1 The plaintiff (“the Wife”) and the defendant (“the Husband”) (collectively “the parties”) were married in 1992 in Singapore. ¹ They are both Singaporean citizens and are 56 years old this year. There are no children to the marriage. The matters that fall for determination in this case pertain to the division of matrimonial assets, the maintenance due to the Wife and costs.

2 The parties both worked during the early years of the marriage. The Wife worked at a fashion distributorship and the Husband worked as a professional. ² The Wife stopped working from 1998; according to the Wife, this was a joint decision because the parties wanted to start a family, but were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to do so. ³ The Husband eventually became an equity partner in his firm and continued working until his retirement at the age of 49. ⁴

3 In the first six years of their marriage, the parties lived in the home of the Husband’s mother. They moved to their first matrimonial home in 1998 and moved again to live in a condominium at Keppel (“the Keppel Property”) from 2004 onwards. ⁵

4 The parties separated on 15 December 2016. ⁶ The Wife filed for divorce on 12 January 2017 on the ground that the Husband behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. On 6 February 2017, the Husband filed a counterclaim on the same ground. Interim judgment was granted on 20 April 2018 on an uncontested basis on both the claim and counterclaim, ending a marriage of 26 years.

5 Section 112(1) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Women’s Charter”) empowers the court to order division of matrimonial assets, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the factors listed at s 112(2).

6 I apply the global assessment methodology as the parties made submissions on that basis. ⁷ As set out in NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743 at [31]–[33], the global assessment methodology comprises four distinct phases: identification and pooling of the matrimonial assets, assessment of the net value of the pool of assets, determination of a just and equitable division of the assets and apportionment on the basis of the proportions of division.

7 The starting position for the date of the identification of matrimonial assets is the date interim judgment is granted (“the IJ date”), ie, 20 April 2018: ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [31]. The starting point for the date of the valuation of the matrimonial assets is the date of the ancillary matters hearing (“the AM date”), ie, 4 April 2019, unless departure from the AM date is warranted by the facts: TND v TNC and another appeal [2017] SGCA 34 at [19].

8 At the hearing, the parties agreed that the matrimonial assets should be identified and valued as at the IJ date, save for the Husband’s reservations in relation to the moneys in the Wife’s POSB Bank Account number ending with 8162. ⁸ I adopt the IJ date as the operative date for identification and valuation generally. I consider the Husband’s submissions regarding the Wife’s bank account below at [30].

9 The parties have largely agreed on the valuation of the assets in the Joint Summary of Relevant Information filed on 28 March 2019 (“JS”). I first set out the agreed assets, followed by the assets disputed to be matrimonial assets and those with disputed values.

10 The matrimonial assets with agreed values are set out below:

11 The Wife noted in the JS that the following bank accounts in the Husband’s sole name were joint assets but did not dispute their values: ¹²

12 The Husband submitted that the SICC Membership in the Wife’s sole name was a matrimonial asset. ¹³ The Husband and the Wife valued this asset at $195,000.00 and $190,000.00 respectively.

13 The matrimonial assets with disputed values are:

14 I deal with the issues of identification and valuation of each asset in turn.

15 The valuations of these two bank accounts are not disputed. The Husband also did not dispute that these assets fall within the matrimonial pool. ¹⁶ However, although the accounts are in the Husband’s sole name, ¹⁷ the moneys in POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427 were taken from the parties’ joint POSB Bank Account number ending with 4356. ¹⁸

16 As for the moneys in DBS Bank Account number ending with 0560, the Husband explained that $200,007.15 was transferred from his POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427. ¹⁹ The Husband opened the DBS Bank Account number ending with 0560 as he needed cheque facilities, and its balance was $126,435.87 as at 31 January 2018. ²⁰ The balance as at 31 January 2018 differed from the agreed valuation of $83,672.94 to account for the Husband’s living and renovation expenses. ²¹ I include the balance of $83,672.94 in the DBS Bank Account number ending with 0560 in the pool as the Wife did not require the difference between the agreed valuation and the valuation as at 31 January 2018 to be returned to the pool. ²²

17 Regardless of the source of the moneys in these two accounts, the two accounts are in the name of the Husband. For the purposes of identification and valuation, it is appropriate to include the agreed balances of the two accounts in the pool as the Husband’s assets. How the source of the moneys affect the division of the matrimonial assets is a matter that will be dealt with separately. I will deal with the amount in the Husband’s POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427 to be included in the pool below at [28].

