fit the bill of manipulated shares”. ³⁵⁶ The import of this point was that it was not logical for the accused persons to have conspired to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares when there was no need for them to do so. The companies could and would have risen in value.

137 I address the first argument when I draw all my findings together in respect of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges at [889]–[894] below. However, as regards the contention that BAL were companies of “genuine value”, that is an issue I address from [826]–[844] below when discussing the expert evidence of Mr Ellison.

138 As alluded to at [19] above, it was the Defence’s case that they did not cause the Crash. Primarily, of course, this position was premised on their very denial of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. If the Defence had succeeded in that regard, it logically followed that the accused persons could not be said to have “caused” the Crash. ³⁵⁷ However, the Defence’s argument went beyond that. I understood their submission to be that, even if the accused persons were convicted of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges, they were nevertheless not the cause of the Crash because they had not done anything to trigger it. ³⁵⁸ Instead, there were several other triggers, chief amongst which were the SGX’s query on 1 October 2013 (see [14] above) as well as its decision to designate BAL shares in the manner it did (see [17] above). There were also others to blame – namely, UOB, because it was the first to designate BAL shares, which applied downward pressure; the SIAS for its publication (see [15] above); and Goldman Sachs for making a substantial margin call on BAL shares. ³⁵⁹ At [888] and [1299]–[1306] below, I set out and address this aspect of the Defence’s case in greater detail.

139 In respect of the Deception Charges generally, the Defence advanced one principal argument – this being that the charges did not contain sufficient particulars and could, therefore, not be answered. The Defence’s charge-specific arguments were organised around two groups: the Foreign Accounts and the Local Accounts.

140 At the risk of stating the obvious, I should highlight that the accused persons’ alleged control of the Relevant Accounts, raised in connection with the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges, bore on the Deception Charges. After all, the fact of such control formed the foundations on which it could be asserted that the FIs had been deceived as to the accused persons’ involvement in the instructing of BAL orders and trades in the Relevant Accounts. Without establishing control or at least “involvement” more generally, it could not be said that the FIs had been deceived as to anything.

141 Using Charge 24 as an example, the Deception Charges read:

142 The thrust of the Defence’s submission that the Deception Charges did not contain sufficient particulars was as follows: ³⁶⁰ The Prosecution did not set out details in respect of how the accused persons were said to have “concealed” their “involvement” in the “instructing of orders and trades” in the Relevant Accounts. As noted at [49] above, the Prosecution’s case in respect of the issue of control comprised many permutations. ³⁶¹ For example, with respect to some Relevant Accounts, it was said that the accused persons gave direct instructions to the TRs without being formally authorised to do so. In respect of others, it was said that the accused persons relayed instructions through accountholders and, thus, had concealed their involvement in that way. Where Mr Gwee, Mr Tai, and Mr Gan were concerned, the accused persons were also alleged to have been “involved” through these individuals as delegates. Such specifics, however, as may be seen from the charge reproduced above, were not set out in each Deception Charge.

143 I explain and address this argument in greater detail at [948]–[957].

144 In respect of the Deception Charges pertaining to the Foreign Accounts, the Defence advanced two arguments of general applicability across all 49 charges which concerned Foreign Accounts (out of the 161 Deception Charges): ³⁶²

(a) First, that the instructions the accused persons supposedly gave would have been either: (i) conveyed to the foreign FIs’ trading desk through an authorised person (that was, the intermediaries holding LPOAs); or (ii) entered online by intermediaries. Thus, the Defence said, the foreign FIs could not have been “deceived” because the FIs did not and would not have looked further than the fact that the instructions had been given by an authorised intermediary. Moreover, there was no suggestion that the accused persons had falsely represented any state of affairs to the FIs. ³⁶³

(b) Second, that trades which had been carried out in the Foreign Accounts would have been performed as part of each account’s portfolio construction discussed between the foreign FI, the intermediary and the accountholder. Accordingly, the FIs could not have been deceived since they would have known from the outset the portfolio that was to be constructed by the intermediary, and the steps which would have been required to get to that portfolio. ³⁶⁴

145 Apart from these two arguments of general applicability, the Defence also raised more targeted and fact-specific points relating to the accounts which had been managed by Mr Tai (see [1082]–[1083] below), ³⁶⁵ Mr Phuah (see [1085]–[1086] below), ³⁶⁶ Mr William Chan (see [1087]–[1090] below), ³⁶⁷ and Ms Cheng (see [1093]–[1101] below). ³⁶⁸ I set out and address these arguments together with my analysis of each of the Deception Charges to which they pertain.

146 In respect of the Deception Charges concerning Local Accounts (of which there were 112), ³⁶⁹ the Defence advanced a variety of fact-specific arguments. For example, as regards an account of Advance Assets ³⁷⁰ held with DBS Vickers ³⁷¹ under the management of the TR Mr Yong, ³⁷² it was submitted that the Prosecution had failed to adduce sufficient evidence because neither Mr Yong nor the person in control of Advance Assets, Mr Sugiarto, gave evidence. ³⁷³ The Prosecution had planned to call Mr Sugiarto as a witness. However, he was eventually unable to give evidence for medical reasons, having been diagnosed with cancer at Stage IV. ³⁷⁴ As regards Mr Yong, he was unable to give evidence physically in court and the Defence exercised its objection to him testifying by way of video-link. Given the specificity of the Defence’s arguments in respect of the Deception Charges, they are set out and dealt with together with my substantive analysis from [988] below.

147 More generally, the Defence also argued that many (though not all) of the Deception Charges pertaining to Local Accounts had not been made out because the FIs had not been “deceived”. More specifically, these were the charges concerning local FIs whose TRs had been aware of the accused persons’ “involvement” in the instructing of orders and trades in the Relevant Accounts. One example is Mr Jack Ng, mentioned at [40] and [44] above. As there existed agent-principal relationships between the TRs and the FIs, the Defence contended that the knowledge of those TRs ought to be attributed to their principal FIs. If knowledge were to be attributed, the FIs could be said to have known of the accused persons’ involvement. As such, they could not have been “deceived”. ³⁷⁵ I set out and address this submission in greater detail at [990]–[1003] below.

148 The operative allegation in the Cheating Charges was that the accused persons dishonestly concealed that they had been “engaging in a course of conduct, a purpose of which was to create a false appearance in the market for BAL [shares]”. As such, the Defence’s basic position in respect of these charges was that, if they were acquitted of the False Trading Charges, the Cheating Charges automatically failed as well. ³⁷⁶

149 In the alternative, the Defence had three broad submissions:

(a) First, the accused persons could not be said to have exercised a deception on either Goldman Sachs or IB. A deception “would have [had] to be by way of words or acts that conveyed a falsehood, or omissions that failed to convey a truth”. ³⁷⁷ It was not the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons had made positive false representations and, thus, only omissions were in issue. ³⁷⁸ However, to establish that there was an impugnable omission, it was insufficient for the Prosecution to assert that the accused persons had failed to “tell” Goldman Sachs or IB that they had been manipulating the markets for BAL shares. This was because, for an omission to amount to deception, “there must [have] either [been] a duty to act in a particular manner or to state a particular fact, or there must [have been] circumstances where silence [was] in itself a statement. None of that [was] the case here”. ³⁷⁹