18 It was not disputed that the Wife’s parents gifted the SICC Membership to her prior to the marriage. ²³ The Husband submitted that it was a matrimonial asset, citing s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter: ²⁴

19 The Husband submitted that the SICC Membership was a matrimonial asset that was ordinarily used and enjoyed by the parties for social and recreational purposes, and which was substantially improved by him during the marriage. ²⁵ He deposed that the SICC Membership had initially been non-transferable and that the Wife converted it into one that was transferable around the time of the parties’ marriage. ²⁶ It was the “present transferable membership” that was “acquired during the marriage”. ²⁷

20 I do not agree that what the Husband called the “present transferable membership” is an asset acquired during the marriage. The asset in question is the SICC Membership; its transferability is only a quality of the asset. The qualifying words in s 112(10) operate such that s 112(10)(a) does not apply: see Chen Siew Hwee v Low Kee Guan (Wong Yong Yee, co-respondent) [2006] 4 SLR(R) 605 (“Chen Siew Hwee”) at [37] and [48]. As the SICC Membership was gifted to the Wife prior to the marriage, it is not a matrimonial asset simply by virtue of the parties’ use of it for social and recreational purposes. This finding coheres with the underlying rationale of s 112(10), which centres on “the recognition of the donor’s intention as well as the concomitant need to prevent unwarranted windfalls accruing to the other party to the marriage” [emphasis in original]: Chen Siew Hwee at [32].

21 The qualifying words in s 112(10) provide that the SICC Membership could have been converted into a matrimonial asset if it was “substantially improved during the marriage” by the non-donee spouse or by both parties: Chen Siew Hwee at [34] and [35]. The former requires a direct causal link between the non-donee spouse’s contributions and the substantial improvement of the asset: Chen Siew Hwee at [51]. The High Court in Chen Siew Hwee at [51] rationalised the Court of Appeal’s decision in Koh Kim Lan Angela v Choong Kian Haw and another appeal [1993] 3 SLR(R) 491 on this basis. At [24], the Court of Appeal found that a 20% shareholding in a business was a matrimonial asset even though the shares were given to the husband by his father prior to the marriage. The wife had assisted the husband in the business, and it was their joint efforts that substantially improved the value of the asset.

22 In comparison, the Husband did not establish on the evidence that he made substantial improvements to the SICC Membership, or that such improvements were made by both parties in a collaborative way (see Chen Siew Hwee at [35]). According to the Husband, it was the Wife who had paid for the conversion of the SICC Membership around the time of marriage. ²⁸ The SICC Membership expenses and subscriptions were around $171.20 a month. ²⁹ To illustrate his contributions to the SICC Membership, the Husband explained that after 2009, the monthly SICC Membership expenses were deducted from the Wife’s bank account from the $2m that he transferred into her account. ³⁰

23 In my view, even if the Husband did contribute to the SICC Membership’s monthly subscription fees, this cannot be said to have improved the SICC Membership’s underlying value. I therefore agree with the Wife ³¹ that the SICC Membership is not a matrimonial asset and exclude it from the pool.

24 The parties obtained formal valuation reports for the Keppel Property. The Husband’s and Wife’s valuers valued it at $3.8m ³² and $4m ³³ respectively.

25 The Husband submitted that his report was more accurate as it considered two factors that reduced the value of the property which were not addressed in the Wife’s report: (a) the property’s “private enclosed space”, ie, an outdoor area that reduced the property’s usable indoor space; and (b) the conversion of one bedroom into an entertainment area. ³⁴

26 I do not accept the Husband’s submission that these two factors were the sole basis for the difference in the parties’ valuations. Indeed, the Wife’s report referenced a “balcony” attached to the property and the presence of a “partition room” in addition to three bedrooms. ³⁵ Since the two valuation reports used similar bases of valuation, ³⁶ and there was no ascertainable reason why one valuation should be preferred over the other, I thus adopt the average of $3.9m as the valuation of the Keppel Property.

27 The valuations for the balance in this account differed by around $6. As the parties agreed to value this asset as the IJ date (20 April 2018), I adopt the valuation supported by the bank statement dated 30 April 2018, ie, $496.98. ³⁷

28 The Wife deposed that the Husband transferred $7,236,359.10 from the joint POSB Bank Account number ending with 4356 to his POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427 on 13 December 2016. ³⁸ However, the relevant bank documents actually show that the sum transferred was $7,236,000.00. ³⁹ Regardless of the amount transferred, it is not in dispute that the transferred sum continues to form part of the matrimonial pool.

29 I note that the agreed balance in the Husband’s POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427 is $7,043,119.73, and that transfers were made from this account to the Husband’s DBS Bank Account number ending with 0560 (see above at [16]). The Husband has not provided evidence of his expenditures. However, save for pointing this out, ⁴⁰ the Wife did not allege that the Husband had wrongfully dissipated any part of the transferred sum. I will therefore not address the difference between the amount transferred in December 2017 and the agreed balance further. I include the balance of $7,043,119.73 in POSB Bank Account number ending with 1427 in the pool.

30 The difference between the valuations of this bank account was $159,828.76, which arises from the different dates of valuation that the parties used.

31 The Husband proposed identifying the balance in this account as at 30 April 2017, being the known value closest to when the Wife left the matrimonial home on 15 December 2016. He submitted that this accounted for the sums she wrongfully dissipated prior to the IJ date, which should be notionally returned to the matrimonial pool. ⁴¹ The Wife valued the balance in this account as at June 2018. She also argued at the hearing that the sum of $159,828.76 had not been wrongfully dissipated, but covered her expenditures after the Husband stopped her credit facilities after 15 December 2016. ⁴²

32 At the outset, in so far as the Husband alleges that the wrongfully dissipated sums should be notionally returned to the pool, this is a matter of identification that is conceptually distinct from valuation. If any wrongful dissipation occurred, this should be addressed by notionally adding the dissipated sum to the matrimonial pool, and not necessarily by adopting a valuation date that differs from the IJ or AM dates. Indeed, the courts have been chary of adopting a valuation date other than the IJ and AM dates, as the adoption of a date that is not tied to any legally significant event in the divorce proceedings would be akin to adopting “an unguided discretion”: see BPC v BPB and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 608 (“BPC”) at [55].

33 Accordingly, I take the IJ date as the date of valuation for the Wife’s POSB Bank Account number ending with 8162. This is because it would have been reasonable for the parties to expect that they would be free to spend from their bank accounts from the IJ date, this being the date their separation became formalised (see TBZ v TCA [2017] SGHCF 18 at [28]). The use of the IJ date in valuing this bank account is also consistent with the use of the IJ date for the valuation of the other bank accounts (see above at [8]). I therefore accept the Wife’s valuation of $1,607,080.73 (as at 5 June 2018), ⁴³ being the valuation closest to the IJ date.

34 Next, I consider whether the Wife made wrongful dissipations from January 2017 to the IJ date. The Court of Appeal set out the following guidelines in TNL v TNK and another appeal and another matter [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [24]:

35 I also considered the High Court’s statements in AJR v AJS [2010] 4 SLR 617 at [6] as regards dissipation (albeit in the context of a proposed eight-step methodology for the division of matrimonial assets):

36 According to the Husband, the Wife spent $972.34 in December 2016. ⁴⁴ However, she spent $230,012.51 from January 2017 to June 2018 from her bank account and on the Husband’s credit card, and her average monthly expenses based on that sum were $12,778.47. ⁴⁵ These expenses comprised: ⁴⁶

(a) monthly rental payments of $4,000.00 to the Wife’s mother, whose house the Wife was living in at the time; ⁴⁷

(b) aesthetic treatments, including hair, face, laser pigment therapy and manicure pedicures amounting to approximately $5,283.25; ⁴⁸

(c) restaurant meals for groups of her friends; ⁴⁹

(d) flowers for the Lunar New Year; ⁵⁰

(e) employment of a domestic helper; ⁵¹

(f) medical tests, including gastroenterology tests, medical treatments and visits to a psychiatrist and psychologist; ⁵²

(g) grocery expenses; ⁵³ and

(h) exercise classes and gym memberships. ⁵⁴

The Husband deposed that the Wife’s reasonable monthly expenses amount to $1,525.40. ⁵⁵ However, from January 2017 to June 2018, her monthly withdrawals ranged from $273.50 to $53,588.22. ⁵⁶

37 I do not agree with the Husband that it was excessive for the Wife to have restaurant meals, hire domestic help and seek medical treatment. He did not adequately show that these were not run-of-the-mill expenses. The Husband himself raised examples to illustrate the parties’ comfortable standard of living prior to their separation: they went on extended overseas holidays; the Husband brought the Wife to a Michelin-starred restaurant for a dinner and to a restaurant on her birthday; they always had domestic help throughout the marriage; and he accompanied her and paid for her medical consultations with an endocrinologist, gynaecologist and neurologist when she was concerned about her forgetfulness. ⁵⁷ His submission that she should not have eaten at restaurants and sought medical treatment and surgery after their separation is therefore not reasonable.