(b) Second, the Prosecution did not adduce enough evidence to establish that the accused persons had specifically entered into six distinct conspiracies to cheat Goldman Sachs and IB at the time the Relevant Accounts had been opened and collateral accepted by the FIs. ³⁸⁰ Instead, they only relied on general evidence which could not prove that there had been such conspiracies. Simply put, the Defence argued that the Prosecution’s evidence did not prove that the accused persons had “hatched a plan to cheat [Goldman Sachs] and IB”. ³⁸¹

(c) Third, the FIs were not induced to deliver any financing as they had made their own assessment and carried out their due diligence in deciding to accept BAL shares as collateral. For example, Mr Wang ³⁸² gave evidence for Goldman Sachs that, before a share was accepted as collateral, it had to be assessed by Goldman Sachs’ “PRISM” system, which “measures various collateral eligibility criteria … including liquidity, volatility, portfolio concentration, minimum price levels and minimum market capitalisation levels”. ³⁸³ As against such sophisticated systems of assessment, neither positive misrepresentations nor omissions, would have had any effect on the FIs’ decision to extend financing. The FIs would have “extended financing on their own accord, based on their own expert assessment” of the potential shares to be put up as collateral. ³⁸⁴

150 I address the Defence’s first submission at [1117]–[1124] below with my explanation of the elements which the Prosecution needed to prove in order to establish the Cheating Charges. The second and third arguments are set out in greater detail and addressed together with my substantive analysis of the individual charges from [1125]–[1156] below.

151 As regards the Company Management Charges, the First Accused’s position varied for Blumont, Asiasons and LionGold. In respect of Blumont, his evidence was that he only acted as an informal advisor to the company’s Executive Chairman, Mr Neo. ³⁸⁵ In respect of Asiasons, he denied having any involvement in its management. ³⁸⁶

152 Where LionGold was concerned, the First Accused’s position was somewhat more nuanced. The First Accused denied that he had been involved in the “running and operations” of the company. ³⁸⁷ However, he gave evidence that he held the appointment of “Advisor” to the Chairman of the company, Tan Sri Nik. ³⁸⁸ In this capacity, he had been “involved in deals and acquisitions”, “negotiations with external parties as well as internal discussions”, and he had been, essentially, “asked to be the salesman for LionGold”. ³⁸⁹ This, the First Accused argued, was not conduct which fell afoul of s 148(1) of the Companies Act. Specifically, it was submitted that the prohibition contemplated cases in which creditors and stakeholders do not have visibility into the operations of the company such that a discharged bankrupt’s involvement puts them at risk. Such concerns did not apply to public-listed companies such as LionGold, where there were strict accounting, auditing, and compliance requirements in place. ³⁹⁰

153 At [1158]–[1165] below, I set out the threshold to be met in order for an offence under s 148(1) to be made out. Thereafter, at [1166]–[1179], [1180]–[1186], and [1187]–[1195], I set out and address the specific evidence and submissions raised by the parties in connection with the charges which related to Blumont, Asiasons and LionGold respectively.

154 In the Witness Tampering Charges, Mr Gan, Mr Tai, Mr Chen, and Mr Wong XY were the witnesses involved. In respect of all four, the Defence took out applications to impeach their credibility. Connectedly, it was the First Accused’s submission that the allegations of witness tampering they each made against him should not be believed. ³⁹¹ From [1197]–[1288] below, I will state and address the evidence and arguments relevant to these charges.

155 Before leaving my summary of the Defence’s case, it is essential to note that in mounting their defence, the accused persons made several allegations of misconduct and case mismanagement against the Prosecution as well as the investigating authorities. To be fair, I should state that the extent to which these allegations were made differed between the two accused persons. However, as they did not bear on my decision on criminal liability, it is sufficient just to note at this point that there were such allegations. I will set out and address them from [1460]–[1488] below.

156 Before I set out my analysis proper, I begin with a preface. Cases involving allegations of conspiracy are exercises in reconstruction. Indeed, oftentimes, multiple scenes need to be reconstructed. In approaching an exercise like this, one certainly needs to examine the evidence systematically. However, while people, documents, and real evidence do provide information, they often do not tell complete stories. The interests of individual actors, their knowledge (or lack thereof), as well as the degree of openness with which they approach disclosure, tends to result in fragmented accounts with some truths, some untruths, and some potential truths that are difficult to prove one way or the other. The more complex the case, the more one needs to approach the exercise with careful scrutiny as to who and what to believe. That said, in reconstructing events from their remnant pieces and fragmented witness accounts, one can also hardly go without drawing informed inferences about how those events transpired. Thus, the two perspectives must be balanced.

157 The False Trading Charges against the First Accused are set out below. I do not reproduce the corresponding False Trading Charges against the Second Accused as they are materially identical to those brought against the First Accused:

158 The two Price Manipulation Charges which concern the conspiracies to support the price of Blumont and Asiasons shares, read:

159 The other two Price Manipulation Charges, which were for manipulating the prices of Asiasons and LionGold shares, were as follows:

160 I pause to highlight that Charges 1, 4 and 8 fall within the version of s 197(1)(b) in force prior to the amendments brought about on 18 March 2013 by the Securities and Futures (Amendment) Act 2012 (No 34 of 2012) (the “SFA amendments”). The other seven charges relate to periods following the amendments. With the charges in mind, I turn to the applicable legal principles.

161 The relevant version of s 120A(1) of the Penal Code (ie, that was in force from 1 August 2012 to 3 October 2013) provides:

It should be noted that this provision has been repealed and re-enacted by s 36 of the Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (No 15 of 2019) (“CLRA 2019”).

162 Participation in a criminal conspiracy is, in and of itself, an offence. As such, given that all ten False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were criminal conspiracy charges, all the Prosecution needed to prove in respect of each, was the fact that the accused persons had agreed to commit the offence described in each charge: NMMY Momin v The State of Maharashtra (1971) Cri LJ 793 at 796, cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 619 at [75]–[76].

163 That said, it is also trite that there is almost never any direct evidence of parties entering into and setting out the objects of their conspiracy. This case was no exception. Accordingly, although the inquiry was technically whether an agreement existed, in answering this question, I invariably needed to examine the conduct of the accused persons to determine whether an agreement could be inferred. Such an inference “would [have] be[en] justified only if it [was] inexorable and irresistible, and account[ed] for all the facts of the case”: Er Joo Nguang and another v Public Prosecutor [2000] 1 SLR(R) 756 (“Er Joo Nguang”) at [35], repeated in Hwa Lai Heng Ricky v Public Prosecutor [2005] SGHC 195 at [33].

164 I turn then to the principles underlying an offence under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. These principles were necessary to determine whether any agreement that had been entered into by the accused persons was to do acts which would have substantively amounted to an offence under s 197(1)(b). In this regard, there were two broad questions to be determined. First, what the elements of a s 197(1)(b) offence were, both before and after the SFA Amendments. Second, what it meant to create a false appearance as to the “market” and, separately, “price”.

165 I begin with the elements for the offence of false trading under s 197(1) prior to the SFA Amendments. This version of the provision read:

166 A plain reading of this provision suggested there were three potential means by which an accused person could commit an offence. First, by actually creating a false or misleading appearance in respect of either the trading activity of, the market for, or the price of the security in question (the “first limb”). Second, by doing anything intended to create such an appearance (the “second limb”). Finally, by doing anything likely to create such an appearance (the “third limb”).

167 In respect of Charges 1, 4, and 8 (see [157] above), the Prosecution opted to rely on the second limb. It thus needed to prove that an accused person did certain “acts” with the intention of creating a false appearance with respect to the market for BAL shares. There was no need to prove that the acts were likely to create such an appearance, much less that they did in fact create such a false appearance. This view was supported by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tan Chong Koay and another v Monetary Authority of Singapore [2011] 4 SLR 348 (“Tan Chong Koay (CA)”) at [43]–[53], in particular [44].

168 However, a consequence of the Prosecution’s choice to pursue criminal conspiracy charges on the second limb of s 197(1)(b) of the pre-amendment SFA – which requires proof of intent – was that the accused persons’ guilt in respect of these three False Trading Charges, essentially turned on two levels of inference. The first was a basic inference from the accused persons’ conduct that they agreed to do certain acts. Determining the existence of specific intent was, plainly, also an inferential question: see, eg, the observation in Tan Joo Cheng v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR(R) 219 at [12]. Thus, the second inference which needed to be drawn, on top of the first, was that in agreeing to do those acts, the accused persons’ intention was to create a false appearance as to the market for BAL shares. I was mindful of these two specific inferences which needed to be drawn, and I bore them in mind when arriving at my decision on each of the Conspiracy Charges.

169 To summarise, to establish Charges 1, 4, and 8, there must have been sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused persons had entered into an agreement to do “acts” and, that, in agreeing to do those acts, the accused persons’ intention was to create a false appearance as to the market for BAL shares.

170 However, the level of “intent” that the Prosecution needed to prove in order to establish liability was not wholly clear. In Monetary Authority of Singapore v Tan Chong Koay and another [2011] 1 SLR 348, Lai Siu Chiu J suggested that, in order for liability to attach under the provision’s second limb, it needed to be shown that “the sole or dominant intention of the party charged … was to set or maintain a certain price of a security” [emphasis added] (at [67]). She derived this proposition from North and others v Marra Developments Limited (1981) 148 CLR 42 (“North”) at 59, a decision of the High Court of Australia, as well as Fame Decorators Agencies Pty Ltd v Jeffries Industries Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 58 (“Fame Decorators”) at 62–63, a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. North and Fame Decorators pertained to the now-defunct s 998(1) of the Corporations Law (Cth), with which s 197(1) of our SFA was in pari materia (at least before the SFA Amendments were brought about). The Court of Appeal in Tan Chong Koay (CA) did not disturb Lai J’s statement, but it also did not specifically comment on this.

171 Given that the Court of Appeal did not address this point, I did not regard myself as being bound by Lai J’s statement. Respectfully, I disagreed with her suggestion. In my view, neither North nor Fame Decorators purported to lay down the general proposition that s 998(1) required proof that the wrongdoer had the sole or dominant intention to create a false appearance as to the market or price of the shares in question. Instead, the courts there appeared simply to be finding, as a matter of fact, that the cases before them involved acts carried out with such sole or dominant intent. In my view, s 197(1)(b) of the SFA simply required “intention” in the ordinary sense, understandable by reference to the usual authorities (see, eg, Daniel Vijay s/o Katherasan and others v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 1119 at [88] and Muhammad Khalis bin Ramlee v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 449 at [36]–[37]). There was nothing about the text of the provision which required that such intention be “sole” or “dominant”.

172 I turn then to the elements of the remaining three False Trading Charges which concerns the post-amendment version of s 197(1)(b) of the SFA:

173 As with the pre-amendment version of s 197(1)(b), there were also three means by which a person could commit an offence under this provision: (a) by doing anything; (b) causing any thing to be done; or (c) engaging in a course of conduct, a purpose of which was to create a false or misleading appearance. It will be noticed from this change that the amended provision imposed a mens rea element on all three limbs by requiring all forms of actus rei to be carried out with, at least, a purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance, even if that was not the accused person’s sole or dominant purpose. By contrast, an intention to create a false or misleading appearance was not required by the first and third limbs of the older provision. That is, if it was shown that the act done actually created, or was likely to create, such an appearance, this was sufficient to make out the offence (see Tan Chong Koay (CA) at [32]).

174 As such, similar to the pre-amendment charges, the Prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons agreed to undertake a “course of conduct” or “cause certain acts to be done”. However, unlike the pre-amendment charges, the Prosecution only needed to prove that one of their purposes for the agreement – inferable from the surrounding evidence – in pursuing that course of conduct or causing those acts to be done, was the creation of a false appearance as to the market for or price of BAL shares.

175 There were two further points which arose in respect of the principles applicable to the post-amendment version of s 197(1)(b). First, although the phrase “course of conduct” was added, it was not given any statutory definition. However, as there was nothing ambiguous about the phrase, it could be given its natural meaning; that was, the accused persons carried out a series of acts which could collectively be said to form a unified course with some centrality and continuity of purpose.

176 Second, the First Accused submitted that there was a distinction between “purpose” and “intent”. ³⁹² He argued that “intent” was wider than “purpose” because it did not require that the actor possess a “conscious desire” to achieve a particular end. By this argument, the First Accused seemed to be making two successive points. The first was that, when an individual acts with “purpose”, which was said to be narrower than “intent”, he necessarily acts with “intent”. I was prepared to accept this as it was supported by Tan Chong Koay (CA), where the Court of Appeal stated that, “if a defendant does an act with the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance … his actions must necessarily be intentional. A purpose is a desired goal or objective, and a person cannot effectuate a purpose without doing an intentional act to achieve it. To prove the absence of a specific ‘purpose’ must therefore be equivalent to proving the absence of a specific ‘intention’” (at [49]).

177 However, the second point which follows from the First Accused’s argument was that, where a person acts with “intent”, he does not necessarily act with “purpose”. The First Accused seemed to make this point to the end of increasing the threshold which needed to be met for the Prosecution to establish mens rea under the post-amendment s 197(1). Although I appreciated that the word “purpose” may, in common parlance, connote a stronger sense of “motive” (or “conscious desire” as the First Accused put it) than “intent”, this in my view, was an extremely technical argument. As stated at [168] above, a finding that someone has acted with “intent” was a matter of inference, and, so too was the finding that he acted with a particular “purpose”. Where such inferences were to be drawn from the state of affairs, ie, false appearances as to the market or price of shares, it was rather contrived to suggest that there was an analytical difference in assessing the existence of these two ostensibly different states of mind. Indeed, if it was found that a false appearance as to the market was created intentionally, it could scarcely be maintained that the creator(s) of such false appearance did not purposefully bring about such appearance. As such, the elements to be proven in respect of the False Trading Charges for periods after the SFA Amendments, as well as the Price Manipulation Charges (all of which concerned periods after the amendments) were simply those stated at [174] above.