38 The Wife explained that she made some big-ticket expenses during the relevant period; for instance, she underwent biopsy surgery in July 2018 to remove five lesions, which cost over $23,000. ⁵⁸ The Wife also provided a breakdown of her expenses from August 2017 to May 2018 in her answers to the interrogatories served on her. To illustrate, she accounted for the respective decreases of $33,987.39 and $53,588.82 in her bank account in November 2017 and January 2018 as follows: ⁵⁹

39 I make the following observations on the Wife’s spending.

40 First, there was little information provided about the nature of the Wife’s monthly expenditures during the marriage. This was expected because the parties were unlikely to have kept detailed accounts of their spending during the marriage. After January 2017, the Wife acknowledged that she made large cash withdrawals from time to time (eg, $10,000.00 in April 2018) ⁶⁰ to pay for her cash expenses and that this was consistent with her practice during the marriage. I accept that as the Wife earned no salary of her own, it was expected that she would have used the moneys in the POSB Bank Account number ending with 8162 for her day-to-day expenses both during the marriage and after the parties’ separation. Accordingly, some allowance should be given to account for her spending from this account from January 2017 to the IJ date. This is despite some lack of documentary evidence as to her spending. I am satisfied that the Wife did make substantial efforts to substantiate her expenditure in her answers to the interrogatories. It would be unrealistic to expect her to produce full and complete records accounting for her expenses incurred over 18 months. ⁶¹

41 Second, the Wife explained in her answers to the interrogatories that she incurred $1,223.01 in aesthetic treatments in November 2017 and April 2018. ⁶² She elaborated that aesthetic laser pigment therapy was required because her skin “reacted harshly to years of radiation exposure”, and that such treatment had not earlier been required because she had married the Husband when she was 29 years old. ⁶³ However, as she failed to substantiate that she routinely received aesthetic treatment during the marriage, I find that this type of spending was excessive especially in the light of the Husband’s claim that she disapproved of such procedures during the marriage. ⁶⁴

42 Third, the Wife explained that she made monthly rental payments of $4,000.00 to her mother for expenses in lieu of rental of a three-bedroom private condominium apartment akin to the matrimonial home which the Husband continued to live in. This putative rental sum covered her share of electricity, water and laundry expenses. ⁶⁵ In total, she paid her mother $72,000.00. ⁶⁶ I agree with the Husband that these payments called for explanation. A payment of $48,000.00, ostensibly to account for 12 months’ rent in 2017, was only made to the Wife’s mother in January 2018 after the Wife had lived rent-free at her parents’ home for a year. The other rental payments were also not made on a regular basis. There was no evidence showing the basis upon which this rental sum was arrived at, or showing that the Wife’s mother treated these payments as rental, eg, by showing income tax statements reflecting her rental income earned. ⁶⁷ While it would have been reasonable for the Wife to pay a sum to her parents to cover rent and her living expenses, the payments of $4,000.00 a month appear slightly excessive.

43 It is only to be expected that the Wife would incur daily living expenses after she left the Husband and started a new life. Moreover, the Husband’s submission that her reasonable expenses should be $1,525.40 per month is on the low side, and is premised on her receiving free accommodation from her own family. On balance, after taking into account the Husband’s allegations of the Wife’s wrongful dissipation, and her spending on reasonable day-to-day expenses and other expenses that she reasonably incurred, I add a sum of $40,000.00 to the matrimonial pool against the Wife for wrongful dissipation. This is very much a rough figure in the round, based on the available evidence. I should add that even if the entire amount of $230,012.51 which the Wife spent from the account and on the Husband’s credit cards between January 2017 and June 2018 (see above at [36]) is returned to the pool, it would only make a difference of less than 2% to the total value of the matrimonial assets that is arrived at below at [45].