178 It is useful to also address the meaning of a false appearance as to the “market” as well as “price”. The Prosecution submitted, relying on various authorities, that a false or misleading appearance as to the “market for” securities would arise “where there [was] any artificial distortion of the true forces of supply and demand in the financial market for that security”. ³⁹³ In assessing whether there was an artificial distortion, the Prosecution suggested that the court ought to look to whether an accused person, by his trading activity, was pursuing a legitimate commercial objective. Similarly, relying on Tan Chong Koay (CA), the Prosecution submitted that where “trades [were] conducted not for the primary purpose of genuine investment but for some extraneous purpose of setting or maintaining the market price, this [would] amount to a false or misleading appearance in the price”. ³⁹⁴

179 The Defence did not suggest a different interpretation of these aspects of s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. In my view, the Prosecution’s submissions accurately represented the law. However, as far as the present case was concerned, the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were conspiracy charges premised on s 197(1)(b). As discussed, these charges could be made out so long as the accused persons had agreed to perform acts or engage in a course of conduct with the intention (or purpose) of creating a false market or appearance as to price. This being so, whether a false market or a false appearance as to the price of BAL shares had actually been created by the accused persons, was slightly beside the point. As discussed at [177] above, if a false market or false appearances had in fact been created, then such fact would have supported the inference that the accused persons had possessed such an intention (or purpose). However, such intention (or purpose) could be inferred from more than this, which was, in and of itself, not an element of the present charges.

180 Before turning to the factual issues, I address the preliminary but fundamental objection raised by the Defence to the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. As set out from [126]–[128] above, the Defence submitted that these ten charges lacked particularity, ³⁹⁵ and, as a consequence, if the Prosecution was unable to establish the broad allegations made in the charges in their entirety, then the accused persons ought to be acquitted.

181 In greater detail, the Defence’s arguments were as follows.

(a) The First Accused submitted that “it [was] clear from the case law that the approach to be taken in determining if there [had been] market manipulation [was] a mathematical one, and require[d] that the Prosecution particularise the charges in detail”. ³⁹⁶ The Second Accused made similar submissions. ³⁹⁷ In respect of s 197(1)(b) offences which concerned price, the First Accused cited Public Prosecutor v Wong Leon Keat [2021] SGDC 53 (“Wong Leon Keat”); and for those which concern the market for shares, he cited Public Prosecutor v Ng See Kim Kelvin and another [2012] SGDC 141 (“Kelvin Ng”). The Second Accused did not rely on any particular authority but instead made the more general submission that, given the manner in which the Prosecution has framed its case, it needed to prove that the accused persons, amongst other things, “had knowledge of, and gave instructions for, each and every [trade] … [taking place] in … BAL shares in all 189 [Relevant Accounts]”. ³⁹⁸

(b) On the footing that the approach to establishing market manipulation was a “mathematical one”, the First Accused submitted that the court should adopt an “all or nothing approach” ³⁹⁹ in respect of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. That was, either the whole of the Prosecution’s case on the basis of all 189 Relevant Accounts was proven, or it was not. Accordingly, if the Prosecution only succeeded in proving that some of these 189 Relevant Accounts had been controlled, the accused persons could not be convicted of these charges because it was “impossible to determine whether what [was] left ma[d]e out the charges, given that no specific activities have been particularised”. ⁴⁰⁰ It bears stating that the First Accused focused on the general control of all 189 Relevant Accounts, and he did not go so far as to say that the Prosecution needed to prove each and every BAL trade executed in the 189 Relevant Accounts. This was the Second Accused’s submission. ⁴⁰¹

182 I did not accept these arguments. The Prosecution proceeded on charges for criminal conspiracy and, as stated, such charges could be made out so long as the accused persons agreed to perform acts or engage in courses of conduct with the intention (or purpose) of creating false markets or false appearances as to the prices of BAL shares. Although showing that the accused persons had used specific accounts in specific ways to place specific trades would naturally have bolstered the Prosecution’s case, that was their evidential case, not the strict legal case they needed to make out on the charges brought. After all, such a degree of specificity simply was not required to establish a conspiracy to commit an offence under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA.

183 The foregoing discussion covers the points of law needed to address the accused persons’ liability for the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges – bearing in mind that these were charges for criminal conspiracy. It was not, however, enough to deal with the potential extent of their liability in the event that they were convicted.

184 Notwithstanding that the Prosecution ultimately preferred criminal conspiracy charges against the accused persons, it was, nevertheless, their case that the accused persons had successfully carried out the conspiracies which underpinned the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges. This was a position they took both before and after the amendment of the charges from charges for abetment by conspiracy to charges for criminal conspiracy (see [21] above). Indeed, when they applied to amend the charges, I specifically asked the Prosecution to consider making express reference to the punishment provision, s 109 of the Penal Code, to make clear that it was their case that the s 197(1)(b) offences had been committed (on this, also see [1319]–[1339] below). As can be seen from [157]–[159] above, references to s 109 were included. Having included this reference in each of these charges, it was clear that the Prosecution not only intended to prove that the accused persons had conspired, but that they had managed to carry out their conspiracies.

185 In this connection, the question which then arose was whether the Defence’s submissions that there were “insufficient particulars” undermined the method by which the Prosecution sought to prove that the conspiracies had, in fact, been carried out (as opposed to the conspiracies merely having been entered into). In my view, the answer was still “no”. As discussed from [164]–[177] above, a substantive offence under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA, whether before or after the SFA Amendments, could be committed merely by doing acts or undertaking a course of conduct with the requisite intention (or purpose) to create a false market or appearance as to price. A false appearance did not actually need to have been created. Accordingly, though cases such as Wong Leon Keat, Kelvin Ng, and indeed, even Tan Chong Koay (CA), had approached this offence by examining narrow sets of specific trades, this was not strictly necessary to determine liability. Such examination of specific trades was only relevant in so far as it shed light on what the accused persons intended to do by those trades.

186 This was clear from Tan Chong Koay (CA). The appellants in that case were Dr Tan Chong Koay (“Dr Tan”) and Pheim Asset Management Sdn Bhd (“Pheim Malaysia”). Dr Tan was the founder, CEO, and chairman of the investment committees of two companies, Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Asset Management (Asia) Pte Ltd (“Pheim Singapore”). He was also their largest shareholder. Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Singapore were licensed fund managers in Malaysia and Singapore, respectively. At all material times, Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Singapore had accounts holding shares of a company called United Envirotech Ltd (“UET”). In total, at the close of trading on 27 December 2004, the Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Singapore accounts held 16,604,000 UET shares. This date was significant because the trades in contravention of s 197(1)(b) of the SFA took place on 29, 30 and 31 December 2004. On these three days, near the close of each trading day, Dr Tan instructed the purchase of UET shares for Pheim Malaysia. In total, 360,000 UET shares were purchased. As a result, UET’s share price rose by about 17%, closing at S$0.38 on 27 December 2004 before Dr Tan’s purchases, and at S$0.445 on 31 December 2004. Given their holding of 16,604,000 UET shares, Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Singapore enjoyed a net asset value (“NAV”) increase of S$1,086,989. With this boost, the two companies outperformed their year-end benchmarks, and earned an additional S$50,000 in fees. This mode of false trading is generally known as “painting the tape” or “marking the close”. ⁴⁰²

187 The Court of Appeal found from the pattern of trading, that Dr Tan’s primary purpose was to increase the NAV of certain funds managed by Pheim Malaysia and Pheim Singapore which held UET shares. It therefore found both Dr Tan and Pheim Malaysia to have been in breach, specifically, of the second limb of s 197(1)(b) and maintained the fine of S$250,000 imposed by Lai J in the High Court. The court expressly declined to consider whether the acts of Dr Tan and Pheim Malaysia created or were likely to create a false appearance under the first and third limbs of s 197(1)(b) as it was not necessary for those questions to be answered (see Tan Chong Koay (CA) at [28]–[31]).

188 From this, it can be seen that the offence under s 197(1)(b) – whether prior to or following the SFA Amendments – could be made out with or without proof of the likely or actual impact on the market. Thus, to bring the accused persons’ cases within s 109 of the Penal Code, it was, again, sufficient for the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons not only agreed to commit an offence under s 197(1)(b), but in fact undertook a course of conduct with the requisite intention (or purpose). This may benefit from proving that the accused persons controlled all 189 Relevant Accounts and were responsible for each and every BAL trade executed in those accounts. However, the existence of a particular intention (or purpose) was a matter to be inferred (as stated at [168] and [177] above). Thus, it was a question of how much and how far the Prosecution wished to go to prove its case (and I shall turn to the evidence shortly). Certainly, the requisite intention (or purpose) could be inferred from less than proof of involvement in each and every BAL trade.

189 Before I leave this point, however, I must state that the Defence’s submissions on the need to pinpoint each and every trade in the Relevant Accounts and prove that the accused persons were behind those individual trades, were not entirely irrelevant. As just explained, they did not show that the Prosecution’s case could not be made out under s 109 of the Penal Code. However, they did raise another point which also related to the extent of the accused persons’ liability. This point arose because, the bare finding that the accused persons had successfully carried out the substantive offences under the second limb of s 197(1)(b) did not paint the full picture as regards the accused persons’ responsibility for the Scheme in its entirety. This is why, at [1307] below, I will return to the volume of trades actually attributable to the accused persons.

190 I have dealt with the Defence’s submissions as to the lack of particularity at length because it is necessary to ensure that the three issues touched upon by those submissions are properly disentangled. The first issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the conspiracies which constituted those charges. The second issue was whether there was, additionally, sufficient evidence to establish not only the conspiracies which constituted those charges, but also the underlying substantive offences under s 197(1)(b) of the SFA. The third issue, which only arose if the Prosecution had proved not only the conspiracies but also the underlying substantive offences, was the extent to which the accused persons could be held responsible for the BAL trades carried out in the Relevant Accounts. Arguably, it was only in respect of the third issue that the highly granular analysis suggested by the Defence (see [181(a)]–[181(b)] above) was even potentially necessary (see [1307]–[1316] below). At this juncture, however, for the purpose of addressing the accused persons’ liability for the False Trading and Price Manipulation, there is no need to delve into such granularity. I accordingly turn to my reasons for convicting the accused persons of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges.

191 As would have been gathered from the manner in which the Prosecution’s case was set out from [25]–[106] above, the approach which the Prosecution took to establish the conspiracies forming the subject matter of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges, was to prove the individual components of what they said constituted the accused persons’ overarching Scheme. Collectively, these components sought to support the general inference that the accused persons not only had such a Scheme, but that they had also successfully implemented it to highly damaging ends.

192 This approach was sound. As I have stated repeatedly from [161]–[190] above, the key elements of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges were largely matters of inference. Inferential questions, particularly in inordinately complex cases like this, are best answered by systematically building up the factual premises from which the ultimate inference is to be drawn. To this end, my grounds will address the following questions in sequence:

(a) First, whether the accused persons exercised control over the Relevant Accounts during the Relevant Period and, if so, to what extent they exercised such control. This was the foundational issue upon which all others were built.

(b) Second, on the basis that the accused persons had controlled the Relevant Accounts, whether they had coordinated and managed their use of these accounts, and, if so, how they did so.

(c) Third, with control and coordination established, whether the accused persons had used abusive and illegitimate trading practices in the Relevant Accounts to inflate the liquidity and price of BAL shares.

(d) Fourth, as regards the inflated liquidity of BAL shares, if the accused persons had used abusive and illegitimate trading practices to that end, to what extent the markets for BAL shares were artificially created by the accused persons’ actions.

(e) Fifth, as regards the inflated prices of BAL shares, if the accused persons had used abusive and illegitimate trading practices to that end, to what degree the prices of BAL shares were inflated as a consequence of the accused persons’ actions.

(f) Sixth, if, having put into effect a complex scheme to inflate the liquidity and prices of BAL shares, whether the accused persons had any broader objectives for the Scheme beyond the fact of such inflation, and, if so, what those objectives were.

(g) Finally, in the period after the Crash, whether the accused persons conducted themselves in a way which suggested that they in fact operated the Scheme.

193 I will set out my answers to each of these seven questions in turn, and, from [889]–[894] below, I will draw these individual answers together to explain my general conclusion that the accused persons had indeed conspired to manipulate the markets for and prices of BAL shares during the Relevant Period. This, however, does not specifically address each of the six False Trading and four Price Manipulation Charges brought against the accused persons. Thus, from [895]–[942] below, I will state my narrower conclusions in respect of each and every one of those ten charges.

194 The most foundational aspect of the Prosecution’s case in respect of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges was that the accused persons had controlled the Relevant Accounts to effect the Scheme.

195 To be clear, the general concept of control as far as the Prosecution’s substantive case on liability was concerned, was that the accused persons could and did use the Relevant Accounts in furtherance of their Scheme. The actual manner in which they had allegedly exercised control over and used these accounts to trade in BAL shares varied between accounts. The Prosecution advanced three main methods, which, on their case, had been deployed either individually or in combination in respect of each Relevant Account.

(a) First, in respect of Relevant Accounts held with local FIs (ie, the Local Accounts), it was broadly the Prosecution’s case that the accused persons had directly instructed the TRs (see [34]–[36] and [40]–[43] above).

(b) Second, in respect of certain Local Accounts, and all Relevant Accounts held with foreign FIs (ie, the Foreign Accounts), the Prosecution’s position was that the accused persons had either given instructions to a Relevant Accountholder or intermediary who would enter the instructed order online (those falling within this category were only Mr Leroy Lau’s personal account ⁴⁰³ and the Relevant Accounts held with IB and Saxo in respect of which Mr Tai had LPOAs); ⁴⁰⁴ or, the accused persons would relay instructions to TRs or the FI’s general trading desk through the Relevant Accountholders, intermediaries or other unauthorised persons. ⁴⁰⁵

(c) Lastly, the Prosecution also alleged that the accused persons had delegated the task of instructing or placing trades to three individuals, Mr Gwee, Mr Gan and Mr Tai (see [39] above). ⁴⁰⁶

196 The particulars of the Prosecution’s case in respect of how each Relevant Account had supposedly been controlled is set out in the “Index of Relevant Accounts and Charges” appended to these grounds. ⁴⁰⁷

197 Before turning to my analysis of the individual Relevant Accounts, I should highlight that there were disputes about three mobile phone numbers that the accused persons were said to have used to contact TRs, intermediaries, and other persons.

(a) The first was the 3611 number (see [83(c)] above). The Prosecution’s case was that the mobile phone bearing this number had been used by the First Accused. ⁴⁰⁸ The First Accused’s evidence in response was that he had not been the exclusive user of the mobile phone. He suggested that there were periods during which the number would have been used by others, chief amongst whom were Mr Chen and Ms Ung. ⁴⁰⁹

(b) The second was the 678 number mentioned at [58] above. This was also said by the Prosecution to have been used by the First Accused. ⁴¹⁰ The First Accused’s evidence in response was that, although he had used the mobile phone bearing this number during the Relevant Period, it was often left in the Lakeview Club in Kuala Lumpur and had been “widely used” by others who were there, such as Mr Neo ⁴¹¹ and Mr Lee CH. He did not take it with him when travelling out of Malaysia. This was a position he first took during investigations ⁴¹² and essentially maintained during the trial. ⁴¹³

(c) The third number was +60 197726861 (the “6861 number”). This was said to have been used by the Second Accused. ⁴¹⁴ I will state the First Accused’s explanation of how this number had been used by persons other than the Second Accused at [211] below.