44 In summary, for the disputed assets and assets with disputed values, I set out in the table below the valuations by the parties and the valuations which I have adopted:

45 The total value of the matrimonial assets is $14,497,158.19 as set out:

46 The Wife submitted that she should be awarded 40% of the matrimonial pool under the structured approach in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) for the division of the assets. ⁶⁸ As explained in TYU v TYV [2017] SGHCF 8 (“TYU”) at [31], the structured ANJ approach involves the following steps:

47 The Husband proposed distribution in the proportions of 85:15 between the Husband and Wife, under both the ANJ approach as well as the precedents-based approach in TNL. ⁶⁹ As regards the latter, he referred to the Court of Appeal’s statements in TNL at [44] and [46] that the structured ANJ approach does not apply to Single-Income Marriages. In such cases, the court reaches a just division by the use of trends and precedents and with reference to the factors in s 112(2) of the Women’s Charter: see UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921 (“UBM”) at [33] and [55].

48 I disagree with the Husband that the two approaches in ANJ and TNL can both be applied in a single case. The two approaches are mutually exclusive; whether the ANJ approach applies depends on whether the marriage is dual-income or single-income: BPC at [95].

49 The High Court in UBM considered a “Single-Income Marriage” to be one where “one party is primarily the breadwinner and the other is primarily the homemaker” [emphasis in original] (at [50]). A spouse may be the primary homemaker even if he or she worked for a part of the marriage. In Yow Mee Lan v Chen Kai Buan [2000] 2 SLR(R) 659 (“Yow Mee Lan”), which was classified as a long Single-Income Marriage in TNL at [51], the wife worked continuously during the 26-year marriage for third parties and the husband. The High Court in UBM at [52] emphasised that the court is to qualitatively assess the roles played by each spouse in the marriage relative to the other. Accordingly, it considered Yow Mee Lan to be a case where there was a clear demarcation of responsibility between the parties: the husband focused entirely on his business while the wife supported him by running the household.

50 While the Wife worked for six years after the marriage, the parties did not dispute that the Husband was the primary breadwinner for majority of the marriage of 26 years and that the matrimonial pool was largely accrued through his efforts. It was on this basis that the Wife submitted at the hearing that her direct financial contributions were between 3.07–6.13% of the matrimonial pool, depending on the court’s findings on the disputed matrimonial assets. ⁷⁰ In my view, this was a Single-Income Marriage, especially in light of the rationale for the TNL approach being that the application of the structured ANJ approach should be reconsidered where it severely disadvantages a non-working spouse vis-à-vis a working spouse (at [44]).

51 As this case involved a Single-Income Marriage, I do not apply the structured ANJ approach, and turn to consider the relevant precedents and the factors in s 112(2) of the Women’s Charter.

52 In cases involving long Single-Income Marriages, the courts tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets: TNL at [48]. In BOR v BOS and another appeal [2018] SGCA 78 (“BOR”), the Court of Appeal explained at [111] that TNL involved a marriage of some 35 years, and that the relevant precedents classified as “long Single-Income Marriages” in TNL involved marriages of between 26 to 30 years. In “moderately lengthy marriages” in the range of 15 to 18 years, the courts have awarded the homemaker wife about 35% to 40% of matrimonial assets in precedent cases: BOR at [113], citing ATT v ATS [2013] 2 SLR 859.

53 The Court of Appeal’s statements in BOR at [113] are largely borne out by the three precedents (decided pre-TNL) involving childless marriages which the Husband helpfully highlighted in his submissions. ⁷¹

54 In Chen Siew Hwee, the High Court awarded division of 65:35 between the husband and the wife. While there were no children to their 17-year marriage, the husband had a son from his first marriage. The wife’s non-financial contributions included looking after the husband’s needs and helping on various occasions to look after her in-laws. However, these non-financial contributions were not very substantive or systematic, despite some evidence that the wife occasionally cared for her step-son (at [66]). The 65:35 division was premised on the non-inclusion of shares gifted to the husband in the matrimonial pool, which were of “enormous value”. As the wife had done nothing to enhance the value of the shares, the High Court observed that if the shares were included in the matrimonial pool, granting her 35% of the value of the shares would neither be just nor equitable (at [67]).

55 In Woon Wee Lee v Koh Ai Hua [2012] SGHC 128, the marriage lasted some 35 years, the parties having married in 1975 and interim judgment being granted in 2011. While the parties were living in Leeds in the early years of the marriage, the wife earned income distributing flyers, sorting vegetables in a factory and waiting tables, and her income provided substantially for the parties’ expenses as the husband was still studying. When the husband was gainfully employed in Macau, the wife started a business teaching flower arrangements and making clothes (at [35]). The High Court awarded the wife 40% of the assets and held at [40] that she had “contributed significantly to the welfare of the family particularly in the early years of the marriage when parties had very little money”. She made significant contributions at the outset of the marriage when the parties were poor, and continued working and contributing (albeit to a lesser extent) even after the husband obtained his PhD and was gainfully employed (at [42]).

56 In TXW v TXX [2017] 4 SLR 799 (“TXW”), the High Court ordered division of 65:35 to the husband and the wife. The marriage lasted nearly 22 years and the matrimonial asset pool was valued at $14.4m. The husband was the sole breadwinner and the wife did not provide any direct contributions to the marriage. The wife submitted that she hosted parties for the husband’s clients and colleagues, supervised the domestic helpers in the running of the household, and drove the husband to work. The High Court held that the wife’s contributions in supporting the husband at home and in his career ought to be sufficiently recognised (at [36]), and arrived at the final division ratio after also taking into account the Husband’s inability to fully account for every sum relating to his expenditure (at [47]).

57 In the present case, I award distribution in the proportions of 62.5:37.5 between the Husband and the Wife. In so doing, I considered the following factors relevant and adopted a “broad brush” approach which does not require nor encourage the meticulous particularisation of each party’s respective contributions: UYP v UYQ [2019] SGHCF 16 (“UYP”) at [45].

(a) This was a long marriage that lasted 26 years until interim judgment was granted. The High Court in UYP held at [16] (citing Loh Swee Peng v Chan Kui Kok [2015] 3 SLR 1 at [33]) that the length of the marriage is a highly relevant and significant factor in the division of assets involving a long marriage.

(b) Both parties worked for the first six years of the marriage. However, although the Wife claimed to have supported the Husband during these years to the extent of depleting her bank accounts to pay for his personal expenses, I believed the Husband’s account that this was not completely accurate as he had worked in his profession for a few years by 1992, and was by then financially independent. ⁷²

(c) I believed the Wife that her decision to stop work in 1998 was influenced by the parties’ joint desire to have children. As the parties were unable to conceive a child naturally, she underwent various artificial conception procedures from 2000 to 2003 but was ultimately unsuccessful in conceiving a child. ⁷³ These were contributions she made to the marriage and the parties’ relationship, even if, as the Husband claims, she decided to stop trying for children around 2003 when she turned 40. ⁷⁴

(d) The parties disputed whether the Husband encouraged the Wife to return to work after 2003. ⁷⁵ I accept that the family’s financial burdens might have been reduced if the Wife had returned to work. But I also observe that the parties were in agreement that the Wife was a thrifty and budget-conscious person who was frugal during the marriage, preferring for instance to take public transport instead of renewing her certificate of entitlement to obtain a car. ⁷⁶ Given this fact, I do not consider that the Wife’s decision not to work placed the family’s finances at risk. The Husband enjoyed significant earning power that the Wife was unlikely to have matched even if she had returned to the workforce. This was especially so given that, as the Husband claimed, the Wife was not in a high paying job and his salary soon exceeded hers shortly after marriage. ⁷⁷

(e) The comfortable lifestyles that the parties enjoyed and the sizeable matrimonial pool were accrued as a result of the Husband’s efforts.

(f) The Wife’s homemaking efforts were not phenomenal or substantive especially when the parties lived in the Husband’s mother’s home from 1992 to 1998 where there was domestic help to take care of the house. ⁷⁸ After the parties moved out into their first matrimonial home in 1998, the Wife ran the household with domestic help. There were no children to the marriage and the Wife was not working at the time, although she claimed to cook for the Husband, which he disputed. ⁷⁹ Regardless, I accept that she would have taken on some managerial role to ensure the smooth running of the household (with all the accompanying logistical requirements), and this role is as essential and important as the direct performance of the chores itself: Pang Rosaline v Chan Kong Chin [2009] 4 SLR(R) 935 at [20].