198 In sum, my findings were:

(a) The 3611 number had been used by the First Accused. I did not conclude that he had necessarily been the exclusive user in the sense that no one else could have used the mobile phone. In my view, however, upon review of the evidence and the Prosecution’s extensive submissions on this issue, ⁴¹⁵ I found that the First Accused had been the primary user of the 3611 number. To be more analytically precise, the First Accused’s explanation that there had been other users of the mobile phone did not cast any reasonable doubt on the overwhelming evidence of multiple witnesses – namely, Mr Alex Chew, ⁴¹⁶ Mr Gan, ⁴¹⁷ Mr Kam, ⁴¹⁸ Mr Leroy Lau, ⁴¹⁹ Mr Jack Ng, ⁴²⁰ Mr Ong KC, ⁴²¹ and Ms Yu ⁴²² – that it was the First Accused who had used the 3611 number.

(b) The 678 number had been used by the First Accused. Similar to the 3611 number, many witnesses gave evidence that this number belonged to and had been used by the First Accused. These included Mr Richard Chan, ⁴²³ Mr William Chan, ⁴²⁴ Mr Chen, ⁴²⁵ Mr Gan, ⁴²⁶ Mr Hong, ⁴²⁷ Mr Leroy Lau, ⁴²⁸ Mr Lincoln Lee, ⁴²⁹ Mr Jack Ng, ⁴³⁰ Mr Nicholas Ng, ⁴³¹ Mr Ong KC, ⁴³² Mr Tai, ⁴³³ Mr Tjoa, ⁴³⁴ and Mr Wong XY. ⁴³⁵ In the face of such overwhelming testimony pointing towards the conclusion, there was no reasonable doubt that the 678 number had been used by the First Accused. Moreover, unlike the 3611 number, I did find that there was enough to conclude that he had been its exclusive user. Several pieces of objective evidence pointed towards that conclusion; for example, the communications records for the 678 number reflected that there were roaming calls made from the number when the First Accused was in Singapore. ⁴³⁶ This undermined the First Accused’s claim that he would leave the phone bearing this number in Malaysia when he travelled. However, the most persuasive evidence, in my view, was the fact that this number had been used to exchange highly personal messages between the First Accused and Ms Cheng during the course of their romantic relationship. ⁴³⁷ The First Accused offered the explanation that he had trusted his associates not to read those messages. ⁴³⁸ However, that missed the point. It was simply unbelievable that he would have left the phone bearing the 678 number with others in the first place when it had been used for such a purpose.

(c) The 6861 number had been used solely by the Second Accused. For my reasons on this, I refer to [211]–[216] below, where I discuss the issue alongside a substantive defence raised by the First Accused in connection with certain Relevant Accounts held by Mr Chen.

199 It is not feasible to discuss the accused persons’ alleged control over the Relevant Accounts individually. This will be far too cumbersome and repetitive. However, given the way the Prosecution and Defence’s cases developed during the trial, the accounts also cannot be conveniently grouped around any single criterion. Certain accounts are most logically grouped around the TR or intermediary associated with them, and others are best grouped around their Relevant Accountholder. Further, the Defence’s best grouping of the accounts differed from the Prosecution’s.

200 Accordingly, for clarity and to avoid as much repetition as possible, I adopt the following rules for grouping the 189 Relevant Accounts.

(a) First, the 61 Relevant Accounts which had been under the management of the members of the Manhattan House Group – that was, Mr Tai, Mr Gan, and Mr Tjoa – are dealt with separately from the remaining 128 Relevant Accounts. Given the extent to which the Defence’s case focused on these accounts as a group (see [129]–[130] above), it is appropriate for my analysis of the control of these 61 accounts to be set out independently from the others.

(b) Second, the remaining 128 Relevant Accounts are separated into two main groups: (i) 102 Local Accounts; and (ii) 26 Foreign Accounts. These two groups are then further subdivided into the accounts which formed the subject of Deception Charges and those which did not. This resulted in four groups: (i) Local Accounts which formed the subject of Deception Charges (“Group 1”); (ii) Local Accounts which did not form the subject of Deception Charges (“Group 2”); (iii) Foreign Accounts which formed the subject of Deception Charges (“Group 3”); and (iv) Foreign Accounts which did not form the subject of Deception Charges (“Group 4”).

(c) Third, within these five groups, further sorting rules are applied. Group 1 comprises 83 Relevant Accounts and is further sub-grouped based on the TRs who managed those accounts. Within Group 2 there are 19 Relevant Accounts which are not further sub-grouped. Group 3, which comprises 20 Relevant Accounts, are further sub-grouped by the intermediary appointed to manage the accounts. Group 4 comprises six accounts and is further sub-grouped by their Relevant Accountholder. Lastly, my analysis of the 61 Relevant Accounts managed by the Manhattan House Group is organised around Mr Tai, Mr Gan and Mr Tjoa, though I will also address Mr Gwee’s role in the group.

201 I will address Groups 1 to 4 followed by the Manhattan House Group.

202 I will state my findings in respect of the 83 Relevant Accounts within this group alphabetically, based on the surnames of the TRs under whose care these Local Accounts were held.

203 There were two Relevant Accounts held with UOB Kay Hian within Group 1 under the management Ms Ang, ⁴³⁹ and both were in the name of Mr Chen. ⁴⁴⁰ It was the Prosecution’s case that both accused persons had directly instructed Ms Ang on the BAL orders placed in these two accounts. ⁴⁴¹ In summary, I found that these two accounts had in fact been controlled by the accused persons. I explain.

204 Unfortunately, by the time the trial of this matter commenced in March 2019, Ms Ang had passed away. As such, the only direct evidence on which the Prosecution could rely, was that of Mr Chen. ⁴⁴² Mr Chen was one of the five witnesses in respect of whom the Defence had brought impeachment applications. (The others were Mr Tai, Mr Gan, Mr Tjoa and Mr Lincoln Lee.) But as I will explain momentarily, I found Mr Chen to be a credible and forthright witness.

205 By way of general background, Mr Chen was a Relevant Accountholder who had 14 Relevant Accounts in his name. These 14 accounts were held with eight FIs, both local and foreign. These were AmFraser, UOB Kay Hian, Lim & Tan, Phillip Securities, Maybank Kim Eng, DMG & Partners, Saxo and IB. ⁴⁴³ Their opening dates ranged from 25 May 2000 at the earliest, to 14 May 2013, in the thick of the Relevant Period, at the latest. The two accounts under Ms Ang’s care were opened early – on 25 May 2000 and 21 December 2001. ⁴⁴⁴

206 On Mr Chen’s evidence, these two, amongst other, Relevant Accounts, were opened for the benefit of the First Accused. Mr Chen testified that: ⁴⁴⁵

207 In respect of the First Accused’s control and use of these two accounts, Mr Chen gave evidence as follows: ⁴⁴⁶

208 Mr Chen’s evidence, as reproduced above, cut right to the heart of the issue. Although I did not have Ms Ang’s evidence, Mr Chen’s evidence was nevertheless corroborated by the TRs of other local FIs. The evidence of those other TRs, namely, Mr Jordan Chew (see [256] below), ⁴⁴⁷ Ms Chua (see [273] below), ⁴⁴⁸ Mr Kam (see [301] below), ⁴⁴⁹ Mr Ong KC (see [388] below), Mr Wong XY (see [444] below), and Mr Tjoa (see [716] below), strongly supported the conclusion that Mr Chen had not conducted any trading activity in any of the 14 Relevant Accounts, not just those under Ms Ang. In light of Mr Chen’s direct evidence that it was the First Accused who had been using his accounts, there was sufficient evidence to conclude the First Accused controlled them.

209 The First Accused’s defence in respect of these two accounts held with UOB Kay Hian was, essentially, that Mr Chen’s then long-time girlfriend and, at some point, fiancée, Ms Ung, was the party actually using the accounts. In his submissions, the First Accused asserted that Mr Chen had “admitted that [Ms] Ung was actively involved in at least his account with [Ms] Ang, as he had authorised her to trade in his account, but it was evident that her involvement extended to all of his accounts”. ⁴⁵⁰ This was not an accurate summary of the evidence Mr Chen gave at trial. The portions of Mr Chen’s cross-examination, to which the First Accused referred in support of the above assertion, read: ⁴⁵¹

210 It was readily apparent from this that, even if Mr Chen could be understood as impliedly accepting the terms of Mr Sreenivasan’s question – that Ms Ung was “actively involved” in connection with Mr Chen’s account(s) under Ms Ang – the substance of his answer was, nevertheless, that he did not know whether Ms Ung actually placed any orders therein. However, as a starting point, I did not think Mr Chen’s answer could even be understood as accepting Ms Ung’s active involvement specifically in relation to the account(s) under consideration.

211 To establish that Ms Ung was the party controlling these two accounts held in Mr Chen’s name, the First Accused also alleged that Ms Ung and Ms Ang had been using Mr Chen’s accounts “since 2000” to engage in a long-running “malfeasance”. ⁴⁵² This suggestion arose during cross-examination in the context of the First Accused being questioned about a salient phone number ostensibly used by the Second Accused, the 6861 number (mentioned at [197] above). ⁴⁵³ The First Accused testified that the mobile phone bearing this number had not been used exclusively by the Second Accused during the Relevant Period. He stated that it had instead been shared between Ms Ung, Ms Tracy Ooi, Ms Ang as well as the Second Accused, ⁴⁵⁴ each of whom often travelled between at least Singapore and Malaysia. The exact way in which the First Accused explained this arrangement is usefully set out in full: ⁴⁵⁵

212 For context, Ms Tracy Ooi ⁴⁵⁶ was a “bank officer” at UOB. ⁴⁵⁷ On the First Accused’s evidence, he came to know her through Mr Chen. ⁴⁵⁸ However, she passed away prior to the start of the trial of this matter, and, as such, though her title can be gleaned from certain UOB documents, ⁴⁵⁹ her precise role and connection with the accused persons were not entirely clear.

213 When the Prosecution questioned why such an arrangement was sensible, referring also to the fact that several TRs had given evidence that the Second Accused was the user of the 6861 number – namely, Mr Alex Chew (see [229] below), ⁴⁶⁰ Mr Leroy Lau (see [308] below), ⁴⁶¹ Mr Andy Lee (see [323] below), ⁴⁶² Mr Jack Ng (see [374] below), ⁴⁶³ Mr Ong KC (see [388] below), ⁴⁶⁴ Ms Poon (see [399] below), ⁴⁶⁵ Mr Wong XY (see [444] below), ⁴⁶⁶ and Mr Tai (see [688] below) ⁴⁶⁷ – the First Accused disagreed. He stated: ⁴⁶⁸

214 Respectfully, the First Accused’s response strained credulity, and, consequently, the Second Accused’s reliance on his evidence as a basis to introduce doubt in respect of her use of the 6861 number, ⁴⁶⁹ also did not have a footing on which it could stand.

215 Before explaining why I did not believe the First Accused, however, it bears reiterating that in light of the Second Accused’s election not to give evidence, she could offer no positive explanation either of her own, or in support of the First Accused’s testimony. All she could do was make submissions on the point. To that end, relying on Mr Tai’s testimony that he did not recall the Second Accused using the 6861 number to contact him in 2012, and that he only remembered her doing so in the second half of 2013, ⁴⁷⁰ the Second Accused submitted ⁴⁷¹ that there was reasonable doubt in respect of whether she had been the “only person” who had used the 6861 number. She also stated that the doubt was accentuated by Mr Tiong’s ⁴⁷² evidence that the user of the number was Ms Chong, and not her. ⁴⁷³ I did not accept this. It failed to account for the evidence of the numerous other TRs who testified that the Second Accused had contacted them using the 6861 number. As far as Mr Tai’s evidence was concerned, there was no dispute that the Second Accused had used more than one mobile line. In fact, Mr Tai’s evidence that the Second Accused had only started contacting him with the 6861 number in the latter half of 2013 was expressly prefaced by his statement that prior to that period, she had used the Singapore number 9650 6523. ⁴⁷⁴ This was consistent with the evidence given by other TRs – for example, Mr Alex Chew (see [232] below), Mr Lincoln Lee (see [338(a)] below) and Mr Jack Ng (see [375] below). In respect of Mr Tiong’s evidence, for reasons I will set out at [428]–[443] below, I found his credit to have been impeached and did not give weight to his claim that the user of the 6861 number had been Ms Chong. In any case, that position was wholly inconsistent with the First Accused’s own evidence that the 6861 number’s other users had been Ms Ung, Ms Tracy Ooi and Ms Ang.

216 I turn then to the First Accused’s position. As stated, I did not find it credible. On his evidence, not only would Ms Ung, Ms Tracy Ooi, Ms Ang and the Second Accused have had to share a mobile phone – an arrangement which, in and of itself seemed to defeat the very purpose a mobile phone served – I was urged to accept this conclusion on the rather thin basis that Ms Ung had been diagnosed with cancer and had therefore asked the Second Accused to assist her in relaying messages. ⁴⁷⁵ This basis was particularly thin given that the Second Accused, Ms Ung, Ms Tracy Ooi and Ms Ang did not even reside in the same country. Further, there was evidence which showed that the roaming records of the 6861 number aligned with the Second Accused’s travel records. ⁴⁷⁶ Also, I refer to my finding that the First Accused had tampered with Mr Gan’s evidence by directing him to inform the CAD that he could not be certain that the Second Accused had been the user of the 6861 number (see [1213]–[1225] below). In any event, apart from the difficulty I had understanding the logical premises of the First Accused’s explanation, the explanation still could not account for why Mr Chen gave direct, incriminating evidence against the accused persons as he did.

217 In this connection, the First Accused suggested that Mr Chen was attempting to “downplay” Ms Ung’s role because his (present) wife was insecure about his past relationship with Ms Ung. ⁴⁷⁷ I found this explanation to be rather farfetched, and it could not explain Mr Chen’s evidence that the First Accused had used all 14 Relevant Accounts he held with various FIs. If Mr Chen had indeed been concerned about calling his continued connection with Ms Ung to his wife’s attention, this did not explain why he stated unequivocally that the First Accused used the other 12 accounts. Nor did it account for the fact that the TRs in charge of those other accounts similarly testified to having received instructions from either the First Accused, the Second Accused or both. There was simply no reason proffered for why those other TRs might have acted uniformly against the accused persons in favour of Ms Ung.