(g) The Husband’s main recreational sport was playing golf, and his circle of friends gathered at SICC and bonded over golf. He was able to frequently engage in this hobby only because the Wife extended the spousal privileges under her SICC Membership to him. ⁸⁰

(h) The parties did not actively invest or manage the assets acquired during the marriage and blamed each other for this state of affairs. The Husband submitted that the Wife made no efforts to invest his funds or to rent out a residential property that was left vacant for 10 years before it was sold. ⁸¹ The Wife responded that she had advised her Husband to consult her sister (who was working in the finance industry) for investment advice, and that it was he who had refused to rent the property. ⁸² It is not necessary for me to attribute blame to either party, but I note that the parties collectively failed to capitalise on their matrimonial assets.

(i) Both parties alleged unreasonable behaviour by the other party in their affidavits. The Wife claimed that she was subjected to verbal and emotional abuse which necessitated psychiatric and psychological treatment after the marriage. ⁸³ The Husband deposed that the Wife became very involved in religious activities after 2003 and that such endeavours of hers required him to sacrifice his own needs and comfort. ⁸⁴ While I considered these allegations (which both parties denied) in the round, I echo the High Court’s caution in TXW at [35] that amplifying fault in substantive ancillary matters does not sit well with Parliament’s intention to adopt a “no fault” divorce regime to minimise acrimony and support the harmonious resolution of family disputes.

58 The total pool of matrimonial assets is valued at $14,497,158.19 (see above at [45]). Applying a division of 62.5:37.5 between the parties, the Husband is entitled to $9,060,723.87 (62.5%) and the Wife is entitled to $5,436,434.32 (37.5%).

59 The Wife’s assets are valued at $2,255,483.00, and comprise:

60 The amount that remains payable by the Husband is $3,180,951.32 (being $5,436,434.32 – $2,255,483.00). I leave it to the parties to decide how the necessary transfers are to be made within a six-month time frame. This is to take into consideration how the joint assets (the Keppel Property and the POSB Bank Account number ending with 4356) are to be dealt with. In this regard, I note that the Husband would like to keep the Keppel Property, and the Wife has no objections to him doing so. She also has no objections to him keeping the car. ⁸⁵

61 Maintenance ordered pursuant to s 114 of the Women’s Charter endeavours to place the parties in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down. The court’s power to order maintenance plays only a supplementary role to its power to order a division of matrimonial assets, and the court will take into account a wife’s share of the matrimonial assets upon division when assessing the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be ordered: ATE v ATD and another appeal [2016] SGCA 2 at [31]–[33].

62 The Wife submitted that she should receive a lump sum maintenance of $1.2m. ⁸⁶ This would account for her monthly expenses of $7,428.00, ⁸⁷ her standard of living during the marriage, and the fact that she has no earning capacity, no property to her name and no financial resources. ⁸⁸ The Husband responded that she should be awarded no maintenance as her share of the matrimonial assets will be more than sufficient to address her needs. He also disputed the reasonableness of some of her claimed monthly expenses. ⁸⁹

63 In TXW, the High Court did not award maintenance to the 52-year-old wife and observed at [48] that her 35% share of the matrimonial assets amounted to $5m, and that she would be able to purchase a home for herself and still have substantial assets remaining. If she managed the remaining assets well, this share of the assets should generate reasonable yields for her future maintenance. Furthermore, it was pertinent to consider under s 113 of the Women’s Charter that the husband was over 71 years old and had health issues.

64 The Court of Appeal similarly did not order maintenance for the wife in BOR as the wife was awarded assets worth over $9m, and would have income sufficient for her maintenance if she managed the assets properly (at [119]).

65 In my view, an order of no maintenance for the Wife is appropriate. I take into consideration that the Husband is retired and no longer drawing an income. Both parties are now essentially living off the earnings that the Husband made during the marriage. The Wife’s share of matrimonial assets is also substantial, being $5,423,684.32, and is mostly liquid in nature. If this sum is properly managed and invested, she should have sufficient income for her maintenance.

66 Costs are generally not ordered in matrimonial cases: TYU at [45]. I did not consider that the conduct of the parties required an order of costs to be made against a particular party to incentivise good litigation conduct: TYU at [45]; JBB v JBA [2015] 5 SLR 153 at [33].

67 I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs, including the option of each of them bearing their own costs. If there is no agreement, parties are to file and exchange submissions on the issue of costs (limited to ten pages) within 21 days from the date of this judgment.

68 For the reasons above, I make the following orders:

(a) Distribution of the matrimonial assets in the proportions of 62.5:37.5 between the Husband and the Wife, with the Husband to transfer $3,180,951.32 to the Wife within six months from the date of this judgment.

(b) No maintenance for the wife.

(c) Liberty to apply.