218 This then brings me to the First Accused’s impeachment application. ⁴⁷⁸ To attack Mr Chen’s credibility, six areas of inconsistency between his evidence in court and his previous statements to the CAD were highlighted. ⁴⁷⁹ I will state my findings in respect of each, in turn.

219 The first inconsistency raised by the First Accused was Mr Chen’s failure to mention Ms Ung’s involvement in the opening of five Relevant Accounts between 2000 and 2002. ⁴⁸⁰

(a) More particularly, Mr Chen had, in two investigation statements dated 8 April 2014 ⁴⁸¹ and 19 August 2014, ⁴⁸² omitted to mention that it was Ms Ung who had conveyed the First Accused’s request for Mr Chen to open the five Relevant Accounts he had held with UOB Kay Hian, Maybank Kim Eng, and Lim & Tan that had been opened between 2000 to 2002. Mr Chen had also omitted to inform the investigators that it was Ms Ung who had made arrangements for Mr Chen to complete the account opening forms. He mentioned her involvement only in his testimony. That was, in his conditioned statement (see [206] above). The First Accused submitted that these were material omissions as Ms Ung was the one actually in control of these accounts, not him, and Mr Chen had deliberately downplayed Ms Ung’s role so that the CAD would focus on the First Accused’s involvement in the opening of these accounts.

(b) I did not accept that these were material omissions. In my view, Mr Chen’s consistent position was that the First Accused had requested the opening of those accounts and, more pertinently, that it was the First Accused who had controlled them. In particular, in the investigation statement dated 19 August 2014, Mr Chen stated that he opened the ten accounts pursuant to the First Accused’s requests, but acknowledged that there was the possibility that the First Accused could have asked someone to convey the requests to him. ⁴⁸³ What was not stated in Mr Chen’s investigative statements was the fact that Ms Ung had conveyed the First Accused’s instructions to open those accounts, and that she had played a role in arranging the opening of those accounts. This, however, in my view, was not a material inconsistency.

(c) Mr Chen’s explanation that he had forgotten Ms Ung was involved ⁴⁸⁴ was plausible. Given that the account openings took place, at that point, around 12 or 13 years prior to Mr Chen’s interviews, this could hardly be said to be a significant omission. Furthermore, even if I scrutinise the omission with ample suspicion, Mr Chen also made the clear and simple point that there was no reason to downplay Ms Ung’s involvement. ⁴⁸⁵ While, as mentioned at [217] above, the First Accused had suggested that Mr Chen was seeking to conceal his connection to Ms Ung from his wife, there was no suggestion that there was anything untoward about Mr Chen’s interactions with Ms Ung, much less that their interactions were of such a character that warranted Mr Chen deceiving the investigating authorities.

(d) Furthermore, while Mr Chen may have omitted to mention Ms Ung’s involvement in the opening of some of these accounts, including Mr Chen’s two accounts under Ms Ang, the fact of Ms Ung’s involvement in the opening of those accounts may or may not have revealed any involvement in the use of those accounts. If Mr Chen had indeed intended to downplay Ms Ung’s role, his omission was a relatively toothless way to accomplish that objective.

220 Related to the above, the second inconsistency concerned Mr Chen’s shift in position regarding when he broke up with Ms Ung, and the period in which she was involved in the opening of accounts. ⁴⁸⁶

(a) In his investigation statements dated 24 November 2014 and 7 April 2015, Mr Chen stated that they had broken up between 2008 and 2010, and that the trading accounts opened before 2010 were opened upon Ms Ung’s request, who was – on Mr Chen’s evidence – acting upon the First Accused’s request. ⁴⁸⁷ However, in his testimony, Mr Chen said that he had broken up with Ms Ung in 2004 or 2005, and that she was no longer involved in the opening of accounts thereafter. This would include two of the Relevant Accounts opened in 2010, ie, Mr Chen’s accounts with DMG & Partners and AmFraser Securities. ⁴⁸⁸

(b) While this inconsistency seemed to bolster the First Accused’s claim that Mr Chen was “downplaying” Ms Ung’s role, my view was that it was quite a peripheral matter. Mr Chen’s consistent position was that all requests for accounts to be opened stemmed from the First Accused, and not Ms Ung. Although, as discussed above, he omitted to mention her in his investigation statements dated 8 April 2014 and 19 August 2014, he was thereafter generally candid about Ms Ung’s involvement in the opening of accounts. In his investigation statement dated 7 April 2015, he stated, “[f]or all the securities trading accounts which were opened in 2010 and before, they were opened upon [Ms] Ung’s request and she claimed it was upon [the First Accused’s] request”. ⁴⁸⁹

(c) Having admitted to Ms Ung’s role in the opening process for at least some accounts, there was no reason for Mr Chen to then attempt to conceal that role in respect of two specific accounts opened in 2010 in his testimony. Indeed, of Mr Chen’s 14 accounts, five were opened between 2000 and 2002, two in 2010, two in 2012, and five in 2013. This being the case, assuming that Mr Chen was attempting to back-pedal when he changed his position that they broke up between 2008 and 2010 to sometime in 2004 or 2005, that did nothing to distance Ms Ung from the opening of the accounts between 2000 and 2002. It made little sense that Mr Chen lied to minimise her involvement in the opening of two accounts, but not the others. Put another way, this change in position had so little bearing on how Mr Chen’s evidence framed either the First Accused or Ms Ung’s role, that it was difficult to read into it a more fundamental issue with Mr Chen’s credibility. I therefore did not find that these aspects were material.

221 Third, the First Accused contended that Mr Chen was inconsistent in his evidence relating to whether it was he, ie, the First Accused, who financed the use of certain Relevant Accounts, or, whether it was the accountholders who had provided such financing. ⁴⁹⁰

(a) In his investigation statement dated 20 August 2014, Mr Chen claimed that there were financiers who funded the share trading in his accounts, conducted by the First Accused (as the First Accused did not have any money). The individuals named were Tun Daim, ⁴⁹¹ Mr Neo, Mr Billy Ooi, ⁴⁹² Tan Sri Mat Ngah, ⁴⁹³ Abdul Razak Jalil, and Tan Sri Lee Kim Yew, ⁴⁹⁴ associates of the First Accused from Malaysia with substantial wealth. ⁴⁹⁵ However, in his testimony, Mr Chen suggested that the financing was provided solely by the First Accused; he made no mention of any financiers: ⁴⁹⁶

(b) Mr Chen subsequently explained in court that the position he had taken in his 20 August 2014 statement was false, and that he had lied to the CAD. ⁴⁹⁷ I was satisfied with this explanation. In court, Mr Chen stated that the true position was that, although the First Accused did have financial backers, such funding had not been applied to his 14 Relevant Accounts. He had lied to downplay the First Accused’s role in the use of these accounts and to create doubt as to whether the First Accused had been their beneficial owner. As regards why Mr Chen did so, he explained that the First Accused had instructed him to take steps to distance the First Accused from the trading activity in his accounts. As an implied threat, the First Accused stated that he had a mole within the CAD who would notify him of the information given by interviewees. ⁴⁹⁸ This alleged threat itself formed the subject of a Witness Tampering Charge against the First Accused, and my decision in respect of that charge (see [1197] below) led me to the conclusion that Mr Chen’s shift from the evidence given in his 20 August 2014 statement, to his evidence in court, was not a shift which undermined his credibility.